Distribution Agreement In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. Signature: _____________________________ May 16, 2012 Andreea Smaranda Aldea Approval Sheet Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry – Thinking with Edmund Husserl By Andreea Smaranda Aldea Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy __________________________________________________________ David Carr Advisor __________________________________________________________ Thomas Flynn Committee Member __________________________________________________________ John Lysaker Committee Member Accepted: _________________________________________________________ Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D., Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies _______________________________ Date Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry – Thinking with Edmund Husserl By Andreea Smaranda Aldea B.A., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2006 M.A., Emory University, 2010 Advisor: David Carr, Ph.D. An abstract of A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 2012 Abstract Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry – Thinking with Edmund Husserl By Andreea Smaranda Aldea This dissertation explores and argues for the import of the imagination (Phantasie) in Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. It contends that Husserl's extensive analyses of the imagination influenced how he came to conceive the phenomenological method throughout the main stages of his philosophical career. The work clarifies Husserl's complex method of investigation by considering the role of the imagination in his main methodological apparatuses: the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions, and eidetic variation – all of which remained ambiguous despite his extensive programmatic discussions. The work illuminates and clarifies aspects of the Husserlian phenomenological method never before explored. In order to clarify Husserl's eidetic method of inquiry, I propose a new way of thinking about the imagination – as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) and as horizonal-nexic level of consciousness exhibiting the neutrality, freedom, and possibility as its essential features. Following Husserl's studies of the imagination, I propose a threelevel model of consciousness (realizing, imagining, and eidetic) and explore the dynamic flexibility of each level (as horizon within which acts such as judgments or memories can unfold). This model of consciousness allows for a rethinking of the sources and conditions for the possibility of eidetic phenomenological inquiry – topics Husserl was mostly silent about. Through a rethinking of the model of consciousness, I propose a tight and substantial relationship between the natural (everyday) and artificial (methodological, theoretical) attitudes. I argue that the structure and systems of possibilities pertaining to the artificial attitude – i.e., our actual as well as possible methodological tools – are structurally and well as informationally bound to the structure and system of possibilities pertaining to the natural attitude. In order to explore the nature of the relationship between these two attitudes I argue that we must take a closer look at the structure and abilities of imagining consciousness – the sole nexic-horizonal level that can function both naturally and artificially. This insight regarding the nature of consciousness clarifies Husserl's transcendental idealism in its intimate connection to the everyday. Understanding Husserl's philosophical stance is thus purged of all possibility of mistakenly labeling it as entailing immanent detachment, solipsism, or Platonic idealism. Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry – Thinking with Edmund Husserl By Andreea Smaranda Aldea B.A., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2006 M.A., Emory University, 2010 Advisor: David Carr, Ph.D. A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 2012 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. David Carr, my advisor and mentor, under whose subtle guidance this project has taken shape and come to fulfillment. I hope to one day master the art of mentorship and follow in his footsteps. I would also like to thank Dr. Dieter Lohmar and Dr. Dirk Fonfara, from the Husserl Archives in Cologne, for helping me navigate the immense reservoir of Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. This project would not have been possible without the generous research support offered by Emory University and the Laney Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and without the dynamic and engaging scholarly discussions nurtured by Emory's Philosophy Department. Last by not least, I would like to thank my partner James Ives, who understands my love of learning and my academic commitment. He has been most patient and supportive throughout this lengthy process. TABLE OF CONTENTS: Abbreviations 1 Introduction: Imagining – A World Regained 2 PART I: PHANTASIE – ITS STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS 16 Chapter 1 – Perception and Phantasie – Inquiry and the Two Worlds of Thought 17 §1. Bildbewusstsein – The Paradox of Imaging Consciousness §1!. The structure of Bildbewusstsein as image consciousness §1". Images – the Conflict and Paradox of Bildbewusstsein §1#. Other types of indirect intuitive presentation – symbol, sign, analogy §1$. Non-presence and Bildbewusstsein as Reproduction and Presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) §2. The World of Perception – Reality, Knowledge and Being §2!. The structure of Perception (Wahrnehmung) §2". Realizing Consciousness and the Constitution of Reality §2#. The Grounding Belief of Perception – Conflict and the Quest for Knowledge and Being §3. The World of Phantasie – Irreality, Inquiry and the Otherwise §3!. Mental Images and Phantasie – from Bildbewusstsein to Wahrnehmung §3". The Structure of Phantasie as imagining consciousness §3#. Imagining Consciousness and the Constitution of Irreality §3$. The uniqueness of Phantasie – Conflict, Inquiry, and the Otherwise §4. Conflict and Skepsis – The Asking of a Question §4!. The Two Worlds of Thought §4". Skepsis – Seeking the Non-present Chapter 2 – Phantasiemodifikation and the Neutrality of Inquiring Thought 80 §1. Retentional and Memorial Modification as Positional §1!. Retentional Modification as Synthesis of Identification §1". Memorial Modification as Associative Synthesis of Recognition §1#. Positionality – Order and Knowledge Acquisition §2. Modality Modification as Positional §2!. Doxic and Ontic Modalization §2". Existence and Positional Inquiry §3. Phantasiemodifikation as Non-Positional §3!. Neutrality Modification as Phantasiemodifikation §3". Fundierung and Phantasiemodifikation §3#. Positionality and Non-positionality Compared §4. The Neutrality of Inquiring Thought §4!. Non-positional Inquiry – The Importance of 'Mere Thought' §4". Essence and An Other Kind of Positionality Chapter 3 – Phantasiemodifikation and the Freedom and Possibility of Inquiring Thought 129 §1. Phantasie and Possibility §1!. Real Possibility §1". Irreal Possibility §2. The Bound Freedom of Phantasie §3. Imaginative Variation as Phantasiemodifikation §3!. Imaginative Variation – Freedom and Possibility §3". Free Variation and Neutrality Modification §4. Idealization and the Irreal §4!. Eidetic Inquiry as Idealization and Free Imaginative Variation §4". Universalizing Thought Two Kinds of Eidetic Inquiry PART II: PHANTASIE AND HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY 160 Chapter 4 – Abstraction, Universals, and the Beginning of Phenomenology 164 §1. The Structure of Consciousness §1!. Brentano's Structure of Consciousness §1". Husserl's Structure of Consciousness and His Critique of Brentano §2. Fundierung and Modifikation Consciousness Rethought §3. The Philosophical Import of Intentionality §4. Abstraction and Ideal Objects §4!. Brentano's Abstraction and the Status of Intended Objects §4". Husserl's Abstraction and its Ideal Objects §5. Husserl's Descriptive Phenomenology – The Carving of a Philosophical Path Chapter 5 Phenomenological Reflection and the Natural Attitude 210 §1. The Transcendental Phenomenological Project as Artificial (künstlich) §1!. Consciousness and the Phenomenological Method: Structures and Systems of Possibilities §1". Transcendental Reflection and the Demands of Ideation §2. Phantasiemodifikation and The Roots of Theoretical Inquiring Consciousness §2!. Phantasiemodifikation as Natural Radical Modification. The Two Levels of the Natural Attitude: Perceptual and Imagining Consciousness §2". Theoretical Inquiring Thought: Surpassing the Limits of the Natural Attitude §3. The Shift from the Natural to the Artificial §3!. Phantasiemodifikation: A Multifaceted Affair §3". Whence Neutrality? Dispelling the Myth of Self-Standing Neutrality Modification §3#. The Ambiguity of Non-Positional Consciousness Chapter 6 Phenomenological Reflection Rethought 268 §1. Phantasiemodifikation and the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reductions §1!. Husserl's Reductions §1!1. The Epochê §1!2. The Phenomenological Reduction §1!3. The Eidetic Reduction §1". Rethinking the Reductions as Transcendental Non-Positional Modifications §1"1. The Epochê Rethought §1"2. The Phenomenological Reduction Rethought §1"3. The Eidetic Reduction Rethought §1#. Phenomenological Modification (Phen.Mk1): Manifested Natural-Artificial Bond §2. Eidetic Variation Rethought §2!. Husserl's Eidetic Variation §2!1. Phenomenological Reflection as Descriptive Analysis of Experience §2!2. Husserl's Eidetic Variation §2". Artificial Non-Positional Consciousness (Art.N-P) and Eidetic Variation §2"1. The Given and the Taken §2"2. Phantasie and the Shift from the Variant to the Invariant §2#. Higher-order Eidetic Variations and Post-Ideational Thought Conclusion: Inquiring Thought – (A) World Stretched Open 389 Bibliography 399 List of Figures: Map of Leveled Nexic-Horizonal Consciousness 258 1 List of Abbreviations: Psychologie Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt SNB Brentano, Vom Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewusstsein WE Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz Hua Husserl, E. (1950-). Husserliana Gesammelte Werke CM Husserl, Cartesian Meditations Idea Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology Ideas I Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology Ideas II Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book Ideas III Husserl, Phenomenology and the Fondations of the Sciences. Third Book Crisis Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology PP Husserl, Phenomenological Psychology BPP Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911 FTL Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic LU Husserl, Logical Investigations (2 vols) PICM Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925) EJ Husserl, Experience and Judgment EU Husserl/Landgrebe, Erfahrung & Urteil * For full citations see bibliography. 2 INTRODUCTION: IMAGINATION – (A) WORLD REGAINED So kann man denn wirklich, wenn man paradoxe Reden liebt, sagen und, wenn man den vieldeutigen Sinn wohl versteht, in strikter Wahrheit sagen, dass die 'Fiktion' das Lebenselement der Phänomenologie, wie aller eidetischen Wissenschaft, ausmacht, dass Fiktion die Quelle ist, aus der die Erkenntnis der 'ewigen Wahrheiten' ihre Nahrung zieht.1 If anyone loves a paradox, one can really say, and say with strict truth if one will allow for the ambiguity, that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology as of all eidetic sciences is 'fiction', that fiction is the source whence the knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance.2 Upon reading this paragraph one is left to wonder at the oddity and significance of Husserl's claim that fiction is the very source of phenomenological questioning as eidetic science. In fact, according to this inconspicuous passage in Ideas I, fiction seems to find itself at the very center of phenomenological inquiry. Focusing on ideal structures and essences and following the arduous path seeking to grasp them appear to bear the mark of the fictional, of the irreal. Commonly regarded as the source of creativity, the imagination is often related to a free yet arbitrary playfulness. But how could something so fluid and slippery as the imagination move and ground phenomenological thought – a thought that requires a clearly delineated methodological framework? The answer to this question lies in understanding the complexity of the imagination and the nature of its wondrous abilities. My goal here is to give heed to this wonder as to how and why fiction – the imagination – moves and grounds Husserl's phenomenology. In this dissertation, entitled "Phantasie and Phenomenological Inquiry – Thinking with Edmund Husserl," I seek to show that the imagination (Phantasie)3 opens the very possibility of Husserlian phenomenological 1 Hua III/1, 148; I will refer to the Husserliana volumes by using the standard abbreviation (Hua). 2 Ideas I, p. 184 (Boyce Gibson translation modified) 3 Husserl employs the term Phantasie to refer to imagination as act. This is an interesting word choice that differs from the typical term used in a philosophical context – Einbildung or Einbildungskraft. The motivation behind this choice is his interest in moving away from traditional epistemological projects (like the Kantian and Neo-Kantian ones). Another, perhaps more implicit and subtle reason for this choice is the insight into the fact 3 inquiry. More precisely, in uncovering the complex dynamic between the imagination and phenomenological reflection in its various guises – the reductions, ideation or eidetic variation, and postideational thought – I hope to uncover the former as necessary condition for the possibility of the latter. In the case of the reductions and eidetic variation my argument is stronger – I contend that Phantasie is a sufficient condition for their possibility. I discuss post-ideational thought as indirectly dependent on the imagination. If the necessity claim is not striking enough, the sufficiency claim is bound to be – though intriguing – significantly less palatable. The reason for this reluctance stems from deeply-seated preconceptions regarding the nature of the imagination, the most insidious of which being: its pictorial character, its status as derivative representational faculty, its reliance upon all perceptual structures, and its need of rational guidance. Most of all, however, reluctance to consider the imagination anew and rethink its import for theoretical inquiry is especially indebted to its assumed relationship to rationality and predicative thought. Its mediating (and secondary) epistemic role – that of bridging the gap between perception and the faculty of judgment – is perhaps one of its most engrained (and arresting) features. The success of the necessity and sufficiency arguments hinges upon dismissing all of these assumptions – a feat accomplishable only through a sweeping investigation of the structures and dimensions of the imagination. This is precisely what Husserl's extensive and meticulous analyses offer us. Most of the scholarship on Edmund Husserl's notion of imagination has overlooked its central role in his method of inquiry. My dissertation explores the nature and dimensions of the imagination (Phantasie) and argues that it is pivotal for Husserl's that consciousness and its acts are not epistemic functions or faculties, but rather dynamic intertwining dimensions or modes of consciousness. Last but not least, it is also triggered by Husserl's moving away from image and sense data theory and its representational implications – he criticizes the empiricists for claiming that there are images (as contents proper) 'in' consciousness. The term Einbildung is etymologically and philosophically closer to the representational approach. 4 phenomenological eidetic thought1– thought attempting to grasp ideal objects or meanings.2 Through insights gained from this analysis of Husserl's universalizing thought, the project also suggests the import of the imagination in inquiring thought broadly construed as well as mathematical and positive scientific inquiry, thus opening the possibility for future, hopefully fruitful, interdisciplinary research endeavors. Some scholars3 have focused on the significance of the imagination for aesthetic consciousness;4 others5 have explored Husserl's analyses of the imagination6 in order to clarify their results;7 a few8 have briefly pointed out the role the imagination plays in phenomenological inquiry; fewer still9 ventured to consider the implications of Husserlian phenomenology of the imagination for methods employed in other fields. In this project, I unravel how and why Husserl's easily overlooked Ideas I claim was right with respect to the phenomenological eidetic method of investigation while also opening new inquiring possibilities for studies of method in the exact and positive science. Despite numerous discussions of the relation between phenomenology and the natural sciences,10 a study 1 By 'eidetic thought' broadly construed I mean, following Husserl, all thought seeking knowledge of ideal universal objects; such thought is fundamentally inquiring given its aspect as search. 2 By 'ideal objects' I mean universal objects that are invariant and independent of the subjective processes grasping them. Logical and mathematical principles (such as the principle of non-contradiction) as well as the structures of experience and consciousness, according to Husserl, fit in this category. 3 Cf., Brough (1992), Wiesing (1998) 4 Other notable examples of such studies such are those by Rang (1975), Marbach (1989, 1993), Haardt (1995), Sepp (1996), Volonté (1999), Beites (2001), and Lotz (2007), Wiesing (1996, 2000, 2005). 5 Cf., Saraiva (1970), Volonté (1997), Elliott (2005) 6 Most of these texts have already been published in German in the Husserliana collection (vol. XXIII) under the title Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung 1898-1925. More of these research manuscripts, thus far only available at the Husserl archives, will be published in the newest Husserliana volume (vol. XLI, which deals primarily with the eidetic method of inquiry). Some research manuscripts remain unpublished but available in archives. I will refer to the Husserliana volumes as 'Hua' hereafter. 7 Because these studies spanned over 30 years of work and were mainly in the form of lectures or research manuscripts, their results were not distilled in a succinct and explicit manner. Many a shift occurred over the course of these studies. Only a careful study of these manuscripts can hope to establish the gist of Husserl's conception of Phantasie. 8 Cf., Kuspit (1968), Caeymaex (1996), Volonté (1997), Jansen (2005) 9 Cf., Lohmar (2005, 2008, Brudzinska (2005) 10 Cf., Kockelmans & Kisiel (1970), Garrison (1986), Embree (1992), Harvey (1994), McMullin (1996), Ströker (1997), Hopkins (1997), Feist (2004), Ierna (2005, 2006), Chiriac (2008) 5 stressing the inter-disciplinary relevance of the phenomenological method clarified through the imagination has yet to be offered. While my work is firmly rooted in Husserl's phenomenology, its interdisciplinary import lies in its attempt to locate the imagination at the heart of all theoretical inquiring thought. The dissertation has three main goals. First, it seeks to explore the structure and dimensions of the imagination and illuminate it both as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung), structurally equiprimordial with external perception, and as primordial level of consciousness related to, yet radically different from, perceptual consciousness. In doing so, it dispels several deeply engrained presuppositions about the imagination, such as its pictorial (bildlich) character, its derivative representational nature, or better yet, its secondary status as faculty meant to link perception and ratiocination in inductive and abstractive processes. Second, it aims at clarifying, through the lens of the imagination, the structure and functioning of the most fundamental methods that Husserl developed but left largely ambiguous – such as the phenomenological and eidetic reductions and the process of eidetic variation; as such, the project seeks to make significant contributions to phenomenology studies.1 My dissertation is the first extensive study to uncover the imagination as the grounding and sustaining force of Husserlian phenomenology. Third, the project aims at exposing the substantial ways in which phenomenological findings can contribute to investigations and methodological reflections in other fields. It contends that Husserl's analyses of imagining consciousness constitute a rich reservoir of insights that could further clarify the roles played by the imagination in philosophical, exact, as well as positive scientific projects. The goal of revealing and establishing a solid foundation upon which inter-disciplinary dialogue can occur lies at the 1 For broad discussions of the development of Husserl's thought, see Boehm (1968, 1981), Carr (1987), Ströker (1993), Zahavi (2003), Moran (2005), Mohanty (2008, 2011), Hopkins (2011). 6 heart of this project. The argument here focuses on the complex dimensions of the imagining consciousness and the multifarious manners in which it contributes to inquiring projects and methodologies spanning beyond field-specific boundaries and touching all spheres of theoretical inquiry. Much remains to be unraveled with respect to Husserl's proposed phenomenological method of inquiry – Husserl himself allotted most of the texts published during his lifetime to the discussion and clarification of his method. He also dedicated over two decades to the analyzing and understanding of imagining consciousness. My project weaves these two apparently disparate endeavors together, expanding Husserl's discussions of the phenomenological method with his own explicit and implicit insights with respect to the imagination. One may understandably ask: Why the imagination? First, because Husserl himself suggests this path – one that he himself never took.1 The second reason for superposing these two projects lies in my own discoveries with respect to his analyses of the imagination and his programmatic discussions: he describes his method in terms of possibility, neutrality, and freedom. After a decade of rigorous analyses of the imagination2 he proposes an understanding of the imagination in light of these three specific dimensions. The question then becomes: are the possibility, neutrality, and freedom at work in his method stemming from imagining consciousness or some other source? I argue that these dimensions are the very dimensions of imagining consciousness and that without them, the phenomenological method as Husserl envisaged it would lack 1 See already mentioned Ideas I passage. 2 He begins to seriously study Phantasie or imagination/imagining consciousness around 1904; a decade later, around 1912-1915 his account of this type consciousness stabilizes and reaches a complex and subtle level of refinement. At this point possibility, neutrality, and freedom take center stage in his discussions of Phantasie. 7 both its grounding and its driving force.1 Thus, my work seeks to answer central and traditional phenomenological questions such as: What are the conditions for the possibility of the reductions? How does eidetic variation as universalizing thought – the shift from the variant to the invariant – unfold? What guarantees the successful grasp of ideal objects? The project approaches these questions in novel ways able to uncover not only the nature of phenomenological inquiry, but also exciting aspects of inquiring thought broadly construed. The implications and discoveries of this work are thus relevant not only for phenomenological or philosophical studies and other highly specialized academic disciplinary projects, but also for a broader audience interested in understanding our inherent ability to pose questions and seek answers for them. In considering the role of the imagination beyond the sphere of phenomenology, the project uncovers potential ways to engage contemporary discussions in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, or the epistemology of modality about the nature and import of models and exemplars as well as visualization aids such as diagrams.2 In the concluding thoughts, I introduce potential methodological questions regarding the nature of hypothetical and experimental thought through the Husserlian notions of possibility, neutrality, and freedom. The foundations for a discussion regarding modality across the continentalanalytical divide will also hopefully come to the fore; this dialogue could focus on metaphysics and epistemology of modality arguments about the relationship between conceivability and possibility, the nature of impossibility, and the dynamic among logical, metaphysical, epistemological, conceptual, physical and practical possibilities. 1 The project looks chronologically at what Husserl claims about the method as his program develops, what he discovers about the imagination, and how he implements his method in specific micro-phenomenological studies showing that they are dynamically intertwined. 2 Engaging for instance the work of Galison (1987), Kaiser (2005), Giaquinto (2007), Bender & Marrinan (2010) 8 The thorough and refined structure of imaging consciousness suggested – explicitly or implicitly – by Husserl's analyses of the imagination along with my discoveries regarding the multifaceted role played by the imagination in eidetic variation as type of universalizing thought both function as a solid ground upon which to engage important claims made in the analytic tradition. The following comes to light: 1) that insights stemming from phenomenological studies can contribute substantially to investigations unfolding in different philosophical traditions and projects, and 2) that the questions posed and answers sought in these traditions need not be estranged from phenomenological endeavors as one might be prima facie tempted to assume. For instance, consensus could be reached across the continental-analytic divide with respect to the central significance of the relationship between conceivability and possibility for positive scientific inquiries. I intend to follow this path in my future research projects. In a thoroughly Husserlian vein, my dissertation seeks to question dismissive practices across philosophical traditions, thus encouraging dialogue and collaboration. To achieve these goals, I ground my investigations of eidetic phenomenological inquiry on three aspects of the imagination. These aspects, suggested by Husserl's research, are able to place our understanding of inquiring universalizing thought in a new light. These aspects are: 1) Phantasiemodifikation (imaginative modification) or the engaging of objects under the aegis of possibility, neutrality, and freedom1 rather than doxic commitment, actuality and determinacy; 2) its nexic-horizonal character (its functioning as a dynamic horizon within which other acts, such as memories and judgments, occur); and 3) the non-pictorial character 1 Neutrality as indifference toward the existence or non-existence of the object frees inquiring thought from the demands of the actual as familiar and taken for granted. The freedom of the imagination is both freedom from the actual and freedom to conceive that which is radically other. I discuss possibility as the other of actuality – the result of contemplating what could be instead of thinking about what is. 9 of imagination proper (reine Phantasie).1 In order to uncover the richness of Husserl's views regarding the structure of imagination and to further clarify the nexic-horizonal model of consciousness that I am proposing, I engage his extensive analyses of the imagination over the course of two intensive decades of micro-phenomenological studies (1904/05-1924). The dissertation has two main parts, each comprising three chapters. Part I (Chapters 1-3) focuses on Husserl's extensive studies of Phantasie in order to capture its structure and dimensions as distinct level of consciousness. It also considers the possible ways in which through its structure and dimensions, the imagination plays a significant part in inquiring thought broadly construed. First, I argue that Husserl's analyses make room for non-pictorial imagination – that the givenness of its objects does not involve mental images as representations of external things. I explore here potential ways in which non-pictorial imagination can play a role in conceptual thought, such as philosophy. Second, I show, going beyond Husserl's insights, that imagining consciousness is a nexic-horizonal level of consciousness – that the imagination as consciousness functions as horizon within which other acts, such as expectations or judgments, can occur. It is a nexus in so far as imagining acts can found other more complex acts at this level of consciousness. The imagination is thus a manner of relating to an object, and not solely a type of singular act (e.g., imagining a centaur). Third, I clarify Husserl's notion of Phantasiemodifikation – the shift from engaging an object as real to experiencing it as irreal – and stress the three main dimensions of the imagination that this radical shift entails: freedom, possibility, and neutrality. I close by discussing how and why inquiring thought broadly construed is reliant upon them. Part II of the dissertation (Chapters 4-6) begins by considering the implications of the non-pictorial aspect of imagination proper (reine Phantasie) for sense data, image, and 1 Husserl's analyses show that imagining consciousness or imagination proper (reine Phantasie) does not entail mental images understood as representations or copies of perceptual objects. 10 abstraction theories such as those of the British empiricists1 and of his mentor Brentano. It also discusses the relation between mental images on the one hand and perception and memory on the other. This study reveals an alternative way of conceiving abstraction as not reliant upon mental images. Husserl himself gestures toward this when, in his early 1900/1901 Logical Investigations, he discusses idealizing abstraction (ideirende Abstraktion) as phenomenological method of inquiry. He does not, however, fully explain what he means by this new method. My goal here is to clarify the method of idealizing abstraction, which he identifies as the method of his early study of consciousness, and show that it implicitly relies on non-pictorial imagination as the facilitator of the shift from the variant and particular to the invariant and universal. Showing that the imagination facilitates the grasping of qualitatively different kinds of possibilities (i.e., universal formulas rather than their multiple instantiations) constitute the core of this argument.2 Part II focuses primarily on the nexic-horizonal character of imagination and on Phantasiemodifikation (along with its three essential dimensions – neutrality, freedom, and possibility) and uncovers their pivotal roles in the two main types of phenomenological methods: the epochê, the phenomenological, eidetic, and transcendental reductions on the one hand3 and eidetic variation on the other.4 In order to emphasize Husserl's development of the 1 Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 2 Because of this, I will dedicate a substantial part of this first section to the discussion of the three dimensions of imagination – possibility, neutrality, and freedom. 3 The reductions secure the neutrality of phenomenological inquiry–they are processes of bracketing or putting out of play (Ausschaltung). The phenomenological reduction is the bracketing of the belief in the existence of objects as 'real', thus focusing on them as phenomena (i.e., that which is given or experienced as appearing to us). The eidetic reduction is a focusing on the ideal universal structures of phenomena; it is a suspension of any interest in the particular nature and context of the studied phenomenon. The transcendental reduction secures the neutrality of the inquiring subjectivity understood as transcendental (i.e., as distinct from the transcendent objects that it investigates but as intentionally related to them); through this reduction, transcendental subjectivity (understood as the inquiring phenomenological subject) manifests itself as a self-reflective consciousness of something as something. The epochê is the suspension of the belief in the reality and existence of the natural world as a whole. 4 Eidetic variation is the process through which the ideal or universal invariant structure of a phenomenon (for instance remembering something) is brought to the fore. This occurs through a process of varying possible 11 phenomenological method as eidetic inquiry, I focus on both his static transcendental method proposed in 1913 and his later genetic discussions of the method in the late 1920s and early 1930s.1 I discuss the reductions and eidetic variation in Husserl's static transcendental method on the background of lecture courses and research manuscripts dealing with the imagination prior to and around 19132 as well as his methodological statements in programmatic texts dated between 1901 and 1913.3 4 Specifically, I argue that Phantasiemodifikation is necessary and sufficient for all of the reductions and for eidetic variation.5 In making these claims I question a deeply engrained view in Husserl scholarship, namely, that bracketing and the engaging of possibilities can be achieved without relying on the imagination.6 instances sharing the same structure; it culminates in what Husserl refers to as intuition of essence (Wesensschau), which no longer focuses on possible variants but the invariant structure itself. 1 The main methodological stages consist in what comes to be labeled as early act-descriptive phenomenology (1900/01-approx.1907), static phenomenology (1913 and the years closely following), and genetic phenomenology (1920s-mid 1930s). Static phenomenology analyzes the structures of experience in isolated snap shots, while genetic phenomenology studies acts in their dynamic development and interconnectedness. Act-descriptive phenomenology aims at describing appearances or phenomena rather than explaining them. This feature will remain central to Husserl's subsequent statements regarding the phenomenological method of investigation, however, what distinguishes the act-descriptive approach from the later static and genetic approaches is the emphasis on act analysis rather than an act-object correlation analysis. 2 Hua XXIII and XLI as well as manuscripts available at the Husserl archives 3 Such as the Logical Investigations (1900/01), The Idea of Phenomenology (1907), Ideas I (1913), Ideas II-III, which were written around 1912, as well as research manuscripts to be soon published in Hua XLI and other manuscripts available at the Husserl archives. 4 I will also engage lecture courses date prior to 1913 dealing with issues such as perception, spatiality, and time-consciousness, which are relevant to the analyses of the imagination and contemporaneous with them. These lectures are published in various volumes of the Husserliana collection (e.g., vols. X, XVI). 5 Phantasiemodifikation is one of the central aspects that Husserl identifies in his analyses of Phantasie; it signifies the peculiar manner in which objects are intended or meant in imagining consciousness – i.e., as appearing and given regardless of their ontic status. Their existence and particular actuality are put out of play. 6 This view presupposes both that all imagination is pictorial (and therefore at best marginal in phenomenological inquiry) and that there must be a way other than Phantasiemodifikation that facilitates the employment of neutrality, freedom, and possibility in the phenomenological method. I believe that these are the main reasons why scholars have chosen to look elsewhere in their attempt to understand Husserl's methods of investigation despite the fact that no one has suggested what this other way may be or seriously considered the methodological significance of Phantasiemodifikation. 12 Most scholars1 interested in the import of the imagination for the phenomenological method fail to recognize that all non-positional acts are imaginative because they rely on a notion of the imagination as representational, pictorial act (similar to Bildbewusstsein and thus dependent upon the content provided by external experience). They fail to see that all acts – including founded higher-order predicative acts – can unfold at the level of imagining consciousness. Not relying on the imagination as well as solely viewing it as pictorial act are both stances with nefarious consquences for any attempt to clarify and disambiguate Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. Saraiva (1970) was the first scholar to support the view that not all non-positionality is imaginative (i.e., that other radical modifications can attain non-positionality understood as neutrality and freedom apart from the imagination). Subsequent studies followed suit and unquestioningly adopted this position. The model of leveled nexic-horizonal consciousness I develop through my close study of Husserl's analyses of Phantasie dimisses these crippling pressupositions and opens the possibility for a radical rethinking and clarification of Husserl's phenomenological method of inquiry. On the genetic model, the reductions and eidetic variation, unlike the earlier actdescriptive and static model, stresses the synthetic character of consciousness and of its experience. The relations among the three levels of consciousness are tighter. Husserl's later notion of synthetic consciousness entails the flexibility of the structures of consciousness and their interconnectedness in a dynamic whole.2 My investigation relies here on Husserl's later 1920s studies of the imagination (which discuss it as synthetic and genetic nexus or horizon 1 Cf., Kuspit (1968), Saraiva (1970), Caeymaex (1996), Volonté (1997), Brainard (2002), Elliott (2005), Lohmar (2008b), Rizzoli (2008) 2 For instance, perceptions and judgments are not seen as divorced; on the synthetic model perceptual consciousness exhibits structures that find themselves in predicative consciousness. This does not occur through a mere inclusion of the former into the latter, but a dynamic incorporation of features or substructures. 13 of consciousness),1 Husserl's discussions of the genetic method,2 and his studies of passive and active synthesis.3 On the genetic model eidetic variation, which largely maintains its previous structure and functioning, becomes what I refer to as co-variation: the phenomenological inquiring subject varies correspondingly because its understanding of itself depends upon its understanding of the object and vice-versa. The method becomes marked by historicity and inter-subjectivity. The core arguments for my analysis of the reductions and of variation stem from the three-level nexic-horizonal view of consciousness that I propose, following Husserl's analyses of perceptual and imagining consciousness, and from my development of Phantasiemodifikation as essential organizing or structuring principle of consciousness. The three levels of consciousness that I identify are: 1) perceptual-realizing positional, 2) imagining nonpositional, and 3) eidetic positional. The radical difference between them lies in the kinds of objects (possibilities) they engage as well as how these objects are intended and given.4 For Husserl, essences are ideal possibilities – possibilities necessarily binding all real and imagined possibilities. The project maps his discussions of truth, evidence, and knowledge acquisition on the proposed tri-level consciousness structure as well as in light of Husserl's distinction between the natural, non-theretical attitude, and the artificial, theoretical and 1 I.e., marked by temporality; its structure is flexible and morphs through its functioning and interaction with other cognitive processes. Most of these materials have been published in Hua XXIII and XLI, or are available at the archives. 2 The late main programmatic texts I will be looking at are his lectures and research manuscripts on the reductions and eidetic variation (published in Hua VIII, XXXIV, XLI or available at the archives), Cartesian Meditations (1929), and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). 3 These lectures have been published in Hua XI and XXXI. 4 All of these levels are nexic horizons; acts such as memory, judgment, and expectation can unfold at each level. The perceptual-realizing positional consciousness or attitude engages objects while presupposing their reality understood here as factual existence or actuality–e.g., memories are memories of what are believed to be actual things or events. In imagining non-positional consciousness acts intend their objects without any doxic commitment with respect to their ontic status. The objects are neutrally given–I imagine that I remember an event but make no implicit or explicit claim about the event's reality or non-reality. The third, eidetic positional level of consciousness intends objects as essences–universals or ideals. It posits nothing with respect to their existence but positively claims their status as essences. 14 methodological inquiring attitude. Thus, not only can we understand how truth and knowledge are accessible at each level, but also how something like universal truth and knowledge of necessity can be attained given our reliance on perception as primitive experience.1 This argument reveals Husserl's realism anew: both as his acknowledgment of the primacy of perceptual consciousness and as his recognition of this consciousness' significant role in eidetic projects. This argument will make it impossible to misinterpret Husserl's transcendental idealism for a view that ultimately entails the divorce from the everyday. One of my main goals in Part II of the dissertation is to show that there is an essential and substantial relationship between what Husserl identifies as the natural and artificial (künstlich) attitudes. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's artificial method of inquiry is feasible given the structures of natural imagining consciousness. Furthermore, I show that through Phantasiemodifikation, information gathered in the natural attitude becomes an integral part of ideational inquiring process once the reductions are performed. Thus, imagining consciousness emerges as the essential link between the natural and artificial, between the pre-theoretical attitude and the philosophical-phenomenological one; this, in its turn, forces us to reconsider the nature of his transcendental idealism and its relationship to empirical knowledge – gathered both in the everyday factual attitude as well as the positive scientific inquiring mode. Once this relationship is uncovered anew through imagining consciousness as core link, we could begin to consider new ways through which 1 Husserl introduces the notion of Phantasiemodifikation to describe the shift from the first to the second type of consciousness and analyzed the relation between perception and imagination in terms of possibility, neutrality, and freedom. I will introduce and argue for a second, novel type of radical modification–what I refer to as eidetic modification–in order to clarify the shift from the second to the third level. I will argue that these modifications, while marking the radical differences among these three levels also function as relations–venues through which meaning and information can be translated from one level to another. Through this tri-level yet holistic view of consciousness, the project will identify different types of possibility through the two modifications separating as well as linking them. Thus, the project will seek to understand the movement of thought from the particular to the universal or ideal in terms of the modal dynamics between these levels of consciousness. 15 phenomenology can inform and be informed by non-philosophical projects – such as those of cognitive science. In the conclusion, the insights gained through the study of Husserl's eidetic method function as the stepping-stone for considering the role played by the imagination in positive scientific thought. While scientific methods such hypothetical, experimental, or abstractive thought are different from eidetic variation,1 they can nevertheless be shown to rely on the freedom, neutrality, and possibility pertaining specifically to Phantasiemodifikation. Clarifying the synthetic genetic structure of the imagination as horizon of consciousness and exposing the role of Phantasiemodifikation in eidetic thought could help better understand the methods employed in the positive sciences. Thus, following the proposed tri-level nexic-horizonal model of consciousness as well as contemporary discussions in philosophy of science, one could further explore – in future projects guided by what this dissertation establishes – the structure of hypothetical and experimental thought processes and their relation to truth, knowledge, and evidence. Issues such as induction, generalization, and predictability are analyzable in light of the modality of imagination. It all begins with proposing innovative ways of thinking about the nature of discovery as well as creativity in the context of theoretical inquiry broadly construed based on the foundation Husserl established through his extensive analyses of imagining consciousness. Thus, rethinking the nature of the imagination – while in many ways a shattering of comfort zones – is a regaining of our exciting world(s) of thought. 1 This is so in so far as they do not occur in the reduced or bracketed attitude and do not focus primarily on consciousness and its experiences. 16 PART I: PHANTASIE – ITS STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS Part I of this dissertation seeks to elucidate the structure and nature of the imagination (Phantasie) by gathering Husserl's insights stemming from studies spanning over three decades of thought. It also aims at unraveling the ways in which inquiring thought broadly construed is deeply indebted to the imagination and its dimensions. Chapter 1 compares Phantasie with image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and perception (Wahrnehmung) in order to emphasize its unique structure and aspects. Chapter 2 discusses neutrality as one of the main dimensions of Phantasie and seeks to show its import for questioning projects, especially as that which grants their beginning. Chapter 3 explores freedom and possibility as the imagination's other two core dimensions and as the driving forces of inquiring thought. Part I closes with a discussion of universal eidetic thought and its reliance upon Phantasie, thus pointing toward Part II, whose goal is to show the dynamic between imagination and phenomenology as subjective eidetic science. The discussions in Part I are meant to reveal Phantasie as both direct non-pictorial intuitive presentation as well as fundamental level of horizonal-nexic consciousness. What I uncover here about the organizing principles of perceptual and imagining consciousness (i.e., founding, non-radical modifications, and radical modification) and about the core dimensions of imagining consciousness – freedom, possibility, and neutrality – aids us in mapping the phenomenological consciousness along with its cognitive levels and acts (as well as their correlates) at work in phenomenological inquiry. This map of consciousness that I reveal stems from Husserl's extensive analyses of the above-mentioned two basic types of consciousness; in this attempt, however, I surpass Husserl's explicit claims about the structure of consciousness. Our goal of clarifying the convoluted structure and functioning of his methodological apparatus justifies this apparent transgression. 17 Chapter 1: Perception and Phantasie – Inquiry and the Two Worlds of Thought §1. Bildbewusstse in – The Paradox of Imaging Consciousness Husserl's interest in Bildbewusstsein (image consciousness) stems from his long-lasting interest in different types of Vorstellung (presentation). In lecture courses spanning from 1898 until 1925 Husserl seeks to uncover the types and structures of presentation in gradually more detailed terms and through a rigorous classification. As early as 18981 he identifies two overarching types of Vorstellung – anschauliche (intuitive) and begriffliche (conceptual). In Hua XXIII he focuses exclusively on the former. Thus he comes to map Bildbewusstein in light of his analysis of anschauliche Vorstellung (intuitive presentation), which is further classified as direct and indirect.2 Direct intuitive presentation occurs in perception (Wahrnehmung),3 as I shall discuss in §2 of this chapter. It also occurs in Phantasie or imagining – a claim that cost Husserl years of toil. Husserl labels indirect intuitive presentation as bildliche (imaging or picturing).4 What this entails is that if a presentation is indirect it must involve imaging – the occurrence of an image (Bild)5. Bildbewusstsein is thus placed under the category 'bildliche Vorstellung', and so is Phantasie until 1909-1912.6 Husserl discusses the two – Bildbewusstsein and Phantasie – as structurally parallel until approximately 1912; moreover he considers them both to be types of Imagination or Einbildung, which as the latter term suggests involves imaging or the occurrence of images in the process of presentation.7 Even once he comes to clarify the nature of Phantasie as direct rather than indirect presentation he still views it as type of 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, §16 2 Cf., Hua XI, §17 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.17-18, 24, 47-48 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1 (1898) and No.1 (1904/05), pp.17-18, 47-48 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.16ff., and No.1, Appx.9 (1905) 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, 1904/05, pp.17-18, 21-25, 25-34, 63; cf., also Hua XXIII, No.8 (1909), No.15h (1912) 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, 1904/05, pp. 17-18, 82 18 Imagination.1 Holding this position is not without contradiction since Imagination as bildliche Vorstellung involves images, but Phantasie as direct presentation does not2. The question then is: Does Phantasie involve imaging, i.e., the occurrence of images, or should we seek to understand its structure as direct presentation in a manner that does not rely on images? This is one of the questions that tormented Husserl the most during three decades of thought on the topic of intuitive presentation and although he gradually moved to a more subtle way of analyzing Phantasie as direct modification of perceptual presentation, the thought of images lingered throughout these three decades of intense study. My goal in discussing the nature and structure of Bildbewusstein (in this section) and Husserl's juxtaposition of Bildbewusstsein and Phantasie (in §3, Chapter 1) is to illuminate the structure of image or imaging consciousness along with the occurrence and nature of images in order to ultimately show what imaging entails and ask whether one should seek a similar occurrence and structural element in Phantasie as imagining consciousness.3 For Husserl, Bildbewusstsein functions as aid in analyzing Phantasie, the study of which presented, from the beginning, significant difficulties. Such indirect analogical phenomenological approaches can be fruitful endeavors – Husserl's juxtaposition of Phantasie and perception provides many insights into the structure and nature of Phantasie. Whether this is also the case in his comparative study of imaging and imagining has yet to be established. Analogical approaches can also lead to unwarranted claims, which may have unfortunately strong holds on the unfolding of subsequent phenomenological analyses. Husserl's initial interest in creating a structural parallel between imaging and imagining morphed into an obsessive thought that haunted his studies of Phantasie as late as 1 Hua XXIII, No.15i (1912) 2 In discussing the structure of perception I shall emphasize the lack of a mental image as an implication of its directness (cf., Chapter 1, §2) 3 Not involving the perception of a physical image such as a painting. 19 1918/1922, a period during which Husserl fully clarifies the simple structure of Phantasie by focusing on the structural parallel between imagining and perception despite the radical differences between them. Husserl comes to see that two types of acts or consciousness may be structurally parallel and yet fundamentally different – that structural parallelism does not entail full overlap. §1! . The structure of Bildbewusstse in as image consciousness Image consciousness has a complex structure – it involves multiple layers of apprehension (Auffassung) and appearance (Erscheinung). Multiple objects are given in the process of image consciousness. When looking at one of Cézanne's paintings of Mont Sainte-Victoire three objects are given: the physical thing or Bildding (the canvass, the paint, and the frame), the depicting image or Bildobjekt (Cézanne's portrayal of the beloved mountain), and the subject of the painting or Bildsujet (Mont Sainte-Victoire).1 This would suggest three corresponding apprehensions for each of these objects, but Husserl discusses the structure of Bildbewusstsein mainly in terms of two apprehensions: one pertaining to the Bildding and the other to the Bildobjekt-Bildsujet structural complex.2 Thus two appearances are identified, each corresponding to the two apprehensions3; however, Husserl focuses primarily on the appearance of the Bildsujet through the mediation of the Bildobjekt as the main appearance in image consciousness. Structurally distinguishing between these layers of apprehension and appearance points to the possibility of focusing (phenomenologically or otherwise) on each of the three 'sub'-objects of Bildbewusstsein.4 The Bildding is perceptually given. Its apprehension and appearance are those of perception. If one were solely to focus on the canvas and the paintbrush traces on it one 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.18-20, 29-34; see also, No.1, Appx.5 (1905), No.17 (1912), p.489 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.17-18, 23-25 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 25-27, 45 4 This has significant consequences for our understanding of aesthetic contemplation. 20 would experience this object in perceptual consciousness. The object would be given directly as physical and transcendent, as part of the objective world of reality. However, taken in the overall structural complex of image consciousness the Bildding is a physical image – it functions as an instigator1 – as that which triggers the apprehension of the Bildobjekt here understood as mental object.2 It is worth emphasizing that the content of this first apprehension is sensation, i.e., the content typical of perception.3 The Bildobjekt apprehension is facilitated by the Bildding apprehension. The former is a figment (Fiktum) – it relies on perceptual apprehension for its givenness but is not a perceptual object.4 It does not belong to the reality constituted through external perception. Perceived objects are given as existent – we believe in their existence. Figments are irreal rather than real – the issue of their existence or non-existence is suspended.5 While their apprehension and givenness are real (reell)6 they are not real (real).7 Husserl qualifies the Bildobjekt as 'mental image' and claims that figments as mental images cannot occur without a perceptual instigator – they require the initial perceptual apprehension as their foundation.8 The dynamic between Bildobjekt and Bildsujet fascinated Husserl because of the complex and convoluted nature of the second apprehension of imaging consciousness. The 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.17 (1912) 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.19-20 3 For most of the 1900s, until approximately 1909-1910 Husserl's analyses of intuitive presentations are schematic – i.e., in terms of content and apprehension. Apprehension is that which renders the content intentional, it is an interpretation, an attaching of meaning. Later Husserl comes to question this schematic approach, mainly due to the problems stemming from the notion of content; such problems were pervasive in the theories of the British empiricists and of Husserl's mentor, Franz Brentano. 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.54ff.; cf., also, Hua XXIII, No.17 5 Husserl employs the term 'nullity' (Nichtigkeit) to refer to the irreality of the Bildobjekt and Bildsujet (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1 (1904/05), pp.46-47, and No.1, Appx.1, (1898)). However this term is inherently ambiguous since it also refers to non-being or non-reality. We thus need to strictly distinguish between irreality and non-reality – between not positing either being or non-being and positing non-being. 6 All acts and types of consciousness are present and real in so far as they are part of the internal stream of consciousness. This reality Husserl labels as 'reell' – it is the immanent presence of all cogitationes (i.e., intentional experiences, cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, p.330). 'Real' on the other hand refers to reality as transcendent, as external. It is the reality pertaining to physical things as things in the natural and objective world. 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.46 8 Cf., Hua XXIII, No. 16 (1912), No.17 (1912), and No.17, Appx.52 21 Bildding and Bildobjekt are given in one apprehension – the former is perceptual the latter marked by irreality.1 The second apprehension stems from the relation of depiction (Abbildung) and exhibiting (Darstellung) between the Bildobjekt and the Bildsujet; this relation is the mark of indirect intuitive presentation.2 The Bildsujet (the depicted object) is irreal – it is non-present yet given 'as if' (als ob) it were present3. Imaging consciousness brings to appearance that which is not perceptually apprehensible.4 Unlike perception, in which belief in the existence or non-existence of the object as real lies at the very core of the apprehension, imaging consciousness exhibits doxic neutrality – there is no posited belief in the existence or non-existence of the depicted sujet. The sujet is meant or intended as the object of the entire complex of imaging consciousness through the Bildobjekt as figment and depicting mental image. This meaning (i.e., intending) of the Bildsujet through the Bildobjekt is a 'seeing' of the former 'into' the latter (hineinschauen).5 Unlike direct or simple presentation (Vorstellung in the strict sense of the word), indirect perception involves the grasping of the meant object by mediation through mental image – Darstellung as depiction or exhibiting is this relation of mediation through mental image as figment.6 In order to fully explore the dynamic of the two apprehensions Husserl identifies as pertaining to image consciousness we need to uncover their paradoxical nature – each 1 I shall soon turn to a discussion of the paradoxical nature of the two apprehensions of imaging consciousness. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.16-17 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.49 4 Husserl refers to imaging consciousness as Veranschaulichung – the bringing to intuition of that which is not present and hence directly intuitable in perception. He comes to equate Veranschaulichung and bildliche Vorstellung as indirect presentations (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.51, and Hua XI, §18), however later in his discussions of ideation he relies on Veranschaulichung to point to the bringing forth of exemplars necessary for the fulfillment (i.e., synthesis of identification between intended and intuited) of eidetic variation. As with most of his claims regarding the structure of Phantasie, we would be well advised to take his early claims about its pictoriality with a grain of salt. 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.35; cf., also No.1, Appx.4 (1904/05) 6 Husserl employs the term Perzeption to refer to the perceptual moment or foundational apprehension at work in image consciousness. He distinguishes between Perzeption and Wahrnehmung – the latter refers to the act of perception, which has its own content (senstation) and simple/singular apprehension (cf., Hua XXIII, No.16, 1912). 22 being fundamentally marked by conflict (Widerstreit). Understanding the nature and types of conflict in light of reality and irreality will prove critical for our discussion of perception and Phantasie. It will also help illuminate the ways in which these two worlds – one of presence the other of non-presence – cannot be given (intuited) simultaneously as they are mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, I hope to show that their conflict is not merely a relation of rejection but also one of cooperation. Where this cooperation stems from and how it unfolds are crucial issues for understanding the nature of all inquiring thought, regardless of its context (be it practical or theoretical). My goal is to gradually bring to light the significance of conflict for inquiring projects of all kinds, which will be my main topic in the last section of the current chapter; it will also mark the culmination of the present project at the end of Part II. §1! . Images – the Conflict and Paradox of Bildbewusstse in The first conflict that comes to the fore in Husserl's analysis of image consciousness is the conflict between the Bildding or physical image and the Bildobjekt as figment and mental image.1 The former is perceptual – it is present and real (real) because it appears through a perceptual apprehension of sensations. It also functions as instigator for the appearance of the figment. As we have already seen a perceptual foundation belongs essentially to figments, which are not real. They require the input of perception but go beyond presence and bring forth the non-present or the irreal.2 While the physical image is given perceptually and is located spatially and temporally in the objective real world, the mental image as figment appears with the aid of perception but plays a different role – it opens up an irreal and non- 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.25-27, 43ff, 51ff, 54ff; cf., also Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.2, 7, 9, 12, 13; Hua XXIII, No.4 (1908), No.15g, No.15, Appx.40, Nos. 16-17 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.4 23 present dimension at the very core of reality.1 There is therefore the basic conflict between the Bildding and the Bildobjekt given the former's appurtenance to reality and the latter's being located outside of it. The paradox at the core of their relation lies in the ineluctable gap that sets them apart despite the fact that the mental image cannot appear without the physical image.2 Related to this basic conflict there is also the conflict and paradox at the core of the Bildobjekt appearance – it is founded on a perceptual moment but is itself imaginative or depictive.3 Imaging as indirect presentation relies on the consciousness of difference between mental image or Bildobjekt and the sujet or intended object.4 The depicting image may show the sujet from a certain angle or perspective (Abschattung),5 in smaller proportions, with distorted colors,6 however as long as there is a sufficient amount of similarity between the image and the sujet depiction as, mediation occurs and the sujet is meant through the image.7 The image is thus different from the original. Fulfillment, or the givenness of the object, in the case of Bildbewusstsein is conditioned by this similarity.8 The depicted object is presented through the image object, but it is meant beyond the limited characteristics brought forth by the latter. The transition toward the intended sujet through the image object occurs seamlessly,9 unless the difference between them is significant enough to disrupt this 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9, pp.151-152 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 47-48 3 Husserl employs Imagination or Einbildung to refer to indirect imaging presentation (bildliche Vorstellung), which is radically different from perception as direct presentation that does not employ mediating 'images' (cf., Hua XXIII, pp.17-18). 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.25-27, 32, 54-63, 82-83 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.17 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p. 26; cf., also No.1, Appx.7, and No.17 8 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9 9 Hua XXIII, No.1, p. 31 24 intentional process.1 But the fact that image consciousness essentially involves the consciousness of difference between image and sujet implies that if one were to actively decide to focus on the Bildobjekt, one could. Aesthetic consciousness is possible in light of this very ability. The consciousness of difference between image and sujet is also suggestive of their conflict. On the one hand, there might be fluctuation involved in the appearance of the image object, which would not influence the constancy of the sujet and of its being meant or intended.2 We have already seen that the limited or distorted characteristics of the image object are not obstacles for intending the sujet in a coherent and richer fashion. I may see a picture of the Chenonceau castle, which is a miniature depiction of the really existing structure on the valley of Loire, but the size, faded colors, and perspectival3 two-dimensional nature of the image object cannot prevent me from intending the depicted object in a fuller fashion, even without my ever seeing it in person. On the other hand, unlike the foundational apprehension of the Bildding through which the appearance of the image object is facilitated, the apprehension of the image object as that through which the sujet is presented is a modifying apprehension.4 What is brought forth ceases to have any links to the reality of the Bildding and its environment. What is presented is the sujet as irreal through and through. Unlike the image object, which in the context of the first apprehension is irreal yet intimately linked to reality through perception, the sujet has no ties to reality. Its existence or non-existence is not posited; there is thus no doxic modality marking this apprehension. 1 A perfect likeness between the image object and the sujet represents a liminal case, one that could not be structurally distinguished from perception. Under most circumstances there is a certain degree of similarity and of difference between the Bildobjekt and the sujet (Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 32-33). 2 Extreme cases of fluctuation in the appearance of the image object can affect the intuition of the sujet; an intention meaning a new object can thus occur because of image object fluctuation (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p. 33). 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, fn.1, p. 37 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 39-41 25 And unlike the first foundational perceptual apprehension, which has sensation as its content, the second, modifying apprehension of image consciousness has phantasma as content.1 Phantasma is the content of apprehensions that bring forth non-presence as irreality.2 The conflict between the image object and the sujet stems from the latter's irreality and non-presence. This is the paradox of image consciousness: it brings forth the not-now through the now.3 The real world of present experience is torn open and an other, nonpresent world, comes to the fore. The sujet along with the world it belongs to are nullity (Nichtigkeit) understood as irreality.4 It may presently exist elsewhere and thus be absent, it may be a thing of the past, it may simply not exist at all;5 regardless of these ontic scenarios what they all share in common is the manner in which the sujet is meant or intended – in my looking at Cézanne's Mont Sainte-Victoire its existence is not posited – the intended object reveals itself as non-present presence. One might think this is an ontic contradiction and the paradox is merely the result of simultaneously positing both being and non-being. However, the paradox does not occur within the boundaries of ontic positings. The paradox at the core of image consciousness consists in the simultaneous conflict and cooperation of reality 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.12 2 As I shall show in Chapter 2, we must resist the temptation to see phantasmata as the contents of all presentifications. They are contents pertaining to acts that bring to appearance non-present objects as irreal. Positional presentifications, those for which non-presence implies past, future, or merely absent being under the guise of non-being, have modified sensations as their contents. However, these modifications are positional and thus radically different from Phantasiemodifikation, which neutralizes, ontically and doxically, the content and apprehension of perception. Thus, we should be weary of following in Husserl's footsteps when he claims that phantasmata are contents of positional memories, as he so often does. Phantasma can be the content of memory if and only if as act it occurs in the imagining attitude – if it is itself neutralized. Positional memory cannot have phantasma as content since the latter is essentially bound to the givenness of irreality (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.12). 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 47-48 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.51 5 For a further discussion of ontic dimensions attached to irreal objects, see Chapter 1, §3. 26 (as having a positive or negative ontic modality) and irreality (as having no ontic modality whatsoever).1 The modifying apprehension of image consciousness stretches open the space and world as real and brings forth a radically different dimension, i.e., the irreal, at the very core of the real.2 I am looking at Cézanne's painting – it is exhibited on a museum wall. The wall, room, and the museum are real objects located in the real world given through perception. The painting – the canvass and its frame – which I encounter and experience in reality through perceptual apprehension, are the contested locus of tension where the other world of irreality comes forth.3 The frames are the borders delimiting this other realm – they are the very edges where the real and irreal almost come into contact.4 While I experience the museum room and the physical painting on the wall as real things in the world, imaging consciousness (through its modifying apprehension) relocates me from the real into the irreal.5 The present and that which is perceptually given as real vanish and I immerse myself in the otherwise – the world of Mont Sainte-Victoire. This experience and appearance of the irreal in Bildbewusstsein occurs at the very core of reality and presence and yet it is completely divorced from them. Two worlds overlap and yet have nothing in common.6 The conflict between reality and irreality essentially marks image consciousness. We shall see in §3 of this chapter why this cannot be so in the case of Phantasie as imagining consciousness. 1 Ontic modalities such as being, non-being, doubtful or probable being, etc. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.49; cf., also No.1, Appx.2 3 For a discussion of this tension and Husserl's success or lackthereof in his account of the structure of imaging consciousness, see Rang (1975), Marbach (1989), Sepp (1996), Volonté (1997, 1999), Fernández Beites (2001), Lotz (2007). 4 I say 'almost' because the real and the irreal cannot be simultaneously intuited. They can at most be simultaneously intended but never fully given at once. 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.45-46, No.1, Appx.1, 9, and Nos.17-18 6 Hua XXIII, No.16, Appx.51, p.482 27 In image consciousness there is a consciousness of difference between reality and irreality from the very beginning.1 In fact, if this consciousness were lacking imaging could not occur. The conflict between reality and irreality is structurally essential to Bildbewusstsein. I make an implicit yet clear distinction between the Bildding, Bildobjekt, and Bildsujet and the image object as figment (Fiktum) is not illusory or a deceptive sensuous semblance (Schein)2. Image consciousness is fundamentally self-reflective3 – I am not lost in irreality, I coperceive the museum wall and though I may let myself be engulfed by the imaged world, I am never completely lost within it. If I were, image consciousness would cease and I would be convinced it all occurred in perceptual consciousness. The irreality of imaging does not trick me – it must give itself in stark contrast to the reality of perception, which subtly recedes to the background. §1! . Other types of indirect intuitive presentation – symbol, sign, analogy Image consciousness is not the only type of indirect intuitive presentation – symbolizing and signifying consciousness as types of analogical thought both bear the mark of structural mediacy.4 The main difference between Bildbewusstsein and these types of consciousness lies in the nature of the relation between the image and the object. In the former, there is a sufficient degree of similarity between the image and the object such that the passage through the image toward the object (the 'seeing' of the object 'into' the image, i.e., hineinschauen) is facilitated by this similarity and could not occur without it. In the latter types of indirect presentation the similarity between image and object is either minimal or altogether lacking. Husserl claims that Bildbewusstsein, symbol, and sign consciousness are placed on a continuum of degrees of similarity between image and object. The lower to null 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1. 82-83, and Nos.16-17 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, p. 41, No.1, Appx.9, pp. 151-152 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 40-41, No.16, Appx, 51, No.17, p.490 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 86-87 28 levels of similarity pertain to symbolizing and signifying as indirect acts of presentation. If in a case of Bildbewusstsein this similarity gradually diminishes image consciousness morphs into symbol or sign consciousness. The main difference between image, symbol, and sign is thus solely one of degree and not of kind. We should mention here a distinction Husserl makes between external and immanent image consciousness.1 So far we have exclusively focused on external Bildbewusstsein – one triggered by the perception of a physical image. Immanent imaging has a similarly complex structure but lacks the physical image.2 Instead, the image object (or 'mental image' to use Husserl's terminology) has a depictive function in bringing forth the sujet, and a signifying function in pointing at another object. This occurs, for instance, in memorial association – when in looking at Cézanne's Mont Sainte-Victoire, I intend the mountain Cezanne's work depicts but I also remember the Omu peak in my native Carpathians. The latter is associatively brought to recollection. The image object need not be a sign for a second object resembling the initially intended sujet. It may also function as sign or symbol for a concept, a feeling, or a volition – for instance, it may remind me of the freedom I felt as a child while camping in the mountains and it may trigger the desire in me to experience it once more. §1! . Non-presence and Bildbewusstse in as Reproduction and Presentification Yet another way in which Husserl labels direct and indirect intuitive presentations (anschauliche Vorstellung) is genuine/authentic and non-genuine/inauthentic (eigentlich and uneigentlich).3 This distinction too relies on the mediated apprehension of the intended object 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 52-53; cf., also, No.1, Appx.4 (1904/05), and No.17 (1912) 2 Immanent imaging consciousness was initially external imaging, however in the former, the physical image is left behind and new function is attributed to the image object, which is still depictive, but not solely depictive – it now also a sign for another object somehow related to, in resemblance or contextually, to the initial object (i.e., sujet) of the initial external imaging. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 47-48 29 in imaging consciousness. More importantly, Husserl refers to this same distinction in terms of presentation (Präsentation or Gegenwärtigung) and representation (Repräsentation) or presentification1 (Vergegenwärtigung).2 In direct perceptual presentation (Vorstellung proper) the object is given in propria persona as real, present, and actually existent. In representation or presentification, a non-present object is brought forth. Image consciousness is a type of presentification that makes present a non-present, irreal object. Not all presentifications have irreal objects. Memory and expectation are presentifying acts – they let the non-present appear – however in their case the non-present has the ontic character of non-being (i.e., the no longer and the not yet).3 All intuitive presentations are present or real acts whether they have present or nonpresent objects. Husserl uses presence and reality in an ambiguous fashion: the object of perception is present and real (real) – it is believed to exist now in actuality and is located in the external real world. The object is transcendent. But the act of perception and the act of imaging occur in the present flow of consciousness – they are real (reell) insofar as they are elements or structural moments of this flow of consciousness.4 For now, it is important to note that Bildbewusstsein is a type of Vergegenwärtigung whose appearing object is an irreal non-presence. Phantasie shares this feature with image consciousness, but, as we shall soon see, the appearance of irreality in Phantasie is different from the one pertaining to Bildbewusstsein. It is also worth emphasizing that not every presentification is an indirect intuitive presentation. Phantasie as Vergegenwärtigung is a type of (modified) direct intuitive presentation, structured like perception and yet radically different 1 I find 'presentification' to be a better translation of Vergegenwärtigung than 'representation' – the latter being employed as a translation of both Repräsentation and Vorstellung, which are terms Husserl regularly uses. 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.4, pp.139-140 3 I discuss the different types of presentification in Chapter 2. For an interesting historical discussion of memory, see Yates (1966). 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.13 (1905) 30 from it. Imagined objects are irreal; they are not given as real, actual things in the external natural world. Reproduction (Reproduktion) is also a way in which Husserl approaches the complex structure and mediated second apprehension of Bildbewusstsein. We should identify two types of reproduction: one that is directly dependent upon perceptual apprehension and sensation (i.e., its content), and the other independent of perception. Image consciousness belongs to the former category, Phantasie to the latter. The reproductive presentation of image consciousness is perceptually bound – it cannot occur without the founding perceptual apprehension of the Bildding as instigator1 of the second modifying apprehension in which the givenness of the Bildobjekt functions as pathway toward the appearance and presentation of the Bildsujet (i.e., the intended object of the act of imaging).2 Thus reproduction in the context of Bildbewusstsein refers to the perceptual character of the founding apprehension3 and to the mediating and modifying character of the second. Reproduction in the context of Phantasie does not signify indirectness as mediacy – it refers to a different type of modification, which also results in the givenness of irreality. Phantasiemodifikation4 is not reliant upon perception in the same fashion Bildbewusstsein is – the former directly transforms the content and apprehension of perception and is, as a result, a type of direct presentation; the latter is founded upon an initial perceptual layer of content and interpretation (i.e., apprehension), which is subsequently employed in rendering apparent that which is essentially inapparent – i.e., the non-present here labeled as irreal. 1 Hua XXIII, No.17 (1912) 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.16, and No.16, Appx.50 (1912) 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.44ff. 4 Chapter 2 focuses primarily on the nature and dimensions of Phantasiemodifikation and its relation to perceptual apprehension and its content (i.e., sensation). 31 Image consciousness and Phantasie bring forth the irreal, but they do so in two distinctly different ways. They share in common the 'hovering before' (vorschweben1) of the intended object as irreal – as non-present presence. The difference between them, 'distinct' as it may be, is not easily uncovered. We see Husserl struggle in gradually distancing himself from collapsing the two and merely emphasizing some inessential (though remarkable differences) (1898-1904/05), to uncovering some essential differences but still clinging onto their structural parallelism (1904/05-1908/09), to eventually seeing the core differences in their structures – one complex and indirect, the other simple and direct – and yet still letting the old juxtaposition occasionally take over through concepts such as 'mental image' (1909/1912), to finally recognizing in detail the uniqueness of their structures and being able to stress similarities between them without the danger of structural super-imposition (19181925). I consider the core of this struggle to be Husserl's reluctance to let go of the empiricist conceptual framework of imaging – be it physical or mental. It is my intention to uncover a different way of approaching the structures of 'imaging' and 'imagining' – one in terms of appearance and givenness rather than images. Husserl himself leads us in this direction from 1918 onward. Before we can fully discuss Husserl's trajectory from analyzing Phantasie in terms of image consciousness to comparing it to perception we must focus on both perception and Phantasie as acts and types of consciousness. I thus turn to perception as direct intuitive presentation and as the most basic act constitutive of reality. §2. The World of Perception – Reality, Knowledge, and Being Perception is the simplest and most basic cogitatio. It is the intentional experience that gives us direct access to the world as real. This claim represents the core of Husserl's realism. Perception also stands as the grounding structure in the context of his phenomenological 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 3-4, 42, and No.15a (1912) 32 analysis of intuitive presentations. We have already seen that by 1898 Husserl distinguishes between two types of intuitive presentations: direct and indirect.1 He focuses on image consciousness as the prime example of indirect presentation; he also seeks to analyze Phantasie on this model. He considers perception to be the primary type of direct intuition. While there were questions and doubts from the beginning regarding the parallelism between Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein, Husserl's inquiry into the structure of perception was steady and secure. His position with respect to this act and type of consciousness did not fluctuate much throughout his extensive work on presentation. From the 1890s onward his analyses of Wahrnehmung gradually attained higher levels of clarity; his distinctions grew subtler and the insights he brought forth became at once rich and supple. They also lead him back to the main course of inquiry whenever he strayed away following more or less fruitful tangents. One such side-path was the comparative study of imaging and imagining consciousness, which exerted an intoxicating appeal during the first decade of his work on Phantasie. His study of perception eventually guided him away from overemphasizing this juxtaposition and suggested another, better approach for analyzing the elusive act of Phantasie. Unlike Bildbewusstsein and Wahrnehmung, which he approaches in an unmediated and direct fashion, his analysis of Phantasie employs aids such as comparison and analogy. These approaches are not altogether misleading; in fact, they can be quite illuminating when the terms of the comparison can clarify each other. As shall obvious in Part II of this project, I consider comparative, analogical, and juxtaposing techniques to be indispensible for the phenomenological project and method of inquiry. I am thus not opposed to such approaches; my target here is the comparative study of imaging and imagining 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1 33 consciousness, which I consider problematic, as Husserl himself came to realize around 19121. The problem here lies not only in the choice of the compared terms, but also in the goal of this comparative project, which is gaining evidence for the terms' utmost structural similarity. As I see it, the study of perception plays the role of a hard-earned wake-up call. Husserl's shift to seeing the directness and structural simplicity of Phantasie as intuitive presentation was facilitated by his study of perception. By juxtaposing perception and imagining consciousness and by looking back on the comparison between imaging and imagining Husserl uncovers the extent and nature of the differences that set these three acts apart. More importantly, this process reveals the uniqueness of Phantasie. Thus, perception becomes the lens through which Husserl observes and studies imagining consciousness. Without this lens Phantasie would simply slip away and elude the phenomenological project. Nevertheless, this coin has two sides – the main goal of my project is to show that a phenomenology of perception ultimately requires a phenomenology of Phantasie. In fact, that all phenomenological projects are reliant upon Phantasie. To grasp and unfold the meaning of this claim, which Husserl makes in his first lecture on Phantasie2 (1904/05) and in his programmatic Ideas I3 (1913), we must engage in a phenomenology of Phantasie and fully explore its structure and dimensions. Exploring and understanding the nature of phenomenology as philosophical inquiry requires that we study the imagination, and yet we can only clarify the imagination through a phenomenological project. I do not deny the circularity of this project, nor do I lament it. I see this hermeneutical aspect as a guiding clue to the question I pose and attempt to answer – what is the relation between Phantasie and 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos. 15-18 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, p. 1 3 Hua III/1, p. 148 34 phenomenological thought? The circularity only points to their complex and dynamic relation. Accepting Husserl's invitation, I follow perception as my way of entering the circle. My intention here is to uncover the structure and nature of perception in order to subsequently show the extent to which understanding perception as intentional act makes possible the successful study of Phantasie. The uniqueness of this comparative project, which Husserl eventually embarked on, stems from the paradox that renders it successful – only by unraveling the stark differences between perception and imagination can we illuminate the ways in which they fundamentally mirror each other. This paradox questions Husserl's initial presupposition, which mislead him into seeking a parallel between imaging and imagining – that structural similarity implies the dissolving of radical differences. Husserl's instinct was right from the beginning – he knew perception and imagining were fundamentally different acts. This lead him to suppose that because of the extent of this difference the two must also have strikingly different structures. However, two acts can mirror each other structurally and yet stand worlds apart. §2! . The structure of Perception (Wahrnehmung) Perception gives direct access to the world as real. The object of perception is directly given as present and actually existing – it appears in propria persona.1 Unlike image consciousness, which has a complex structure and mediating apprehension, perception has a simple structure. There is one apprehension whose content is sensation.2 This apprehension interprets the non-intentional content and renders possible the meaning or intending of the object. There is also only one appearance3 – the direct givenness of the object as present and 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.16-18 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 5-7, 24, 34, 47-48, 80-81; cf., also, No.1, Appx. 8, 12, 13 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 3-4, 5-6, 47-48, 29-30 35 actual.1 Through perception reality and presence are brought to the fore.2 There is no mediating image at work – be it physical or mental.3 There is no distinction to be made between an image and the original – all there is is the direct, unmediated appearance of the object. Appearance and image are one – or better yet, there is no image in perception. This is why Husserl viewed perception as the primary type of direct intuitive presentation.4 For him, directness of appearance is the main characteristic of authentic or genuine intuitive presentation.5 The lack of image or imaging, along with the singularity of apprehension and appearance, and the direct givenness of reality are the key structural features of perception that must guide our juxtaposition of perception and Phantasie. Despite his early initial claim6 that Phantasie was an indirect and thus non-genuine presentation, Husserl comes to see that Phantasie too is direct and genuine.7 This insight gained as early as 1904/058 suggests the lack of images in imagining consciousness; however, Husserl claims the direct and genuine character of Phantasie as presentation while also discussing its structure in terms of mental images.9 This contradictory position is the result of Husserl's being torn between following perception as a guide in his analysis of Phantasie and clinging onto his early approach that sought an exact structural parallelism between Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein. The object of perception is given as real and actual, but it is also given as presently existent. Reality and presence are what perception brings to the fore. We have already seen that these two notions have two dimensions or meanings in Husserl's structural analysis of presentations: the object is given as real (real) and present or located in the external natural 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.33 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 3-4, 12, 16-18, 67-69,82ff., 102-103, and No.1, Appx. 1, 10, 13 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 64-71, and No.1, Appx.10 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 16-18, 29-30 5 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 29-30, 47-48 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1 7 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 85-87 8 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.10 9 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 64-71, and Nos. 16-17 (1912) 36 and physical world, while the act, along with its apprehension, content, and appearance as givenneness of the object are real (reell) as structural moments of consciousness and present insofar as they are occurring in the now of internal time consciousness.1 The subjective pole of reference as correlate of the transcendent (external) object and its world is the empirical ego, located in the natural physical world through the body.2 Each act intending an object has a subjective correlate – an ego pole as center of intentionality. Husserl distinguishes between external and immanent perception.3 So far we have discussed external perception – intending transcendent objects as things located in the objective natural world. The ego, or subjective pole as correlate of the object and its world, is in this case the empirical ego and its body. If I simply taste the hot and bitter coffee while sitting on my grandparents' porch, I am an empirical ego. However, every external perception has the structurally inculcated potentiality of self-reflection or selfconsciousness.4 While enjoying the coffee and the autumn mountain breeze I am also aware of the fact that I am perceiving this coffee and the breeze. I am aware of my own perceiving and thus bring to actualization the covert potentiality of self-reflection, which Husserl refers to as immanent perception.5 Unlike external perception whose object is a transcendent real (real) object, immanent perception objectifies acts (reell). Thus, my act of external perceiving becomes the object of immanent perception, whose ego is not the empirical embodied ego but the actual ego pole of internal consciousness. Both immanent and external perception are real (reell) and present6 acts of this ego. This is so due to the latent possibility of selfreflection embedded in external perception. Thus any act that I perform intending a 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.13 2 Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.14 3 Cf., Hua XI, §16 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2a (1904), No.2d (1907/08) 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2 6 I.e., occurring in the now of the flow of internal consciousness. 37 transcendent object can be objectified and given in immanent perception. If I judge a transcendent state of affairs, or I will, desire, and perceive an actual present object, I can always focus on these acts themselves (along with their intended and intuited objects).1 If I imagine a unicorn my imagining act can be objectified in immanent perception. Acts become the objects of immanent perception and are given as appearances. In self-reflection acts as objects are the given appearances.2 Unlike external perception, in which a potentially infinite series of perspectival appearances of the same object are essentially possible (Abschattungen), in immanent perception the object is directly grasped as a whole – the act appears holistically and at once.3 As we shall soon see,4 perceptual self-reflection is not the only type of selfreflection. Immanent Phantasie structurally mirrors immanent perception.5 Self-reflection as reflection on Phantasie can, as it often does, occur in immanent perception. But it can also occur in immanent imagining.6 External and immanent perception, as foundational types of actual and direct presenting consciousness, are dimensions within which other acts occur. Perceptual consciousness involves the direct givenness of objects as existent, present, and actual. It is the most primitive attitude toward the world, one in which we take its reality and certainty for granted. This attitude is the basis upon which all modified acts rely.7 Before I engage in an in-depth discussion of modification and modified acts, I wish to point out the occurrence of acts – volitions, judgments, memories and expectations – within this overall attitude that I refer to as 'realizing'. The realizing attitude posits the existence of objects as real, and it also presupposes their truth and certainty. In §2 of the current chapter I explore the imagining 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx. 20, 23, and No.9 (1909) 2 Hua XXIII, No.2c, and No.9 3 Cf., Hua XI, §§3-4, 16, 24 4 Cf., Chaper 1, §3 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2a, 2c, 2d, and 2f (1904-1912); cf., also No.14 (1911-1912) 6 Hua XXIII, No.9 7 I will discuss in detail In Chapter 2 the different types of modification Husserl analyses and identifies. 38 attitude as parallel consciousness dimension; in §§3 and 4, I juxtapose the two attitudes and show their equiprimordiality – i.e., their shared primitive, basic, and direct character. I can will, judge, remember or expect in the realizing attitude; what this entails is that these acts intend and give their objects as really existent and certain. The objects may not be present, as in the case of memory and expectation, but they are remembered as once having existed or as expected to exist. Perception is thus not a mere act – it is the direct givenness of the world as real and certain and it lies at the core of an attitude that assumes this about the world and the encountered objects. The realizing attitude, like perception is twodimensional – it is transcendent (or external) and immanent. If I judge an external1 or immanent2 state of affairs as existing and actual3, then the realizing attitude is transcendent. This might sound paradoxical in the case of immanent objects, but these acts as objects, though reell, i.e., not posited as existing in the external spatio-temporal world but instead as structural moments of the internal flow of actual consciousness, they are intended as direct counterparts of the actual ego without the actualization of self-reflection. Self-reflection is the mark of immanent consciousness. If I perform an act without actualizing self-reflection, regardless of whether this object is external or immanent, I do so in the transcendent realizing attitude. If, on the other hand, I reflect upon an act after or while engaging in it, I am aware of my performing of this act in the manner of self-reflection. Here again, the external or immanent status of the object is irrelevant; what matters is the actualizing of selfreflection as inherent potentiality of all acts performed in the external realizing attitude. Thus reflecting upon a judgment intending an external state of affairs (e.g., whether this coffee is or is not worth purchasing) and reflecting upon a judgment intending an immanent one (e.g., 1 The intended object of the above-mentioned acts is transcendent, i.e., intended and given as externally existing in the objective spatio-temporal world. 2 The intended object is an act as reell moment of consciousness – if I judge a state of affairs that is reell rather than real, for example in my judging whether a past or present memory is accurate or not. 3 Existing as 'real' in the case of transcendent objects and as 'reell' in the case of immanent objects. 39 whether this memory is accurate or not) are both examples of transcendent realizing consciousness. §2! . Realizing Consciousness – the Constitution of Reality Perception is constitutive of the real world as coherent and ordered.1 Realizing constitution is the direct givenness of objects as presently existent2; it is their being grasped and made to appear.3 We thus must not confuse constitution and creation. Perception as direct intuitive presentation is productive of reality as that which stands over against the empirical ego in an ontic and epistemic fashion.4 Perception is Gegenwärtigung where as all reproductive acts are Vergegenwärtigung.5 We must come to understand this productivity in terms of the givenness of objects, of their being and certainty, and of their harmonious actual world. Production stands for the direct encounter with the world as real and factual. All other realizing acts are reproductions or reproductive modifications of perception. This is the case with memory and memorial modification, which I explore in Chapter 2. We have already discussed image consciousness as reproduction in §1 of this chapter. As we shall see, Phantasie is also a type of reproduction, but it is radically different from both memory and image consciousness. Here I would simply like to emphasize perceptual appearance and intuition of objects as original and productive. Perception is intimately bound to the present, which is brought forth through the very act of perceiving.6 It is the passage toward the concrete, but also the sole access to 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx. 13, No.3 (1905/06); cf., also Hua XI, §§26, 45 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.12, 46, 65, 68-69 3 Hua XXIII, No.7 (1909), and No.7, Appx.29 (1910) 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.14 and No.14, Appx.34 (both 1911/12) 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Chs. 8-9 6 Hua XXII, No.1, pp. 102-103 40 actual presence.1 Sensation and its passive perceptual apprehension (or interpretation) lie at the originating center of internal time consciousness.2 Constitution is the givenness of the transcendent world as real, but it is also that of the immanent world as flow of consciousness.3 Perception lets the real world as present appear, and with it, it gives access to the present as the very center of gravity of internal consciousness, which is temporal consciousness.4 Thus in perception, we witness the constitution of both the immanent and the transcendent world.5 Perception has a complex and holistic temporal structure itself – it does not completely lack extension as duration. The consciousness of the present as constitutive of reality essentially points toward the past and the future; it includes the original impression (the apprehension of the sensuous content given in the now), retention (the transition of the apprehension-content complex from the now to the just now), and protention (the pointing toward the near future, the anticipation of the upcoming new now and its impression).6 By 1909/1910 Husserl employs impression to refer to the very core of perceptual apprehension, which stretches into the past and points toward the future. As this temporal-structural core of perception, impression is the original portal for accessing reality. Any reproductive realizing act is dependent upon and modifying of this impression. Reproductive acts, be they realizing or imagining, bring to presence that which is non-present7 and they are able to do 1 Memory is the access to actual non-presence as past being and expectation intends actual non-presence as future being. Perception alone is the act that opens and renders accessible the sphere of actual presence, of existence in the now. 2 Cf., Hua XI, §18 3 Cf., Hua XI, §23. For an extensive discussion of consitution and its place in Husserl's overall phenomenological project, see Sokolowski (1970). 4 For excellent discussions of time consciousness, see Rinofner-Kreidl (2000) and de Warren (2009). 5 Hua XXIII, No.14 (1911-1912) 6 Hua XXIII, No.14, Appx.33, 35; cf., also Hua XI, §§2-3, 18-19, 24 7 Non-presence has two senses here: nullity as non-being in realizing reproductions and nullity as irreality in imagining reproductions. 41 so in light of their structural dependence and connection to perception as constituting consciousness of presence.1 Immanent perception positions the acts and the apprehension of their objects in the overall flow of internal time consciousness.2 Such internal positioning (Stellung) is possible through the tripartite temporal structure of perception – impression, retention, protention. Consequently, objects not only gain duration, but if their duration is limited, their objective temporality is assigned a corresponding internal temporality gradually receding in the past but not lost since its re-accessing is always ideally within reach through recollection or memory. Objects are thus located both externally and in reference to internal consciousness. Perception is constitutive of the spatial order of the external world as real. It thus structures reality both spatially and temporally. Each perceptually appearing object has a stable horizon or environment within which it appears.3 This background is co-intended and co-intuitied and it affects, along with out past experience accessible through memory, our relation to the object. As we shall see in the following subsection, the world of perception is not entirely harmonious but it certainly strives to become so and maintain the best possible balance between past, present, and future experience as knowledge attainment. External perception locates or grants a positioning (Stellung) to transcendent objects within the objective spatio-temporal world.4 Spatio-temporal positioning (Stellung) is one of the main dimensions of perception as direct intuitive presentation. Related to positioning but different from it is the notion of positing (Setzung) – which is the belief qua certainty in the present existence and truth of the given object. Perception is the primary and most primitive positional act since it constitutes 1 Hua XXIII, No.15a (1912) 2 Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.56 (1918) 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.33, 46ff., 65-69; cf., also No.1, Ch.7 4 Cf., Hua XI, §1 42 and hence offers direct access to reality as present and certain. Reproductive positional acts such as memory, though they intend non-present objects, they bring them forth as real and certain because such acts are directly related to and dependent upon perception.1 This world as reality and actuality exhibits order and a holistic structure.2 Through this order we are able to identify irregularity and conflict and establish the norm, which guides our expectations. Expectation is conditioned by both present and past experience and occurs in light of the coherence we have grown accustomed to witnessing when objects appear repeatedly in their specific horizons. The nexus or world of reality is determined as existing and certain and real objects are individualized through perception and memory – they are assigned a unique position within the objective spatio-temporal world and the acts apprehending them are located in the overall unity of consciousness receding into the past and pointing toward the future.3 What is given in external perception is facticity, bound by empirical laws, mapped by our past experience, and viewed in light of our expectations.4 The fulfillment of these expectations can only occur through perceptual intuition (i.e., perceptual grasp) and is never guaranteed or fully completed.5 A sufficient level of similarity between the image object and the sujet secures the fulfillment or intuition of image consciousness. Perceptual fulfillment, which may never reach completion, consists of multiple, gradually enriching, different appearances of the same object – such as seeing it from a different angle (Abschattung), seeing its back side, or experiencing it through apprehensions that interpret contents stemming from different sensory fields.6 1 Hua XXIII, No.14, Appx.15 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.68-69, 72-73 3 Hua XI, §30 4 Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.45 5 Cf., Hua XI, §2 6 Cf., Hua XI, §§1, 16 43 The real world is a world of determinacy and harmony, and although this may guide us in our expectations, the latter can always be disappointed and harmony may be disrupted.1 Reality exhibits a certain degree of indeterminacy.2 Nevertheless, it is a 'determinable indeterminacy'3 and there is an infinite possibility of future determination4 since perceptual fulfillment can never reach completion. There will always be yet another facet of the real object to be apprehended and thus brought to appearance and to knowledge.5 Realizing consciousness essentially seeks to establish and maintain reality as harmonious because it is ultimately aiming at the attainment of factual knowledge.6 Without stability knowledge is but a dream. Thus, in realizing consciousness being and knowledge are fundamentally intertwined because stability is here ontically established. Real objects are given in perception as existing and certain. Perception is Wahr-nehmung, i.e., taking something to be true.7 Should anything disrupt this fragile assumption, the passive or active search for the reinstatement of being and certainty begins and does not cease until it secures them, at least temporarily. This stabilizing ontic and epistemic dynamic represents the very core of realizing consciousness and of perception as its original act.8 §2! . The Grounding Belief of Perception – Conflict and the Quest for Knowledge and Being Reality is the world of familiarity (Heimwelt) or striving for familiarity when it is lacking.9 Perception as realizing consciousness and constitutive of reality as familiar has belief as an essential structural moment. Our belief in the existence and truth or certainty of 1 Cf., Hua XI, §§22, 46 2 Hua XI, pp.7-8 3 Hua XI, p.6 4 Hua XI, p4ff. 5 Cf., Hua XI, §3 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.8-10 7 Hua XXIII, No.14; cf., also, Hua XI, §§1-4 8 Cf., Hua XI, §§20-21 9 Cf., Hua XI, §§1, 3 44 the transcendent perceptual objects is not something superposed on apprehension as selfstanding. Belief fuels apprehension and structurally pertains to it. All realizing apprehension exhibits this moment of belief and all perceptual apprehension is marked by belief as the unmodified (original) consciousness itself.1 Reality, as transcendent ontic dimension corresponding to realizing consciousness, mirrors a holistic system of belief.2 Being and doxa are therefore in a relation of direct correspondence – they are corresponding modalities.3 Thus, the doxic modality of belief as certainty has being-certain as its ontic modal counterpart.4 Certainty and being-certain are the most basic doxic and ontic modalities; they ground the entire doxic structure of realizing consciousness and the ontic structure of reality. Certainty is the original stance consciousness takes with respect to reality. It is an embedded presupposition as one of the essential and most primitive structures of the realizing attitude. Husserl refers to this presupposition as Urdoxa, i.e., the protodoxa – the primordial epistemic stance of realizing consciousness.5 Wahr-nehmung (i.e., the taking of something to be true) is this protodoxa – the original realizing consciousness.6 Perception is the experience of factical actuality par excellence. It entails our most primitive familiarity with the real world and it represents the naïve attitude of the everyday. The naïveté of this doxic stance lies in its being passively presupposed. It also refers to the stubbornness of the realizing consciousness in its attempt to regain certainty if anything threatens it. Familiarity and our taking it for granted are facets of a 1 Hua XXIII, No.19 (1912/13) 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2e 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.48 5 We see Husserl beginning to hint at this notion as early as 1908 (cf., Hua XXIII, No.4; cf., also, No.5, Appx.28 (1912 or later) and No.10 (1909)); however the idea was already latently present in 1905/06 when he discusses perception in terms of belief (Hua XXIII, No.3). In 1913 he refers to the Ur-doxa in his Ideas I (cf., Hua III/1, §§104, 114). However not until 1918 and the early 1920s does he come to fully explore this notion in his studies of passive and active synthesis compiled in Hua X and Hua XXXI, and also in Landgrebe's Erfahrung und Urteil. 6 Hua XXIII, No.14; cf., also Hua XI, §4 45 primitive perceptual-realizing attitude; anything that challenges this familiarity and thus conflicts with it is unfamiliar or otherwise than expected. I will soon focus on different types of unfamiliarity and the otherwise (cf., Chapter 1, §§3-4). What is of import here is the corresponding relation between familiarity and actuality as the real. The most basic reality constitution occurs at the level of the protodoxa – the level of perceptual passive synthesis. All intentional acts are synthetic – their structure is a whole whose parts are essentially related, they are located or positioned within the overall internal flow of consciousness, and they are constitutive of objects whose structures too are complex corresponding ordered wholes. But not all acts are passive – i.e., occurring without selfconsciousness (which is nevertheless ideally possible and latent in them) and in a receptive fashion. Receptivity is one of the main features of passive synthesis. Active syntheses are self-conscious, deliberately willed, and spontaneous.1 However, all active syntheses are grounded in passivity and receptivity. Passive synthesis is the foundation of active synthesis – this claim is central to Husserl's mature genetic view, which claims that all acts are structurally founded and exhibit a genetic development initiated in and through passivity.2 Perception may be passive or active (i.e., when I happen to perceive something vs. when I will to perceive something and thus search it in the environing world) – but originally, perception is passive. We have already touched upon the claim that all reproductive acts, be they realizing or imagining, are dependent upon perception. Memory, image consciousness, and Phantasie each have a specific relation of dependence to perception. However, the claim Husserl makes in his studies of passive and active synthesis is that acts like judgments and 1 Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40 2 I will focus on Husserl genetic method and claims in Part II, Ch.6. 46 even conceptual thought intending universals are grounded in perception as passive and receptive.1 Belief as original unmodified (passive) consciousness2 is the foundation for all passive or active acts. Perceptual consciousness as basic realizing attitude is ontically and epistemically motivated.3 I have already pointed at the tight relation between being and knowledge – in the passive realizing attitude the prescribed goal is the attainment of factual knowledge. The first form this knowledge takes in passivity is the protodoxa – the original belief in the existence and truth of the objects. This initial form is the basis for subsequent passive or active syntheses, but most importantly, it epistemically motivates and guides all syntheses in the realizing attitude. All encounters with the world as real do not solely entail being and existence, they also seek to establish truth and knowledge.4 Thus, perception as intuitive presentation of reality, essentially involves motivation as the teleological search for being and truth.5 The challenging of the original belief in the being and certainty of objects as real things in the world is most common. This inhibition (Hemmung) of the protodoxa stems from conflicting apprehensions. Unlike the conflict we witness in image consciousness, which is conflict between reality and irreality, the conflict specific to perception occurs entirely within the sphere of reality.6 The conflicting elements are thus apprehensions bringing forth an unexpected and other kind of ontic status. This disruption affects both ontic and doxic modalities. 1 Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.46, 48 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.3, 5, 11-13 3 Hua XXIII, No.4 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 5 Hua XXIII, Nos. 4, 15b, 15j, 15k; cf., also Hua XI, §§21-23 6 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.40-41 47 The disappointment (Enttäuschung) of perceptual expectation can take several forms, the most common of which being the contrast between past apprehensions and the present apprehension of one object.1 I have certain expectations in light of my past perceptual experience. These expectations can be contested by the present apprehension of the object revealing other qualities than those initially supposed to pertain to it.2 Hence, the expected ontic quality is annulled (aufgehoben) and the newly apprehended one established and affirmed as being-certain.3 However, the disappointment of expectations4 is not the only type of conflict that occurs in perception, though it is by far the most common. Another type of conflict within the realizing attitude is deception – i.e., perceptual or sensory illusion. Husserl makes an interesting distinction that helps clarify the paradox of image consciousness. He distinguishes between Bildbewusstsein and illusion as perceptual deception. The example that he employs for the latter is the experience of a wax mannequin that is initially posited as an existing real person.5 The consciousness of illusion occurs solely within the sphere of reality – I first believe the mannequin to exist as a human being, I then experience conflicting appearances of the mannequin (its stiffness seems unnatural in light of my past experience of human behavior) and hence vacillate in doubt between two beliefs – its being and non-being as real person; I eventually come to realize through further perceptual apprehensions that it had been a wax figure all along and not a human being. I 1 Cf., Hua XI, §22 2 I am looking at a red apple – I expect to find the same color appearing on the now concealed side once I turn it in my hand; however once I do this I apprehend the color green. My expectation has been disappointed and my past experience with red apples shown to be incomplete and misleading in the expectation it created. I here have two competing apprehensions – the grasping of the color red, which is what I expect given the redness of the side of apple I initially apprehended, and the grasping of the color green, which actually occurs when I turn the apple. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.16, Appx.51 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7 5 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 48-49; cf., also No.16, Appx.50 48 become conscious of the illusion and ascribe to the initially intended object its revised and presently appropriate ontic status – the human being does not exist. Deception as perceptual illusion involves tension within reality between two apprehensions of real objects1; this experience terminates with the positing of the initial object's being or non-being. The situation is very different in the case of hallucination as Phantasie illusion2 – here the irreal presents itself under the guise of the real – the imagined object and world are given with such clarity and intensity that I take them to be real, as in the case of fata morgana. Hallucination is Phantasie lacking self-reflection.3 We can also experience imagining (i.e., modified) deception, which is not the same as Phantasie illusion. In Phantasie deception, which occurs completely within the sphere of irreality, the conflict occurs between two apprehensions of irreal objects, for instance, between the apprehension of an imagined centaur and that of a unicorn. This conflict occurs particularly in obscure or unclear Phantasie, whereas Phantasie illusion exhibits a high level of clarity, able to suggest itself as reality. Although the two examples of conflict within the realizing attitude (i.e., disappointment of expectations and perceptual deception) are different they share several common features, which are exhibited by all conflict within the sphere of reality. First, there is the initial belief in the being of the object, which subsequently is either negated and replaced by non-being (as in the case of my turning the apple to see its concealed side) or is put under question in vascillating doubt4 which terminates with the reaffirmation of the initial belief in its being or with the negation of this belief and hence the establishing of the 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, §§5, 12, Appx.9, 11, No.4 (1908), No.6 (1909), No.7 (1909), No.10 (1909). For deception in positional memory see No.14, Appx.34, No.15, Appx.37, 46, No.16, Appx.49 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, §§5, 8, 12, No.1, Appx.7, 11, No.7 (1909), No.13, (1910) No.15a-c, No.16, No.16, Appx.51, No.17 (all 1912) 3 Hua XXIII, No.13 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.11 49 object's non-being (as in the case of perceptual deception as illusion). Second, whatever the reason and nature for the disruption of the protodoxa as belief in the being and certainty of the object as real, a resolution is necessarily sought and demanded given the epistemic and ontic motivational structure of realizing consciousness. The realizing attitude cannot tolerate uncertainty – all vascillation as questioning and doubt must come to an end, which affirms one apprehension and negates the other.1 One apprehension must be brought to passive confirmation (Bewahrheitung)2 thus securing the reestablishing of the lost initial balance – i.e., the belief in the certainty and being of the object.3 We must note here that this belief is no longer naïve since it has undergone modification4 from the initially presupposed stance. Reaffirmed being is not the presupposed being of the protodoxa. Conflict is fundamentally related to questioning. The goal of the realizing attitude is the attainment of factual knowledge.5 The motivation toward truth and certainty is initially exhibited in the protodoxa and remains central despite the fact that this primive doxic stance is repeatedly and constantly challenged.6 Conflict within the realizing attitude and with respect to the world as real is this very challenging of the protodoxa and of any subsequently modified doxic modalities accepted through confirmation (Bewahrheitung) and annulment (Aufgehobenheit). What I would like to point out here is the significance of conflict in the context of the ontic and epistemic motivation of the realizing attitude. We come to question through conflict or when we engage the possibility of conflict. For instance, when I wonder about the qualities of a presently concealed side of a perceptual object I am aware of the 1 We see Husserl here emphasize the validity of the principle of non-contraction even at the level of passive knowledge attainment. 2 In judgment as active synthesis reestablishing validity occurs through validation (Bewährung) rather than confirmation (cf., Hua XI, §12; cf., also Hua XI, §§16-25). For a difference between passive and active modalization, see No.15, Appx.47 3 Cf., Hua XI, §§5-15 4 For an extensive discussion of modality modification see Part I, Ch.1 5 Cf., Hua XI, §21 6 Hua XI, §23 50 uncertainty I am facing. The apple appears red from where I perceive it now, but its back side could be green or yellow as well as red. In light of my present and past experience with red apples I expect its back side to appear red once I turn the apple in my hand. Despite the harmony of the real world and the coherence of past experience, which is the achievement of realizing motivation, I cannot be certain this expectation will be fulfilled. Even before conflict occurs – the other side of the apple appears as green – the very possibility of conflict and of my initial presupposition's being challenged opens the questioning mode of realizing consciousness. In the case of perceptual deception the conflict between the two apprehensions and the uncertainty it triggers leads me to question the validity of each. Conflict, uncertainty, and questioning are fundamentally intertwined.1 They are also intimately related to possibility.2 Questioning within the realizing attitude is ineffably guided toward reestablishing the being and certainty of the intended objects. There is little or no tolerance for uncertainty and doubt in the realizing attitude. Due to the luring and potent influence of the protodoxa, all acts occurring in realizing consciousness succumb to the search for being and certainty. They are essentially or structurally bound to covet certainty with respect to the being and truth of their actual objects (transcendent or immanent).3 In the following section we shall see that the situation is radically different in the case of Phantasie, in which other types of conflict are revealed and which tolerates and even fuels the uncertainty and doubt stemming from these conflicts. More importantly, we will consider4 the ways in which this tolerance is crucial for the possibility of other types of questioning – one that occurs outside the boundaries of facticity and free of the demands of realizing consciousness. 1 Cf., Ch.1, §§3-4 2 Cf., Ch.3 3 Hua XI, §§21-22 4 Chapter 1, §§3-4 51 §3. The World of Phantasie – Irreality, Inquiry, and the Otherwise In this section I focus primarily on the specific structure of Phantasie and on its unique features and dimensions. So far we have gotten mere glimpses at the ways in which imagining consciousness differs from image consciousness and perception. It is now time to fully bring to the fore what Husserl uncovered about Phantasie, but also to consider the implications of his discoveries. I begin by pointing out the key aspects of his transition away from analyzing Phantasie in terms of Bildbewusstsein and subsequently discussing his mature views with respect to the structure of imagining consciousness. These views stem from his comparative study of imagination and perception. §3! . Mental Images and Phantasie – from Bildbewusstse in to Wahrnehmung Irreality is a world of its own – self-standing and coherent, exhibiting structure and an order that mirrors reality.1 And yet irreality is essentially incompatible with reality.2 Focusing on image consciousness offers a glimpse into the fundamental differences between these two worlds and the two corresponding consciousnesses – the realizing consciousness of perception and the imagining consciousness of Phantasie. This is so because the paradoxical structure of Bildbewusstsein involves both of them– it is both perceptual and imagining (we see this in the nature of the two apprehensions at work in imaging consciousness), and its irreal sujet is both within and without reality as it appears in a space stretched open at the very center of the real and actual world. In this subsection I would like to emphasize the key structures and dimensions of Bildbewusstsein and follow the movement of Husserl's thought away from thinking Phantasie on the model of image consciousness to rethinking it through a parallel with perception as direct intuitive presentation. Husserl's toil in making this transition is indicative of the strong 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.8-9 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.16 (1912) 52 hold the initial approach had on his studies of Phantasie. The luring power of this initial angle of analysis stemmed from Husserl's own project to move beyond the problems of empiricism (such as 'mental images' and 'content') and from the difficulties he encountered on the way. The temptation to employ the conceptual framework of mental images was still sporadically successful as late as 1918, especially in his comparative discussions of memory and imagining. I would thus like to stress the essential differences between imaging and imagining. In this section, I wish to show that imaging and imagining are two radically distinct ways of accessing irreality and that Phantasie, or imagining consciousness, is the most direct, unencumbered, and primitive path toward the irreal, just like perception is the foundational encounter and constitution of the real. I thus hope to uncover the equiprimordiality of realizing and imagining consciousness. Husserl frequently employed the juxtaposing and analogical method in his phenomenological studies – just before 1900, he begins his inquiry into the structure and nature of Phantasie or imagining consciousness by comparing it to Bildbewusstsein (image consciousness). Such methodological venues typically have the advantage of revealing unique aspects of the objects as the very differences that set them apart. However, Husserl's goal in this particular inquiry was to achieve and uncover similarities rather than differences between these two acts or types of consciousness. Stark differences, such as the lack of a perceptual founding apprehension in Phantasie, soon came to light. Nevertheless the driving source of energy for this phenomenological study was showing the structural parallelism between Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein. This goal clouded the matters at hand and heavily tilted the search in one direction thus precluding other angles from revealing themselves as viable alternatives. Not until 1910-1912 does he come to realize the influence this approach had had and the need to completely rethink the terms of the comparison. The value of Husserl's 53 analyses during the 1900s is not to be completely contested since they revealed much about imaging and imagining. His goal, however, did not let him rest and the search for this unwarranted parallelism continued despite significant insights suggesting a different method. At times one sees him torn between the initial method that he had opted for and new different approaches1; however, comparing imaging and imagining was time and time again proving to be too tempting to resist. Thus Husserl cyclically returned to this juxtaposition, despite his insight into other ways of thinking about Phantasie. The main danger of this comparative project proves to be structural superimposition – once Husserl established and described image consciousness his search focused on finding the same structural elements or moments in Phantasie. In 1898 he claims that there is the equivalent of an image object in imagining consciousness.2 This was perhaps the most potent claim, one that misguided most of his subsequent analyses of this act. If there is a mental image in consciousness, there must also be the equivalent of the modifying apprehension we see in Bildbewusstsein. We thus witness a doubling of apprehension in Phantasie – one apprehension leading the to the presentation (Präsentation) of the mental image and the other to the representation (Repräsentation) of the imagined object. Moreover, there must be a consciousness of difference and similarity between this image and the intended object. Both imaging and imagining are thus placed under the category of indirect, non-genuine (uneigentlich), intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung), which is equated on the one hand with Imagination as class of acts involving mental images, and with Veranschaulichung as illustrative bringing to intuition of that which is non-present on the other. These are the most potent claims stemming from the initial (1898) juxtaposition of imaging and imagining – a mental image in Phantasie as the equivalent of the imaging 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.86 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1 54 Bildobjekt, two apprehensions, the consciousness of difference between image and intended object, and the indirect or non-genuine character of Phantasie. They are interconnected and hence need to be overcome as a whole – dismissing one but holding on to another is a contradictory endeavor, one that Husserl found himself engaged in 1904/05 during the time of his first lengthy study and lecture course on imagining consciousness. Let me point out some of the key claims Husserl made in this analysis. The comparison of imaging and imagining lays out the approach of this study. Thus, in the fall/winter of 1904 Husserl holds as true all of the above-mentioned claims already made in 1898. He soon comes to realize that a full structural parallelism is out of the question because there are no equivalent structural moments in Phantasie for the Bildding and its perceptual apprehension.1 Nevertheless he still claims that there are two apprehensions at work in imagination – one giving access to the mental image or 'Phantasie image' and the other bringing forth the intended imagined object.2 Positing two apprehensions is directly linked to positing mental images, and both are the basis for the claim that Phantasie is an indirect intuitive presentation.3 Perception is here discussed as direct presentation, having one apprehension and no mental image. Husserl acknowledges very early that there is a radical difference between perception and Phantasie, but he considers this difference to be primarily structural or structurally-based. He presupposes that imagining has a significantly more complex structure than perception because the latter is claimed to be direct while the former indirect.4 In Husserl's view, in Phantasie, as in imaging, there is a consciousness of similarity and difference (since similarity implies lack of perfect likeness) between the image and the 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.18-20 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.21-23 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.23-25 4 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.23 55 intended object.1 We already saw in section 1 that there needs to be a sufficient amount of similarity between the image and the sujet for the consciousness to qualify as imaging. Should such similarity be insufficient the consciousness would either be signifying or symbolizing. The claim of the consciousness of difference as structural moment of Bildbewusstsein is fairly easy to make in light of the 'picture' given through the perceptual apprehension as instigator of the mental image. One could aesthetically or phenomenologically focus on the Bildobjekt and its apprehension. But how could one establish the occurrence of such a consciousness in the structure of Phantasie? Could one distinguish between image and imagined object? Initially Husserl unwarrantedly claims the possibility of such a distinction. I shall soon discuss what mislead him into making this claim besides his interest in the structural parallel between imaging and imagining – he confused the various appearances of the same imagined object with mental images. Another distinction between Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein that comes to the fore and is related to the lack of a perceptual apprehension in Phantasie is the way in which these two types of consciousness give access to irreality. We discussed in detail the manner in which imaging brigs forth the irreal sujet by tearing open another horizon or world at the very heart of reality; we noted the tension occurring at the very edges as frames of Cézanne's painting. But imagining a centaur does not happen through an initial perceptual moment and the irreal horizon within which the centaur is given (i.e., it background, environment, etc.) is not in direct tension with the world as real. There is no structural conflict between reality and irreality at the core of Phantasie.2 There is here a consciousness of difference between the real and the irreal, as in the case of imaging, but this is because both imaging and imagining are self-reflective – i.e., one is aware of the non-presence or irreality of the object while 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.25-27 2 Hua XXIII No.1, pp.49, 54-63, No.1, Appx.8-9 56 intending it.1 Phantasie brings forth the irreal apart from any direct dependence on perception and as a separate and self-standing world. This insight Husserl had in 1904/05 should have planted the seed of doubt in the validity of his initial comparative project. Instead he did not fully explore it and limited himself to exploring the difference in terms of the fullness and stability of the irreal worlds of imaging and imagining. Thus he claims that the lack of a perceptual apprehension and physical image primarily entails a lack of stability of Phantasie irreality.2 Such claims cannot hope to illuminate the heart of the matter and are at best tangential and poorly established. But they can lead to further misleading endeavors. Husserl had to find a way of dealing with the lack of a perceptual apprehension in Phantasie. In image consciousness the Bildobjekt is a figment (Fiktum) – a mental image triggered by and brought forth through perceptual givenness. The mental image of Phantasie could not be a figment in this sense.3 His instincts, which always lead him in the right direction4, were not fully overwhelmed – given that Phantasie irreality does not appear with the aid of perception he asks himself: "[h]ow does it appear, then? Does it actually appear in the manner of an image? Does an image object through which an image subject is intuited actually become constituted in phantasy? I must confess that again and again I was seized by serious doubts here"5 Whether we could have mental images other than figments founded on perceptual apprehensions is a question worth asking – Husserl himself did not directly engage this question but his insistence upon claiming the occurrence of mental images in Phantasie indicates that he assumed this position – as a consequence he also insisted on the difference 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.58-59 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.58 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.54-55 4 Whether he always followed them or not is a different matter. 5 PICM, p.60. "[w]ie erscheint es also? Erscheint es wirklich in der Weise eines Bildes? Konstituiert sich wirklich in der Phantasie ein Bildobjekt, durch das hindurch ein Bildsujet angeschaut wird? Ich muss gestehen, das ich hier immer wieder von ernstem Zweifel ergriffen wurde" (Hua XXIII, No.1, p.55). 57 between figment and mental image1. I here wish to point out a different view – one that includes two main points. First, that all mental images are figments. As such they are directly or indirectly reliant upon a foundational perceptual apprehension and sensation. Consequently, there are no mental images in structurally simple acts (such as Phantasie), which do not rely upon perceptual apprehension. Second, that claiming figments or mental images as structural elements of imaging consciousness is a redundant position that could be reinterpreted in light of appearance (Erscheinung). Instead of analyzing the structure of Bildbewusstsein in terms of both appearances and mental images2, the former can be shown to easily replace the latter. Thus, we could rethink the structure of both Phantasie and Bildbewusstsein apart from the 'image' conceptual framework. This position is one Husserl was always tempted to adopt in so far as a he was an avid critic of British empiricism and the reification of images as somehow existing 'in' consciousness.3 However, he did not take this claim to fruition – instead of rejecting the existence of images 'in' consciousness but finding a way of reclaiming their relevance as 'reell' structural elements of imaging and imagining consciousness, Husserl could have rejected both their 'real' existence in consciousness and their 'reell' presence at a structural level. As early as 1905 Husserl sporadically points out the direct appearance of irreality in Phantasie.4 He holds this position more decisively by 1909/19105 and 19126 while also employing the conceptual framework of mental images7 – which entails a structural contradiction. By 1918 Husserl ceases to employ 'mental image' in reference to the structure 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.17, pp.489-490, and No.17, Appx.50 2 In 1904/05 at the time of his first extensive study of Phantasie Husserl is adamant about distinguishing between mental image and appearance in Bildbewusstsein and emphasizes the same distinction in the structural context of Phantasie also (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.68). 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, and Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.22-23 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9-10, 13 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.6, 8 6 Hua XXIII, No.15h 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15i 58 of Phantasie, but he begins to utilize it more heavily in the context of memory – thus often speaking of 'memory images'.1 What is so troubling here is that during this period Husserl is interested in structurally comparing memory and Phantasie, claiming that the latter has a role to play in the former. Chapter 2 dismisses the possibility of realizing memory being structurally founded on Phantasie; here we should point out the danger of importing mental images back into the structure of imagining not via imaging but through memory. The conceptual framework centered around mental images still makes its potent impact felt as late as 1922/23 when Husserl still speaks of 'memory images'.2 As we acknowledge the tumultuous nature of Husserl's journey toward clarifying Phantasie as direct imageless presentation, we should also emphasize the key claims that came to light through this toil. First, there are no mental images in Phantasie and perhaps even in Bildbewusstsein. Second, though both image consciousness and imagination are reproductions or presentifications (i.e., Vergegenwärtigungen) – they have radically different relations to perception as production.3 And third, imaging and imagining grant access to the irreal in distinct ways. The former does so through a structural conflict with reality and thus in a mediated fashion, and the latter directly and without reliance upon perception and conflict with reality. I now turn to Husserl's mature view of Phantasie. §3! . The Structure of Phantasie as imagining consciousness Phantasie is a type of direct intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung).4 It has, like perception, a simple structure – one apprehension and its content (i.e., phantasma) and one appearance (i.e., of the intended object).5 Phantasma, the content of Phantasie, is the 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 3 For a discussion of Phantasiemodifikation and the relation between Phantasie and perception see Chapter 2. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§5, 38, No.1, Appx.9 5 Hua XXIII, No.4 (1908) 59 counterpart of sensation as the content of perception. It essentially demands a doxically neutral interpretation (i.e., no claim is made about the object's ontic status) whereas sensation is apprehended in a doxically charged fashion (the object is given as existent and certain1)2. Phantasmata are suggestive of the irreal, but despite this they are reell present contents, and so is the act of imagining.3 Phantasie has a radically different content and apprehension than perception as realizing consciousness.4 As we shall see in this section, the difference between perception and Phantasie is not solely based on their contents.5 They are distinct acts with parallel structures; the difference between them stems from what Husserl refers to as Phantasiemodifikation, which I explore in Chapter 2. The imagined object appears in an unmediated fashion. Thus, in Phantasie, there is no mental image as Bildobjekt6 'into' which we 'see' (hineinschauen) the intended object (i.e., sujet): "The phantasy appearance, the simple phantasy appearance unencumbered by any imaging built on it, relates to its object just as straightforwardly as perception does."7 Phantasie presentation is a simple8 and genuine (eigentlich) presentation. We see here the radical structural difference between Bildbewusstsein and Phantasie – the former, Husserl claims, exhibits a difference between mental image and object; the latter, as he eventually comes to 1 This initial doxic stance, i.e., the protodoxa, can always be challenged along with the object's positive ontic stance – the latter may become 'being-questionable', 'being-probable', and even 'non-being'. 2 Sensation and phantasma as contents lack an intentional character; they gain it through apprehension, i.e., through their being interpreted (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§5, 39) 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§37, 51-52, No.5 (1909) 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§5, 7, 35 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§6, 45-49 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§26-27, 42, 49-50; cf., also No.1, Appx.7, 10, 13; No.2f, No.2, Appx.22, No.17 (1912) 7 PICM, p.92. "Die Phantasieerscheinung, die schlichte, mit keiner daraufgebauten Bildlichkeit beschwerte, bezieht sich ebenso einfältig auf den Gegenstand wie die Wahrnehmung" (Hua XXIII, No.1 (1904/05), §42, p.85). Husserl makes this insightful claim in 1904/05 during his first lecture on Phantasie; however, as we shall see in §4 of this chapter, he fails to be fully consistent about it until 1918 when his juxtaposition of perception and Phantasie occurs in terms of positionality and non-positionality (i.e., ontic and doxic neutrality). 8 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.8 (1909) 60 see, has an unmediated appearance of the object apart from all imaging.1 Thus, in Phantasie as in perception2, there is no consciousness of difference (or similarity) between an image and the object. Nevertheless we must distinguish (in the context of perceptual or Phantasie direct givenness) between the appearance of the object and the object itself.3 I imagine a centaur – in one apprehension it appears from its profile and the lighting is dim – I cannot quite tell what it is doing; in a subsequent apprehension it appears from the front and the lighting is different – the sun is now permeating the thick ceiling of the primeval forest in which I 'see' this creature; it its holding a broken arrow and weeping. Two apprehensions, two intentional rays, aiming at the same object presented in two ways but nevertheless the same. I am conscious of the difference between any of these two appearances and the intended object. This, however, is not the difference Husserl claims to exist between mental image and object in Bildbewusstsein. Any transcendent perceived4 or imagined object5 is given in a perspectival fashion (Abschattung). All transcendent intuitive presentations give the object perspectivally.6 Two things are worth emphasizing here. First, Phantasie can be clear or obscure. If the lack of clarity is significant the object is at best partially given; if the degree of clarity decreases drastically from one apprehension to another, in the context of the same imagining 1 I discuss in §3 the possibility of rethinking this framework of analysis in the case of image consciousness – could it be that what seems to be a mental image is simply confused with the appearance of the object? If we can show this is feasible we can subsequently put forth a structural analysis of imaging free of the conceptual apparatus and language of mental images, initially suggested by Aristotle in Book III of his De Anima and subsequently taken to a whole new level in British empiricism, esp. in the context of the theory of abstraction. In Part II, Chapter 4 I will focus on the structure and nature of abstraction as Husserl conceives it prior to 1913 and in light of the impact British empiricism and 19th c. philosophy of mathematics had on his analyses. Yet again, as in the case of mental images and Phantasie, we witness Husserl's struggle to disentangle himself from the empiricist conceptual framework, which was initially instilled in his methodological approaches due to the influence of his mentor Brentano, who was devoted to empiricism. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §32 3 This distinction maps onto Husserl's later (1913 and onward) noetic-noematic structural correspondence. I focus on this structure in Part II, Chapter 2. 4 Cf., Hua XI, §§1, 16 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, p.16 6 Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9 61 intentional complex, the intended object may very well morph into something else. Fluctuation of the degree of clarity can impact the intending of the object1; nevertheless, some fluctuation, if not significant, will not preclude the intending of the same imagined object, as in the case of my perspectival 'seeing' of the weeping centaur. Given that there is only one apprehension, along with the pertaining appearance, in Phantasie, multiple apprehensions of the same object suggest multiple acts of imagining. But they are linked in terms of intentionality and meaning – one object appears from different angles. These Phantasie acts form a nexus or an intentional complex. Due to their link they may or may not2 give the object as enduring in time. The issue of the clarity or obscurity of Phantasie is a significant one since Husserl classifies some types of imagining by placing them on a continuum of clarity and obscurity having as extremes total clarity and total obscurity. Thus we have two liminal cases of Phantasie one of which is most interesting – the case of perfectly clear Phantasie.3 Imagining with such clarity brings forth irreality that in most cases tempts one to interpret it as reality – it thus becomes irreality under the guise of reality. The case of hallucination as Phantasie illusion is such an example4 – I am imagining but due to the clarity and vivacity of the given irreal object I become lost in its world and thus suppress the latent or active self-reflection that renders all imagining consciousness aware of the irreality of its objects. I confuse the irreal with the real and imagining with perception. 1 For the protean character of Phantasie, see Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.58-71. 2 The intentional link between different imaginative apprehensions does not necessarily imply the temporal continuity of the object. I may very well imaginatively see an instantaneous object, such as a lightning, from different perspectives. I 'see' it now far away above the mountain range; I 'see' it next so close I feel its energy surrounding me – the buzzing of the tense stormy air makes me restless and I am overwhelmed by expectation. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §2 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 58-69, No.1, Appx.1, §§5, 8, 12, No.1, Appx.7, 11, No.7 (1909), No.13, (1910) No.15a-c, No.16, No.16, Appx.51, No.17 (all 1912) 62 Second, as in the case of perception, the grasping of an irreal object as having duration gives this object individuality and uniqueness. This duration is on the one hand established in relation to the reell imagining act as occurring within the actual flow of consciousness. It is also, on the other hand, assigned an irreal temporality – the temporality pertaining to the irreal spatial world of the object.1 I thus see the weeping of the centaur and notice that the tears are flowing in a fast streaming way. Irreal time may flow slower or faster than real objective time – it may even flow backwards. Regardless of the characteristic of irreal time it is significant that the irreal object is temporally and spatially positioned, and thus individualized.2 §3! . Imagining Consciousness and the Constitution of Irreality In contrast to perception, Phantasie gives its object as present but not real. The imagined object is a non-present presence3 – an object given 'as if' (als ob) it were present or 'as it were' (gleichsam) present.4 Imagining shares this trait with all reproductive acts (Vergegenwärtigungen), which are reliant in some way or another upon perception as production.5 Memory intends and intuits its past object 'as if' it were present; similarly, expectation intends its future object 'as if' it were present. However, 'present' here is ambiguously employed. Memory and expectation are intentional acts primarily occurring in the realizing attitude – the object may be past or future, but it is positioned in the world as real. The act of remembering or expecting is located in relation to the present as the original source of internal time consciousness, thus the grasp or givenness of the object is positioned both 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, pp.178-179 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2a (1904); cf., also No.2, fn.2, p.175 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.12, 58ff., and §§34-52 4 For an extensive discussion of the notion of 'als ob', see Vaihinger (1911). 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §48, No.2, Appx.22, and No.2e (1908), No.15a; cf., also Hua XI, p.243ff. I discuss Phantasie as reproduction in great detail in the context of Phantasiemodifikation, in Chapter 2. 63 externally within the real and actual world and immanently in the nexus of the fundamentally temporal actual consciousness. The object as non-present presence pertains to the transcendent world of reality and/or1 to the immanent actual world of consciousness. 'Presence' in this case essentially entails the reality and actuality of the object. The 'as if' and 'as it were' of reproductions occurring in the realizing attitude (i.e., positing the being and certainty of the object) has the primary meaning of absence.2 Imagining is a self-standing consciousness constitutive of a separate world – the irreal.3 Phantasie (like perception) is constituting, but unlike perception its constitution is not realizing – it does not posit the given objects as real and certain. We must strictly differentiate between these two types of constitution4 and their respective radically different worlds.5 We must begin by unpacking the ambiguous notions of 'presence' and 'nonpresence' at work here. The 'presence' of the imagined object refers solely to its being presently given. We have already seen that all acts are potentially self-reflective. If this self-reflective capacity were to be actualized in the case of imagining acts we would become aware of the object's present givenness and appearance. Phantasie, just like all intentional acts, is reell (i.e., a structural moment of internal actual consciousness as immanent nexus)6; and like all intentional acts, it is essentially self-reflective.7 'Presence' in the case of imagination does not imply the reality and actuality of its object.8 The latter does not lack positioning (Stellung) – it 1 If the object is an act, then it is solely positioned within the immanent sphere of consciousness. If it is transcendent, it is located and individualized both temporally and spatially – it is located in the real external world and with respect to the immanent sphere. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.13 (1910) 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 49, 57-58, 67-68, No.1, Appx.8-9; No.2c (1905), No.15, Appx.37, 40, 48; cf., also Hua XI, p.244ff. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.44 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§37, 51-52 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.58-59, No.2a (1904), No.2b (1905) 8 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7 64 is located in the irreal world or horizon constituted in Phantasie. Like an external perceptual object, the external imagined object (i.e., non-reell but irreal) does not appear separated from all context – it has a background, spatial relations to other objects, it appears from a certain angle, at a certain distance, with more or less clarity. All transcendent presentations exhibit this feature – they give their objects as positioned within a spatio-temporal world and context.1 But what the imagined object does lack is positing (Setzung) – in being presented, no claim is being made about its existence or certainty. It lacks an ontic modality and Phantasie as act lacks a corresponding doxic modality.2 The imagined object is irreal.3 The 'as if' and 'as it were' of Phantasie as imagining reproduction primarily entails the ontic neutrality of the object not its mere objectively temporal and spatial absence.4 Thus non-presence (given 'as if' it were present) has different meanings in memory and in Phantasie. In the former it refers to past being whereas in the latter it points at neither being nor non-being.5 We must here further explore the dimensions of the imagined object's 'non-presence'. The imagined object may be extant but presently absent or elsewhere, non-existing, impossible, or lacking a suggested ontic status. Thus I can imagine my grandparents' porch while I am away from it and in this case I am imagining an object I have memories of.6 I could also imagine the Mayan temples of the Yucatán peninsula, which fascinated me as a young teenager, and in this case I would be imagining an object that I merely read or heard about without having actual memories of it. In both of these instances the objects are extant but elsewhere. The imagined object may be non-existent – I imagine a golden mountain. It may also be impossible – I imagine a square circle. Lastly, it may or may not exist as in the 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§7, 35 2 We will explore this feature of imagining consciousness in terms of neutrality in Chapter 2. We should here emphasize several significant insights about Phantasie. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §37 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2 (1904/09/12), Nos. 7-10 (1909) 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.18 (1918), No.19 (1922/23), No.19, Appx.61-63 6 I.e., my actual memory informs the act of imagining. 65 case of my imagining what I consider an ideal umbrella – as such, this object lacks a suggested ontic modality. All of these objects are imagined and thus irreal – what grants them their irreality is not their suggested non-presence as absence or non-being. That would qualify as non-reality rather than irreality. No – what renders them irreal is their being given in a doxically neutral fashion – while I imagine any of these objects I am completely indifferent with respect to their ontic status. They may exist elsewhere, not exist at all, be impossible, or I may simply not know whether they exist or not – what matters is that they appear and are thus given to me in a doxically neutral fashion. I intend their appearance alone, apart from all doxic and ontic claims. Another way of mapping these different categories of imagined objects while acknowledging their irreality is in terms of possibility.1 Imagined objects as extant but elsewhere exhibit the real possibility of becoming actually grasped in perception and thus given as being and certain. The imagined object is here positionable2 or conceivable3. Imagined objects as non-existing may be positionable at some point in the future or nonpositionable, as in the case of the golden mountain. Non-positionable imagined objects lack the real possibility of being grasped as extant.4 Impossible imagined objects5 lack the ideal possibility6 of being intuited7 (as existent or otherwise) because their existence implies a logical contradiction. Lastly, imagined objects lacking a suggested ontic status exhibit irreal possibility – a possibility of conceiving something apart from existence or non-existence and 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.42, and No.18 – Husserl here does not explicitly map these suggested ontic modalities of irreal objects on the threefold structure of possibility; nevertheless he seems to point toward such an interpretation and analysis. 2 Hua XXIII, No.18 (1918) 3 Hua XXIII, No.15k 4 This is the case of the centaur as irreal nullity (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7). 5 Hua XXIII, No.14 6 Cf., for instance Hua XXIII, No.15b-c. For an in-depth discussion of possibility, including ideal possibility, see Chapter 3. 7 They may be intended or meant but this intention is bound to remain empty – it cannot be fulfilled through intuition. 66 hence beyond the ontic and epistemic sphere of influence of realizing consciousness and facticity. I discuss these three types of consciousness (i.e., real, irreal, and ideal) at great length in Chapter 3 where I also explore their relation to and impact on various types of inquiries with different methodologies and goals, with a special focus on the phenomenological method, which is thoroughly explored in Part II of this project. We have already seen in section 2 of this chapter that perception can be immanent or external (i.e., transcendent). This is the case with Phantasie also. In immanent Phantasie I can imagine that I reflect upon my present imagining act just as I can imagine that I reflect on any act whatsoever – whether it intends its object as real or irreal.1 I can imaginatively reflect on any act regardless of the ontic status of its object. I can thus imaginatively reflect on both realizing acts (e.g., an actual judgment that I now perform intending an actual state of affairs) and on imagining acts (e.g., an inactual judgment one that occurs in the imagining consciousness and whose object is irreal rather than real (real)).2 The difference between immanent perception and immanent Phantasie consists in the former having the actual ego as unifying pole of realizing-actual consciousness and the latter having the imagining ego as unifier of imagining consciousness.3 Immanent Phantasie has appearances as its objects as well, but the manner in which these appearances are given is fundamentally other than that of immanent perception. This observation is of the utmost importance – we have two venues for reflection and selfreflection. One focusing on acts given as actual and one focusing on acts as inactual. The former involves the belief in their actuality, the latter implies no such belief and engages 1Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, pp. 176-177, No.2d (1907/08), No.2, Appx.23 (1910) 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 96-98, No.2 a-d, and esp. No.2f 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.16 and 18 (both 1912). As I shall discuss in §3 of Chapter 1, Phantasie or imagining consciousness has its own temporal and spatial horizon. 67 these acts in 'mere thought'.1 We must note here the claim that the objects of immanent perception and Phantasie, the objects of reflection and self-reflection, are appearances. This is crucial for our attempt to elucidate the nature of phenomenological inquiry whose objects too are appearances. Phenomenological inquiry must be related to immanent perception and Phantasie in so far as it shares this common trait with them. But unlike reflection in the natural attitude (i.e., reflection bound by facticity as external existence, as in the case of external perception, or as actuality, in the case of immanent perception), phenomenological reflection is free from such assumptions. Interestingly enough so is immanent Phantasie. Both immanent and external Phantasie lack the belief in the actuality and reality of their objects – be they transcendent or reell. In Chapter 2 I explore this feature of Phantasie. In Part II, I focus on this feature's relation to the phenomenological method of inquiry. There is one further distinction we need to make here – Phantasie is different from immanent imaging.2 Husserl analyzes immanent imaging in terms of the consciousness of difference between image and object. Unlike external imaging – i.e., imaging whose foundational apprehension is perceptual – immanent imaging lacks a perceptual apprehension but exhibits a mental image as one of its structural moments. This image does not solely function as pathway toward the presentation of the intended object, as in the case of external imaging; it also functions as a reell sign (i.e., not a transcendent sign initially perceptually given). It points toward another object either similar to the intended object or somehow related to it. Immanent imaging can thus trigger memorial association. Despite the fact that imagined objects too can function associatively as signs, their appearance does so itself – there is no mental image involved in the association.3 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15g 2 For a more detailed discussion of immanent imaging, see §1, Chapter 1. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.20 (1909 or 1912) 68 Similar to the realizing attitude, the imagining attitude or consciousness is transcendent or immanent. It is transcendent if the imagining act is performed without the actualization of the potentiality for self-reflection, regardless of the irreal or reell status of the object. I say irreal instead of real because no imagining act, be it Phantasie proper or a judgment, volition or memory in the imagining consciousness, intends its object as real (real) – i.e., as actually existing. Imagining acts intend their objects as irreal but this irreality is ambiguous – it can either refer to external or transcendent irreality, as in the case of an imagined centaur, or it can refer to immanent irreality or inactuality, as in the case of an imagined act. The imagining attitude is immanent if the imagining act is performed in selfreflection. For instance when I imagine that I remember and I am self-conscious of this imagined memory as I perform the act of imagining.1 As suggested by the structure of external and immanent perception and Phantasie – the two are consciousness dimensions that function as 'loci' for other acts. They are equally fundamental and basic reflective attitudes – one realizing, the other imagining.2 I can thus judge in the realizing attitude and posit the existence or non-existence of the state of affairs. This is actual judgment. I can also actually reflect upon my actual judgment in immanent perception, which is the same as actual self-reflection (performed by the actual ego-pole). But I can judge in the imagining attitude and thus not posit the existence or non-existence of the transcendent state of affairs, which is now given as irreal.3 Finally, I can imaginatively reflect upon an imagined judgment and thus not posit the actuality of this act.4 It is important to note here that acts occurring in imagining consciousness do not lose the structure and order or coherence they exhibit in realizing consciousness. Thus the imagined 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.19 2 For the following types of acts and reflection/self-reflection see Hua XXIII, No.1, §49. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§46, 48-49, No.2b (1905). In No.1, §49 Husserl emphasizes the neutrality of the imagined judgment in terms of its lack of choice/decision and subsequent deed/action. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2b 69 judgment may very well be valid despite its being inactual. Of great significance here is Husserl's classification of acts in terms of their realizing or imagining character. Such a distinction would not be possible in terms of content alone1 (i.e., sensation vs. phantasma) – these acts are marked by two fundamentally different attitudes – one that posits the existence and certainty of the object and one that does not. The difference here is not one of degree but of kind. An empiricistic model of classification in terms of content would not be able to clarify the occurrence of acts within imagining consciousness – how would the imagined judgment differ from an actual judgment in terms of content alone? §3! . The uniqueness of Phantasie – Conflict and the Otherwise We have explored the nature of conflict in both Bildbewusstsein and perception. I now turn to a discussion of conflict in the context of Phantasie as imagining consciousness. It is my intention here to emphasize and point out some significant dimensions or characteristics of Phantasie that come to the fore through the nature of conflict. Phantasie conflict can take two main forms – it can either be completely located within irreality, in which case two imagining apprehensions are in tension with each other, or it can occur between irreality and reality, which entails tension between a realizing apprehension and an imagining one. Both cases of conflict are crucial to our understanding of the process of questioning. We have already seen that perceptual conflict (i.e., conflict occurring within the scope of reality) triggers a process of search and inquiry aiming at reestablishing ontic and epistemic balance. We could refer to this process as 'realizing inquiry'. Conflict and inquiry as search are fundamentally related. The situation is mirrored in the context of imagining consciousness. Here too, conflict triggers inquiry. 1 Herein lies the core of Husserl's critique of Brentano in LU V and Hua XXIII, No1, §§3-6, 45-49, and of British empiricism in LU II. 70 Conflict located exclusively within irreality entails two (or more) imagining apprehensions that find themselves at odds with each other. There are several possible scenarios for this kind of tension: disappointment of expectation, fluctuation across apprehensions that endangers the sameness of the intended object, obscure Phantasie, and last but not least, the extreme case of hallucination. The temporal structure of imagining consciousness is just like that of actual realizing consciousness – the originating temporal core of Phantasie exhibit the tri-partite structure of phantasma (as modified impression), and modified retention and protention – hence the possibility of recollection and expectation in imagining consciousness. If my imagining anticipations are disappointed – if, in light of my previous apprehension(s) I expect the centaur to be in a peaceful mood and then it suddenly appears as enraged I experience disappointment. In the case of fluctuation the shifting occurring from one apprehension to the next may be so great that it leads to the appearance of a different object – this too might be experienced in terms of disappointment. Obscure Phantasie can trigger frustration also – the object is given but in an unsatisfying fashion – I find myself craving a fuller and clearer appearance of the centaur. The structure of disappointment (Enttäuschung)1 is possible in the context of imagining consciousness because the latter is temporally coherent and structured. Husserl pointed out the fluidity of Phantasie temporality as transcendent2, but the immanent temporality of Phantasie as act and consciousness is also more fluid than the immanent temporality of perception.3 Unlike immanent actual temporality, the immanent temporality of imagination lacks the rigidity and orderly determination the former has. The stream or flow of actual consciousness is fixed – each act and its respective object are assigned a 1 Cf., Hua XI, §22 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.58-71 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 (1922/23) 71 specific position that grants them individuality as specific singularity. We might lose track of this specificity but it is always, at least ideally, potentially retrievable. The immanent temporality of Phantasie exhibits a significant degree of order to the point of establishing the possibility of recollection and expectation. This order, in Husserl's view, is however insufficient for establishing with full determinacy the individuality of objects and acts or act complexes. There is a certain amount of blurring amongst imagined objects and the acts granting access to them. Nevertheless, we are here still in the position to speak of disappointment and failing expectations, at least in the context of the same imagining act or imagining complex (i.e., multiple apprehensions and acts presenting the same object). What is extremely interesting in these three cases of conflict is that the resulting disappointment is not ontic or epistemic. It is not a failure to establish and maintain the being and certainty of the object because there are no such goals in Phantasie. Imagining consciousness is non-teleological – it is not guided by any motivation. It thus appears to be arbitrary, unbound, and free. The frustration occurs merely with respect to the quality and nature of the givenness or appearance of the imagined object. Hallucination1 as liminal case of Phantasie involves conflict once we become conscious of it and thus of its deception. Imagining consciousness is essentially selfreflective – we are aware that we imagine otherwise we would simply be lost in the irreal world and we would confuse it with reality. Hallucination is Phantasie without self-reflection – it is irreality giving itself under the guise of reality. In most instances this is due to the fact that the object appears with utmost clarity – so much so that it fools us into thinking that it is real, i.e., actually existing, and presented to us in propria persona. But the clarity of the appearance is not necessary in all cases of hallucination. There could very well be instances 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, §§5, 8, 12, No.1, Appx.7, 11, No.7 (1909), No.13, (1910) No.15a-c, No.16, No.16, Appx.51, No.17 (all 1912) 72 of hallucination that are obscure imaginings. What matters is the lack of self-reflection. Hallucination comes to the fore as an illusion as soon as we regain this self-reflection and become aware of the irreality of the appearing object. Such awareness of being deceived does not in turn demand a search for truth and being. The situation may remain unsettled – uncertainty need not be resolved. This is the case with all conflict within irreality – it does not pose uncertainty as epistemic threat because imagining consciousness is not epistemically motivated.1 The other type of Phantasie conflict we mentioned was between reality and irreality.2 We saw a similar conflict in the structure of Bildbewusststein as the tension between the founding perceptual apprehension giving access to a real physical image and the second modified apprehension in which the image object as irreal nullity brought to presentation the irreal sujet. This paradox of image consciousness was discussed in §1 as the very core that makes possible and fuels image consciousness as consciousness of irreality. However, the conflict between the real and the irreal in the context of Phantasie does not play an essential structural role because Phantasie is not structurally dependent upon perception the way Bildbewusstsein is. When it occurs, passively or by active choice, it is a juxtaposition of reality and irreality – of that which is actual and that which is inactual. The inactuality of the irreal refers primarily to possibility. In the context of the realizing attitude what we engage is the actual and when we expect a certain outcome we view it as really possible in light of the previously established actuality. Thus, real possibility is predetermined and tightly bound to the real as factual.3 There is very little room for fluctuation, and all oscillation as doubt must cease with a positive 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 (1909) 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15j 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.14 73 resolution. We could say the realizing attitude is allergic to doubt and uncertainty and finds it difficult to tolerate indeterminacy. Doubt, uncertainty, and indeterminacy in the imagining attitude are not problematic because there are no binding epistemic demands.1 The irreal possibility2 of Phantasie is non-motivational and non-teleological and hence free to move beyond facticity. Phantasie is able to engage another kind of otherwise – one that is not located within the range of variations dictated by previous factual experience. Its doxic neutrality and its object's ontic neutrality3 are the very source of this freedom.4 §4. Conflict and Skepsis – The Asking of a Question §4! . The Two Worlds of Thought Perception as realizing attitude is the venue through which the world as real is given to us. It is also the source of our familiarity with the world. Our most primitive assumption is that of the existence and certainty of the world and of worldly things. Husserl refers to this as the protodoxa – our belief in the being and truth of real objects. This basic belief motivates the realizing attitude, which is thus essentially oriented toward the attainment of factual knowledge and tirelessly seeks to grasp and maintain the being and certainty of real and actual objects. Any disruption of this harmony must be eliminated – resolving conflict as disappointed expectation or deception is a structural need of realizing consciousness. In perceptual deception the initial doxic assumption is challenged and annulled, but a new positing must replace it – a situation marked by doxic uncertainty troubles the realizing consciousness, which always seeks positive doxic balance through an affirmation following whatever doxic-ontic annulment. 1 I also discuss these notions in Chapter 2 in the context of Phantasiemodifikation. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10, No.15i, No.19 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, 7, 13, No.2, No.2, Appx.21, Nos.3-5, No.5, Appx.28, No.6-8, Nos. 10-12, No.20; cf., also Hua XI, pp.97, 365 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9, No.2c, No.15d, i, j, k, No.18 74 The real world is a predetermined world, as we saw in section 2 of this chapter; this determinacy entails a fairly rigid and highly organized ontic and epistemic nexus. There is very little room for flexibility – present and future experiences are expected to unfold in certain specific ways in light of our past experience. Should anything throw this web of meaning out of balance harmony must be reinstated at all cost, even if only temporarily. The intentionality typical of realizing consciousness is a motivated and positional intentionality – the meant objects are claimed as actual and knowledge about them as within reach. The situation is radically different in the case of Phantasie – in fact, one could say things here are the very opposite of what we witness in perception and realizing consciousness. Nevertheless such opposition should not lure us (as it initially it did Husserl) into thinking that perception and Phantasie have very different structures. Their structures mirror each other thus forming a surprising and interesting parallelism. Every structural moment in perception has a counterpart in Phantasie. They share the same structure with one proviso: Phantasie lacks all doxic modality and its object is not ontically determined. If we keep this difference in mind we can freely explore the above-mentioned structural parallelism without straying off course. Imagining intentionality is free of doxic presuppositions; it does not aim at establishing the ontic and epistemic status of its objects.1 Phantasie is not teleological the way perception is. The protodoxa motivates all passive and active layers of realizing intentionality – the goal is the attainment of factual knowledge with respect to the nature and being of real objects. In the imagining consciousness there is no such motivation or primordial belief that ineffably guides, determines, and binds all thought. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15c 75 Phantasie is a direct presentation of a non-present irreal object (i.e., an object lacking ontic modality). It does not involve mediation through mental images and its object is not located in the world as real and actual. Nevertheless, as act it is reell and self-reflective. Furthermore, Phantasie is not a mere act like memory or judging; it is a basic type of consciousness, an overarching attitude as 'locus' or sphere within whose boundaries other acts, such as memory, judgment, or volition, occur and unfold.1 In this respect too, Phantasie parallels perception and its realizing consciousness. As such, imagining consciousness is world-constituting – it brings forth a holistic and ordered spatio-temporal dimension2 entirely separate3 from the world of reality constituted and accessed in and through realizing consciousness. Reality and irreality are mutually exclusive but nevertheless may cooperate with each other through their very conflict understood as incompatibility.4 The realizing and imagining attitudes are not only structurally parallel, they are also equiprimordial – they are equally primitive types of consciousness.5 In fact, they are the two most primitive reflective and self-reflective attitudes. They both span across passivity and activity – i.e., they are both receptively and spontaneously synthetic. For every level of realizing passivity and activity there is an imagining counterpart. The two attitudes mirror each other, and although perception for Husserl is the original kind of presentation, Phantasie accompanies it at the most basic level6, like a shadow.7 All thought occurs directly or indirectly through these two attitudes. Both perception and Phantasie are more than types of singular intentional acts. They are the two distinct, yet equally primitive, types of consciousness – one granting access to 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §46, No.2a (1904), No.2b (1905), No.5 (1909) 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §35, No.1, Appx.9, No.16, Appx.51, No.18, No.18, Appx.56-57 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§23, 27, 32, No.1, Appx.8 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§35-37, No.1, Appx.8-9 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d, No15, Appx.48 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 (1909) 7 For irreality as the 'shadow' of reality, see Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9 76 and constituting of reality, the other irreality. They are attitudes within which other acts unfold – we actually remember or we imagine that we remember, we actually judge or we imagine that we judge. Moreover, two dimensions of self-reflection (i.e., immanent perception and immanent Phantasie) are uncovered here as well. We begin to see the immense reservoir of meaning lying behind this apparently simple and straightforward parallelism between realizing and imagining consciousness. Two ways of thinking present themselves – one focused on the existence and certainty of objects as real and actual, the other indifferent to the objects' ontic status and hence doxically neutral. One obsessively strives (passively or actively) toward factual knowledge, the other tempts us to passively or actively question and seek in what looks like a random and arbitrary fashion that does not concern itself with the attainment of knowledge, factual or ideal1. §4! . Skepsis – Seeking the Non-Present Thought or reflection in the imagining attitude is radically different than thought in the realizing attitude because in it indeterminacy is approached as positive and fruitful – i.e, as leading to new possibilities – and not a threat or obstacle to be eliminated. Different types of conflict bring forth different kinds of roles the imagination plays in inquiry and we can classify these types of inquiry in light of conflict. But irreality also entails possibility and freedom, so we can further distinguish and analyze classes of inquiry in light of these two dimensions. Conflict, possibility, and freedom are intimately connected to questioning or inquiring thought. Due to the utter separation between imagination and perception (and between their respective worlds) the conflict between the real and the irreal is, for the most part, a mere latent potentiality. When it does occur these two worlds most certainly cannot come in touch 1 This is knowledge of essences or universals. 77 with each other – their interconnection is out of the question. The conflict between reality and irrealty may be willed or passively occurring. As soon as I start wondering about the otherwise – about how a situation may be different – I bring together two radically different dimensions – the actual and the possible. Any attempt to engage the otherwise as possibility involves the imagination and its conflict with perception. Questioning is this very attempt as search for that which is currently non-present but whose presence is sought. If we ask a question within the realizing attitude the inquiry is bound by real possibility – the already determined coordinates dictated by past experience. There is some room for variation here but 'realizing inquiry' is fundamentally bound by the assumption of the objects' being and certainty. Asking a question pertaining to reality through real possibility (as the otherwise) aims at establishing or reestablishing ontic and epistemic truth. The prime example for this doxic behavior is clearly exhibited in doubt as conflict within the sphere of reality. An inquiry that goes beyond the boundaries prescribed by the realizing attitude involves bringing the irreal in dialogue with the real. In imagining consciousness all being, truth, and search for knowledge are put out of play1 – the belief in them is suspended (cf., Ausschaltung).2 When conflict occurs in or through Phantasie there is no preset obsessive need to resolve whatever uncertainty and indeterminacy may come to the fore. Phantasie is free to engage this uncertainty – to freely play with various ways of handling it without the pressure of an epistemic goal.3 What this opens up is a whole new dimension of possibilities that are not dictated by factual knowledge. Novelty, improvisation, and creativity all involve either the conflict between the real and the irreal (by juxtaposing the actual and the irreally 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7, No.3, No.15c-d 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d, No.15, Appx.40 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1, No.15j 78 possible) or the conflict within irreality between two imaginative apprehensions (by juxtaposing two irreal possibilities). The conflict between the real and the irreal points out how real situations could be radically otherwise. The possibility at work here is not bound real possibility but free irreal possibility. Phantasie brings forth the radically otherwise as that which is free to go beyond the given and the familiar.1 The imagined otherwise is unfamiliar. Its unfamiliarity comes to the fore as significant for and related to the real when we juxtapose what is the case and what could be the case beyond all real boundaries. The conflict between reality and irreality manifests itself as the striking juxtaposition of actuality and possibility. Thus, even though reality and irreality are mutually exclusive the two can cooperate through this very conflict. Thus what appears to be the simplest of everyday behaviors – such as improving a pumpkin muffin recipe – involves engaging the thought of the irreal. Until I decide on one spice over another I merely think about them in ontic and doxic neutrality. I modulate a variety of spice combinations without any pressing commitment. This process of variation – of imaginative variation – is crucial to all practical and theoretical endeavors. It is equally employed by me in my quest for a better recipe, by scientists considering a hypothesis and the suitable experiments able to test it, by mathematicians doing a complex proof, and by philosophers in asking questions about universals. However one important distinction needs to be made here. The neutrality, irreal possibility, and free variation of Phantasie can be employed in asking questions about the real (esp. its future). Such inquiries rely on the conflict between the real and the irreal. When I relate the imaginative variation as irreal possibility to the realizing attitude the latter informs it to a certain extent and binds it to its interests and goals. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 79 It renders it teleological but the goal is of a factual nature. However, irreal possibility could also be employed in inquiries completely divorced from the real – such as the mathematical or philosophical quests. In these instances irreal possibility is placed in dialogue with ideal possibility, as we shall see in Part II. The conflict stimulating this inquiry occurs completely within the irreal, when we are engaging two or more imaginative apprehensions and irreal possibilities at odds with each other. Herein lies true free imaginative variation, which is here not bound by the real or the factual goals of the realizing attitude – there is a potentially infinity variation and modulation. Inquiries focusing on ideals, such as logical or mathematical principles and philosophical universal concepts, rely on the free variation of Phantasie. They too render it teleological, but unlike empirical quests, their goal is ideal rather than real. Despite the differences between these inquiries and their distinct relations to irreal possibility and freedom they all share one thing in common – they strive for the nonpresent, be it real but absent, impossible (such as utopian thought), irreal, or ideal (the universal). Phantasie is our only path toward this rich array of instances of non-presence. In order to ask any question, regardless of its goal, one must imagine. 80 Chapter 2 – Phantasiemodi f ikat ion and the Neutrality of Inquiring Thought My goal in this chapter is to unpack the transition from the positionality of existence to the positionality of essence through the non-positionality of Phantasie, and to examine the potential significance of this transition for inquiring thought broadly construed. In Part II of this dissertation I disentangle the ways in which phenomenology as inquiring thought is fundamentally reliant upon this transition, which can only occur through Phantasie. In Chapter 1 I emphasized the significance of the conflict for inquiries either related to or divorced from the real. In this chapter I stress the import of non-positionality as neutrality for inquiring thought, esp. for eidetic projects.1 In Chapter 3 my goal is to uncover freedom and possibility as the very engines of inquiry. As a whole, Part I of this dissertation lays the foundation for our revealing Phantasie – through real-irreal conflict and cooperation, neutrality, freedom, and possibility – as the path that inquiring phenomenological thought must take. Chapter 1 touched on the notions of reproduction (Reproduktion) and presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) in the context of the realizing and imagining attitudes. I briefly discussed memory and expectation as reproductions distinct from Phantasie.2 In this chapter I focus in great detail on the notion of reproduction and its various types, along with their distinct relations to perception. Presentification as reproduction is the result of modification, which can be either positional or non-positional. There are various sub-types under the former category – we have encountered most of them already – but here we have the opportunity to explore their structure and relation to presentation (Vorstellung as Gegenwärtigung). The two main positional modifications I focus on in this chapter are retentional and memorial 1 Projects seeking knowledge of universals or ideals. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7, No.2a 81 modification.1 I discuss Phantasie as the sole type of non-positional modification. I close the current chapter with thoughts on the significance of Phantasiemodifikation for inquiring projects, specifically for eidetic inquiries. All reproduction is dependent, in some way or other, on perception as productive – i.e., all modification is modification of perception.2 But various types of reproduction entail various relations of dependence to perception. My goal here is to reveal the stark difference between positional and non-positional reproduction by further developing the parallelism uncovered in Chapter 1 between realizing and imagining consciousness and fully qualifying the former as positional and the latter as non-positional. I intend to show that although Phantasie as non-positional reproduction is dependent upon perception, this relation of dependence is not one of derivation. In other words, Phantasie as direct and simple intuitive presentation and as level of horizonal-nexic consciousness is not parasitic upon perception – that it is not bound to merely 'copying' that which has already been given in and through perception. Chapter 1 extensively sought to uncover the primordial character of the perception-Phantasie parallelism in terms of the mirroring of realizing and imagining consciousness. Chapter 2 seeks to further pursue this parallelism, and show that Phantasiemodifikation and the ensuing neutrality and non-positionality are co-original or equiprimordial with perception and positionality. This chapter ultimately aims at clarifying the structure and nature of Phantasiemodifikation in terms of ontic and doxic neutrality. Unlike Chapter 1, where I focused on neutrality solely in terms of irreality and the suspension of belief in the ontic status of the object, I here explore this notion as one of the most significant moments of Phantasiemodifikation. In order to uncover the uniqueness of Phantasiemodifikation I compare it 1 Expectation and empathy are also positional modifications and presentifications. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.14 82 to and distinguish it from founding (Fundierung) as the process Husserl refers to when discussing the genetic-synthetic formation of complex acts based on simple acts. I stress here the simplicity of Phantasie as act, not structurally as I did in Chapter 1, but in terms of its peculiar modification. Its originality and equiprimordiality with perception is thus shown not solely in light of its structure but also via its modifying relation to perception. Thus two simple presentations – perception and Phantasie – come to the fore as structurally equivalent. Establishing the nature and dimensions of positionality and non-positionality facilitates exploring the idea of an other type of positionality – one focused on essence rather than existence. Accessing this second kind of positionality involves leaving facticity and actuality behind and thus surpassing the initial positionality of existence. Only through the non-positionality of Phantasie can we engage a thinking of essences – only by renouncing the interest in existence can we refocus on essence. All universalizing thought, i.e., all thought asking about ideals and essences as universal concepts, is facilitated by the neutrality of Phantasie. Imagination is the leap toward the universal and the compass guiding our search and grasping of essences. This becomes particularly clear in the context of free or imaginative variation, as we shall see in Chapter 3. Last but not least I explore the import of neutrality and 'mere thought'1 for all inquiring projects thus complementing the suggestions I made towards the end of Chapter 1 with respect to the role of Phantasie (and conflict) in questioning processes. §1. Retentional and Memorial Modification as Positional In this section I explore the nature of positional modification. The two main subtypes under consideration here are retentional and memorial modifications. The two corresponding reproductions are retention and memory. As we seek to clearly distinguish 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15g 83 among different types of reproductions as modifications we must note from the beginning that not all reproductions are presentifications – i.e., acts intending non-present objects1 and bringing them to the fore 'as if' they were present. Retention and protention are modifications of impression, as we already saw in Chapter 1 in our discussion of perception and its original temporality. They involve a transitioning away from impression as original core of perception and original time-consciousness. Retention unfolds as receding into the past and protention as a stretching toward the future.2 However, these two modified acts are not reproductions as presentifications – they are reproductions of impression; they give the object as present because they belong essentially to the complex temporal structure of perception.3 Retention and protention are thus not reproductions of perception – they structurally constitute perception along with impression. But they are modifications of impression itself. Memorial modification is a type of presentification – positional presentification to be more exact – and it indeed involves the modification as reproduction of perception itself.4 As we shall soon see, like perception, memory too has an original impression, retention, and protention5 and so it has a past and a future (the latter essentially pointing toward the present). We must consequently classify retentional modification as presentation6 (Gegenwärtigung) and reproduction of impression but still structurally part of the living present7, and memorial modification as presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) and reproduction 1 Cf., Hua XI, §17 2 Husserl offers an interesting analysis of the differences between retention and protention in Hua XI, §18. Here he claims that retention, unlike protention, lacks an initial intentionality and does not function associatively. It gains intentionality in a secondary fashion through memorial or reproductive association. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.12, 14, Appx.32 4 Cf., Hua XI, p. 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.14, Appx.32 6 Or at least as structural moment of presentation as Gegenwärtigung. 7 Cf., Hua XI, §18 84 of perception.1 In section 2 of this chapter I distinguish between positional temporal presentification and positional modal presentification; the latter exhibits a different kind of dependence upon perception. As important as protention is, especially in the context of expectation and fulfillment, I decided to focus exclusively on retention and its relation to memory. The reason for this choice lies in Husserl's own interest and emphasis on these two types of modifications as distinct from Phantasiemodifikation. The more we uncover about retention as positional modification, the better our grasp on the uniqueness of Phantasie as non-positional modification becomes. In this chapter I compare positional and non-positional modification, just as I compared perception and imagination in Chapter 1. However, before beginning my in-depth discussion of retention I wish to point out another important distinction between retentional and memorial modification. The former is the original constitution of the past as receding sedimentation. The latter is the recovery of the past 'as if' it were present through the awakening and association motivated by the present and that which is presently given. Such recovery of the past is conditioned by its being initially constituted. We see here the primacy of retention. The possibility of having a past is tightly bound to the possibility of having subjectivity as unified and continuous whole exhibiting complexly intertwined facets2 i.e., of an object and self-constituting subjectivity.3 Retention orders this multifariousness. Memory would not succeed in retrieving singular or individual past objects without this initial ordering (and individualizing) through retention. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.14, 16 2 Cf., Hua XI, p.124f. 3 Hua XI, p. 124 85 §1! . Retentional Modification as Synthesis of Identification Husserl's analyses of acts and their corresponding objects were from the beginning synthetically oriented – they were on a part-whole model. We witness this analytic approach as early as the Logical Investigations,1 in his 1905 study of time-consciousness,2 and in his work on intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung). Consciousness as streaming temporality is also studied on this model. The appeal of this framework for analyzing subjective structures stems from the unifying aspect of synthesis – the manifold is molded into a coherent, continuous, and ordered unity. This approach is further developed in the early 1920s in studies dedicated to passive and active synthesis. Here he goes beyond the whole-part structure (though he never leaves it behind) and explores the ways in which acts, objects, and consciousness itself are not just coherent wholes – they are genetically dynamic coherent wholes.3 Passivity as the original level of subjective and objective constitution is the foundation for subsequent active acts. Activity is bound to and stems from passivity. This genetic view allowed Husserl to illuminate essences and structures in their dynamism. Within passivity there are several levels of synthesis the distinguishing of which will prove central to our discussions of retention and memory (Erinnerung) or remembering (Wiedererinnerung)4. The most original level is the synthesis of original time-consciousness. All other synthetic levels, be they primitive and passive or founded and active, depend on it.5 The nature of all constitution is synthetic, thus each level of synthesis pertains to a certain type of constitution. The constitution of subjectivity occurs at the level of original time 1 This structure is explicitly discussed in LU III and applied in a more or less covert fashion throughout the rest of the Investigations. 2 Cf., Hua X, §10 3 Cf., Hua XI, pp.121-122 4 In Hua XI Husserl primarily employs the latter probably because it is more indicative, etymologically speaking, of the retrieval involved in presentifying non-presence as past presence. In Hua XXIII, Husserl also refers to memory as Wiedervergegenwärtigung (cf., No.2, Appx.14) 5 Cf., Hua XI, p.125ff. 86 consciousness, which involves simultaneity and succession (this is the level of impression, protention, and retention), and the level of the constitution of the immanent reell world, which involves memory and expectation facilitated by association1. The constitution of the external objective world requires these previous two levels of synthesis.2 Retentional modification lies at the core of the first synthetic level of original time-consciousness and structurally bridges it with the second synthetic level constitutive of the immanent world. Thus, retentional modification, as the connector of immediate impressional presence and succession, is the path beyond the present unfolding and opening into the past3; without it, the constitution of both transcendent and immanent worlds as continuous wholes would not occur.4 I am here interested in clarifying the nature of retentional modification in terms of the now and the just-now;5 however, beyond this structural discussion, I am primarily aiming at uncovering the extent to which the constitution of both immanent (reell) and transcendent (real) objects requires retention. Most importantly, I wish to show that positionality essentially entails the constitution of objects in an individualized manner, and that individualization as a type of ordering is the main condition for the attainment of knowledge. Beyond their immediate givenness in impression, objects attain individuality as singularity when being located or positioned in the overall receding flow of consciousness.6 The now becomes just-now but the object is identified as the same.7 Either the object was given as momentary – a lightning for instance, presented and gone the next moment, in 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.126ff. 2 Cf., Hua XI, p.126 3 Cf., Hua X, pp.30-31 4 Cf., Hua X, pp.27-29 5 Cf., Hua X, §§11-12 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.127, 140 7 We are here not discussing protention, but the present experience of the object informs the future as it recedes toward the past. 87 which case it begins to gradually fade into the past. In this receding process the ephemeral object accrues temporal richness since it is not only positioned with respect to the now as the present, but to the series of nows preceding and following it. The object obtains uniqueness. Alternatively, the object may be given as having duration – this very givenness of the object as enduring is guaranteed by retention as the transition into the just-now.1 Beyond this, once the object ceases to be given as present (my listening to Debussy's Suite Bergamasque comes to an end and begins to fade into the past) retention secures its positioning (Stellung) in the stream of consciousness. It grants individuality to the enduring object, which is now located in the overall flow of receding nows –both preceding and following it.2 Retentional modification breaks away from the immediacy of impression as original givenness through succession as the form of the flowing past consciousness. Thus retention, as reproduction of impression, constitutes and links the past to the present.3 The potentially infinite receding flow connecting all past nows constitutes the flow of consciousness as immanent world.4 Retention is also necessary for the constitution of the transcendent or external world – the givenness of external objects is located in the stream of consciousness and the objects themselves gain individuality both in terms of their objective temporality and in terms of the immanent temporality of their givenness. The constitution of the transcendent world requires more than the synthetic form of succession – it implies the co-givenness of a multitude of objects as present. Thus within the same now several things appear to me in propria persona and as really existing while others are assumed to presently exist elsewhere. The world as whole or nexus of interconnected 1 Cf., Hua X, §16 2 Cf., Hua XI, §30 3 Cf., Hua X, §13 4 Similarly, protention breaks from impression by pointing beyond the original present toward the future. 88 present objects is given through the synthetic form of simultaneity.1 Husserl conceives simultaneity (in the case of transcendent objects) as being both temporal and spatial – the co-givenness of multiple objects involves a horizon of spatiality – both actually and potentially given.2 Thus any external object has a background and is positioned in a spatial context.3 We see that positioning (Stellung) is both temporal and spatial.4 For Husserl, temporality is the primordial synthetic form at work both immanently and externally. The individuality of objects stems primarily from succession.5 Spatial simultaneity as synthesis of homogeneity pertains solely to the external world and objects. What retention secures is the enduring character of this world – it recedes into the past as a whole, more specifically, as a structured whole whose parts are also temporally articulated and individualized.6 The synthetic forms of simultaneity and succession secure the constitution of both immanent and transcendent worlds beyond impression as immediate presence. Retentional modification is a continual synthesis of identification7 8 in so far as the temporal singularity of the object is positioned with respect to a potentially infinite series of past, present, and future nows. However, it is also constantly receding to the nil point of dissipation.9 It is a falling away from existence given in propria persona.10 Retention as gradual 1 Cf., Hua XI, pp.127-128 2 Cf., Hua XI, p.136 3 I see the desk and the wall behind is co-perceived despite its not being intended; the desk is two meters away from the wall. 4 Cf., Hua XI, §30 5 Cf., Hua XI, p.144-145 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.121, 136-137 7 Hua XI, p.144 8 We must note here that protention too is part of the continual individualizing of objects in so far as it points toward the future in relation to impression and toward the present when occurring in the context of continual retention. Protention too positions the objects – only it does so in relation to what comes after it rather than before it. Retention has primacy in our discussion because it opens the very horizon of the past and makes possible memory as retrieval. Memory is of interest here as positional presentification juxtaposed to Phantasie as non-positional presentification. In order to understand memory and thus clarify the unique of Phantasie as other than memory we must first discuss retention. 9 Hua XI, p.169 10 Hua X, pp.27-28 89 fading away is an emptying as forgetting leading to indeterminacy.1 Retention constitutes the past, individualizes objects, but also leads to the possibility of indeterminacy and forgetting.2 Despite this fading away into darkness the retrieval of the object is in principle guaranteed or rendered ideally possible through individuality, which is precisely the object's temporal contextualized character or identity.3 Indeterminacy as forgotten individuality is essentially determinable.4 Simultaneity and succession are syntheses of homogeneity. They order objects and their givenness by conferring individuality upon them. Without these syntheses there would be no coherence in our experience as a whole – no accumulation of objective and subjective knowledge. The possibility of retrieving a past object would also be lacking since retrieval requires individuality as singularity and uniqueness. The indistinguishable cannot be recognized. Objects become recognizable as located in the nexus of the immanent flow of consciousness.5 Retentional modification is thus not solely significant in terms of immanent and transcendent constitution, but also with respect to the epistemic teleology that essentially marks the realizing attitude. Positionality (Setzung) involves, as we saw in Chapter 1, the positioning (Stellung) of objects and of their givenness. It shares this feature with nonpositionality since the imagining consciousness too is temporally organized.6 But positionality, unlike non-positionality, also implies the belief in the existence and certainty of objects. Realizing consciousness is ontically and epistemically motivated – being and knowledge are its goals. In this chapter I equate the realizing attitude with positionality and juxtapose it to non-positionality as ontically and epistemically neutral. I now turn to 1 Cf., Hua XI, pp.8-9, 168-169 2 Cf., Hua XI, pp.170-172 3 Cf., Hua XI, pp.169-170 4 Cf., Hua XI, p.8 5 Cf., Hua XI, pp.144-145 6 Cf., Hua X, §§17, 19 90 memorial modification in order to unpack the structure and nature of the retrieval of past objects. While retention is a receding and an emptying, memory is a recovery and a determination in terms of fulfilling. §1! . Memorial Modification as Associative Synthesis of Recognition We already mentioned the importance of individuality for the recognition of objects. Memory is the recognition of objects once given as present and real. These objects gained singularity and positioning through retentional modification, thus becoming distinguishable. Besides being individualized these objects also gradually faded away into the past. But their awakening remains, at least in principle, possible. The awakening of past objects occurs through the synthesis of association as the core of memorial modification. Association may occur within the present horizon, may point toward the future as anticipation1, but it functions, for the most part, as a link to our past consciousness and intentional experiences.2 Association is primarily reproductive association.3 Memorial modification, like retention and the synthesis of original time-consciousness, is constitutive of the immanent world. Through associative awakening the past is regained, brought to the fore once more and related to the flow of consciousness as a whole. Positional subjectivity becomes gradually richer through both retentional and memorial modifications. Memory is the original positional reproduction and presentification because it is constitutive of a singular holistic subjectivity and immanent world.4 Memory further unifies and renders more complex the flow of original time-consciousness. Each memory has its own retention and protention (as pointing toward the present, the now as ideal limit5) and as act gradually fades 1 Cf., Hua XI, §§40-41 2 For an extensive discussion of Husserl's phenomenology of association, see Holenstein (1972). 3 Cf., Hua XI, p.120ff. 4 Cf., Hua XI, pp.119-121 5 Cf., Hua X, p.35 91 into the past and remains potentially recuperable in the future.1 It itself presupposes the unity guaranteed by retentional modification and succession, but unity is also the prerequisite for conflict in the context of memory. I shall soon focus on conflict as memorial error since Husserl discusses it as fusion (Verschmelzung) of mental images, which as we saw in Chapter 1, is a problematic approach. Memory also plays a crucial role in the constitution of the external objective world. By the 1920s, when Husserl engages in the study of passive and active synthesis, the structure of correspondence between consciousness and object is well in place. Thus, the harmony and determinacy of the transcendent world is in part the product of memorial modification.2 This, as mentioned before, has epistemic as well as ontic import since harmony is the necessary foundation for the acquisition and securing of factual knowledge. Reproductive association involves awakening the givenness of the past object and bringing it to the fore in presentification. This process of awakening is instigated by an object appearing as present and real (reell or real). There are two main types of reproductive association that Husserl identifies – first, immediate association in which the givenness of one object awakens the presentation and recognition of another3; second, mediated association in which the recognition of an object occurs through an awakened presentation of a second object triggered by the givenness of an initial present object.4 Mediated association can occur as a chain reaction and it may very well involve more than three terms.5 1 Cf., Hua X, pp.35-36 2 Which conditions for instance our expectations with respect to the future since it articulates our past experience as that which informs the lived experience of the present and the arising of expectations related to the latter (cf., Hua XI, p.13) 3 Cf., Hua XI, p.122ff. 4 Cf., Hua XI, pp.121-122 5 Cf., Hua XI, p.123 92 Both of these types of association are related to the present perception of an actual object.1 The object given as present is awakening, while the past object brought to recognition is awakened. Memorial modification occurs as the recognition and bringing to the fore of past (non-present) objects through this associative awakening (Weckung). Unlike retentional modification, which is a distancing from the present, memorial modification is a bringing closer to the present – it is the intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung) of nonpresence as past being and certainty. Unlike retention, memorial or reproductive association is a modification as presentification because its object is essentially non-present. But like retention, memory involves a fundamental relation between and unity of the past and the present. It implies the harmony of the immanent and transcendent worlds. The awakening process relies on similarity (Ähnlichkeit)2 – not samenes (Gleichheit)3.4 Through similarity the present object triggers the re-cognition of the forgotten past object, or it may trigger the presentification of another object, which in its turn functions in an awakening fashion. This associative awakening is a filling of the emptied past – a renewed presentation of previous retentions and their objects.5 This synthesis of similarity as basis for associative awakening unfolds in terms of both simultaneity and succession; it links the present and the past and gives as present that which is past.6 Similarity is a form of community (Gemeinschaft);7 but it does not exclude discordance or contrast. In fact, there is always some degree of difference between the objects involved in awakening association – this difference is necessary for the consciousness of association 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.121 2 Hua XI, p.123 3 Cf., Hua XI, p.131 4 Although Husserl distinguishes between similarity and sameness he places them on a continuum of degree with sameness as one extreme (cf., Hua XI, p.132). 5 Cf., Hua XI, §27; cf., also Appx. 12-13, 15 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.131-132 7 Hua XI, p.133 93 and distance between the present and the past.1 However, there are cases in which the similarity is seen to be so great that the moments pertaining to the present and past objects collapse in an undifferentiated whole. This Husserl refers to as fusion (Verschmelzung).2 According to Husserl, fusion may occur among moments pertaining to present and past objects, moments pertaining to past objects, or moments pertaining to past and imagined objects.3 Such instances of fusion make it very hard to distinguish between the terms of the association. This in turn impacts the clarity of the recognition of past objects. If their moments are not identified to a large extent, the possibility of retrieving their individuality is lost, and with it, the possibility of recognition. In memory, unlike perception, there is no guarantee for the reality and certainty of the object. There is the possibility of error4 and it creeps in primarily through fusion, which influences the relation and association occurring among moments of past objects. When the distinction between moments of past objects collapses, several memories are awakened instead of one; their simultaneous awakening makes them appear as one memory rather than multiple. Another possibility is the fusion of moments pertaining to real past objects with those belonging to a past imagined object. Husserl discusses fusion in both of these cases in terms of an overlapping of 'memorial' or 'mental' images. The error thus consists in an illusory image (Scheinbild).5 In his lecture courses on Phantasie dating as early as 19046 and 1904/057, and in 19121 and onward2 Husserl employs a similar framework of discussing 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.138 2 Cf., Hua XI, p.139ff.; see also, Hua XXIII, No.14, Appx.34 3 Cf., Hua XI, p.119ff. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.37 5 Hua XI, p.119; cf., also §§42-43 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.15 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.4; Husserl also employs the language of 'memorial images' in his 1905 study of time consciousness (cf., Hua X, p.34). In fact in this study he discusses presentification as essentially occurring 94 memorial error. This conceptual choice is unfortunate for the reasons I discussed in Chapter 1. The main question is: do we have a consciousness of difference between image and object in memorial consciousness? My suggestion in the previous chapter was that what seems to be the consciousness of difference between image and object is actually the consciousness of difference between appearance and object. What is con-fused and overlaps in memorial error are not multiple images but multiple appearances pertaining to different objects. These objects are simultaneous and obscurely brought to presence – they lack individualization and morph into one misleading appearance of an object that was never perceptually given. The further troubling matter is Husserl's unqualified claim that 'memorial images' can overlap with 'Phantasie images'. This cannot occur under normal self-reflective circumstances because Phantasie and positional memory (or perception and any positional act) cannot occur simultaneously – they are mutually exclusive. The only context in which memory and Phantasie fuse is when Phantasie occurs without self-reflection under the guise of memory.3 This is the only case when phantasmata can be the contents of memories.4 This is an important qualification that Husserl fails to make in Hua XI and we see him overlook this distinction in Hua XXIII also. Omissions of this nature can have significant consequences, such as obscuring the radical nature of the distinction between positionality and nonpositionality. through 'mental images' (cf., Hua X, pp.40-41). This is the conceptual framework employed in his contemporary studies of Phantasie as intuitive presentation. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.14, Appx.34 (1911/12) 2 As late as 1922 Husserl still employs the language of 'memorial images' (cf., Hua XXIII, No.19) 3 Of course, this fusion might be willed, as in the case of the fiction writer who makes use of past experience and combines some of the elements, adds others, and creates an irreal world. Phantasie may utilize memorial moments, but only after neutralizing them ontically and doxically. This process of neutralization can happen actively, as in the case of the fiction writer, or passively as in regular Phantasie. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 (1909) – here Husserl claims phantasmata as potentional contents for memory only he fails to qualify this. Either this is a case of Phantasie lacking self-reflection pretending to be memory or it is a case of neutralized memory, or memory in the imagining attitude. 95 Similarity is a comparison of moments shared by the awakening and awakened objects. These common and related moments affect (exhibit an allure Reiz) and thus tempt the empirical and/or actual ego into bringing to the fore the past object.1 Thus, I see and admire the red tile roofs of houses while traveling in Austria's Steiermark region and the roofs of Transylvanian village houses come to mind. Affection (Affektion) is the objects' very 'striving toward self-givenness'2 – it initially occurs in impression3 and remains preserved as a latent structural element in retention, despite the latter's gradual emptying and fading into forgetfulness. Affection and its allure (Reiz) instigate the associative awakening that terminates in the intuition of the past object.4 Husserl employs the term 'affection' to ultimately refer to the object's demanding to be intended. The object could make no such claim if it were not individualized and unique among other objects. An object and its moments (such as the red of the tile roofs) require prominence (Abhebung) in order to affect the ego and draw its passive or active attention.5 The more prominent and individualized an object and its moments are the more vivacious affection becomes.6 Affection, like awakening association, presupposes the unity of original internal time-consciousness and the individualization of immanent and transcendent objects7, which are secured through retentional modification.8 1 Hua XI, p.132; cf., also Hua XI, §§32-35 2 Hua XI, p.149 3 Cf., Hua XI, p.168 4 Cf., Hua XI, §33 5 Hua XI, pp.154-155 6 Cf., Hua XI, §35; see also, Appx.22-23 7 Cf., Hua XI, §34 8 One aside is required here – the language of affection, vivacity, and association is not new – it had originally been employed by Hume in discussions aiming at clarifying similar phenomena (e.g., remembering something). However, unlike Hume, Husserl employs these terms in the phenomenological context as universal subjective or objective structures. 96 §1! . Positionality – Order and Knowledge Acquisition Associative awakening essentially occurs in the present – remembering is itself a present act.1 The affection of a presently given object propagates through retention, layer after layer, deeper into the past and awakens the affection and allure of the past object, which thus reclaims the ego's attention and focus and demands to be brought back into presence.2 Memorial modification implies association through awakening of past affection. We thus have two fundamentally distinct but cooperating types of temporal positional modification – retentional and memorial. The former achieves the structuring of the past and the individuation of objects as uniquely positioned in this past through a modification of impression; it also involves a gradual depleting of meaning as emptying headed toward the nil point of forgetfulness. The latter functions on the basis of the order and unity achieved through retention, but it is directed toward the present – it aims at the present and at bringing back to light what has retentionally faded away, and thus it is a modification of retention as structural element of past perception.3 These two modifications are fundamentally constitutive of the original timeconsciousness and of the immanent and transcendent worlds as true being.4 They are positional in so far as they involve the belief in the existence of past objects.5 But equally significant is their epistemic impact – retention individualizes thus rendering objects essentially recognizable and memory retrieves and re-cognizes these objects and hence constantly enriching the immanent subjective world.6 They facilitate the attainment of factual knowledge, which is the goal of realizing or positional consciousness. We already saw in 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.16 2 Cf., Hua XI, §36 3 Cf., Hua XI, §36 4 Cf., Hua XI, pp.207-208, 210; cf., also Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.37 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7, No.2, Appx. 16, No.5, Appx.28, No.14, No.15j, No.16, Appx.49 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.12-13, 207-208 97 Chapter 1 that the realizing attitude is centered around presence or the direct givenness of objects as existing and certain. This claim has now the further meaning of associative awakening and recognition stemming from and occurring within presence. One of the key structural elements of realizing consciousness is the motivation toward the securing and maintaining of factual knowledge. This motivation is rooted in the present, more precisely, within the impressional givenness of objects, and propagates backward through retention thus spanning the whole of the flow of consciousness only to be brought back to presence through memorial modification. These two temporal positional modifications involve the individuation of objects on the one hand, and their ontic (as past being) and epistemic (as past cognition) retrieval on the other. They are both ontically and epistemically oriented. Indeterminacy as the opposite of individuality leads to error and is thus problematic in light of the overall motivational structure of positional (realizing) consciousness. In these ways retentional and memorial modifications are similar to another positional modification – i.e., modality modification, which is also concerned with the being and certainty of objects and which seeks to eliminate indeterminacy at all cost. My goal in discussing both temporal and modal modifications is to emphasize the main features of positional consciousness – the claiming of the being and certainty of objects, the aiming at factual knowledge acquisition (in its relation to reality and being), the ordered determinacy and familiarity of reality – both immanent and transcendent, the (failing) attempt to completely extirpate all traces of indeterminacy and doubt, the obsession with the individuality and singularity of objects, and the centrality of presence as reality and actuality. The more we emphasize these aspects the better our grasp of the otherness of non-positionality as imagining consciousness becomes. 98 §2. Modality Modification as Positional We have seen in section 1 of this chapter that not all modifications are presentifications despite being reproductive, as was the case with retentional modification. Modality modification is reproductive in a distinct way; we shall determine whether it may or may not qualify as presentifying. Nevertheless what temporal and modal modifications share in common is their relation to and dependence on perception as direct simple presentation. Their uniqueness lies in the various ways in which they depend on perception. In this section my goal is to explore modality modification in its relation to perception and qualify it as primarily positional – i.e., claiming the existence and certainty of objects as real. In Chapter 1 I discussed in great detail the structure and dimensions of realizing consciousness. I here refer to this same attitude as positionality. Husserl adopts this notion and terminology later in his studies of intuitive presentation (it becomes more frequent in 1918 and after1) in order to further emphasize the claim consciousness makes with respect to the being and truth of real and actual objects. Since we covered the nature of realizing constitution and also discussed the dynamic between the protodoxa and secondary doxic modalities, my discussion of modality modification in this chapter will be brief. I am here aiming at locating modalization in the overall context of positional consciousness and stressing its fundamentally epistemic interests and motivation. Unlike chapter 1 where I focused on modalization in the context of perception and perceptual conflict, in chapter 2 I explore modalization from a different angle – as positional modification aiming at the securing of existence and factual knowledge. What I eventually hope to show through my discussion of temporal and modal modifications is the epistemic teleology of positionality. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.18-20 99 §2! . Doxic and Ontic Modalization – Uncertainty and Indeterminacy As already emphasized, the protodoxa1 is the most basic and primitive doxic modality of realizing consciousness – it is the belief as certainty in the existence and truth of real objects.2 The protodoxa is an assumption – a presupposition deeply engrained in the positional attitude. As such, it guides and motivates all positional acts, be they passive or active. The motivation of the protodoxa is twofold – it refers to both being and truth as factual knowledge of being. The pull of this doxic tendency is tremendous and no realizing act can deny it. Even when this primitive belief is challenged, as it so often is, the regaining of certainty and the securing of the object's being are the main goals. And although instances of primitive belief may be challenged, the protodoxa as basic doxic attitude can never be bypassed in the context of realizing-constitutive consciousness. To move away from this belief as center of gravity and to dislocate the emphasis on being and certainty is no easy task. Phantasie alone can accomplish this. We focused in Chapter 1, section 3 on the force of Phantasie as this very ability to move away and beyond doxic and protodoxic behavior. I will emphasize this once more in section 3 of this chapter while exploring the structure and dimensions of Phantasiemodifikation as neutrality. For now, let us focus on the dynamics of modality modification. Modality modification is the very challenging of the protodoxa.3 Any questioning of this assumption is a threat to be dealt with and eliminated. The constitution of reality and real objects is a continuous synthetic process aiming at maintaining the harmony of this world. Because reality is an ontically coherent whole and realizing consciousness is an ordered nexus of past and present experiences, expectations with respect to future events are 1 Hua XI, p.28 2 Cf., Chapter 1, section 2 3 Cf., Hua XI, §5 100 rendered possible.1 Retention secures this immnanent and transcendent order, which in turn is the condition for the individualization as positioning (Stellung) of singular acts and their objects. Through order and the individualized character of objects the attainment and accumulation of factual knowledge are likewise secured. Memory as recognition presentifies past objects and brings them to the fore as essentially belonging in their givenness to the overall unity of consciousness. Moreover, memory also facilitates the accumulation of recognitions and of factual and experiential knowledge through repetition. Thus two coherent wholes are simultaneously constituted – the real transcendent world as ontically stable and the immanent world of consciousness as doxically and epistemically stable. This order and familiarity is reinforced through fulfillment (Erfüllung) – the confirmation of expectation and presentation as intuition of what was initially not given but intended.2 Just like objects tend toward self-givenness and hence demand to be meant in their affecting of the ego, so too intentional acts have a penchant for fulfillment as intuition and givenness of objects.3 However, order and familiarity are frequently disrupted through conflict or the disappointment (Enttäuschung) of preset expectations. We discussed in detail the structure and impact of conflict in Chapter 1. Here I wish to stress the fragile stability of the immanent and transcendent nexuses of actuality. Change is the main threat to this ontic and epistemic balance because change brings forth the otherwise. I stressed before4 the ambiguity of the term 'otherwise' – it can refer to 'the unexpected' in the context of realizing consciousness or 'the unfamiliar' in the context of imagining consciousness. The difference at the core of this ambiguity goes even deeper – the realizing attitude seeks to eliminate the uncertainty and indeterminacy stemming from 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.25 2 Cf., Hua XI, pp.66-67; Husserl talks about fulfillment in terms of evidence also – as such, evidence is conceived as the adaequatio, i.e., the correspondence, between intention and intuition (cf., Hua XI, §23). 3 Cf., Hua XI, §20 4 Cf., Chapter 1 101 the appearance of the unexpected,1 whereas the imagining attitude essentially implies uncertainty and indeterminacy and hence does not shy away from them. In modality modification as positional (i.e., realizing) change and the otherwise refer to an ontic and doxic fluctuation and not the utter suspension of being and certainty. Positional change occurs through and is dependent on the unity of reality and actual consciousness.2 The unexpected occurs on the coherent background of reality and past experience of reality. Its appearance requires the cooperation of perception and memory – change within the present alone is not feasible. If the initial unity of reality is disrupted, positional consciousness seeks to recover the lost balance by taking into account the otherwise3 – the unexpected is incorporated harmoniously into the overall nexus and thus rendered familiar. This process continues until satisfaction through confirming fulfillment is attained.4 The unity is established once more, and consciousness is now richer and more complex, more prepared for challenge than before. This constant dynamic of replacement5 is driven by the protodoxa and its motivation toward the attainment and maintaining of an epistemic unity of sense and fueled by modality modification as the challenging of this initial unity. Doubt and questioning are also examples of modalization. Husserl occasionally discusses them as presentifying modifications because they involve bringing forth, in a vacillating fashion, the non-present 'as if' it were present.6 We could consider modality modifications as presentifications, although this qualification does not essentially affect the main point under consideration here – i.e., their positionality. 1 Cf., Hua XI, pp.83-84 2 Hua XI, pp.26, 29 3 Hua XI, p.27 4 Hua XI, p.83 5 Hua XI, p.30 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.18 102 Doubt and questioning challenge an initial doxic stance, which may or may not be protodoxic. I say this because all epistemic claims (including previously modified ones) are subject to revision in the context of facticity and existence. I discussed the significance of doubt and questioning as conflict within the realizing attitude in Chapter 1; what I want to stress here is the epistemic rather than the ontic dimension of doubt. In the case of the mannequin initially appearing as a human being one vacillates for a while between two apprehensions and their respective perceptual appearances1 – human being vs. mannequin. This vacillation was previously discussed mainly in ontic terms, but it is equally epistemic. Being and knowledge as truth are interconnected. Establishing the non-being of the person and the being of the mannequin has epistemic import – factual knowledge has been attained with respect to this object. Ontic indeterminacy and uncertainty are mirrored by doxic and epistemic indeterminacy and uncertainty.2 Like disappointment, doubt requires resolution and the regaining of factual knowledge. Vacillation in the realizing-positional attitude must cease – a decision needs to be made leading to the reestablishing of ontic and epistemic coherence through negation or reaffirmation.3 Reality and consciousness as unified wholes emerge anew – more complex than before. The resulting epistemic stance is thus no longer naïve (i.e., the protodoxa as presupposition) but a confirmed doxa. Like retention, which renders possible the constitution of original timeconsciousness and of the immanent and transcendent worlds through a gradual sedimentation of perceptual (impressional more precisely) experiences fading into the past, modality modification leads to a continuous enrichment of consciousness and of reality. The 1 Cf., Hua XI, §8 2 This mirroring maps onto Husserl's noetic-noematic correspondence (cf., Hua XI, p.38) 3 Hua XI, §9 103 history of consciousness1 is the unfolding of a contested doxic nexus in which the struggle to overcome uncertainty and indeterminacy takes center stage. §2! . Existence and Positionality Positional intentionality, motivated by the protodoxa, strives toward realization2 – toward the establishing and securing of the being and truth of objects as real. It is thus fundamentally teleological.3 Positional striving is epistemic striving4 – a search for factual knowledge and certainty. It occurs as a continuous process of regaining the lost balance by reshaping and remodeling the doxic claims made with respect to the real. These individual claims are thus constantly challenged, annulled, or confirmed but what matters the most in the positional attitude is the overall balance and harmony of the ontic and doxic wholes. Modalization is a modification of the belief in the being and truth of real objects. It is also the modification of certain moments (or contents) previously given in perception.5 Replacement implies the annulment (Aufhebung) or crossing out (Durchstreichung) of certain moments in favor of others. This for Husserl is the most primitive (here passive) form of negation.6 It also involves primitive affirmation as confirmation (Bewahrheitung). These are to be distinguished from negation, affirmation, and verification proper, which pertain to judgment as active synthesis.7 What is worth emphasizing here is the fundamentally epistemic structure of passive synthesis as the most basic level of positional consciousness. Husserl was adamant in establishing epistemic teleology at work in passivity and not solely in activity. Furthermore, he also emphasizes the instantiation of universal and eidetic logical principles at the level of passivity – passive positionality follows the principles of non- 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.38 2 Cf., Hua XI, §21 3 Hua XI, pp.91-92 4 Hua XI, pp.89-90 5 Hua XI, pp.30-31 6 Hua XI, pp.31-33 7 Cf., Hua XI, pp.29-30 104 contradiction and of the excluded middle when in modalization it settles conflicts in terms of negation and affirmation1 – an object either is or is not, but not both. The epistemic resolving of modalization depends upon eidetic principles and is ordered correspondingly. We must, however, keep in mind that for Husserl the level of passive synthesis is pre-propositional2 and that judgment proper occurs only as active synthesis. Modalization is reproductive insofar as it challenges ontic and doxic modalities initially established through perceptual givenness. All reproduction is a reinterpretation of what is given in perception. Like memory (and retention in a qualified sense), modalization reinterprets the being and truth of perceptual objects. Through memorial modification real objects are given as having past being and truth; in modality modification the being and truth of objects are given as transformed or having undergone annulment or confirmation. Thus modality modification affects both ontic and doxic modalities and impacts both consciousness and reality. All three types of modifications that I have been focusing on in this chapter are positional – they share in common the claiming of the objects' being and truth. Regardless of the modified sense of 'being' (as past or questionable, for instance), what is at stake in positionality is primarily the existence of objects and the actual attainment of empirical knowledge. Positionality understood in terms of existence is fundamentally factical. I will soon show that this is not the sole type of positionality and that various types of inquiries are motivated teleologically by something other than existence – by essence to be more precise. Universal thought and inquiry aim at the attainment of universal knowledge as knowledge of essences or ideals. As such, positionality of essence does not seek factual knowledge, but 1 Cf., Hua XI, p.103 2 Cf., Hua XI, pp.38-39 105 universal-eidetic1 knowledge instead. However, before we can turn to this other kind of positionality we must engage in an in-depth discussion of non-positionality as the sole path that renders it accessible. Without non-positionality all thought and inquiry would be bound to the realizing attitude as positionality of existence.2 §3. Phantasiemodi f ikat ion as Non-Positional In this section I explore the nature and structure of non-positionality, which is not a mere negation or omission of positionality but the suspension (Ausschaltung) of the belief in the object's existence and factual truth. A mere negation would imply a positing of nonbeing. Thus non-positionality does not involve negation but an abstention (Enthaltung) from all doxic claims with respect to the object's ontic status.3 I thus equate non-positionality and neutrality4 and seek to show that Phantasiemodifikation alone grants access to neutrality. As such, it secures the path toward the second kind of positionality, i.e., positionality of essence. §3! . Neutrality Modification as Phantasiemodi f ikat ion Husserl analyzes Phantasiemodifikation from early on in terms of non-positionality. We see him employ this framework in 1900/01 in his Logical Investigations5 and in 1904/05 and onward in his studies of intuitive presentation. However, not until 1912 does he come to realize the stark difference between positionality and non-positionality. As late as the early and mid-1920s his work still exhibits moments when he fails to fully take into account the radical nature of this difference. My specific goals in this section are to clarify the structure 1 Husserl employs the term eidos to refer to essences or universals. Sciences and inquiries seeking knowledge of universals and essences, like phenomenology, are thus referred to as 'eidetic' sciences or projects. 2 From now I will refer to the two types of positionality as 'positionality of existence' and 'positionality of essence'. Husserl himself did not employ this terminology nor did he study these two attitudes in a juxtaposing manner. He does not explicitly discuss the transition from the first kind of positionality to the second through the non-positionality of Phantasie but merely gestures towards it. 3 Husserl employs Ausschaltung and Enthaltung interchangeably in Hua XXIII to refer to doxic and ontic neutralization in Phantasie. 4 This equation will gain further qualification in Part II of this dissertation. 5 I shall soon mention the key points of his discussion of Phantasiemodifikation in the Logical Investigations. 106 of Phantasiemodifikation while emphasizing non-positionality, to equate non-positionality and neutrality and show neutral modification as facet of Phantasiemodifikation (and not the other way round as Husserl claims in his Ideas I1), to distinguish between Husserl's concept of Fundierung and Phantasiemodifikation, and last but not least, to stress the abyss separating positionality and non-positionality as ineluctable gap completely excluding the possibility of any fusion or mixture of these two attitudes. This however does not preclude the possibility of cooperation as relation between the two. Phantasiemodifikation, like memorial modification, is a reproduction (Reproduktion) of perception.2 But unlike memorial modification, which occurs in the context of positionality and the claim of the existence and truth of objects as real, Phantasiemodifikation occurs outside the realizing sphere and makes no such claim. Both Phantasie and memory are types of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) – they give a non-present object 'as if' it were present. But non-presence here, as I showed in Chapter 1, is ambiguous – in the case of memory it means 'past being' whereas in the case of Phantasie neither being nor non-being are claimed. Nonpresence in Phantasie implies irrealty – the lack of an ontic status. As presentifications they modify what is given in perception. Memory involves a temporal and ontic modification, which has epistemic consequences – the object's being is past being and its certainty is not secured as in the case of perception. Nevertheless the object appears in memory as once having been perceived (i.e., as actual). Memory is epistemically motivated. As reproduction it involves a modification in the temporal givenness of the object, but the latter is still given in the positional and realizing context of perception. Thus the relation between perception and memory unfolds within the realizing attitude and with respect to the object as real. Phantasie involves modification also – one that 1 As I shall soon show. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.9, 14 107 affects both ontic and doxic modalities. The object appears without any claim about its being or non-being, while certainty (or uncertainty for that matter) ceases to be an issue because Phantasie does not seek factual knowledge.1 Its reproduction is a modification as leap outside the realizing attitude and an opening of a distinct dimension – the irreal.2 Phantasiemodifikation is a breaking free from the real and the actual and its ontic and epistemic demands.3 The relation between Phantasie and perception is a mirroring4 through which a world separate from reality appears. There is therefore an unbridgeable gap between the real and the irreal – the two worlds revolve around distinct centers of gravity: being and truth for the former and ontic and doxic neutrality for the latter.5 This gap must not be understood in terms of conflict as opposition6 – opposition proper occurs within the real, for instance between being and non-being, as we saw in the case of modalization. The relation between the real and the irreal is a dialogue able to uncover the radical differences between them and suggestive of ways in which new possibilities could be brought into the real.7 Phantasiemodifikation affects both the content and apprehension of perception.8 As showed in Chapter 1, Phantasie is not a complex mediated act; rather it structurally parallels perception in its simplicity and directness. Husserl distinguishes between sensation and phantasma as contents.9 The former demands the positional interpretation (apprehension) of perception and the appearance of the object as real and present – i.e., given in propria persona. The latter requires the non-positional interpretation typical of Phantasie.10 In the case of 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, §§50-52 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, pp.4, 12, 66-67 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, §§45-52, esp. §49 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.16 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §50 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §30, pp.64-71, and §50 7 I suggested this interpretation of the conflict between reality and irreality at the end of Chapter 1. I will further explore this line of thought in Chapter 3 where I discuss freedom and possibility. 8 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.12, No.1, Appx.12-13 9 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.49 10 Cf., Hua XIII, No.1, §44 108 Bildbewusstein, the content of the first perceptual apprehension is sensation, and phantasma that of the second modifying apprehension. Phantasma is a modification of sensation; structurally the two are parallel to each other – like sensation, phantasma is a reell element of an intentional act1; it needs to be apprehended or interpreted in order to gain an intentional character. But unlike sensation, which structurally tends toward perceptual apprehension, phantasma pertains to Phantasie apprehension. The latter interprets and gives the object apart from all ontic assumptions and modalities – it does so without any belief in its being or nonbeing.2 Phantasie is doxically neutral through and through and its object is ontically neutral. Phantasiemodifikation is reproductive because it appropriates perceptual content and strips it of all doxic modal inclinations; thus, its apprehension does not involve any belief in the ontic status of the object. Reproduction here implies an alteration of the initial perceptual content and apprehension,3 but unlike memorial or modal reproduction, which also alter the original structural elements of perception, Phantasie ceases to function within the sphere of influence of the realizing attitude. Thus, it is appropriate to label Phantasiemodifikation and reproduction as a leap leaving all ontic and doxic modality behind. What comes to the fore in Phantasie apprehension are appearances.4 In imagining I have no interest in the object's being or non-being. It is given (i.e., it appears) apart from all ontic connotations. I discussed this in terms of irreality in Chapter 1. Irreality as nonpresence entails the appearance of the object 'as if' (als ob) it were present or 'as it were' (gleichsam) present.5 Thus irreality as the object of non-positional imaginative consciousness is ontically neutral.6 These are the terms in which Husserl seeks to capture the parallelism 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.13 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§50-52, No.1, Appx.7, No.2, p.187, No.2, Appx.21, Nos.3-4 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.22 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40, and No.20 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, No.2, Appx.23, Nos.7-11 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.5-6 109 between Phantasie as presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) and perception as presentation (Gegenwärtigung). Phantasiemodifikation is this very mirroring of presence in a context devoid of ontic modalities.1 The 'as if' of Phantasie, unlike that of memory and expectation, does not imply non-presence as absence; instead it points at the very lack of an ontic status. Herein lies the radical character of Phantasiemodifikation.2 The result of this modification is the complete suspension3 (Ausschaltung) of belief in the ontic status of objects. Phantasie also lacks epistemic motivation – it is non-teleological. Because of this Husserl often refers to the random or arbitrary play of imagination in terms of freedom and pure possibility.4 We shall have the opportunity to discuss both of these dimensions in the next chapter. Here it is important to emphasize the fact that Phantasie or the imagining attitude in general does not seek the attainment of knowledge. As shift, Phantasiemodifikation is the transition from actuality and the binding demands of the realizing attitude to inactuality or possibility as freedom from all ontic and epistemic goals. Neutrality is here understood as freedom from positionality.5 As we shall see in Chapter 3, Phantasie brings forth an other kind of freedom – one that is positively conceived: the freedom to engage the radically other understood in terms of irreal possibility6. I will explore this positive freedom in terms of free imaginative variation. Ideally, for any positional stance there is a non-positional attitude.7 In other words, imagining consciousness parallels the realizing consciousness completely – to the most basic and primitive level of passive synthesis. Thus the shift from positionality to non-positionality through Phantasiemodifikation is always (i.e., ideally) possible. Reality and irreality are 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.8, 18 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.15c-d, 20, No.15, Appx.40 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.18-20 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15k, No.15, Appx.43 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.57, No.19 7 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, p.16, No.20 110 structurally related to each other but utterly divorced in the manner of their unfolding. In section 3 of this chapter I show that this mirroring at the core of Phantasiemodifikation is not a parasitic one – that Phantasie is not derivative in its relation to perception. Instead, as suggested in Chapter 1, Phantasie and perception should be viewed as equiprimordial and simple attitudes, and Phantasiemodifikation clarified as having a primordial nature.1 Positionality and non-positionality are equally basic and foundational and must be explored as such. The radical nature of their difference must also be emphasized and the possibility of their mixture excluded in all circumstances. In section 3, I explore what Husserl refers to as 'mixed' cases of Phantasie and dismiss them by showing that all cases of Phantasie are 'pure', that ontic and doxic neutrality does not come in degrees – it is something an act and its object either exhibit or lack, i.e., they are either non-positional or positional. Non-positionality is the outcome of Phantasiemodifikation and the attitude at the very core of the imagining attitude as horizon within which, as in the case of the realizing attitude, all intentional acts can ideally unfold. At the end of Chapter 1 we saw two thinking attitudes emerge – the realizing and the imagining. They each gain further meanings in light of our present discussion: the former as positional, the latter as non-positional. Doxic neutrality is the mark of non-positional acts and correspondingly, ontic neutrality that of non-positional objects. If Phantasiemodifikation is the sole path to non-positionality, and neutrality is the mark of non-positionality, then neutrality also emerges as the outcome of Phantasiemodifikation. Despite the discoveries he makes in his previous studies of Phantasie, Husserl seems to suggest something different in his Ideas I. He claims that neutrality modification is a broader concept than Phantasiemodifikation. I think there is very little to support this view. Let me first clarify Husserl's 1913 position. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.48 111 In Ideas I1 Husserl clearly distinguishes between neutrality modification and modality modification – the latter involving mere vacillation of doxic modalities, including doubt, supposition, and negation and their respective ontic modalities. Neutrality modification is here discussed in terms of a bracketing of all belief different from all positional modifications, which involve some form of doxic modality. The intended object (i.e., the noema) of neutrality modification is not ontically posited – its ontic modality is suspended. All of this is in tune with Husserl's discoveries in his Phantasie studies. However he pursues the issue of neutrality modification even further and claims that it needs to be distinguished from Phantasie. He claims that the former needs to be recognized as the broader category and Phantasie as type of neutrality modification despite its general applicability to all positional acts.2 What this implies is that there are other ways of attaining neutrality than Phantasie and that neutrality modification may occur outside the context of Phantasiemodifikation. Husserl fails to suggest what other way there may be – I think there is no other way. Husserl's classification needs to be rethought. I am here not comparing neutrality modification and Phantasie, but neutrality modification and Phantasiemodifikation. In my view, Phantasiemodifikation is the broader concept for several reasons. First, Phantasiemodifikation has several different facets and neutrality modification is only one of them. Another is free variation, which I discuss in the context of freedom in Chapter 3. Second, neutrality modification is non-iterable; once the transition to non-positionality has been made there is nothing further to modify.3 This is one of Husserl's earliest discoveries 1 Hua III/1, §§109-110 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §111 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, 2g. Husserl here claims non-iterability as a feature of Phantasiemodifikation, but particularly with respect to the shift to non-positionality, thus he was specifically referring to neutrality modification. 112 with respect to neutrality modification – he first mentions it in his Logical Investigations.1 Phantasiemodifikation broadly construed allows for repetition when already modified acts function as foundations for subsequent imaginative non-positional acts – neutrality being thus carried over into the new founded act. We could say that neutrality modification, along with free variation, are the two most distinct dimensions of Phantasiemodifikation. On this model, all neutrality and non-positionality is attained solely through Phantasiemodifikation. In his later 1918-1924 studies of Phantasie he discusses neutrality modification in the context of Phantasiemodifikation alone, although he never explicitly discusses it as facet or dimension of the latter.2 In 1912 he comes closest to doing this when he directly links Phantasiemodifikation and non-positionality on the one hand and he equates non-positionality and neutrality on the other.3 He also gestures in this direction in one of his last studies of Phantasie.4 In order to fully understand the non-iterability of neutrality modification as facet of Phantasiemodifikation and the possibility of iteration in the context of Phantasie or the imagining attitude we must clearly distinguish between Phantasiemodifikation and Husserl's notion of Fundierung, which is the process of bringing forth complex acts based on simple acts. This will also further emphasize and illuminate my claim that Phantasiemodifikation is the broader concept and the sole way of accessing neutrality. §3! . Fundierung and Phantasiemodi f ikat ion I mentioned toward the beginning of this chapter that Husserl analyzes consciousness, acts, and objects synthetically on a part-whole model. This framework of analysis is prevalent in his Logical Investigations and though it becomes less conspicuous over 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§39-40. Here Husserl discussed neutrality modification as 'qualitative modification' because it impacts the quality rather than the matter of acts – i.e., their positing doxic status and the ontic status of their objects. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.18-20 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d-e, j, k 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20 (1921/24) 113 the years Husserl never ceases to rely on it. The distinction between Fundierung and Phantasiemodifikation that I am here interested in is made, to certain extent, in terms of this part-whole analytic framework. The dynamic between the parts and the whole that Husserl brings to light has a critical feature – the relation existing among the parts given their structure guarantees the coherence of the whole.1 The whole constantly morphs in light of new additions but its overall nature remains unaltered because only certain parts can join the nexus and they can do so in very specific ways predetermined through their very structure. Thus consciousness as a whole is a nexus in a constant state of flux but new acts and their corresponding objects, new intentional experiences, join the whole in an ordered and predelineated fashion – they do so following the unfolding process of impression, retention, and protention. The same holds for acts and objects as wholes. If several acts function as foundation for one complex act the new act comes to the fore as a whole – having a singular intentionality.2 The process of Fundierung occurs on the part-whole model. Complex acts are founded on simple or simpler acts – thus a simple act like perception can be the foundation for a judgment, which in its turn, though already complex or founded, can become the foundation for a subsequent volition. The founding process may or may not affect the reference of the act (what Husserl refers to in the Logical Investigations as matter3), but it changes its quality4 – how the object is given, i.e., in perception, in judgment, or in volition. But Fundierung does not affect the overall quality (as attitude) of the acts, which Husserl already identifies in 1900/01 as 'positing' and 'non-positing'.5 Founded acts remain within one of these two overall genera of 'quality'. 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §19 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §19 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §20 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §20 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §38 114 Several things are of great import here – first, Fundierung is a process whose outcome is a complex or compound act; second, the compound act is a whole, it has unity, which is expressed in terms of intentional singularity; third, it inherits the attitude of its simple acts, thus if the judgment and volition are both positional the subsequent judgment is also positional1; last but not least, the founding process allows for iterability – repetition is at the very core of bringing forth complex acts. The founding process may either unfold while the same matter is maintained (as in the case of perception-judgment-volition) or it may take the form of a 'nesting' of acts, in which case subsequent acts include previous acts as wholes include parts. Both cases are examples of derivation and involve some type of repetition – the complex acts share in common structural elements with the simple founding acts. Fundierung is one example of intertwining of acts – one in which the attitude of acts is not altered in the process.2 Phantasiemodifikation may also involve the intertwining of acts, only it does so in a distinct way. Let me first note what happens at the most basic level of Phantasiemodifikation – simple or complex positional acts become non-positional – they intend the same object, e.g., a house with a red roof, but they intend it in a radically different way: instead of positing the existence and actuality of this transcendent object, the modified acts make no claim with respect to its ontic status. This type of modification does not affect the quality of the act understood as the mode of the object's givenness: being-judged, being-desired, etc. Judgment remains judgment despite Phantasiemodifikation. The matter remains the same as the referent or meaning of the act – 'the house with the red roof'. What changes is the quality 1 If some founding acts are positional and some non-positional, the complex act exhibits the attitude of the most complex of the founding acts. 2 This interconnectedness of acts is a very insightful and interesting way of mapping the dynamics of consciousness and it goes against the mainstream view of faculty psychology. 115 understood as the attitude of the act: it shifts from being positional to being non-positional.12 Thus, in Phantasiemodifikation, simple acts remain simple acts – there is no increase in complexity here. Acts maintain their structure through this modification, which mirrors the realizing attitude and differs from it solely in terms of doxic claims with respect to the objects' ontic modality. This difference is simple and straightforward but most radical. We have seen in Chapter 1 the extent to which this simplicity eluded Husserl in his analyses of Phantasie. There is no derivation here. Phantasiemodifikation understood narrowly as neutrality modification is non-iterable – there is no further modification to be performed. This suggests two things: first, that imagining consciousness functions at the same levels realizing consciousness does. A positional judgment x is paralleled by an imagined judgment x'; likewise, a complex positional desire y has its exact non-positional counterpart y'. Phantasiemodifikation is the bridge between two mutually exclusive attitudes – the realizing and the imagining. Whereas Fundierung is a gradual building with higher complexity levels as its result, Phantasiemodifikation relocates acts from the context of the former attitude to that of the latter without any gain in complexity. The second insight attained here beyond the equiprimordiality of realizing and imagining consciousness is that neutrality modification, or Phantasiemodifikation narrowly understood, is, unlike Fundierung, non-iterable. I mentioned earlier that repetition is not completely excluded from the context of Phantasiemodifikation. Fundierung is a process that can unfold and occur within both the abovementioned attitudes. Thus, bringing forth complex acts based on simple acts can occur within the realizing attitude, but it may very well occur within the imaginative attitude also. I 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§39-40 2 Here Husserl refers to Phantasiemodifikation, or neutrality modification to be more exact, as 'qualitative modification'. We must distinguish between quality as act-character, e.g., 'judgment', 'perception', and so forth, and quality understood as attitude – as the presence or non-presence of doxic claims. He also employs the term 'imaginative modification' to discuss mainly the belief structure of Bildbewusstsein. "Qualitative modification' is the 1900/01 equivalent to Phantasiemodifikation proper. 116 emphasized that the quality of acts, understood as their overall attitude, does not alter during the founding process. An imagining act, say a judgment z, can thus function as a founding act for the desire w – with one proviso: the desire is an imagining non-positional act also. Thus I can imagine that I judge lemon ice-cream to be a good choice for a dessert, and subsequently I imagine desiring an ice-cream. The founding process is feasible in Phantasiemodifikation also if we define this modification broadly in terms of whatever shifts may occur within the imagining attitude. Thus, Phantasiemodifikation neutralizes both simple and complex acts and these acts, once neutralized, can function as founding acts for subsequent more complex acts. In this qualified sense we may speak of iterability in the context of Phantasiemodifikation. In my view the distinction between Fundierung and Phantasiemodifikation further supports the claim that neutrality modification is a narrower concept than Phantasiemodifikation and that the former essentially pertains to the latter as one of its core facts. §3! . Positionality and Non-positionality Compared Our discussion of the distinction between Fundierung and Phantasiemodifikation brought once more to the fore the parallelism or mirroring that occurs through Phantasiemodifikation between the realizing-positional and imagining non-positional attitudes. In this sub-section I would like to further clarify this parallelism by disentangling some of the claims Husserl makes with respect to the relation or cooperation between positionality and non-positionality. Overall Husserl was well aware of the extreme gulf separating these two attitudes or types of consciousness; nevertheless some of the claims he made not just occasionally but on a regular and sustained basis undermine this deep-seated distinction. In my view there are three categories of claims that require our attention. First, the usage of Husserl's 'quasi-' label for all elements or sub-structures of Phantasie and its object as related 117 to perception and the real. Related to this, are his discussions of 'mixed' Phantasie cases; Second, Husserl's collapsing of memory and Phantasie, mainly by claiming that the latter 'founds' the former. And third, the issue of fulfillment ('quasi-fulfillment') of perception through Phantasie. What needs to be emphasized in all of these cases is the radical character of the difference between positionality and non-positionality and the consequences and implications of this difference. In his studies of Phantasie Husserl had sought to distinguish between 'pure' and 'mixed' Phantasie. The latter is discussed as late as the mid-1920s as the outcome of Phantasiemodifikation and hence dependent upon and derivative of perception. The former, on the other hand is original insofar as it had not at any point shifted to non-positionality form positionality.1 Furthermore, due to its 'original' character pure Phantasie exhibits free playfulness and a complete separation from the real and the actual. 'Mixed' Phantasie as derivative and modified is irreal but only insofar as irreality is given 'as if' it were real – it requires the input of the realizing attitude2 and it maintains a residue of positionality despite the neutralizing modification.3 Husserl identifies three cases of 'mixed Phantasie': 1) one whose object is positable, 2) one which is the attempt to conceive the otherwise of reality, and 3) hallucination as irreality under the guise of reality.4 For Husserl, all of these cases of Phantasie exhibit a mixture of positionality and non-positionality. Two problems arise here: the conceiving of neutrality modification and neutrality in general in terms of degrees and the possibility of 'mixing' positionality and non-positionality. Both of these problems undermine the radical difference between positionality and non-positionality and must be seriously addressed. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20, p.577 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20, p.578 3 Ibid., pp.579-580 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, pp.578-580 118 The neutrality of non-positionality is not something measurable in degrees. An act is either neutral or it is not – acts cannot be more or less neutral. Neutrality can only be brought to the fore through Phantasiemodifikation and it is a matter of indifference whether an initially positional act has been modified into a non-positional act, a judgment for instance, or an imagining act occurs ex nihilo without the prior transition from positionality: I imagine a centaur. Neutrality modification does not solely refer to the shift from positionality to nonpositionality; it also stands for the maintaining of the non-doxic attitude. If I imagine a centaur in a self-reflective fashion, i.e., without being lost in this Phantasie and confusing it with perception, my consciousness undergoes neutrality modification at all stages of the act's duration. Neutrality modification is ongoing as it secures the non-doxic character of acts throughout their unfolding in time-consciousness. Husserl's claim that non-positional acts having undergone neutrality modification as shift are somehow bound to reality is very insightful – the parameters of the imagined act's content and quality (act-character) are preset, we could say the freedom of this act in terms of the possibility of varying these parameters is bound. All of this can be discussed in terms other than 'mixture' and 'residue', for instance in terms of freedom and possibility.1 Such language suggests a fusion (Verschmelzung) between positionality and non-positionality, but such fusion is feasible only within the context of one of these attitudes – within its boundaries and not crossing beyond them. In order for two acts to fuse the belief in their similar doxic modality is presupposed. If I confuse elements of memory and of imagination I do so because I take the imagining act to be a memory and thus posit it as actual. If I am aware of the difference in doxic modality between two acts their fusion is out of the question. The first two examples of 'mixed' Phantasie cases are nothing more than instances 1 Which is precisely one of the sub-projects of Chapter 3. 119 in which the non-positional is placed in relation to the positional. But this relation does not necessarily imply their 'mixing'. Two radically different acts can cooperate and through this emphasize the radical differences between them. I discussed this in terms of conflict between reality and irreality at the end of Chapter 1. The third example, hallucination, which unfolds solely within the irreal but gives itself under the guise of the real is not a case of fusion between reality and irreality but of one replacing the other. Thus, when Husserl claims that neutrality modification is a 'covering over' (Überdecken)1 of positionality he fails to do justice to the abyss that sets them apart. There is no bridging middle ground or overlap between doxic modality and doxic neutrality. The undermining of the stark distinction between positionality and non-positionality or between the realizing and the imagining attitude stems from one of Husserl's deeplyengrained tendencies (we saw him exhibit the same kind of stubbornness against his better judgment with respect to mental images): the tendency to analyze and study imagining consciousness and non-positionality in comparative terms taking the realizing-positional consciousness as the original model. If showing radical difference between positionality and non-positionality is the goal, a comparative project will eventually run its course and terminate before the goal is reached. As insightful and fruitful comparative projects may be they cannot illuminate core or original differences. This is so because in order to uncover the uniqueness of one of the compared terms the dimensions preset in light of the other term's structure and parameters must be left behind. To fully grasp the core of the imagining attitude one must think outside the box of realizing consciousness. Husserl was more often than not reluctant to do this. 1 Hua XXIII, No.20, p.581 120 The prime example of this reluctance consists in his constant usage of the term 'quasi-' when referring to the structures, elements, objects, and world of Phantasie, even to the act and consciousness itself. Thus Phantasie is 'quasi-perception'1, the imagined world is a 'quasi-world'2 exhibiting 'quasi-order' and 'quasi-spatiality and temporality'. Such language blurs the path toward the ultimate goal of Husserl's quest – to distinguish in all of its richness the uniqueness of Phantasie. This language is better suited for positional presentifications such as memory and expectation, which bring forth a non-presence directly related to the presence of reality. Irreality as non-presence stands 'aloof' – completely separate and different from reality and actuality. Yet another claim Husserl makes that undermines the radical difference between positionality and non-positionality involves his comparison of memory and Phantasie. This too is a long-lasting comparative study. At times we see Husserl claim that memory is founded on Phantasie3, that it has phantasma as its content. This, as we have seen in our discussion of Fundierung in the context of the imagining attitude, is indeed a possibility, but certainly not the sole or main possibility. Memory is primarily positional – it occurs in the realizing attitude and its objects are given as once real and actual. As such, a positional memory by structural definition has a retentionally-modified sensation as its content and not a phantasma. If a positional memory undergoes neutrality modification its content and apprehension are modified also and its content is indeed a phantasma. Furthermore, if an imagining act of memory is founded on an act of simple imagining, one could say that Phantasie is the 'foundation' of memory. Once modified, acts simple or complex can function as foundations for other acts and in this case we witness Fundierung in the imagining attitude 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No2b, No.4 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.16 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.3-4, 18 121 – non-positional Fundierung. But in both neutrality modified simple memory and in nonpositional founded memory there is no mixing of positionality and non-positionality. The reason behind Husserl's occasional collapsing of Phantasie and memory, despite his overall clear distinctions between these acts in terms of positionality and non-positionality, is that sometimes he employs Phantasie and 'reproduction' or 'presentification' interchangeably thus making Phantasie the genus for all species of presentification, including memory.1 This however is, as I hope to have shown, a bankrupt and confusing approach. There are two classes of presentification – positional and non-positional, and memory belongs primarily to the former while Phantasie pertains solely to the latter. The same holds in the case of modalization. All modalized positional acts may occur in the imagining attitude in a doxically neutral fashion.2 I can imagined that I doubt, suppose, negate and so forth. These are valuable neutral modalizations for all hypothetical endeavors and inquiries – which explore a variety of options without any doxic commitment. Thus, Phantasiemodifikation and imagining consciousness have a different relation to perception than memory and modalization do. Imagining and perceptual consciousness mirror each other structurally and their respective types of consciousness are equiprimordial. They are both loci for all other acts and non-radical modifications3 (i.e., retentional, memorial, and modality modifications) may all occur within the positional-realizing consciousness or the nonpositional imagining consciousness. Phantasie is not parasitic on perception, whereas memory, expectation, and modalization are parasitic upon the original acts of perceiving and imagining as reell acts occurring in 'the now' of actual or imagining consciousness. These insights into the nature of imagining consciousness regarding its relationship to non-radical 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15f, No.20 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d 3 These modifications are non-radical because they do not entail, like Phantasiemodifikation, the shift from one level of consciousness to another. Their functioning maintains the positionality of the act-object correlation. 122 modifications and acts (such as memory) as well as all types of modalizations (such as doubt and negation) will prove immensely helpful in our attempt to disentangle the structure and functioning of the reductions, eidetic variation, and post-eidetic intuition thought in Part II of this project. Lastly, I wish to briefly gesture at Husserl's claiming the possibility of fulfilling perception through Phantasie. I am looking at a red apple and before turning it and seeing its back side I 'quasi-fulfill' the intuiting of this act by 'imagining' its back side as red. In light of my previous discussion of the 'quasi-' aspect of Phantasie and of the structural impossibility of mixing positional and non-positional acts I have serious doubts about Husserl's claim1. Husserl discusses this type of intuition as empty – there is no actual fulfillment of perception here.2 The problem lies in claiming the possibility of a structural comingling of elements pertaining to two radically distinct dimensions. In his later analyses of passive and active synthesis Husserl explores, to some extent, the notion of 'picturing' or Ausmalung.3 He here refers to it as Veranschaulichung or intuitive illustration,4 which is the language he employs in his discussion of Bildbewusstein, i.e., image consciousness. The 'filling' (Füllsel)5 picturing provides cannot satisfy perception but it functions intentionally in manner that anticipates the future expected perceptual fulfillment.6 This strikes one as an all too familiar framework of mental imaging and Husserl does employ the language of images in these analyses. We could easily reinterpret this in light of appearances or the very givenness of the object. In 'picturing' the back side of the apple I am not imagining – I am in the positional-realizing attitude, aiming at factual knowledge with respect to an existing and real object. Imagination 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.3; cf., also Hua XI, pp.4, 41 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos. 12, 14 3 Cf., Hua XI, §§19, 22 4 Cf., Hua XI, pp.40-41 5 Hua XI, p.79 6 Hua XI, p.81 123 has no role to play in this picturing. Ausmalung here is an appearance facilitated by my past experiences of red apples and their back sides. It is memory facilitating positional expectation. It is not a full intuition, but rather an empty 'quasi-intuition' leaving one still wondering. This, finally, is an appropriate usage of 'quasi-'. Phantasie cannot intervene and complement the perceptual act seeking fulfillment. Husserl himself points out that there cannot be any 'mixing' between Phantasie and perception,1 but he fails to draw all of the implications of this insight: "One says that phantasy often supplements perception, but it can never do so in the sense that comes into question here. One can never simultaneously direct one's regard toward the perceptual field and the phantasy field. As soon as we focus out attention on perceptual objects, the phantasy field is gone."2 §4. The Neutrality of Inquiring Thought So far, the main goals in this chapter have been to clarify and emphasize the radical difference between positionality and non-positionality, to illuminate the uniqueness of doxic and ontic neutrality and to show that Phantasie presents us with the sole way of accessing it. This section focuses on the uniqueness of neutrality and begins the process, which will continue in Chapter 3 and Part II of this dissertation, that seeks to explore the various ways in which it has great import for inquiring thought both broadly and narrowly construed. My intention here is to uncover neutrality as that which renders possible the transition from positionality of existence, and its interest in factual knowledge, to positionality of essence as search for knowledge of universals. The intentionality aiming at essences is rendered possible through Phantasie and its neutrality. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, p.76 2 PICM, p.75; Husserl's emphasis. "Man sagt, die Phantasie ergänze vielfach die Wahrnehmung, aber in dem Sinn kann sie es nie tun, der hier in Frage käme. Niemals kann man auf das Wahrnehmungsfeld hinblicken und zugleich auf das Phantasiefeld hinblicken. Sowie wir auf Wahrnehmungsobjekte achten, ist das Phantasiefeld weg" (Hua XXIII, p.69). 124 §4! . Non-positional Inquiry – The Importance of 'Mere Thought' All Phantasie or imagining consciousness implies doxic and ontic neutrality. As such, appearances are brought to the fore in a process that makes no claim about the ontic status of objects. Unlike the realizing attitude, which posits the existence and truth of objects as real, the imagining attitude is free from all such positing (Setzung). This freedom, as we shall see in the following chapter is a privation or negative freedom1, but it lays the foundation for another kind of freedom – one that is positively conceived. Phantasie is solely interested in the givenness and appearance of objects2; this neutrality is the key and foundation of its freedom. Phantasie does not seek to go beyond appearances, the way positional consciousness does, and as such it can engage and reflect on these appearances in a manner utterly unknown to the realizing attitude. Reflection in the imagining attitude has no epistemic goals, no ontic interests, no deeply-engrained fears of uncertainty and indeterminacy, no motivation that predetermines its every step in light of a fixed teleology. One could easily see that what prima facie presents itself as a solely negative freedom – a freedom from the actual and its demands – hides a rich reservoir of positive freedom able to express itself in an infinite number of ways. The positional attitude can never be, properly speaking, doxically neutral. This is so due to the pervasive motivational impact the protodoxa has. Whatever moments of seeming neutrality occur in positionality they are temporary decisions, passively or actively made, to omit claiming a determinate ontic status for the object. But omitting to claim something is not the same as abstaining (Enthaltung) from doing so.3 The former implies a teleological framework beyond the momentary postponing of a claim. Furthermore, even though the 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40, No.20a 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20, p.580 125 object is not assigned an ontic modality, it is still viewed as real – as having an ontic modality despite its being indeterminate at the time. Neutrality as doxic indifference toward the object's ontic status can never occur in the context of positionality. All vacillation as doubt, all indeterminacy and uncertainty – whether chosen or not – is bound to be resolved in the realizing attitude1, which is, in its very structure, essentially aiming at facticity and factual knowledge. Reflection in the imagining attitude approaches objects 'as if' they were real – this allows for the order and structure of positional reflection to carry over and function within non-positionality as well. We have already seen that an imagined judgment may very well be valid. This is so because through Phantasiemodifikation positional structures are mirrored in a non-positional context – it is a mirroring that does not strip acts of their structure and order; it merely renders them doxically neutral. Thus, beneath the mask of utter playfulness and arbitrariness, the imagining attitude exhibits order and coherence and it is equally bound by the eidetic or universal principles of logic, which guide realizing consciousness in both its passivity and activity. Furthermore, imagining consciousness is fundamentally self-reflective.2 The imagining or Phantasie ego is not lost in the irreal world – to imagine entails self-awareness. Should the ego be lost in the imagined world, it would no longer be, properly speaking, imagining. It would confuse imagining with perception. Because of this potentiality for selfreflection, any imagining act could be channeled toward a purpose despite its being essentially non-teleological. We saw this occurring in the conflict as dialogue between reality and irreality in which one sought to conceive of alternative scenarios that could become part of reality. The same cooperation is feasible between the irreal and the ideal – imaginative 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20, p.577 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2a-d, No.2, Appx.21, 23, No.15d, No.20a 126 variation can be located within the teleological context of projects seeking to grasp ideals and universals.1 Thought in the imagining attitude is 'mere thought'2 – free from ontic and epistemic determinations. It is thought stripped of realizing tendencies and interests, which are put out of play or inhibited through neutrality modification.3 Imagining thought is thus nonmotivated and it can exhibit modalization without any epistemic commitment; for instance, one can imagine that one doubts or deems something possible and, unlike modalization in positional consciousness, this doubt or deeming possible can engage uncertainty and indeterminacy in a flexible manner, without seeking to resolve them. We saw in Chapter 1 the extent to which realizing consciousness is threatened by uncertainty and relentlessly seeks and covets harmonious determinacy. Imagining consciousness exhibits no such phobias and obsessions. Imagined doubt is free to leave something undecided. Inquiry in the imagining attitude can thus take the form of an infinite series of modulations – a neverending variation of possibilities that surpass the preset givens of reality. But this process of variation can be redirected and rendered teleological – it can become the path toward factual or ideal goals. Thus, Phantasie freedom as irreal possibility and infinite variation can be placed in dialogue with real or ideal possibilities, as I intend to show in Chapter 3. §4! . Essence and An Other Kind of Positionality Phantasie neutrality exhibits disinterestedness and purposeless.4 It is free to engage the appearances of objects without any ontic and epistemic agenda. Although this may seem to solely lead to randomness and arbitrariness – i.e., a playfulness without structure or direction – this neutrality constitutes the very possibility of engaging in projects that seek to distance 1 I explore the nature of this cooperation between the irreal and the ideal in Chapter 3. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15g, 20a,d 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, 20a, d 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20b 127 themselves from reality as facticity and from empirical knowledge. All theoretical projects share this in common – without neutrality they would not occur; without neutrality all thought would necessarily unfold within the boundaries of the realizing attitude and positionality of existence alone. The positionality of existence is not the sole type of positionality – instead of claiming the existence of intended objects one could intend and claim objects as essences rather than really existing. Essence and existence are thus two distinct statuses objects may have. An essence is non-factical, universal, and beyond the scope of existence. To intend essences and to engage in projects seeking to grasp them require a distancing from facticity and existence. Unlike Platonic realism Husserl does not discuss essences or ideals in terms of existence and being, and unlike nominalism he makes no claim about their non-existence either. Following the idealism of Lotze and Bolzano, which influenced his work during the Halle years leading to the publishing of the Logical Investigations, Husserl discusses ideals or essences in terms of their validity, as trait through which we come to have knowledge of them. Thus, eidetic projects or inquiries – like mathematics and logic on the one hand, and phenomenology on the other, exhibit an other kind of intentionality and motivation than empirical projects. Eidetic inquiries focus on essence rather than existence and they aim at the attainment of universal knowledge. We witness here a doubling of intentionality, teleology, and motivation. Neutrality plays a crucial role in opening the possibility of thought intending essences because it secures the distancing from existence, which is the very starting point of all eidetic projects. In Part II of this dissertation I focus on uncovering the relation between the real and the ideal and claim that the link between them can only come to light through an unfolding of the irreal as neutrality and free variation. These two are the main facets of 128 Phantasiemodifikation. So far, I have solely engaged in exploring the former. Chapter 3 seeks to show the extent to which we can conceive free variation as facet of Phantasiemodifikation. This will complement my argument against Husserl's claim that neutrality modification is a broader category than Phantasiemodifikation. In this chapter I suggested neutrality as the opening of the path toward ideals – neutrality modification alone allows for such inquiry. In Chapter 3 I go beyond this initial stance and claim that free variation, as facet of Phantasiemodifikation, is the very path eidetic thought takes in its attempt to reach knowledge of essences and universals. 129 Chapter 3 – Phantasiemodi f ikat ion and the Freedom and Possibility of Inquiring Thought In Chapter 2 I explored the uniqueness of Phantasiemodifikation and sought to uncover neutrality modification as one facet of Phantasiemodifikation. I also emphasized the extent to which neutrality modification is the sole opening of the path that pertains to eidetic inquiries aiming at attaining knowledge of universals. In this chapter my main goals are to explore imaginative variation (or free variation) as the other main facet of Phantasiemodifikation and do so in terms of freedom, possibility, and its relation to neutrality modification. The significance of uncovering neutrality modification and free variation as facets of Phantasiemodifikation is twofold: first, it helps establish the uniqueness of imagining consciousness as radically distinct from positional-realizing consciousness, and second, it reveals Phantasie as the sole source and path of eidetic thought given that there is no other reservoir of neutrality or irreal possibility that universalizing inquiries could draw on. In the context of this discussion I also intend to clarify how and why eidetic thought is reliant upon neutrality and irreal possibility. Furthermore, in this chapter I also wish to emphasize the central role played by neutrality and free variation in eidetic thought as search for universals. I thus discuss the link between Phantasiemodifikation and the positionality of essence, and argue that imaginative variation is the very path of eidetic thought. Neutrality and free variation should come to the fore as indispensible for eidetic inquiry – the former as foundation and that which maintains or secures the distancing from the real, and the latter, once rendered teleological, as the very quest for universals. So far my discussion of Phantasie has relied heavily on a juxtaposing approach – the comparison between perception and Phantasie on the one hand, and of positionality and nonpositionality on the other. Toward the end of Chapter 2 I began a discussion of Phantasie that I continue in this chapter – a discussion primarily focused on illuminating the uniqueness of 130 imagining consciousness. I thus shift gears and focus exclusively on Phantasie in order to uncover its dimensions in a manner not reliant upon the parameters of positionality. In the previous chapters I stressed the equiprimordiality of positional-realizing consciousness and of non-positional-imagining consciousness in terms of mirroring. This brought to light the structural parallelism between these two attitudes and the non-parasitic (or non-derivative) character of Phantasie. Despite the fruitfulness of this approach, it harbors significant dangers – the presupposed reliance on perception and positionality in the attempt to elucidate the structure and dimensions of Phantasie and the assumption that Phantasie cannot exhibit characters lacking in perception or positionality. I have already showed neutrality as solely pertaining to Phantasie and utterly lacking in positionality. I also intent to clarify free variation as facet of Phantasiemodifikation alone. Phantasie and non-positionality are marked by dimensions shared by no other act or consciousness – they are unique and I intend to fully discuss them as such. Comparative projects have their limitations – one needs to learn when to cease relying upon them. As I redirect my discussion and focus on what characterizes Phantasie alone, I too need to let go of the comparative apparatus I have so far successfully (or so I hope) employed. I have already emphasized the attainment of neutrality solely through or as Phantasiemodifikation fand the import neutrality has for inquiring thought. In this chapter I focus on free variation and what renders it unique – i.e., freedom and possibility qualified in a specific way. I also seek to uncover the dynamic relation among neutrality, freedom, and possibility as facets of Phantasie and relocate this dynamic in the context of eidetic inquiring thought. As much as other inquiring projects – such as empirical, aesthetic, or pertaining to the positive sciences – depend upon the imagination, the main goal of this dissertation is to explore the role of Phantasie in phenomenological inquiry, which is fundamentally eidetic. I 131 will thus focus almost exclusively here and in the following chapters, on the nature of eidetic inquiry and on the relation between the irreal and the ideal.1 §1. Phantasie and Possibility In order to facilitate a comprehensive elaboration of free variation and of its role in eidetic thought I first turn to an in-depth discussion of irreal possibility as playing a crucial role in free variation. I will then focus on Phantasie freedom. What I hope to uncover is the complex nature of imaginative variation in terms of the relation between irreal possibility and freedom. I begin by stressing some of the main aspects of real possibility in order to move beyond it and explore irreal possibility in a non-comparative fashion. This discussion of real possibility will also facilitate an understanding of variation in the context of the realizing attitude and of the extent to which imaginative variation is fundamentally distinct from it. §1! . Real Possibility Husserl discusses possibility in the context of the realizing consciousness in two ways – as open (offene Möglichkeit) and enticing possibility (anmutliche Möglichkeit).2 Both of these are types of real possibility and they share indeterminacy and generality as two of their main features. Open real possibility occurs in the process of perceiving a transcendent object and anticipating the qualities of its temporarily hidden sides. I see a red apple and expect its back to appear to me as red also. This expectation stems from my past and current experience of red apples. But there is a certain degree of acknowledged uncertainty and indeterminacy in this expectation; the latter may very well be disappointed when I turn the apple in my hand and experience the color green. This indeterminacy, as we have already 1 Occasionally I discuss the role of Phantasie in inquiries other than eidetic, but due to the scope of this project, such discussions can only be suggested. Nevertheless I will take every opportunity to point at potential future projects stemming from what I uncover here. 2 Cf., Hua XI, §§10-13 132 seen in Chapters 1 and 2, is something that the realizing-positional attitude seeks to eliminate at all cost despite its constant failure to do so. The penchant for certainty stems from the ontic and epistemic agenda of the protodoxa and characterizes all passive and active intentional positional acts. Indeterminacy occurring within the realizing attitude is thus bound by a strictly delineated epistemic teleology – it is motivated toward the attainment of certainty and hence fundamentally determinable.1 All instances of indeterminacy in the realizing consciousness should be viewed as having, at least ideally, a temporary status – their resolution is one of their core structural moments. These instances do exhibit a certain sense of generality (Allgemeinheit) stemming from the uncertainty accompanying anticipation,2 however, this generality is not free and cannot become divorced from particulars. We must thus emphasize the ways in which realizing indeterminacy is essentially bound. First, it structurally involves its own dissolution as goal.3 Second, its parameters are predetermined in light of previous similar experiences, thus all anticipation (Antizipation) or prefiguration (Vorzeichnung) of viable variables4 is dependent upon positional memory and association. Third, despite the temporary omission of the doxic claim typical of realizing indeterminacy, the object is assumed to have an ontic and epistemic status yet to be established. Last but not least, the generality that marks realizing indeterminacy is tightly bound to particular moments of present and relevant past experiences; this feature is highly restrictive and dictates both the nature and the content of the span of variables qualifying as possible options – thus 'a blue back side of the now appearing red apple' does not qualify as a viable possibility. 1 Cf., Hua XI, pp.39-42 2 Cf., Hua XI, §10 3 Cf., Hua XI, pp.59-60 4 I employ the term 'variable' here to refer to something that varies or changes. 133 Husserl employs the term enticing possibility (anmutliche Möglichkeit) to refer to modalization occurring in the realizing-positional attitude. However, both open and enticing real possibilities must be understood as elements of the overall positional project of seeking fulfillment (Erfüllung) as confirmation or verification of the object's being and certainty.1 We have already discussed at length the nature of doubt (Zweifel) as vacillation (Schwanken) between two or more possibilities. We also saw the extent to which objects exercise various degrees of allure (Reiz) in their attempt to captivate the attention of the empirical or natural ego.2 Possibilities exhibiting higher levels of viability, particularly given the past experience of similar instances or objects, are more enticing than possibilities exerting lower degrees of attraction. Doubt is a vacillation between enticing possibilities, each presenting itself as more or less viable depending on both the past and present context of the experience.3 For instance, when facing the choice between claiming an object as either a human being or a mannequin I weigh the two possibilities in terms of my past experience and the current context and nature of present experience: if I undergo this process while visiting Madame Tussaud's the enticing possibility of the object's being a mannequin is more potent than the one speaking in favor of the human being. If however this is not the first time I am wrong about a mannequin in this establishment and if my perception of the object is not particularly clear (the object is far away), I may be more inclined toward deciding in favor of the other possibility. During the course of such vacillation possibilities may gain or lose strength, depending on the unfolding of the experience. Nevertheless, it is important to note that instances when competing possibilities are equally potent are fairly rare and that such balance that may present itself under the guise of neutrality cannot be indefinitely 1 Cf., Hua XI, §10 2 Cf., Chapters 1 and 2. 3 Cf., Hua XI, §11; see also Erfahrung und Urteil (EU), §21 134 maintained. As I argued in Chapter 2, ontic and doxic neutrality cannot be achieved, not even temporarily, in the realizing-positional attitude. This is so because modalizing vacillation is structurally motivated; it essentially seeks decision between variables (here real possibilities) that entail ontic and epistemic claims with respect to the object. The affirmation or negation of the initial belief as decision between enticing possibilities is what is ultimately at stake in positional modalization.1 Belief in the being and certainty of the object lies at the very core of doubt as vacillation,2 and even though apodictic certainty with respect to transcendent objects cannot be achieved, realizing consciousness seeks certainty despite its ephemeral and easily challenged character (as empirical).3 The (real) possibility of the object's being otherwise remains despite the realizing obsession with final decisions.4 What renders realizing vacillation problematic is the fact that doubt entails the tendency of believing in two or more competing possibilities.5 The conflict between these possibilities is marked by a striving to secure a decision between them, thus rendering certain that which was questionable. Real variation is the search for empirical knowledge; it is essentially motivated, time and time again, to attain as reaffirmed certainty the lost naïve certainty of the protodoxa.6 I will soon distinguish between such vacillation and the variation occurring between irreal open possibilities, which are essentially non-motivational. Thus, I here equate positional vacillation with real variation, or the process of weighing alternatives dictated by past and present experiences. 1 Cf., Hua XI, §§12-13 2 Cf., Hua XI, §11 3 Cf., Hua XI, pp.46-48, 4 Cf., Hua XI, §13 5 Cf., Hua XI, p.42 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.49-51 135 Real variation exhibits very little freedom in terms of the nature and variety of possibilities that are included in the pool of viable options.1 Realizing-positional consciousness has very strictly determined parameters and real variation must unfold within its preset boundaries. Stability and the familiar take center stage in this mode of thought. All inquiries occurring through real variation are likewise limited. They must aim at the otherwise (the other of that which is actual) through a reflective process that can only engage a restricted spectrum of options. As my discussions at the end of Chapters 1 and 2 suggested, reflection and questioning in the realizing attitude necessarily involve particulars and are predetermined by the constantly morphing and coherent nexus of past experience.2 All conflict within reality must be resolved, thus rendering all attempts to question reality within the framework of realizing consciousness fundamentally limited. Unlike such questioning attempts, inquiries in the imagining attitude are free to engage a plethora of scenarios and options that remain hidden to any search occurring within the real. Despite its freedom and ability to move beyond the motivating demands of the realizing attitude, questioning in the imagining attitude does not necessarily entail a rupture from the real and the everyday. I have already gestured toward the possibility of cooperation as conflict between the real and the irreal at the end of Chapter 1. I now turn to the nature of open irreal possibilities in order to stress their uniqueness while also showing how and why they are able to sustain a relation to the real and to the epistemic and ontic teleology of realizing consciousness. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19, pp.534-535 2 Cf., Hua XI, pp.49-50 136 §1! . Irreal Possibility Husserl also employs the term open possibility to refer to the free possibility of Phantasie, or to irreal possibility.1 Unlike open real possibility, irreal possibility breaks free from the motivational framework of positionality in the imagining attitude2 it is essentially non-positional. It thus involves no belief in the ontic and epistemic status of the object and functions in a manner not dictated by positional teleology.3 Because it is non-teleological, irreal possibility has the character of arbitrariness. Beyond its neutrality or non-positionality, irreal possibility exhibits other features that open or enticing real possibilities lack: the nature of its indeterminacy, its attitude toward indeterminacy and uncertainty, the nature of its generality, the scope of the options under consideration, and the nature of these variables as irreal possibilities. The indeterminacy characterizing irreal possibilities is neither solely the product of anticipation and thus tied to futurity, nor limited by the array of related past experiences. What we might call 'irreal indeterminacy' is the product of free conceivability – thus, if I am able to conceive 'blue apples' nothing precludes me from including this option amongst the possibilities under consideration.4 The imagination moves beyond what perception and positional memory can offer. The spectrum of irreal possibilities is thus much wider than that of real possibilities. Nevertheless, irreal possibilities can be relevant with respect to the world as real – they may stand for goals to be attained, which may function as regulative 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.16 (1912); see also EU, §21c 2 Cf., Hua XI, 40-42 (Here refers to Phantasie open possibility in the context of the 'quasi'-fulfillment of perception through the imagination. I have already dismissed the possibility of this type of fulfillment and have expressed my concerns with respect to the conceptual implications of the 'quasi'-; nevertheless it is important to stress the fact that for Husserl 'open possibility' is an ambiguous notion that requires clarification); cf., also, Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.43. 3 Cf., Hua XI, §13; however here Husserl does not clearly distinguish between positional open possibility and non-positional open possibility despite the fact that his description pertains to what I have been referring to as 'open irreal possibility'. He does briefly differentiate between enticing possibility and imaginative possibility (Phantasiemöglichkeit); see Hua XI, p.47. 4 I will soon explore this notion of conceivability further in light of the notion of logical or ideal possibility and impossibility. 137 ideals, as in the case of utopias, or they may function as distant goals yet to be attained, as in the case of drastically improving something. In these instances the goals themselves are irreal possibilities that can nevertheless be positable.1 But irreal possibilities can also constitute the path toward the attainment of a goal – through a variation of free possibilities something new may come to the fore as the answer to a search that is positionally motivated. Most importantly, however, the variation of irreal possibilities leads, as we shall soon see in section 4 of the current chapter, to the grasping of universals as the goal of eidetic inquiries such as phenomenology. The indeterminacy of irreal possibilities involves a sense of generality, but unlike the generality of real possibilities, which is tightly bound to particulars and stems solely from the uncertainty of anticipations, the generality of irreal possibilities moves beyond variables as singular instances. In section 3 of this chapter I explore the process of variation that unfolds solely in terms of free irreal possibilities. For now let us stress that the generality of irreal open possibilities does not stem from uncertainty but from freedom to engage a variety of scenarios that are not bound by the particular moments of present and past experiences. This is not to say that there is no uncertainty in imagining attitude dealing with irreal possibilities. But uncertainty here is not a threat since non-positional imagining consciousness is not motivated by ontic and epistemic goals. Phantasie is free to suffer uncertainty, and beyond this, to consider it in a fruitful and positive fashion.2 Thus, in the imagining attitude, uncertainty ceases to be the deprivation of knowledge and instead becomes the mark of epistemic neutrality as freedom to engage a variety of unbound possibilities. 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.15k, No.18, No.18, Appx.56 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.57, No.19 138 Earlier I spoke about the limited character of inquiry and thought in the realizing attitude and showed this limitedness to stem from the motivational and teleological framework of positionality as well as from its dependence upon present and past experience. Realizing inquiries strive toward a passive or active decision, which in turn is supposed to secure, at least temporarily, the certainty lost in modalization and the challenging of the protodoxa.1 The appeal that the protodoxa exerts on the realizing attitude as a whole is tremendous, such that the empirical positional ego cannot deny it and remains uneasy until certainty is once more attained.2 Uncertainty and indeterminacy are not to be tolerated in this search for very specific and predetermined epistemic goals. Quite differently, questioning and reflection in the imagining attitude involve no such binding requirements. Their ontic and doxic neutrality secure their freedom from the imperious demands of the protodoxa. Imaginative inquiries are non-telelogical and not motivated. Conflict occurring solely among irreal possibilities is not something in need of resolution; if it occurs it may either make no impact or simply lead to further insight with respect to these possibilities and their potential dynamic interaction. Such inquiries have a playful and arbitrary character, which can nevertheless, as I already suggested, be rendered teleological in the context of positional projects. While real possibilities are bound by perception and positional memory and inevitably find themselves in conflict with each other due to their motivational structure and the positional search for certainty and the affirmation of actuality, irreal possibilities as nonpositional and non-motivated do not challenge each other in the same fashion as real possibilities do – their goal is not ontic and epistemic certainty.3 Irreal possibilities present 1 Cf., Hua XI, §15; cf., also Hua XI, Appx. 4, p.356ff. 2 Cf., Hua XI, pp.59-61 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.10 (1909), pp.280-281 139 themselves as a variety of facets that come to exclude each other, and hence become conflicting, for structural or ideal reasons alone – thus, the synthetic principles of simultaneity and succession as well as logical or ideal laws, such as the principle of noncontradiction, still hold and bind the imagining ego. But conflict among irreal possibilities can never stem from the present or past experience of the respective imagined object – this is so because the objects of Phantasie are more fluid and flexible than those of perception and moreover they each could be said to have their own world. While we speak of one real world we must necessarily acknowledge multiple (or a potentially infinite number) of irreal worlds.1 Nevertheless this does not entail that an irreal world lacks order and structure, or the possibility of relating to both the real and other irreal worlds.2 Husserl discusses structural or ideal principles in terms of ideal possibilities, which dictate the nature and functioning of both real and irreal possibilities.3 Real possibilities are bound by both empirical factors and ideal principles. Irreal possibilities are bound solely by ideal or structural principles.4 This insight is of great import for our discussion of the role of Phantasie in eidetic thought – if the imagination, along with its irreal possibilities, were completely unbound and lacking all order or structure it could not function in the organized framework of eidetic teleological inquiries.5 While irreal possibility is not predetermined by the realizing attitude, it is determined by ideal laws. We see here once more why its indeterminacy is broader than that pertaining to real possibility; the latter is determined by ideal laws and further restricted by the structural and contextual demands of realizingpositional consciousness. Irreal possibility is minimally determined, yet this modicum of 1 Cf., EU, §39; see also, Hua XXIII, No.18, pp.522-523, No.18, Appx.57 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, p.522 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.14 (1898); Husserl holds a similar position in his Logical Investigations, cf., Hua XIX/1, §§65-66. 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18 (1918), pp.521-524; cf., also No.18, Appx.57 5 In the following section I discuss in detail the binding factors of Phantasie, including its freedom. 140 structure is what renders feasible its involvement in teleological inquiring projects (empirical or eidetic) and secures the unity and stability of irreality. We should also note here the bound character of neutrality modification as Phantasiemodifikation – while it touches all aspects of realizing consciousness, it is not structurally free; it cannot escape ideal laws. This eidetic determination of irreal possibilities illuminates the nature of their conceivability. An irreal possibility is conceivable as long as it follows the guidelines of eidetic laws, but it can do so in various ways. Imagined objects could be viewed as irreal possibilities. As I already mentioned in Chapter 1, imagined objects may have different ontic connotations without losing their neutral status. Thus, I may imagine an existing but absent object, a potentially existing object, or a non-existing object, and yet regardless of these ontic connotations the imagined object is always given or appears without my assuming any doxic stance with respect to its ontic status.1 We could however map these ontic dimensions onto various types of possibilities: the absent object exhibits real possibility whereas the nonexisting object involves real impossibility; the potentially existing object entails irreal possibility proper since no ontic status is attached to it. Objects such as round squares are ideally impossible. Interestingly, nothing is irreally impossible since the sole type of impossibility that we encounter in the irreal world of the imagination is ideal impossibility. The conceivable could thus be interpreted as real, irreal, or ideal possibility; what distinguishes these possibilities is our way of engaging or reflecting upon them. Real possibilities pertain to the province of realizing positional consciousness while irreal possibilities to that of imagining non-positional consciousness.2 Ideal possibilities are solely accessed through eidetic inquiries, which are positional with respect to essence rather than existence and hence directly dependent upon neutrality modification, as I argued in Chapter 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.12, 14 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15k 141 2. In sections 3 and 4 of this chapter I show why eidetic inquiries are also indebted to imaginative or free variation as the other main facet of Phantasiemodifikation. We should note that despite ideal possibility being the common term of real and irreal possibility, not everything that is irreally conceivable is positable in the context of the realizing attitude – a centaur represents a good example of something conceivable yet non-positable.1 Irreal possibility as conceivable may or may not be relevant to reality.2 Irreal suppositions and hypotheses may be applicable to reality and hence potentially able to impact it – they may function as the conceivable positable 'otherwise' of actuality3; they may also remain 'mere thoughts' divorced from the real. This latter scenario, as we saw in section 4 of Chapter 2, is of the utmost importance for all eidetic projects since any search for ideals or universals necessarily requires the leaving behind of the real and the particular. Irreal possibilities thus find themselves between the real and the ideal and represent the sole link that could elucidate the role played by ideal possibilities in reality. In order to fully explore the role irreal possibilities play in the process of clarifying the relation between the real and the ideal we must uncover the nature of the freedom exhibited by these possibilities. §2. The Bound Freedom of Phantasie Different types of Phantasie entail different kinds of freedom. I am here interested in differentiating between these various types, but most importantly, I wish to stress the significance of one kind of Phantasie and of its pertaining freedom – the bound freedom of active Phantasie. The irreal possibilities brought forth through active Phantasie are marked by this bound freedom. 1 Husserl sometime refers to irreal possibilities that are non-realizable or positable as 'empty imaginings' (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.7). 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 (1922-23) 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20 (1921/24) 142 First, we should distinguish between Phantasie that is completely divorced from the real, or what Husserl refers to as 'pure' Phantasie, and Phantasie that is in dialogue with the real, what Husserl sometime refers to as 'mixed' Phantasie.1 I have already stressed the problematic nature and consequences of the language of 'pure' and 'mixed' Phantasie in Chapter 2 – there, I also mentioned the benefits of referring to these different types of Phantasie in light of their relation (or lack thereof) to reality. I will here continue to employ this framework and distance myself from Husserl's conceptual apparatus. Each of these two types of Phantasie may be either passive or active.2 Imagining consciousness unfolds as both passive and active synthesis. Passive Phantasie occurs without our willing it; for instance, when we read or hear a story our imagination follows its thread and even occasionally surpasses it. It may thus bring forth an irreal world that shows no openness toward reality, in which case its freedom would be bound solely by ideal laws, or it may engage the very link between this world and the real world of the everyday, and thus exhibiting a freedom bound by this relation as well as ideal eidetic laws. However, my interest here lies in emphasizing the uniqueness and import of active Phantasie – both as divorced and related to reality. Active Phantasie is willed, which in its turn is triggered by the desire to attain some goal. In the case of active Phantasie related to the real, the attainment of the goal as something positable involves the conceiving of a scenario other than that which is actual or given. For instance, I may choose to imagine several possible ways of structuring or restructuring this chapter. These 'ways' are irreal possibilities viewed as potentially relevant to a real state of affairs, and as such they are essentially positable they are bound by the context of the real state of affairs and by the goal of my endeavor. The 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.20; see also, Hua XXXI, pp.10-14 (esp. p.14) 2 Husserl seems to suggests these distinctions in Hua XXXI, §3. Also, he speaks of the free choice we have in suspending (Ausschaltung) our doxic claims with respect to the ontic status of the object (cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40). 143 freedom of this type of active Phantasie is both factually and ideally determined – a fact that renders it potentially relevant to reality. Empirical inquiries varying from everyday practical questions to scientific-hypothetical questions and experiments rely heavily on this kind of active Phantasie. Active Phantasie completely divorced from the real is completely unaffected by the demands of the realizing attitude and by factual contexts – its freedom is an absolute freedom from the everyday.1 And yet, this freedom is nonetheless a bound freedom. This is so primarily because it must abide by eidetic laws and ideal possibilities.2 As I shall soon point out, there are other factors and limits that bind the freedom of this active Phantasie. Such limitations, as in the case of active Phantasie related to reality, render the imagination relevant to inquiring and teleological projects only in this case the inquiries are not empirical or factual but eidetic instead. It is my interest here and in Part II of this dissertation to make the case that active Phantasie completely divorced from the real is the very path that all eidetic inquiries must take. I have already uncovered neutrality modification as facet of Phantasiemodifikation and as the foundation of eidetic thought. In the following sections I wish to show that imaginative or free variation is also a core facet of Phantasiemodifikation and the very path of eidetic thought. What I ultimately seek to convey through these four claims is the central and irreplaceable role of the imagination in all thought seeking universals, and most importantly, in phenomenology as eidetic inquiry. I hope to accomplish this goal in Part II of this project. The freedom of Phantasie can thus manifest itself both passively and actively, and both related to or irrespective of reality. Of utmost importance here is uncovering the freedom of Phantasie as bound freedom, regardless of its synthetic status and its interaction with 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19, p.535 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.15k, 18, 19 144 reality. This is so because an unchecked freedom lacks all structure and order, and hence all ability to communicate with any project whatsoever. Unbound freedom is isolated freedom – or better yet, irrelevant freedom. All Phantasie freedom, regardless of its synthetic status and the nature of its relation to reality, involves a radical separation of the irreal from reality and fact.1 Another main structural feature of Phantasie freedom is its being-bound. Husserl sometime refers to the playful or arbitrary freedom of Phantasie2 we need to understand what this playfulness entails and see if it too, like most aspects of imagination, harbors hidden ambiguities. All Phantasie is playful and arbitrary in so far as it is non-teleological and lacks motivation.3 However, there is another way of understanding this 'playfulness'. We could distinguish between different types of Phantasie freedom in terms of degrees – although this classification is successful in identifying the nature and significance of the extreme cases of the spectrum of Phantasie freedom, it fails to clarify the dimensions of those types located between the two extremes. I here solely focus on the extremes: a completely bound Phantasie freedom is inconceivable since distancing from the real, which characterizes all imagination, implies a sense of freedom. Such bound Phantasie could not even pass as perception since even the latter exhibits some degree of freedom, as I already emphasized when discussing real possibilities. Let us then dismiss this extreme and think of the spectrum as gradually presenting lower and lower levels of freedom without reaching a nil point. On the other hand, the extreme of utter and complete freedom does seem to suggest itself as feasible. We could conceive this freedom as an utterly lawless playfulness4, a movement accountable to no principles – a sheer arbitrary fluidity. While this kind of 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.9, No.2c, No.15d, No.15i 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, Appx.1; see also Hua III/1, §4 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.57, No.19, p.535 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.7 (1909) 145 Phantasie is indeed possible, it represents the exception rather than the norm. Such instances of imagining are primarily characterized by a lack of self-reflection and by confusing irreal objects with real ones – hallucination is an example of extreme Phantasie. Another could be some instance of a child's imagination.1 Extreme freedom in these cases should be understood in terms of the lack of organization or structure of the imagining process. However, I would argue that this utter freedom is also extremely limited this is so because it unfolds in a manner divorced from both reality and ideality; as such it is essentially irrelevant. It is limited by its very inability to escape the imaginary world within which it unfolds. Moreover, it is unaware of itself – it unfolds in a manner devoid of self-reflection. What this extreme case of Phantasie 'freedom' reminds us of is nonetheless quite significant the importance of self-reflection, as a type of limit, for all inquiring thought. Without it, thought would be lost to itself and subsequently unable to relate to its own goals. Imagination as both source and path of inquiring thought is fundamentally self-reflective. In Chapter 1 I discussed the nature of this self-reflective character of Phantasie as consciousness aware of the irreality of its object. Here, this character comes to the fore as one of the main aspects that grants the imagining consciousness is relevance to inquiring projects aiming at both empirical knowledge and knowledge of ideals or universals. Active Phantasie freedom is thus bound by ideal-eidetic principles or ideal possibilities (such as the principle of non-contradiction), by the structural laws of consciousness (such as those governing the constitution of original time consciousness or the laws of association), and finally, by the self-reflective character of imagining consciousness. These limits render this bound freedom richer. Limits may be conceived as restrictive, but here our discussion of freedom would benefit from treating limits as abilities: the ability to relate to something 1 One could argue that such an imagination as process and the child's imaginary world exhibit structure and order. 146 other, the ability to unfold in an organized-structured manner, the ability to communicate the meaning of an endeavor, or the ability to aim at a goal. Self-reflection and abiding by ideal principles are limits that function, in the case of active Phantasie freedom, precisely as these sorts of abilities.1 The reason Phantasie abides by the laws or principles of the constitution of consciousness lies in the mirroring aspect of Phantasiemodifikation. As I argued in Chapter 2, Phantasiemodifikation, despite its pervasive and potent manner touching all facets of the realizing consciousness, is not a modification that renders the imagination devoid of all structure and the irreal world deplete of all organization.2 Phantasiemodifikation is a binding limit of imagining consciousness. Through its mirroring effect, it grants the possibility of the dialogue between imagining and realizing consciousness. This possible relation between the real and the irreal spans across all of the radical differences that separate them. As we shall soon see, the same holds with respect to the relation between the irreal and the ideal. Two radically different attitudes, standing worlds apart, can thus engage in a fruitful dialogue. Inquiry, or thought seeking answers yet to be uncovered, is this very dialogue. Yet thought occurs both in solitude and with others – if there were no structure to how inquiries unfolded there would be no community of thinkers, no transferring of meaning and knowledge. Imagining may seem to be an utterly solitary endeavor – like perception. No one tastes the bold richness of morning coffee exactly the way I do. This also holds with respect to my imaginings – no one experiences the vivid world of a fairy tale, and the joy that such a world brings, the way I do. If this is so, how could imagination play a role in questioning projects that are strictly delineated and as such shared by multiple 1 Passive Phantasie does not reflect upon itself and the nature of its object, but unlike extreme cases of Phantasie, it could in principle do so. Active Phantasie, as willed and self-aware, necessarily involves the actualization of its potential for self-reflection. 2 For a discussion of the ordered nature of the irreal world, see Chapter 1. See also, for instance, Hua XXIII, No.10, pp. 281-285. 147 thinkers? The inter-subjective aspect of the imagination can be grounded in its very structure – different thinkers do not imagine irreal possibilities exactly the same way, but they could all agree with respect to their ontic and epistemic neutrality, their ability to reveal new ways of asking and answering a question, the structure and order that these irreal possibilities exhibit, and the role played by such possibilities in specific inquiries. The structure of imagination is ideal – shared by all instances of imagining; as such it is the prime facilitator of intersubjective communication with respect to imagination and its irreal possibilities. Because no one imagines the way I do, my input within the community of thinkers I belong to is even more valuable. In my bound or limited attempt to make others think the way I think I nevertheless contribute to the projects we all share in common.1 The key here is to distinguish between imagination as act or singular consciousness and imagination as thinking attitude. If we conceive imagination solely in terms of isolated acts – my imagining of a fairy tale world while reading one of the stories collected by the brothers Grimm – we preclude ourselves from uncovering the complex ways in which imagination facilitates both solitary inquiring thought and thought shared by a community of thinkers. Undoubtedly, singular imagining acts and the imagining attitude are related and have much in common. I do not wish here to divorce these two ways of understanding Phantasie. What I do wish to emphasize and explore are the ways in which the imagining attitude functions as both the source and the driving force of inquiring thought broadly construed and of phenomenological thought as philosophical eidetic inquiry. 1 An interest example of such intersubjective imagination occurs in aesthetic consciousness where the artist manages to communicate meaning to his audience (cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.60). Cf., Brough (1992), Caeymaex (1996), Sepp (1996), Lotz (2007) 148 The imagining attitude is the dimension within which all types of intentional acts can unfold – desires and judgments, or individual acts of presentification such as memory, expectation, or imagination narrowly construed as singular act. As such, the imagining attitude is a unique kind of thought a thought that approaches its objects in a distinct manner: as ontically neutral appearances and possibilities. §3. Imaginative Variation as Phantasiemodi f ikat ion In section 1 of this chapter I explored real positional variation as vacillation and distinguished it from free imaginative variation. We saw there that vacillation is essentially positional because the poles between which it occurs are ontically and epistemically charged. Vacillation, though it may omit doxic claims and even exhibit lack of inclination, cannot be neutral because it is the result of the very desire, which drives all realizing consciousness, to establish the being and certainty of objects. As such, vacillation as 'real variation' engages a limited array of variables or (real) possibilities predetermined by present and past experience. It is teleological and motivated – its goal is the attainment of empirical knowledge. Unlike vacillation, free imaginative variation is non-positional – it engages variables without any doxic interest. It is also non-motivational and hence not aiming at an epistemic goal. Its doxic neutrality is the very freedom from the actual and the real; through it, free variation is able to bring forth a much wider spectrum of possibilities in a manner devoid of all doxic claims. Its possibilities are irreal – lacking all ontic determination. What is worth emphasizing here is that different types of variation entail different kinds of freedom and possibility and are relevant for different inquiring endeavors. Vacillation as real variation pertains to any search for being and certainty within the realizing attitude and it involves real possibilities, which are strictly delineated and thus exhibit little freedom. Imaginative variation involves 149 irreal possibilities and is free from the demands of the realizing attitude1 – its freedom is conditioned solely by ideal laws and not factual parameters. As such, it plays a significant role in all inquiries seeking to distance themselves from facticity. While this comparative approach revealed free variation as distinct from positional vacillation, I here wish to complete my discussion of free variation without relying on comparatively gained insights. §3! . Imaginative Variation – Freedom and Possibility Now that we have established that imaginative variation involves bringing forth irreal possibilities in a manner free from all realizing demands we need to focus on what this 'bringing forth' entails and how these irreal possibilities interact with each other. While imaginative variation may very well occur in passivity, my interest here lies in clarifying it as self-reflective active process. This is so because the self-reflective character of Phantasie grants its ability to relate to and be relevant for teleological inquiries despite its being essentially non-goal oriented. The non-motivational, non-teleological nature of Phantasie is of utmost importance for all thought seeking to distance itself from the everyday. While doxic neutrality opens and sustains the process of engaging irreal possibilities as the other of actuality, the lack of an epistemic goal allows for a freer and more flexible unfolding of this process. And yet, Phantasie freedom has structure and manifests itself in an organized pattern; because of this the imagining process of engaging irreal possibilities can be located in the context of teleological inquiries. This relocation, which makes Phantasie work toward a goal, does not structurally affect the bound freedom of Phantasie. While the goal binds the process of conceiving irreal possibilities, it does not deprive it of either its negative or positive freedom – it merely suggests a direction in which this process can unfold. Phantasie becomes teleologically 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.57 150 determined, but its freedom from the actual and its demands, and the freedom to bring forth a vast array of irreal possibilities remain untouched. Rendering Phantasie teleological, and thus putting it in dialogue with either the positionality of existence or with eidetic positionality, does not strip it of its essential or structural dimensions. In section 4 I will focus on how ideal goals (i.e., eidetic positionality) bind free variation. Before I do so, I wish here to emphasize the unique nature of free imaginative variation. Imaginative variation is a potentially infinite process of modulation. It is variation as a bringing forth of irreal possibilities.1 For instance, my conceiving of a variety of dresses Cinderella might wear the night she meets her prince. Since this process has no goal, it could continue indefinitely, at least ideally. Ideally is the key here – while nothing factual binds free variation, ideal laws and principles still hold I cannot imagine her wearing two dresses at the same time and both dresses simultaneously appearing to me. Irreal time may flow faster or slower, but the structures of the syntheses of succession and simultaneity still apply to it. How imagined objects appear, how they are given, is governed by ideal laws such as the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of the excluded middle, just like in the case of the realizing attitude.2 In Phantasie freedom I make choices, and these choices have limiting consequences.3 This structure grants order and coherence to the process of free variation.4 Thus, free variation is open in so far as it escapes the parameters of the real and of our experience of it, and bound by both objective ideal laws5, such as the above-mentioned logical principles, and the subjective ideal laws of consciousness, such as the structures of the 1 Cf., Hua XIII, No.19a, pp.546-548 2 Cf., Hua XI, p.103; see also, Hua XXIII, Nos.18-19 (e.g., No.19b, p.563) 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19b, p.563 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19a, pp.547-550 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, pp.522-523 151 syntheses of succession and simultaneity.1 Phantasie in its bound freedom can entertain indeterminacy in a potentially infinite manner – this is so because of the non-teleological and neutral character of Phantasie. Yet how this potentially infinite process unfolds is not arbitrary while the goal may lack, the path is well-defined. I may have no aim in my modulating various possibilities, but these possibilities share common aspects. In my example, the variables are all dresses; they may all even be designed in the style of a specific period. Their indeterminate character stems from these shared dimensions – in my shifting from one dress to another I bring forth these common aspects and thus move beyond any one particular instance. For Husserl, determinacy is one of the primary marks of real individuality.2 In free variation, there is no tendency in settling for any one dress – what matters is the movement from one dress to the next and what grants the common elements that grant the shift from one possibility to another. Though it may seem that I move from one particular to another, I am in fact illuminating what they all share in common, despite my lack of interest in such discoveries.3 Real possibilities are individual through their determinacy. Irreal possibilities are indeterminate due to their neutrality and fluidity4; as such, they should not be labeled as 'individual'.5 The teleological disinterestedness of Phantasie and its doxic neutrality are freedomgranting factors; they also secure indeterminacy6, which lies at the core of free variation. Indeterminacy here stands for the common attributes shared by all of the involved irreal possibilities. But as I already pointed out, indeterminacy does not necessarily imply lawless arbitrariness, which could at best resemble a fragmented playfulness. The arbitrariness of 1 See Chapter 2. 2 Hua XXIII, No.18, p.523, No.18, Appx.56 3 Hua XXIII, No.19a, pp.552-553 4 Hua XXIII, No.19b, p.553 5 Hua XXIII, No.19a, p.553 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, pp.514, 522ff., No.19b, pp.558-564 152 free variation is its very distancing from everything actual, and quite significantly, from everything individual.1 Herein lies the uniqueness of free variation. Our next task is seeking to understand the relation between free variation and neutrality as facets of Phantasiemodifikation in order to uncover the nature of the impact the imagination has on eidetic inquiries. §3! . Free Variation and Neutrality Modification The bound freedom of active Phantasie expresses itself in two interconnected ways – as both negative and positive freedom. Through neutrality modification Phantasie moves beyond the actual and the real it assumes nothing with respect to the ontic status of the object. It also escapes the epistemic demands of the realizing attitude. Phantasie is free from the realizing predetermined tendency to naively take the being and certainty of objects for granted2; it is also free from having to resolve uncertainty and indeterminacy when this naïve assumption is challenged.3 Neutrality could thus be understood as the negative freedom of Phantasie. As suspension of belief (Ausschaltung), neutrality establishes the non-positionality of Phantasie – it renders it position-free.4 This freedom from any position taking could be labeled as privation, as the lack of all doxic claims that weigh down the realizing attitude. 'Mere thought' is thought freed from doxa. This negative freedom captures only one dimension of the movement of Phantasie beyond the real and its demands. Neutrality is also openness – both toward uncertainty, by not obsessively seeking to dissolve it, and toward the otherwise.5 Thus, Phantasie freedom involves the ability to entertain possibilities without any commitment and do so in a non-frustrated fashion. By not having 1 Cf. Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.56-57 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15i 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.57 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15d-e 5 Uncertainty here could be viewed as an instance of what the otherwise may be. 153 to resolve uncertainty Phantasie is free to explore multiple facets of its objects and hence uncover their richness in ways unavailable to intentional positional acts and realizing consciousness.1 Free variation is precisely this exploration and it too, like neutrality, qualifies as 'mere thought.2 Phantasie freedom is freedom to engage the otherwise as irreal possibility.3 Neutrality secures the distance from the everyday and in doing so it opens various ways of conceiving the other of actuality:4 "What I have given as existing belief I can 'imagine as otherwise'. I can phantasy it as if it were otherwise. I can suppose, assume hypothetically, that it is otherwise. The supposition is then a free, 'voluntary' supposition, and is abrogated as null by actual experience."5 We begin to see the interconnectedness of neutrality, possibility, and freedom. On the one hand, neutrality functions as the very foundation of Phantasie freedom and irreal possibilities, on the other, neutrality also sustains the process of free variation through which irreal possibilities unfold. Viewing neutrality as negative freedom and irreal possibility as positive freedom may be conducive to clarifying the ambiguity of active Phantasie freedom (i.e., self-reflective freedom). We could rely on this view as stepping stone in our overall attempt to clarify the nature of Phantasiemodifikation. It is, however, unable to uncover the complex dynamic between neutrality, freedom, and possibility, and the richness pertaining to each and every one of these dimensions. The only way we can uncover this richness and the complex relationship between these three dimensions is by acknowledging the nature of free imaginative variation in terms of both freedom and possibility, by relating it to neutrality modification, and by showing that free variation and neutrality modification are both facets 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §36 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40, No.18 3 Cf., EU, §39; see also Hua III/1, §4 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18 5 PICM, 674. "Was ich im Glauben als seined gegeben habe, kann ich mir 'anders denken', ich kann es umphantasieren, als ob es anders wäre, ich kann ansetzen, hypothetisch annehmen, es sei anders. Dann ist der Ansatz ein freier, 'willkürlicher' und aufgehoben als nichtig durch die Erfahrung" (Hua XXIII, No.19, 561). 154 of Phantasiemodifikation. In doing so we establish the imagination as the sole source and driving force of eidetic thought.1 Phantasiemodifikation is not a singular moment or instance as shift from positionality to non-positionality. It is an attitude or mode of consciousness that is constantly characterized by doxic neutrality, freedom, and possibility. Not even neutrality modification narrowly construed could be viewed as instant shift since neutrality marks imagining consciousness as it unfolds. While neutrality could mark the beginning of entering the imagining attitude, it must also be understood as a necessary dimension of all imagining thought. And yet, by itself, neutrality modification does not capture Phantasiemodifikation in its richness as a whole. Only by complementing neutrality with a discussion of free variation can we hope to illuminate the core of Phantasiemodifikation as thinking attitude. The challenge here is to think 'modification' not in terms of a temporary transition, but as a constant, holistic, and harmonious way of relating to a world of objects – an irreal world to be more precise. Thus, imagining reflection or thought manifests, in exploring any object whatsoever, both doxic neutrality as freedom from an ontic and epistemic commitment, and the freedom to engage a potentially infinite series of irreal possibilities. This complex account of Phantasiemodifikation accomplishes two things: first, it stresses the uniqueness of the imagining non-positional consciousness or attitude, and second, it reveals the imagining attitude as the beginning and sustaining force of eidetic inquiries. So far I have only touched on why Phantasiemodifikation is the path eidetic inquiries must take when I discussed the indeterminacy of free variation as modulating thought able to capture common aspects across irreal possibilities; this indeterminacy also refers to variation being free from any tie to 1 If we were to follow Husserl's claim in Ideas I that Phantasiemodifikation is a type of neutrality modification, we would have to uncover other ways of securing neutrality and non-positionality. Husserl himself failed to point out such other ways (see my discussion of this claim in Chapter 2). 155 individual objects. In the following section of this chapter I wish to finalize this argument by showing what specific aspects of free variation are at work in eidetic inquiry as universalizing or idealizing thought. Husserl refers to such thought in various ways throughout his career1; I will here refer to eidetic thought broadly construed as idealization in order to uncover its structure and reliance upon imagination. §4. Idealization and the Irreal Eidetic thought is thought seeking knowledge of ideals or universals. But what allows for the movement beyond the sensed particulars, which are given to us in the positional realizing attitude? What grants the path toward essence? §4! . Eidetic Inquiry as Idealization and Free Imaginative Variation For Husserl essence is ideal possibility – it is that which binds and governs the real and the irreal (as instantiations of the ideal) alike. As such, these worlds should present us, through their very structure, with the path toward ideal principles and universal structures. Husserl stresses the possibility of employing both perceived and imagined objects as the raw material and basis for eidetic inquiry. And yet the real alone can only search and find itself – it cannot surpass itself. As that which exhibits structure the real may very well function as the material of eidetic thought – but that is the most it can do. The irreal, while also fit for being the material of eidetic thought, can surpass both the real and point beyond itself toward the ideal.2 The irreal grants the path toward essence – a path that only the imagining attitude as Phantasiemodifikation can open. This is so because the force of Phantasie as neutrality is alone able to dislocate the positional center of gravity and interest in existence and empirical certainty, while free variation leads to the discovery of a new positional core – essence and absolute certainty. 1 I discuss the significant differences between these concepts in Part II of this dissertation. 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19, Appx.61; see also Hua III/1, §§4, 79 156 The imagining attitude brings forth the otherwise as irreal possibility – i.e., the other of actuality. The otherwise may also refer to essence or ideal possibility, which is the object of the eidetic grasp as end of an eidetic inquiry. Essences, like particular existents, are a type of object1 – they are the objects of eidetic positionality.2 I have already suggested that such positionality emerges only if the initial positionality of existence, dealing with particulars as real and actual, is put out of play. Essences as ideal possibilities are shared by positional and non-positional objects alike3 what this implies is that essence or the universal structural core of objects is not affected by Phantasiemodifikation narrowly construed as neutrality modification. Thus, the search for essences or ideal possibilities can rely on both positionalreal and non-positional irreal objects.4 Essence as the common element of the real and the irreal implies solely an essential parallel; it does not undermine the radical differences between them.5 The actual and the possible (as irreal) are both governed by the ideal. But, as we shall see in Chapter 6, free variation alone (in the context of the eidetic positional motivational and teleological project) can uncover this essence as the common element binding both the real and the irreal – in modulating multiple irreal possibilities free variation renders essences, which were initially concealed, apparent.6 Let us now broadly locate neutrality modification and free variation, which are essentially non-positonal and non-teleological, in the context of eidetic inquiries. I already emphasized that rendering Phantasiemodifikation teleological does not affect its structure or main dimesions (i.e., neutrality, freedom, possibility). As search (skepsis) for the ideal, eidetic 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §3 2 See the end of Chapter 2. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, pp.503, 506, No.19, pp.527-528 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, p.500, No.18, Appx.56 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19, p.529 6 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.15, Appx.40, No.18, Appx.58 157 thought reaches its goal in eidetic intuition1 (the grasping of the ideal) only through a modulating process – in other words, it must earn this insight through an effort that involves variation.2 Husserl refers to idealization as the process through which the essence or the ideal is liberated from its particular instantiations. Essences are the ideal limits or ideal possibilities of the real and the concrete. Idealization is thus the process aiming to uncover these limits by seeking to transcend the individual real objects.3 But idealization relies on neutrality modification to leave the real behind and on free variation to move beyond determinate individuality. The ideal limit crystallizes gradually through the modulating process bringing forth various irreal possibilities. Free variation, as an initially non-teleological process, here becomes teleological – the variation of irreal possibilities functions as the path toward the ideal. Due to the indeterminacy of irreal possibilities, what comes to the fore is not their particularity but their shared aspects. Thus if the goal is to grasp the essential moments of the act of memory, engaging various non-positional and thus irreal memories will bring into relief the essence or ideal possibility that they all share in common.4 What distinguishes this process from all empirical conceptions of abstraction is the fact that the terms involved in this process of variation are not actualities, but ontically neutral irrealities. Phantasie essentially brings forth possibilities, or that which is other than actuality and concrete singularity.5 Furthermore, modulating thought itself is doxically neutral since it unfolds in the imagining attitude.6 Thus, we see Phantasie at work in projects that are considered conceptual or theoretical – what grants it this ability is its non-positionality (i.e., 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§3-4, 13, 20, 77-79 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §79 3 Cf., Hua XI, §31 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18, Appx.51 5 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19 6 Cf., Hua XI, pp.403-404 158 its doxic neutrality), but also the indeterminacy characterizing both irreal possibilities and free variation as the process modulating them. Variation entails a certain sense of repetition – it is precisely the ideal essence that marks all of the involved irreal possibilities that is, through repetition, liberated from all concrete and contextual singularity.1 We must note here that this repetition is not one involving determinate individualities, which could only be actualities or real possibilities. What free variation repeats in an indeterminate fashion is the essence governing all of the related irreal possibilities,2 which are given as mere appearances, not actually existing singular objects. Idealization is thus thought or reflection focusing solely on appearances.3 Without Phantasiemodifikation there would be no such thought.4 §4! . Universalizing Thought – Two Kinds of Eidetic Inquiry My present discussion of the role played by neutrality and free variation in eidetic positional thought is a mere sketch meant to foreshadow my main goals in Part II of this dissertation. First, I intend to distinguish between different types of eidetic thought and thus establish the uniqueness of phenomenology as eidetic inquiry. I do this by tracing Husserl's own project of disentangling various types of eidetic projects. Related to this, I seek to establish the various roles played by Phantasiemodifikation in these distinct types of eidetic inquiries. Most importantly, however, I will attempt to clarify the complex dynamic between Husserl's discoveries with respect to the imagination and his insights regarding the nature of phenomenological thought and of its methods. Idealization as eidetic inquiry will soon come to the fore as a very broad category – one that covers two main types of ideation (i.e., eidetic inquiry) – objective and subjective. 1 Cf., Hua XI, Appx.17 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19; see also No.15, Appx.39 3 Cf., EU, §33 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.19, Appx.62-63; see also Hua III/1, §78 159 The main distinction between these two types of ideation lies in the nature of their goals – the former aims at objective ideals, such as logical principles or mathematical laws, while the latter seeks to grasp subjective ideals, which are the essences or structures of consciousness. Phenomenology as subjective eidetic science employs subjective ideation, while logic and mathematics as objective eidetic sciences employ objective ideation.1 Each of these modes of inquiry, unlike positive scientific inquiries,2 relies on free variation as the path toward attaining ideal goals. Understanding the parameters of Husserl's initial daunting quest – i.e., his establishing of a viable, unique, and self-standing method through which to bring to light the ideal structures of consciousness and of its correlates – will illuminate the very beginnings and nature of phenomenology. This is my task in Part II – a task whose completion is guided by our insights into the structure and dimensions of Phantasie. 1 The scope of this project prevents us from delving into the differences between these two types of ideation. I intend to tackle this exact topic in one of my next projects. 2 I am also interested in exploring the role of imagining consciousness in hypothetical and experimental thought. This current project will function as the foundation for a project exploring positive scientific methodologies and the nature and extent of their reliance upon the imagination. 160 PART II: PHANTASIE AND HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY Part I of this dissertation sought to elucidate the structure and nature of the imagination (Phantasie) by gathering Husserl's insights stemming from studies spanning over three decades of thought. It also aimed at unraveling the ways in which inquiring thought broadly construed is deeply indebted to the imagination and its dimensions. Chapter 1 compared Phantasie with image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and perception (Wahrnehmung) in order to emphasize its unique structure and aspects. Chapter 2 discussed neutrality as one of the main dimensions of Phantasie and seeks to show its import for questioning projects, especially as that which grants their beginning. Chapter 3 explored freedom and possibility as the imagination's other two core dimensions and as the driving forces of inquiring thought. In closing, Part I discussed universal eidetic thought and its reliance upon Phantasie, thus pointing toward Part II, whose goal is to show the dynamic between imagination and phenomenology as subjective eidetic science and transcendental reflection. In Chapter 4 I will stress the significance of founding (Fundierung) and radical modification (Phantasiemodifikation) as structuring essential principles of consciousness in order to uncover both the complex and dynamic nature of consciousness and what its horizonal, nexic, and layered character entails for the phenomenological method. Chapter 4 will unravel Brentano's failure to recognize the structural significance of radical modification and its eventual consequence – namely, the heavily constrained character of Brentano's philosophical method of inquiry; a method that proved unable to tackle genuine universal or ideal objects and remained essentially bound to empiricism and the natural attitude. We will stress that whatever generality Brentano's analyses might have uncovered was still tied to the particular and the concrete. The distinction between the natural and the artificial (künstlich) 161 attitudes, suggested in Chapter 4, require attention in the specific context of Husserl's mature transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, consciousness – through what I identify as the work of Phantasiemodifikation – has resources much more powerful than those identified by his mentor. These resources, as I will show, essentially (i.e., structurally) translate into the ability to not only engage objects in a non-natural (i.e., artificial, theoretical, methodological) fashion but to also intend and intuit radically different kinds of objects than those corresponding to the natural attitude. Chapter 5 will explore the natural attitude and show that it is marked by an array of essential possibilities (Wesensmöglichkeiten), which can be, at the investigator's will, relocated and translated into methodological possibilities (e.g., the intuiting of exemplars in the natual imagining attitude or the free variation of irreal possibilities). In doing so it, it will seek to clarify the structure and import of the natural attitude in its relation to the artificial inquiring attitude (phenomenological and broadly construed) as well as contend that while radically other than the natural attitude, the artificial is not ineluctably divorced from it. What will eventually come to the fore (through the discussion of the reductions and of eidetic variation in Chapter 6) is: 1) that the reductions (as shifts to the artificial and themselves artificial in character) are not closures and eliminations of information (impoverishing of experience for the sake of philosophical analysis) but instead, openings of an extensive array of experiences – some translated and modified from the natural attitude and some of a radically new kind with corresponding novel objects; 2) not only that maintaining an intimate relation between the natural and the artificial attitudes (esp. with respect to the transfer of information) proves crucial for understanding what secures the success of Husserl's method of eidetic variation, but also that this channeling of information 162 from the everyday to the philosophical does not 'pollute' the purity of Husserl's phenomenological inquiry. As tempting as it might be to either exclude the natural for the sake of establishing a potent and 'pure'1 philosophical methodology or sacrifice Husserl's strict demands regarding the phenomenological apparatus for the sake of giving the natural its own philosophical voice, we refuse to view these as our sole options and thus fall into what presents itself as a fallacial (albeit tempting) trap; and 3) that imagining consciousness facilitates this shift from the natural to the artificial by securing the freely willed expansion of consciousness into the artificial attitude.2 I will explore the shift from the natural to the artificial through Phantasiemodifikation understood as structuring principle of natural consciousness as well as by exposing the manner in which the structure of consciousness conditions the system of possibilities available to it (both natural and artificial). My discussion of Husserl's project in Chapter 6 focuses on his transcendental character in both its static as well as genetic models. It will show that my claims about the structure of consciousness, its system of possibilities, and the import of imagining consciousness for Husserl's reductions and eidetic variation hold on both of these models. The reason for this is that what he comes to discover about the imagination and about consciousness as a whole in his genetic work is mirrored in his later claims about the 1 As we shall see, the 'purity' of the phenomenological method – a qualification Husserl himself was fond of using when referring to the reflective attitude he sought to describe in his programmatic works – consists in fulfilling the demands of what constituted for him the structure and goal of genuine subjective eidetic thought. One of my goals here and in Chapter 6 is to show that fulfilling these demands necessarily entails recognizing the bond and transfer of information from the natural to the artificial phenomenological attitude. 2 I use 'attitude' and 'consciousness' here interchangeably to refer to a specific manner of intending and intuiting objects. By claiming this division into natural and artificial, I am not suggesting a splintering or fragmentation of consciousness. As we shall see, consciousness as a whole is governed by structuring principles that allow radical shifts in attitude or the manner in which we engage objects. Despite its versatile abilities, consciousness remains very much a whole, just like the phenomenologist, despite their ability to perform the reductions and bracket the natural thesis remains very much a person marked by historicity and belonging to a specific socio-political and cultural context. 163 phenomenological method. Chapter 6 will stress explicitly the ways in which the differences between the static and the genetic models are for the most part differences of perspective.1 1 I.e., two distinct ways of engaging in the study of consciousness: one through a series of snapshots focusing on various structures of consciousness as separate and self-standing and one through an approach able to capture the synthetic and dynamic character of the same structures of consciousness now no longer viewed in seclusion. 164 Chapter 4 – Abstraction, Universals, and the Beginning of Phenomenology In order to thoroughly explore the beginning of phenomenology as subjective eidetic inquiry we must distinguish its type if ideation from abstraction, or objective eidetic thought. I have already suggested in Part I that the imagination plays a role in both types of universalizing thought. We must now establish what sets these two models of inquiry apart – an endeavor that involves understanding the import the imagination has for each. This distinction will function as the overarching guiding thread of this chapter. Husserl discusses abstraction extensively in the Logical Investigations; he was thus thinking about abstraction during those crucial years that mark the beginning of the phenomenological method. To capture the dynamic of Husserl thought as he was seeking the path that would become phenomenology, we must therefore not only analyze abstraction but also uncover how Husserl employed it as well as the consequences of his reliance upon abstraction. Chapter 4 will thus trace the question of abstraction back to Husserl's interaction with his mentor Franz Brentano, and to their subsequent ideological break. I will argue that abstraction lies at the core of this break and therefore at the center of Husserl's search for his own philosophical voice. What will hopefully come to the fore in this chapter is the fact that Husserl initially viewed abstraction as a good candidate for his philosophical method of inquiry, and that he extensively sought a model able to fulfill the phenomenological task of investigating the structures of consciousness while maintaining the universal validity of objective ideals as subjectively graspable. In his search for a suitable model of abstraction he distanced himself from Brentano and approached the 19th century idealistic philosophy of mathematics and 165 logic;1 as we shall see in Chapter 6, he eventually understood why abstraction could not be the method of phenomenology and during the last few years of the decade following the Investigations, he distinguished clearly between abstraction on the one hand, and the reductions and phenomenological ideation on the other. Thus, by disentangling the convoluted and intimate relation they were placed in by Husserl's attempt to found a new way of doing philosophy, abstraction and the phenomenological method will emerge as two distinct types of eidetic thought, and the uniqueness of phenomenological inquiry in its incipient stages will have been established. Chapter 4 argues that abstraction is the core of the philosophical and methodological rupture that occurred between Husserl and his mentor Franz Brentano–a rupture that surfaced prominently in Husserl's Logical Investigations. I explore the notion of abstraction at work in these two thinkers' methodological statements through their respective claims regarding the structure of consciousness, emphasizing specifically intentionality, founding (Fundierung), and modification (Modifikation). I seek to show that how Husserl and Brentano conceive the structure of consciousness conditions and strictly delineates these thinkers' philosophical methods and inquiring possibilities. The core of the argument lies in recognizing that Phantasiemodifikation as radical modification plays a crucial role in phenomenological reflection. §1. The Structure of Consciousness There was much that Husserl learned from Franz Brentano, whose allure as a mentor influenced many. And yet, Husserl's Logical Investigations exhibit Husserl's stark break 1 For a discussion of the relationship between Husserl's philosophy of mathematics and the development of his early phenomenological method, see Willard (1984). 166 from Brentano's descriptive psychology.1 This break is not a mere philosophical dispute; it marks the beginning of phenomenology and of Husserl's own carving of a philosophical path. What lead to this break is also what lead to the search for and the establishing of a new way of philosophical inquiry. I will attempt to uncover the issues that drove these two thinkers apart and that surfaced in the powerful philosophical message of the Investigations. Husserl's project in the Investigations was to secure the universal validity of ideal objects while also establishing the possibility of their givenness in subjective acts. To do so, Husserl had to rethink the nature of subjectivity and discuss it in terms of its ideal structures–an approach that would reveal how ideal objects are graspable in individual and subjective processes in a manner that does not threaten their universal validity. It is my contention that this project revolved around the issue of abstraction, and that Husserl's break from Brentano unfolded as a rethinking of abstraction and of its objects–ideal or universal concepts. To understand what they meant by 'abstraction', we must explore Brentano's and Husserl's analyses and claims regarding the structure of consciousness, and in particular the structure of intentionality, as well as the dynamic between acts in terms of founding (Founding) and modification (Modifikation). Let us first turn to Brentano's account starting with one of his most basic distinctions: the distinction between physical and mental phenomena.2 1 For a discussion of Husserl relation to the Brentano School, see Rollinger (1999, 2008), and Ierna (2006). For a discussion of Husserl's earlier mathematical thought and the beginning of his philosophical thought during the 1880s and 1890s, see Ierna (2005). 2 Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, initially published in 1874, went through subsequent revisions (1911, 1924), and as a whole the text exhibits the development of Brentano's thought with respect to the structure of consciousness. The formulation of his claims and arguments becomes gradually clearer. For instance by 1911 Brentano emphatically dismisses the conception of intentionality as relation between two real entities and rejects the inclusion of the object as structural element of the act (Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, Oskar Kraus (Ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig, 1924, pp.133-138 (Psychologie hereafter)). There is also a shift in his conception of what the objects of thought are and can be. However, the overall classification of phenomena into physical and mental, and the sub-classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and feelings of love and hate remained largely the same. The later view changes with respect to the relation and parallelism between these three types of mental phenomena, but their classification remains the same. 167 §1! . Brentano's Structure of Consciousness Physical phenomena refer primarily to the qualities or attributes of external objects. The examples Brentano gives to illuminate this class of phenomena are color, shape, figure, and warmth.1 These are the objects of sense or external perception2 and are also reflected in the images of imagination.3 Brentano attempts to further illuminate the nature of physical phenomena by qualifying them in terms of their 'being' or 'existence'. Physical phenomena have intentional existence–they 'are' in virtue of being the objects of external perception; their 'being' is, however, not actual (wirklich) or certain being.4 For Brentano, reality understood as actual existence involves certainty–this is the type of 'being' that pertains specifically to mental phenomena, given in and through inner perception, which guarantees the certainty of its objects through evidence. Mental phenomena are acts of consciousness5–such as external perception whose objects are physical phenomena. They are characterized, according to Brentano, through their reference to or directedness toward an object (i.e., intentionality6).7 Mental phenomena are intentional acts;8 they themselves become objects in inner perception or inner consciousness9 (a context in which they are given with certainty). Brentano uses the language of 'content' and 'inclusion' to refer to the intended objects of mental phenomena.10 He does 1 Psychologie, Book II, Ch.1, §2, p.112 2 Which is a mental phenomenon. 3 Psychologie, pp.112, 128. It is interesting to note that Brentano presupposes images as representational elements in the structure of imagination. 4 Psychologie, p.132 5 Psychologie, p.140 6 Brentano discusses intentionality through the Scholastic notion of intentional inexistence, which refers to the reference to or direction toward an object (cf., Psychologie, Book II, Chapter 1, §5). 7 Cf., Psychologie, pp.109-140 8 Psychologie, pp.124-125 9 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Chapter 1, §6, p.128 10 This view of inclusion, also manifested in Brentano's interchangeable usage of 'content' and 'object', is directly tied to the Scholastic notion of mental inexistence (Brentano employs the equivalent notion intentional inexistence), which is meant to capture the ontological status of the intended object in its relation to the act–i.e., as not really existing in consciousness but somehow given in and through consciousness. Intentional inexistence is, 168 little in 1874 to dismiss the inevitable consequence of viewing objects as parts of mental phenomena or acts.1 Brentano's goal in the Psychology was to explore the structure and dynamic of mental acts. He sought to establish not only that there are three types of mental phenomena: presentation, judgment, and feelings of love and hate, but also that the distinction between them is a qualitative one (i.e., that these are fundamentally distinct types of acts).2 Presentation (Vorstellung) is the act in which the object appears or is given to us; judgment (Urteil) involves the positing of something as true or false; and emotion or feelings of love and hate (Gefühl) involve the positing of something as good or bad.3 Brentano dismisses both the object and the fullness (or intensity) with which an object is given as viable principles or criteria of classification.4 At this point we ought to mention the other way Brentano defines mental phenomena (besides their above-mentioned intentional reference). While these three kinds of acts are supposedly distinct for Brentano and while this distinction seems to be secured through their specific type of intentional reference, they are fundamentally related to each other; in fact, judgments and emotions are reducible to presentations as the most basic type of mental phenomena.5 In what follows I would like to further explore this reducibility in the in Brentano's view, nothing other than the direction and reference toward an object exhibited by mental phenomena (Cf., Psychologie, pp.124-128, 136-137). 1 Husserl criticizes Brentano for this in the Investigations (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§11). In the appendices to the 1911 and 1924 editions to the Psychology Brentano argues explicitly against viewing the intended object as part of the act or consciousness. Thus, Husserl's critique in the Logical Investigations must be viewed in the context of the 1874 edition. Nevertheless, Husserl's point is well taken–even if objects are not part of consciousness, Brentano's failure to clearly distinguish between act, content (as reell), and the object remains. 2 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Chs.5-6 3 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.6, §3. For a more detailed discussion of emotion or feeling and its relation to judgment, see Book II, Ch.8. 4 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.7, §§2-8. Both of these criteria were extensively employed in the empiricist tradition from Locke onward. Both of these fail, in Brentano's view, to secure a qualitative difference between the three types of acts. In his discussion of presentation and judgment as fundamentally distinct, he claims: "So viel also steht fest, dass der Unterschied zwischen Vorstellen und Urteilen ein innerer Unterschied des einen Denkens vom anderen sein muss" (Psychologie, Book II, Ch.7, §3, p.42 (Band II)). 5 "Wir dürfen es demnach al seine unzweifelhaft richtige Bestimmung der pscychischen Phänomene betrachten, dass sie entweder Vorstellungen sind, oder [...] auf Vorstellungen als ihrer Grundlage beruhen" (Psychologie, p.120). 169 context of the founding (Fundierung) of complex acts. It will be interesting to see whether Brentano can simultaneously hold that acts are qualitatively distinct and also claim that some are (structurally) reducible to others. My hope here is to capture the structure of acts and of consciousness as a whole on Brentano's model of Fundierung in order to subsequently juxtapose it to the outcome of Husserl's analysis of consciousness in the Investigations. In talking about the structural relationship among presentation (Vorstellung), judgment, and emotion and among their respective intentional references to objects, Brentano reveals his notion of Fundierung.1 It is a grounding of complex acts on simple ones. This model of Fundierung entails that presentation, in its totality as act, functions as the basis for judgment and emotion; thus, as a whole, presentation and its intentional reference are engulfed by the structures of these other two, complex or founded acts. Judgments and emotions structurally presuppose presentations.2 The same process also occurs with respect to the laws governing these three types of acts.3 The relationship between these acts reveals itself as one of increased or hierarchical structural and intentional complexity, with presentation as the simplest type of act functioning as the basis for judgment, which in its turn along with presentation, grounds emotion.4 What Brentano ultimately seeks to argue for through his notion of Fundierung is the structural unity of consciousness while also maintaining the qualitative distinction between these types of mental phenomena or acts. The question remains as to whether his model of founding grants these two claims. 1 "Alle Umstände sind hier under dort analog; alle zeigen, dass, wenn in dem einen, auch in dem anderen Falle eine zweite, grundverschiedene Weise des Bewusstseins zu der ersten hinzugekommen ist" (Psychologie, Book II, Ch.7, p.65 (Band II)). 2 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.7, §11 3 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.8, §7 4 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.9, §2 170 In the attempt to establish the unity of consciousness Brentano rejects a disjointed multiplicity of consciousness.1 He considers two types of unity: a unity of independent parts, and a unity of non-independent elements, which together constitute a real unity (reale Einheit).2 The former represents a sum or collection, where the parts themselves are structurally independent of each other. The latter model of unity involves a structural relation between non-independent parts (Divisiven) and represents Brentano's model of partwhole unity; it is, for Brentano, the genuine unity of a multiplicity. Brentano opts for this latter unity in his analysis of consciousness. He rejects the summative model in favor of unity understood as fusion (Verschmelzung); Fundierung is thus conceived on a part-whole model in which the resulting whole (i.e., the complex/more complex mental phenomenon) is a unity achieved through the fusion of non-independent parts. This is important for Brentano since he wants to stress the intimate relationship between the three main acts of consciousness. The complexity of acts can be either qualitative (i.e., entailing a shift in the structure and type of mental phenomenon) or quantitative (complexity increase while maintaining the same type of mental phenomenon).3 The unity of complex acts (achieved through Fundierung) and the unity of consciousness are both examples of real unities (reale Einheit) of nonindependent parts. The unity of consciousness is thus a unity of non-independent yet distinct divisives that belong to one level of reality. These non-independent parts (the acts of consciousness or the mental phenomena) are directly or indirectly related to each other 1 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.4, §§1-2; see also Franz Brentano, Vom Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewusstsein, Oskar Kraus (Ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig, 1928, Part I, §3 (SNB hereafter). He also seeks to avoid a Cartesian model of consciousness–one that makes an explicit substance ontology claim. 2 "Es bleibt die Frage, ob es auch bei einem solchen grösseren Reichtume psychischer Erscheinungen immer noch eine reale Einheit sei, die alle umfasse, ob auch sie alle als Teilphänomene zu einem reell einheitlichen Ganzen gehören, oder ob wir es hier mit einer Vielheit von Dingen zu tun haben, so dass die Gesamtheit des Sellenzustandes als ein Kollektiv, al seine Gruppe von Phänomenen zu betrachten sei, deren jedes Ding für sich ist oder einem besonderen Dinge zugehört" (emphasis mine) (Psychologie, Book II, Ch.4, p.222). I would like to note here that Brentano uses reell and real interchangeably to refer to the structures of consciousness. We shall soon see what real or etwas Reales signifies for Brentano and to what extent the situation is radically different in Husserl's case. 3 Psychologie, p.224 171 through Fundierung as fusion. This model of unity does not exclude plurality, diversity or heterogeneity, and divisibility. All of these are according to Brentano still possible.1 A few points ought to be emphasized here in order to later clarify to what extent Husserl's part-whole unity is radically different than Brentano's: 1) Brentano's part-whole model involves structurally non-independent parts, 2) the relationship between these parts (i.e., acts) entails prima facie both qualitative and quantitative differences, and 3) the unity is guaranteed through the process of direct and indirect Fundierung. Despite Brentano's rejection of unity as sum or collection he too quickly dismisses the additive model as pertaining solely to the unity of independent parts; a closer look at his process of founding reveals addition as its very core. Fundierung, for Brentano, is analogical addition manifested as increase in structural complexity through the inclusion of simple (or simpler) acts into more complex ones. The inclusion and addition of whole acts resulting in increased structural complexity are the fundamental marks of Brentano's part-whole unity. Brentano offers no other formal principle for the unity of consciousness in his Psychology. We will soon explore Husserl's radically different account of Fundierung; let us first turn to his analysis of the structure of consciousness. §1! . Husserl's Structure of Consciousness – The Significance of His Critique of Brentano Unlike Brentano, Husserl did not view the distinction between physical and mental phenomena as either exhaustive or appropriate.2 In his descriptive studies Husserl attempted to refine and bring to light essential distinctions that Brentano failed to illuminate. For Husserl, the structure of experience entails more layers (each with its own essential characteristic) than Brentano's mental-physical phenomena distinction. These layers include: 1 Psychologie, Book II, Ch.4, §3 2 Cf., Hua XIX/I, LU V, §9 172 the act (reell), its content (reell) or hyletic content (sensation (Empfindung) in the case of perception and Phantasma in the case of imagination), and the object.1 The act structurally entails a dynamic between the content and interpretation (Auffassung). The interpretation grants the appearance (Erscheinung) or givenness of the object and is itself guided by the quality of the act (i.e., by its act-character). Husserl stresses that appearance must be strictly distinguished from the appearing object,2 something according to him Brentano failed to do.3 Through act-character Husserl establishes the main difference between distinct types or classes of acts; perception, judgment, imagination, memory, expectation all have distinct act-characters. In the Investigations Husserl employs the notion of quality to refer to two different structural elements of acts; one the one hand it refers to actcharacter4, on the other, quality is understood as distinct attitude–an attitude that acts with different act-characters can share.5 This latter notion of quality stands for the attitude toward the object (the specific manner in which it is intended) and for the manner in which the object is given. I would like to label the two main attitudes as the realizing-positional and the imagining-non-positional attitudes; a third, eidetic positional attitude, could be suggested.6 In making the distinction between act, content, and object Husserl is already parting ways with Brentano, who in his early works used 'content' and 'object' interchangeably. Beyond this threefold initial distinction Husserl takes a special interest in qualifying these elements of consciousness in a manner able to emphasize the essential differences between 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, Einleitung and §2; see also Hua XIX/1, LU V, §14 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§11a, 23 4 Cf. Hua XIX/1, LU V, §20 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §34 6 While the language of realization, typical of Husserl's later works (approx. early 1920s and onward), is something we can only superpose on the earlier model of act-structure, the language of positionality and nonpositionality, which gains a deeper more refined sense from 1904/05 onward through Husserl's analyses of the imagination, is already present in the Investigations. I am here employing 'eidetic' in the broad understanding of 'ideal' or essential necessary universality. 173 them without relying on an ontological model, as Brentano did. Husserl thus claims that the elements of consciousness are reell 1, which is a status he defines not in terms of existence but of structure. Act-character, hyletic content, and interpretation are all reell structures of consciousness and of its acts.2 This claim is meant to radically distinguish them from anything not (structurally) a part of consciousness (i.e., the object).3 Husserl takes great care to avoid collapsing content and object and thus creating ambiguity regarding their status. Through this claim Husserl points out an entire array of possible objects not in terms of their existential status, but in terms of how they are given to consciousness. Real objects are given in propria persona,4 unlike irreal and ideal objects, which are brought forth through acts intending outside the realm of actuality. These three types of objects overlap with the threefold distinction in attitude– realizing, non-positional, and eidetic. As such, they are not the objects of acts exhibiting specific act-characters. They are the objects of various acts unfolding within the horizon of each of the above-mentioned types of consciousness. Thus, presentations, memories, and judgments in the non-positional attitude all intend their objects as irreal; presentations, memories, expectations, judgments in the eidetic attitude all intend their objects as ideal. Objects intended and given as real are intentional correlates of realizing acts. What begins to emerge, following Husserl's analyses in the Investigations as well as in the later lectures on perception and the imagination5, is a model of consciousness that is at once layered, nexic, and dynamic. This 1 Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §27 5 Cf., Hua XXIII (esp. lectures from 1909 and onward), and Hua XI 174 model of consciousness, I will argue, is able to sustain the methodological apparatus that Husserl is seeking in the Investigations.1 Husserl's consciousness is layered not through a distinction between presentation, judgment, and emotion, which are singular types of acts for Husserl, but through a distinction between realizing, imagining (non-positional), and eidetic attitudes or types of consciousness. It is nexic because each of these attitudes is a horizon of consciousness within which acts such as judgments and presentations can unfold. And it is dynamic, as we shall soon see, because Husserl suggests as early as the Investigations, a type of structural relationship able to at once distinguish and relate these three fundamental attitudes: modification (Modifikation). Once he establishes the distinction between act, content, and object, Husserl goes into an in-depth analysis of the sub-structures of acts. I have already stressed the significance of Husserl's distinction between the object and the appearance of the object (Erscheinung).2 In Husserl's view, the content is not itself intentional; it becomes so only through its being interpreted.3 This goes against Brentano's claim that sensation is an intentional act. In fact, Brentano employs perception (Wahrnehmung) and sensation (Empfindung) interchangeably. For Husserl, the former is an intentional act with a specific act character while the latter is the former's hyletic content. Brentano's grosso modo collapse of sensation and perception is in line with his silence with respect to the sub-structures of acts.4 In order to offer a nuanced 1 Because Husserl's goal was to establish the possibility of grasping ideal objects in and through subjective acts without the former's loss of universal validity, Husserl needed to establish a model of consciousness in which such a possibility is not only not foreclosed but also nourished 2 The latter, as reell structure of consciousness, is the outcome of the interaction between content (hyletic content, such as sensation) and interpretation (Auffassung). 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§2, 11a 4 Two qualifications are important here: first, Husserl's terminological choice 'hyle' to refer to the reell content of acts ought not to be viewed as suggesting the inclusion of qualities of external objects in consciousness (an empiricist mistake where objective quality was equated with the qualities of mental processes). Husserl's choice is contextual–he questions the lack of the distinction between the form of acts and their reell contents in his predecessors' analyses (Brentano included). He thus is most eager to embrace a form vs. matter (hyle) type of distinction in his description of acts. His terminology here is driven by his project. Second, we must also ask ourselves why Husserl held onto the language of 'content' despite his eliminating it as a proper term for the 175 description of acts Husserl employs the language of descriptive and intentional content in his detailed analyses.1 Descriptive content stands for the whole of reell elements of acts; intentional content refers primarily to the matter (Materie)2 of acts conceived as that which grants a determinate reference to an object.3 The matter (Materie) as determinate reference to a certain object, along with the hyletic content, and quality as act-character marked by a specific type of intentionality constitute for Husserl (in 1900/01) the core structure of acts.4 Husserl conceives these elements as non-independent moments5 of the intentional act as a whole.6 He thus employs a type of part-whole model in his discussion of acts and consciousness. What these subtle distinctions bring to light is the nuanced structure of acts. For Husserl, establishing the uniqueness of acts (and thus distinguishing them from their objects as well as the hyletic content that they share) was one of the main goals of the Fifth Investigation. Like Brentano, Husserl attempted to discover and establish a criterion for the differentiation of acts. But unlike Brentano, Husserl succeeded not only in establishing this criterion as formal principle of classification but also uncovered the dynamic interrelatedness of acts–a object. This terminology was prevalent among 19th c. psychologists–in maintaining it Husserl was signaling the fact that he was directly addressing their claims regarding consciousness. Beyond this however, I am inclined to believe that once he redefined 'content' as reell structure of acts Husserl opted to employ it not in order to align his analyses with previous positions, but because 'content' reconceived functioned as a reminder that as reell it was fundamentally distinct from the real, ideal, or irreal object. This is what he means when he distinguishes between reell and intentional content–the latter being the intended object proper (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §3). It is also what he wishes to suggest when he claims 'content' has the narrow meaning of hyletic content and the broad meaning of any reell structure of consciousness as radically distinct from any non-reell, external structure (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §14). 1 He employs this in referring to what later in Ideas I will become his distinction between noesis and noema, which are both descriptive (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §16). 2 Materie is different from Husserl's notion of hyle or hyletic content, sometimes also referred to as Stoff. The former is the determinate reference to one object rather than any other; the latter is the reell content that is taken up and interpreted in Auffassung. 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, Appendix to §§11 and 20 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §20 5 The 'non-independence' or 'abstract' character of elements here, in the context of the structure of acts, entails that each is unthinkable apart from the others. To further emphasize the unity that binds quality and matter (Materie) Husserl introduces the notion of semantic essence, which is arguably redundant (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §21). While this notion might not add anything conceptually new its role is, in my opinion, to emphasize the intimate nature of these two elements' structural bond. 6 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§4, 20 176 relation that does not threaten their qualitative uniqueness. By clearly establishing actcharacters as various types of intentional reference to objects (and as the unique core of acts), Husserl lays down the foundation upon which he will continue to explore and clarify qualitative differences among the structures of consciousness. Act-characters such as judgment, perception, memory, and expectation1 become for Husserl the building blocks of a much more intricate structural framework. Husserl's account of qualitative difference goes against Brentano's in two major ways. First, Brentano never spoke explicitly about act-characters; because of this, his account of unique intentional references was always somewhat ambiguous. Second, Husserl did not suggest any form of reductionism regarding the relation between acts. For Husserl, act-characters are irreducible to each other. This however does not necessarily entail rupture among acts. Brentano relied on reductionism in order to secure the structural unity of consciousness; he thought that by grounding complex acts on entire simple or simpler acts he would establish this unity. He failed to see however, that because of this reductionist model, the qualitative difference among acts was sacrificed. Furthermore, he did not consider other options or ways of establishing the structural unity of consciousness besides reductionism (fueled by an understanding of Fundierung as act-additive). Let me now turn to a discussion of Husserl's concepts of Fundierung and Modifikation. My intention here is to unravel these two processes as fundamental laws or principles of the dynamic unity of consciousness. §2. Fundierung and Modif ikat ion Consciousness Rethought The issue of qualitative difference (as the criterion or principle of classification of acts) is pivotal for the unity and complexity of consciousness as Husserl conceived them. It also 1 Perception, memory, and expectation are all types of intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung). 177 conditions the possibility of universalizing thought. If the intentional and structural uniqueness of eidetic presentation, memory, and judgment cannot be clearly established, then consequently, the uniqueness of theoretical philosophical thought is ultimately also sacrificed. Thus, there is at lot at stake in maintaining the qualitative difference of acts while also establishing the unity and fluidity of consciousness. One of Husserl's main critiques of Brentano's account of the structure of consciousness focused explicitly on the latter's claim regarding the primacy, simplicity, and basic character of presentation (Vorstellung).1 Husserl dismisses the possibility of any distinct act being founded on presentation.2 He rejects this additive model of Fundierung. The first point Husserl makes against this model has to do with the simplicity of presentation; he criticizes Brentano for failing to recognize the sub-types of presentation. Thus he distinguishes between two main types of Vorstellung: presentation as Gegenwärtigung and presentation as presentification (Vergegenwärtigung). External perception belongs to the former category; imagination, memory, and expectation fall into the latter.3 We need not engage here the distinctions between positional and non-positional presentifications.4 What must be stressed, however, is the richness of Husserl's account of presentation, as early as 1900/01. External perception and imagination stand for, beyond their narrow status as distinct acts, the two most basic types of consciousness or attitudes conceived as horizons.5 Memories and expectations as well judgments can unfold within each of these two horizons. This layering of consciousness has, as we shall soon see, a crucial import for the qualitative uniqueness of conceptual thought. 1 Cf., Psychologie, p.120 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§27-30 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1; LU V, §§21, 27 4 Memory and expectation fall in the former category, Phantasie in the latter. 5 Cf., Hua XXIII (esp. Husserl's lecture courses on Phantasie 1912 and onward) 178 The further issue here is also Brentano's silence with respect to the distinction between content (hyle, in external perception), act-character as quality, and matter (Materie) as reference to a determinate external object. Thus, not only does Brentano collapse multiple types of presentations into one undifferentiated and obscure general class, but he also fails to see the intrinsic structural complexity of this simple act. Husserl argues against Brentano on both of these accounts. Because Brentano did not recognize the structural complexity of presentation he assumed that he could naturally claim its founding character as act as a whole; the possibility that only a structural element of presentation had the founding character was not recognized as viable and was thus completely overlooked. First, by analyzing presentation into its subtypes, Husserl establishes external perception as the most basic kind of presentation. Second, through his analysis of external perception Husserl distinguishes its content (hyle, or hyletic content) and its matter (Materie) as two of its significant structural moments. Husserl was interested in Fundierung because as process and law or principle of consciousness it could illuminate the complexity of acts as well as their overall interrelatedness. However, he was well aware of the fact that were he to claim that external perception was the founding element as a whole (qua act) for all other acts, he would jeopardize the uniqueness and qualitative distinctiveness of act-characters. Thus, instead of following in Brentano's footsteps, he adopted a very different basis for Fundierung. Husserl claims that whole acts cannot be the foundation for other, more complex, acts; rather, the matter (Materie) of external perception is taken up by other acts, which nevertheless exhibit radically different act-characters.1 Simple or simpler acts do not become non-independent parts or elements of more complex acts; the matter (Materie as reference to 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§32-33 179 determinate objects) of external perception becomes directly or indirectly a non-independent structural element in more complex acts.1 Thus, the same object can be intended in different ways in the context of acts with different act-characters.2 So while an increase in complexity is a possible outcome of Fundierung (for instance, in judgments about judgments,3 or the input of judgments in wishing),4 it need not necessarily entail an increase in complexity. Judgment, like external perception, has a simple and distinct act-character, which as qualitative difference is in no way dependent upon perception.5 Thus, for Husserl, given that the matter and hyletic content of external perception are the basis for Fundierung (not the act itself), the process of founding is non-additive. Husserl's Fundierung, unlike Brentano's, not only preserves the qualitative difference between acts and does not presuppose an increase of complexity through addition; it also secures the qualitatively and quantitatively complex unity of consciousness (as the interrelatedness of different act-characters through their references to determinate objects). This is crucial. On Husserl's model, judgment maintains its unique act-character; it is not bound to intending the objects of external perception (although it is able to do so) or any presentation for that matter. Along with Brentano's collapse of act-qualities, a collapse of object types and intentional possibilities also occurs.6 However, Fundierung alone, in Husserl's view, does not capture the complexity of the structure of consciousness. In his analyses he 1 Along with it, the hyle or hyletic content (i.e., sensation, which Brentano equated with external perception) also plays a role in founding in so far as it provides other acts, like judgments and memories, with a 'hyle' or content of their own, which becomes interpreted through their specific act-characters. 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §38 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §33 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §19 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§32-33 6 This is exactly what Brentano claimed in his later works – fictional and ideal objects are both reducible to real objects– which are primarily the objects of external and internal presentations. These other types of objects are redundant in Brentano's view – they are unnecessary complications that could be explained away through the in recto reference to real objects. 180 discovers another process: modification (Modifikation), also functioning as law or principle of the structure of consciousness. Before turning to Husserl's notion of Modifikation, let us briefly discuss his partwhole relationship model.1 This will help us further clarify founding and modification as principles or laws of consciousness; it will also prove significant for our discussion of abstraction. Husserl employs part-whole and part-part relations to describe both subjective and objective unities, both of which can be ideal.2 Wholes as unities do not merely entail the containment of parts. Like Brentano, Husserl stresses the possibility of both summative as well as non-collective wholes. In his view, wholes as sums or collections are comprised of independent parts, able to stand on their own; non-collective wholes are constituted through the significantly tighter relationship (conceived as association3) of non-independent elements or moments.4 However, unlike Brentano, Husserl's non-summative part-whole model is not reduced or collapsed into a type of collection as the result of addition.5 For Husserl the relationship between non-independent (abstract) parts6 or moments is tight due to their structures and the formal laws and principles governing them. This is an important point. 1 For a discussion of Husserl's mereology and its import for his method, see Sokolowski (1974) and CooperWiele (1989). 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §§4, 21-22. Objective unities can be ideal, real, or irreal. Subjective structures of consciousness are reell in so far as they are 'parts' of consciousness; they are ideal with respect to their apodictic lawfulness and structure. As we shall, Husserl claims, for instance, that logical principles and concepts are objective ideals (cf., the Prolegomena); he labels the structures of acts and consciousness as subjective ideals in LU V and VI. 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §22 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §§1-6 5 Interestingly, Husserl argues against Stumpf, Brentano's student and the most likely venue for Husserl's borrowing of the terms 'fusion' (Verschmelzung) initially employed by Brentano, with respect to this very issue. Husserl's critique of Stumpf's fusion is telling of what we have already emphasized with respect to the significance of qualitative difference– according to Husserl, Stumpf's fusion (a founding process) seeks, unsuccessfully, to achieve change in quality through a change in quantity (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §4). Stumpf must have borrowed this claim from Brentano, who clearly suggested that new types of acts emerged (qualitative change) through Fundierung as fusion and inclusion of whole acts into more complex acts (quantitative change). Husserl employs the term 'fusion' to refer to the continuous unity of both independent as well as non-independent parts.5 For him fusion necessarily entails continuity, which can manifest itself in various quantitative degrees as well as signal distinct qualitative-structural bonds. 6 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §§9,17 181 Non-independent parts are bound to be the moments or elements of a specific whole in a certain specific way; they cannot stand meaningfully on their own and can only function as parts of a whole in a pre-delineated manner.1 Wholes comprised of non-independent elements (such as acts or mathematical sets) are constituted lawfully and necessarily in light of the structure of their parts. Thus, due to their specific structures, non-independent parts are necessarily bound to relate to each other and to the whole in specific ways.2 In applying this framework to his description of the unity of consciousness, Husserl emphasizes the significance of recognizing and understanding the nature of the structural bond between acts and their substructures. Consciousness, as a relative whole,3 is structurally or ideally bound by synthetic a priori laws.4 It is synthetic because a completely formal unity entails no 'matter' or content, and it is relative because it displays not solely a part-whole relationality, but also a part-part interconnectedness.5 Let us pause here and consider the meaning of Husserl's claim regarding unity based on formal and apodictic principles. Brentano sought to establish the unity of consciousness through Fundierung as fusion–a process meant to attain quality change through quantity change. Through the positing of laws and principles as necessarily and apodictically governing the structure of wholes, Husserl can claim qualitative change independent of 1 Hua XIX/1, LU III, §9. This is why, as I previously pointed out, Husserl chose to introduce the seemingly redundant notion of semantic essence in his analysis of the bond between quality and matter (Materie) (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §21). He employed this notion in order to express their non-summative unity as nonindependent parts. The same holds with respect to the relationship between hyletic content and act-character. 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§38, 42. For instance, in external perception as whole, quality could not function without matter (Materie) (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §20) and together, they rely on sensation as hyletic content, which in its turn requires interpretation (Auffassung) through act-character in order to become, as moment, intentional (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §18). Similarly, the synthesis of identity between intuition and intention exhibits the same part-part, part-whole relation. This lawfulness of objective and subjective wholes is, for Husserl, apodictic; they are governed by ideal necessity (Hua XIX/1, LU III, §§10-11). This model of part-part, part-whole relation is most likely something he borrowed from mathematics, esp. Georg Cantor's set theory. Husserl was Cantor's colleague in Halle during the decade preceding the Investigations. For the Husserl-Cantor intellectual exchange, see Ortiz Hill (2004). 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §22 4 Hua XIX/1, LU III, §12; see also Hua XIX/1, LU V, §18 5 Hua XIX/1, LU III, §13 182 quantitative change. We saw that Fundierung on Husserl's model may or may not lead to increase in quantitative complexity. By respecting the boundaries of qualitative difference, this process exhibits an entirely different conception of part-part and part-whole relation than Brentano's version. It is an ideally necessary connection between the substructures of various acts (i.e., Materie and hyletic content).1 In this case, judgment informs the wish but does not become part it; they are linked through their shared Materie.2 Taking a radically distinct path than Brentano, Husserl discusses Fundierung as an a priori and ideally necessary law governing relations of matter (Materie) across acts with the same or distinct actcharacters.3 Let us now turn to Modifikation in order to establish what kind of law or principle it is, what relational role it plays, and to what extent it contributes to the unity and complexity of consciousness.4 5 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §§14-16 2 An important note: according to Husserl, Fundierung as ideal relation between non-independent parts excludes the isolability of the parts as moments of the whole (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §17). Isolability or separability (Abtrennbarkeit) entails the possibility of forming an idea of the part exclusive of its relation to other parts or the whole (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §5). Not only did Brentano's Fundierung entail such separability–since he was seeking to establish the qualitative uniqueness of mental phenomena besides their interconnectedness–it was also a one-sided process. Presentation founded judgment, which in its turn, along with presentation, founded emotion. We could thus say that Brentano's model of founding entails a type of one-sided isolability, which Husserl's analyses completely reject. In Husserl's view, the founding process is anything but one-sided–as process, it can go back and forth across act-characters sharing the same matter (Materie); in this sense, the structure of consciousness is truly dynamic. This dynamic character becomes even clearer–and gains further meaning–through Husserl's discussion of Modifikation, as I shall argue momentarily. This is not feasible according to Brentanian Fundierung because as additive process, it necessarily implies increase in complexity; a reversal of this process (such as simplification) would have to be distinguished from Fundierung and distinctively labeled. As we shall soon see, this is exactly what happens with Brentano's notion of abstraction, which he defines in terms of simplification. 3 As such, acts and consciousness as wholes exhibit, through Fundierung, a potential for infinite yet lawful variation (given ideal possibility) in part-part and part-whole type relations (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU III, §13). 4 Modifikation, as Husserl discusses in the Investigations, has yet to become a full-fledged notion. Much phenomenological work has yet to occur before Husserl is able to offer a transparent and clear description of Modifikation. Most of this work was comprised of his analyses of imagination, imaging consciousness, and perception during the period immediately following the Investigations and continuing well into the 1920s. And yet, Husserl's sporadic remarks with regard to modification in 1900/01 already suggest the significance of this process for a thorough understanding of the dynamic structures of consciousness. Thus, despite the jejune character of his analyses of modification in the Investigations, we ought to seriously consider what they propose– especially in light of Husserl's later discoveries with respect to this process, which we are already familiar with. 5 We must stress whatever ambiguities at are work in Husserl's discussion of modification in order to subsequently elucidate the direction of his thought with more clarity. Husserl employs the language of modification, in the Investigations, to refer to the distinction between presentation as Vorstellung and representation (Repräsentation) (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, §26, LU V, §14; see also Hua XIX/2, LU VI, §§22, 37), 183 In his attempt to distinguish Modifikation from Fundierung Husserl refers to formation and transformation; as far as the structure of these processes goes, these denominations are quite fitting.1 He employs transformation in the context of modification as qualitative change. While founding as formation (Formung)2 entails the constitution of acts (equally or more complex) through their borrowing of the matter (Materie) of other acts, modification as transformation entails a radical shift in the act as a whole–not just with regard to one of its structural moments. Trans-formation is thus a type of re-location of the act as a whole within a completely different horizon of consciousness; this is the case with Phantasiemodifikation: all of the acts occurring in the context of realizing consciousness (i.e., all of the acts intending objects as real and seeking knowledge with respect to them) could occur in the imagining attitude, where, while maintaining their act-character and structural integrity, they would nevertheless intend and intuit their objects in a radically different manner (i.e., as irreal or without any presuppositions or claims regarding their ontic status and without epistemic motivation). Thus, modification as Phantasiemodifikation opens new horizons of consciousness and it enriches exponentially the structure and qualitative as well as quantitative complexity of consciousness.3 which is another term he uses for presentification (Vergegenwärtigung). As such, modification is meant to indicate a radical distinction–between positionality and non-positionality. This is the primary meaning of Phantasiemodifikation as he comes to describe it in 1904/05 and onward. But before this becomes the clear and primary meaning of Modifikation, Husserl also employs the term interchangeably with Fundierung. Husserl employs 'Modifikation' to refer to a change in matter (Materie) also–the new act has a new determinate objective reference. He further qualifies this as 'nominal modification' (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §38). He does so, for instance, in his discussion of empiricist abstraction, in the Second Investigation, where he criticizes the empiricists for failing to recognize the founded and modified character of abstraction and its act-character (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, §31). It is vague at this point what exactly he means by this–his discussion of abstraction becomes more explicit in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations, but one thing is clear–abstraction as Husserl understands it is not a process of simplification, synthesis, comparison, association, or substitution; all of these were processes through which the British empiricists sought to establish true universality (i.e., devoid of any references to particularity and completely indeterminate) starting from a particular and concrete basis–external perception and sensory experience. 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §14 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU VI, §49 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§34, 39. While his extensive discussion of Phantasiemodifikation does not attain transparency until much later (approx. 1918-1920), it is clear to Husserl, as early as 1900/01 that imagination is 184 Modified acts maintain their matter (Materie) and their act-character (quality), and exhibit a new hyletic content (Phantasma rather than sensation). What changes is their quality as manner of relating to the object. They become non-positional.1 2 For instance, judgments may be positional or non-positional (they may refer to objects as real or irreal). As modified, their structural complexity is not affected.3 Modifikation affects the qualitative and quantitative complexity of consciousness as a whole, not of individual acts. Structurally, Modifikation does not entail the nesting of acts or moments of acts; it affects the quality of acts (understood as overall attitude toward the object and its ontic status) while maintaining their act-character (quality narrowly construed).4 Despite its being different than Fundierung, tightly bound to modification understood as the shift from positionality with respect to existence to nonpositionality (i.e., ontic and epistemic neutrality). He makes references to acts as positional (setzende) and nonpositional (nicht setzende) in his brief descriptions of the imagination as distinct type of presentation. 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §37 2 Despite his early insight with respect to positionality and non-positionality, Husserl had yet to understand the distinction between Phantasie (imagining consciousness) and Bildbewusstsein (imaging consciousness). In the Investigations he collapses the two under the general term Imagination, which involved images–we witnessed this tendency in the incipient stages of his analyses of Phantasie in 1904/05. As a result of this collapse he posits two types of modification in the Fifth Investigation–imaginative (imaginative, einbildende) and qualitative modification (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §40). The former makes reference to the shift to non-positionality in the context of imagination understood as involving fictions and functioning based on images. The latter is meant to capture a similar shift to non-positionality, to an attitude of suspension of belief, but somehow free of images–for instance, as in the case of judgments intending objects non-positionally without involving any pictorial thought. The language of pictoriality in Husserl's references to the imagination in the Investigations is overwhelming. Veranschaulichung (illustrative intuition) is considered here able to complement the fulfillment of positional acts in a pictorial fashion (Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §23). This claim is also prevalent in the Sixth Investigation (Cf., Hua XIX/2, LU VI, Einleitung and §§10, 14, 17, 19). Husserl also suggests this quasi-fulfillment through illustration in the case of abstraction or conceptual thought (unfolding in eidetic positionality) (Cf., Hua XIX/2, LU VI, §21). There are numerous problems here that I cannot elaborate on here–for instance, we ought to seriously question the possibility of the imagination's functioning within the context of positional-realizing acts. Not only does Husserl not distinguish between imagining and imaging consciousness, thus concluding that all imagining thought is pictorial and reliant upon images; he also attributes wrongly to the imagination the role of completing or filling in the process of fulfillment in realizing acts– thus positing mixed cases of fulfillment (Cf., Hua XIX/2, LU VI, §§23, 25). This is the role of illustration understood as the reliance upon realizing memory, which is not a non-positional act. The role of imagination in eidetic thought is feasible in so far as both the imagining and the eidetic-positional attitude share in common non-positionality with respect to existence. But let me here emphatically emphasize that imagination as pictorial thought can only have a minimal impact on the success of eidetic thought. Imagination as non-pictorial thought, however, could prove necessary in all eidetic endeavors. See my argument against conceiving the imagination as pictorial or as involving and relying on images (Chapter 1). Husserl too eventually comes to see this more or less clearly in his later 1918-1924 analyses of Phantasie. The modification that Husserl was interested in the Investigations is what eventually he comes to refer to as Phantasiemodifikation–the powerful transition from positionality with respect to existence to nonpositionality. 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §38 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §35 185 which only affects substructures of acts and could entail increase in complexity and nesting, Modifikation too is, according to Husserl, an ideal law and principle of constitution of acts and of consciousness as a whole.1 Both founding and modification function on a part-whole model.2 In Fundierung, non-independent substructures of acts become parts of equally or more complex acts, which nevertheless maintain their structural unity and qualitative difference. In Modifikation, whole acts are transposed into an entirely different intentional horizon; they maintain their substructure and moments but how these moments are related to each other changes drastically. The outcome of this change is a radically different attitude toward the object. Through modification objects that could not have been intended or given in the realizing attitude are engaged. Husserl's discussions of Modifikation in the Investigations suggest an entire realm of consciousness previously untapped and clearly not available to Brentano. Not only are irreal objects now considered possible objects of consciousness, but an entire array of acts such as memory and judgment can unfold in the horizon of imagining consciousness. Through his rethinking of Brentano's Fundierung and his proposal of Modifikation as important principle of consciousness constitution, Husserl rethought the nature of the unity of consciousness and of consciousness itself. This in turn made possible a rethinking of the nature of conceptual and philosophical thought, as we shall soon see. Rethinking the nature of consciousness was thus the prerequisite for Husserl's attempt to establish his own unique philosophical method of inquiry. In what follows I hope to show that how Husserl comes to conceive the structure and unity of consciousness, Fundierung, and Modifikation, and intentionality deeply affects how he defines and understands the phenomenological method. Let us briefly focus on his notion of intentionality. 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §34 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §38 186 §3. The Philosophical Import of Intentionality1 Husserl's model of intentionality is complex and relies on two insights: first, that intentionality is not a relation between two really existing entities (consciousness and its object),2 and second, that intentionality is a three-way relationship rather than a two-way one.3 The three-fold structure of intentionality includes: the act, the intended object (real, ideal, or irreal), and meaning (Bedeutung and Sinn used interchangeably4). Consciousness is consciousness of something (as Brentano states) but for Husserl it is consciousness of something as something (as already noted, there is a process of interpretation (Auffassung)5 at the core of intentionality). Acts intending real and irreal objects cannot grasp these objects in their completeness but only in a series of snapshots (Abschattungen) that gradually form a whole. What is gradually shaped in this potentially infinite series of snapshots is the meaning of the object for us.6 The act of intending an object, how the object is given in this partial fulfillment or intuition understood as the appearance of the object, and the intended object itself are three different elements or moments of intentionality.7 Thus we must clearly distinguish between intention, intuition, meaning, and object.8 Intention is the directedness toward the object; intuition refers to the moment of fulfillment or givenness of the object; meaning is how the object is given in and through fulfillment. In the 1 For a discussion of Husserl's intentionality, see Gurwitsch (1970), Drummond (1990), Hopkins (1993), Byers (2002). For intentionality in Husserl and Brentano, see Morrison (1970), Moran (1996). For Husserl's LU critique of Brentano's intentionality, see Moran (2000). For a discussion of Brentano's intentionality, see Prechtl (1989), Tãnãsescu (2008). 2 Hua XIX/1, LU V, §12b 3 Brentano too stresses the importance of the first insight–for him consciousness is really existent, but its object (e.g., a centaur) need not exist. While Husserl and Brentano's positions agree on this point, they differ radically on the second. 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §15. Later, in Ideas I, Husserl will distinguish between meaning (Sinn) and expressed meaning (Bedeutung). 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 6 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§13-14 7 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §2 (see also Hua XIX/2, LU VI). Later in Ideas I, Husserl employs the language of intentional act, object as it is intended, and object which is intended to signify the same threefold structure of intentionality. 8 Cf., for instance, Welton (1983). 187 context of the realizing attitude–the consciousness intending objects as real–fulfillment or intuition is always partial and incomplete. According to Husserl, there are degrees of knowledge mirroring the different levels of incompleteness in the overlap of intention and intuition.1 As we shall see in our discussion of Husserl's abstraction as process aiming at attaining knowledge with respect to ideal objects, knowledge occurs at this level through complete fulfillment when the intended object and the intuited one overlap in a synthesis of identification or coincidence. Husserl's distinction between intention and intuition made room for consciousness of ideality. We have already discussed meaning as the outcome of the incomplete synthesis of intention and intuition in the context of realizing and imagining or non-positional consciousness. But Husserl employs meaning in a very different way when he refers to the possibility of a complete synthesis of fulfillment. In the cases when the overlap of intention and intuition is attainable he locates meaning as ideal in the context of intention rather than intuition. In the First Investigation Husserl, in his discussion of meaning as ideal, Husserl distinguishes between meaning-intention and meaning-intuition. In his view, the former is essential for the intentional act whereas the latter is not.2 The reason for this is the fact that in this intentional moment, given through the act-character3 as qualitative difference, meaning as ideal is always already structurally present.4 This is the meaning, which, according to Husserl, is expressed in words. It is the condition for genuine expression (Ausdruck).5 This ideal meaning is not to be confused with the object;6 it is independent of it and independent 1 Cf., Hua XIX/2, LU VI, Einleitung 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §9 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §22 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §9 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §10-11 6 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §12 188 of intuition and fulfillment1, which in the context of consciousness of ideality can be complete.2 Fulfillment as synthesis of identification is non-essential to ideal meaning.3 For Husserl, ideality conceived as meaning is already manifest in all acts intending real or irreal objects. While the act is subjective the meaning it grasps is not. Meaning4 as ideal content is independent of the structural (reell) elements of acts.5 Because Husserl conceives intentionality on this threefold model he can distinguish between meaning as ideal and the reell structures of consciousness, such as the acts and their intention and intuition; he thus avoids the illusion of immanence,6 which would render ideal objects dependent upon subjective acts.7 As we shall see, ideal objects become the intended objects only in reflection or abstraction conceived as conceptual thought (i.e., Husserl's later notion of ideation),8 whose fulfillment involves the complete overlap or identification of the intended object with the intuited one.9 In Husserl's view, objective or ideal meaning is discovered (through abstraction) not made (i.e., the ideal is mind-independent)10. Knowledge as fulfillment and synthesis of identity between intuition an intention is a process that does not affect ideal 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §15 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§13-14 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§13-14 4 Meaning as idea exhibits unity apart from all the structural elements of subjective experience–its being-given or presentation is such a reell structural element. 5 Including these acts' psychological content such as sensuous contents 6 At the time when Sartre wrote his Imaginary he had had access to Husserl Ideas I and his Logical Investigations, but not the material subsequently published in Hua XXIII. Sartre's accusation that Husserl falls prey to the 'illusion of immanence' (cf., The Imaginary, 59) is not however justified despite his lack of access to this material. There is plenty of evidence in both Ideas I (cf., Hua III/1, §90) and in the Logical Investigations (cf., Hua XIX/1, 436ff.) that Husserl dismissed the position that claimed the inclusion of mental images in consciousness; for Husserl consciousness is not a box or a container and the above mentioned texts, available to Sartre during the 1930s, make that perfectly clear. There is further evidence for this in Hua II (11, 29-39). For an elaboration of immanence and transcendence in Hua II, see Brough (2008). For discussions of the imagination in Husserl and Sartre, see Wiesing (1996), and Flynn (2006). 7 Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§30-33. This view of intentionality and the threefold distinction between act, meaning, and object constituted the foundation for Husserl's criticism of empiricist abstraction. 8 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, §34 9 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§13-14; Husserl emphasizes in LU I that meaning proper is the meaning-intention, despite the fact that the identification between meaning-fulfillment and meaning-intention is crucial in the attainment of truth. 10 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §§28-29 189 meaning. Truth, already present in meaning-intention, is not the outcome of any subjective process. Husserl thus distinguishes between truth and knowledge and secures the independence of the former from subjective processes.1 This is why Husserl relates ideal meaning primarily to meaning-intention–if it were dependent upon meaning-intuition or fulfillment it would ultimately be dependent upon subjective processes. Such is the case with meaning in the context of the realizing attitude. This real meaning fluctuates and is relative–it is marked by the subjective experience of each and every one of us.2 But if ideal meaning were likewise subject to the whimsical and fluctuating nature of personal experience and subjective acts, all possibility for universal thought and knowledge would be lost.3 Husserl's goal was to secure the ideality and independence of ideal universal objects beyond the scope of the subjective processes through which we are bound to engage them. Given Husserl's threefold structure of intentionality, he has at his disposal the structural apparatus through which to show how truth, in its universal validity, can be established and accessed without undermining its independence through the interference of subjective processes. His discussion of abstraction constitutes the culmination of his 1900/01 attempt to describe the nature of conceptual thought intending ideals and aiming at grasping them. It will come as no surprise that abstraction the way Husserl comes to describe does not affect the universal validity of its ideal objects. Brentano did not foresee the consequences of his claim that truth and knowledge both depend upon the proper functioning of evident 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §23 2 Husserl is careful here to emphasize that meaning proper is always ideal–that in communication we aim at ideal meanings but only fail to achieve full harmony because of the incompleteness of our knowledge. On this view, real meaning is simply an imperfect version of ideal meaning–signaling the gap between the real and the ideal, which is nevertheless something we can strive to close despite not ever being able to do so in all circumstances. Nevertheless, in the context of logic (and the other eidetic sciences) Husserl stresses the possibility of solely engaging ideal meaning (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §28). 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU I, §29 190 judgments. Through his distinction between meaning-intention and meaning-intuition Husserl establishes (pace Brentano) the possibility of intending ideals. His discussion of abstraction will deal with the possibility of intuiting them. Both of these possibilities will prove axial for Husserl's search for a new philosophical method able to investigate the structures of consciousness as ideal. To summarize, Husserl claims: 1) that intentionality and act-character are intimately connected distinct act-characters exhibit respective types of intentions1; 2) that the object can be intended in various ways– as real, irreal, or ideal; and 3) that meaning is brought forth through the intended-intuited dynamic, which entails the possibility of full coincidence when the intended is the ideal itself. Thus, Husserl's threefold structure of intentionality echoes his claim regarding the irreducibility of act-characters as qualitative distinctions between acts, his claim that there are three overall qualities or attitudes best described as horizons of consciousness (the realizing, the imagining/non-positional, and the eidetic), and his claim that ideals can be intended and intuited in manner that does not affect their universal validity. Brentano's intentionality makes reference solely to objects as real (Realia) understood as individual things. This impoverished model of intentionality forecloses the insight that there could be multiple levels of horizonal consciousness. Brentano's consciousness is thus both singlelayered and exhibits no nexic horizonal characteristics. His view of intentionality (i.e., all objects of thought are Realia understood as individual things) mirrors his reductionism; in this context, he argues against ideal objects as possible objects of intentional acts and collapses irreal objects into the category of Realia.2 This reductionism regarding the structure of 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §10 2 He saw no payoff in exploring consciousness as consciousness of ideality or irreality because they were ultimately reducible to presentations of external or internal 'things' (i.e., individuals). As we shall see, this price 191 consciousness affected Brentano's model of intentionality; it also eventually precluded any claims regarding the possibility of genuine universal thought (i.e., thought of ideals apart from any sensory, particular content). What then, we may ask, is the status of descriptive psychology as philosophical inquiry and what are the reaches of its span? Are its results universally valid? How does Brentano escape relativism, subjectivism, and empiricism if the only legitimate objects of thought are individual things, the only dimension of consciousness is that intending these individual things, and abstraction is ultimately a process itself reducible to inner and outer sensory perception? The answer Brentano himself provides (and that Husserl questions in 1900/01) has everything to do with his notion of inner perception.1 For Brentano, the structure of inner perception involves a unity of two moments– the unfolding of the mental phenomenon itself and the manifested or unmanifested selfawareness with respect to it.2 The latter is implied by the very structure of the initial mental phenomenon regardless of its object.3 The self-consciousness of present (unfolding) acts is proved to be a high one to pay–for instance, all reflection on modality (i.e., possibility, impossibility) is reduced to individuals and their particular contexts. There is no universal reflection on modality for Brentano. 1 In his discussion of inner perception conceived as self-consciousness Brentano rejects the unconscious as the sole option other than a regression ad infinitum. Brentano employs his distinction between physical and mental phenomena in his discussion of inner perception and in the attempt to dismiss a reduction ad infinitum. While a sound (physical phenomenon) and the hearing of a sound (mental phenomenon) are simultaneous they are not identical (Cf., Psychologie, Suppl. III (1911); cf., also SNB, Part I, §4 (1914)). The inner perception or selfconsciousness of this act of hearing is a structural element of the mental phenomenon. This, in Brentano's view, resolves the problem of regression ad infinitum. Nevertheless, Brentano must concede that while selfconsciousness is a structural part of the mental phenomenon, its unfolding cannot occur while we are involved in the act. We become aware of it retrospectively (Cf., Psychologie, Suppl. III (1911); cf., also SNB, Part I, §4 (1914)). For a discussion of Brentano's notions of consciousness and the unconscious, see Thomasson (2000). 2 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.2, §6 3 The physical phenomenon as the object of external perception (as mental act) is not doubly presented in the inner perception whose object is the external perception itself (cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.1, §8). Brentano employs here a model of direct and indirect reference to disentangle the ambiguity of intentionality: mental phenomena intend their objects directly (in recto) and themselves (potentially) indirectly (in obliquo); they may also indirectly intend other secondary objects or backgrounds (in obliquo) (In this context there may be a chain of in obliquo references as well (cf., SNB, Part I, §5)). Inner perception as secondary consciousness, itself involves a two-fold reference–it intends the act or the thinking subject in recto; it intends the object of the mental act indirectly (in obliquo) (cf., SNB, Part I, §5). Thus in any unfolding act the in obliquo reference to itself is already structurally included (cf., Psychologie, Suppl. III (1911); cf., also SNB, Part I, §4 (1914)). The in recto reference to the thinking subject that occurs in inner perception is what grants certainty with respect to its existence as certain. External perception through its direct reference to the object and its pertaining inner perception (with its indirect reference to the object) are not able to verify with certainty its ontological status. 192 thus already understood within the structural context of acts, whose manifestation does not entail a unity of two heterogeneous acts (the mental act and inner perception).1 2 Brentano wishes to emphasize two things through the structure of inner perception: 1) the intrinsic or structural possibility of the presentation of mental phenomena, and 2) the evidence and infallibility of inner perception (restricted to the present). He qualifies this claim by stating that inner perception may be confused or unclear, but that it nevertheless entails evidence and thus universal validity in its givenness of mental phenomena as really existing.3 His reason for claiming this infallibility lies in the very structure of acts and their pertaining selfconsciousness; due to the structural unity between the act and the inner perception of the act, the information granted through the latter is deemed evident.4 5 On this model, inner perception gives its objects (i.e., the inner phenomena) with certainty. As such it constitutes the perfect candidate for the foundation of Brentano's Because of this, Brentano chose to employ intentional existence rather than actual (wirklich) existence in his discussion of the intended object. Only mental phenomena and the subject as such have certain actual existence and reality. It would be interesting to note again that despite this lack of ontological certainty with respect to intended objects, Brentano attributes an ontological status to the object nonetheless. On this framework of reference, the only objects that are given in modo recto with certainty as having actual existence are consciousness and its acts (cf., SNB, Part I, §5). There is an ineluctable ontological difference between the subjective-inner world of consciousness and the objective-external world that comes to the fore through Brentano's description. Husserl excludes all such ontological claims from his discussion of experience in his transcendental as well as early, descriptive phenomenology. His distinction between reell, real, irreal, and ideal is not ontologically charged; rather these are methodological tools for referring to structural differences. Because of this, among other reasons, Husserl proposes a model of ideality that does not imply description in terms of being and existence. 1 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.2, §8 2 Brentano employs the language of fusion (Verschmelzung) yet again to signal an even tighter structural unity than the part-whole unity we observed among different acts (cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.1, §10, p.183). 3 Cf., Psychologie, Suppl. II (1911); cf., also SNB, Part I, §§2-3. This is so because for Brentano (unlike for Descartes) clarity has to do with attention, which does not affect the evidence of inner perception (Cf., SNB, Part I, §3). 4 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.3, §1 5 One could easily point out that Brentano's argument entails vicious circularity: the act and its selfconsciousness are structurally one, because of this inner perception is evident, which in its turn guarantees the truth of the initially posited structural unity of mental acts and self-consciousness. While Brentano might escape a regression ad infinitum his argument for inner perception and its evidence appear to fall prey to a circular infinity. He seems to realize this himself when he leaves any attempt to prove the evidence of inner perception behind. Brentano's foundationalism becomes conspicuous through his claim that the evidence of inner perception is immediate and in no need of demonstration (Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.3, §2, p.198). Husserl comes to dismiss the infallibility of inner perception for this reason among others (Cf., LU V, Hua XIX/1, LU V, §§5, p. 27). 193 method of inquiry. With this ultimate goal in mind he wants to suggest a difference between inner presentation and inner perception, in the attempt to secure the apodicticity of the latter. He distinguishes between inner presentation as mere givenness of the act and inner perception as inner judgment, inclusive of the givenness of the act but exhibiting the affirmation of truth or falsity typical of judgment.1 Inner perception takes the role of inner cognition.2 3 Brentano thus establishes a twofold inner consciousness: inner presentation and inner perception as inner non-predicative judgment.4 Inner judgment involves, according to him, the immediate and evident givenness of mental phenomena.5 This claim is central for his theory of abstraction as method of psychological inquiry.6 1 Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.3, §2. By emphasizing the affirmation of truth and falsity as one of the core characteristic of judgments as acts, Brentano aligns himself with the 19th c. revolution in logic, which entailed a thorough questioning of the Aristotelian subject-predicate structure as essential for judgments. His reductionism in his theory of judgment–the claim that predicative judgments of the form 'A is B' are reducible to non-predicative judgments of the form 'A is'–and his emphasis on non-predicative judgment are claims that locate him in the context of the 19th c. reform in logic. For more on the affinities between Brentano and 19th c. philosophy of logic, see R. Poli (1998). For a thorough discussion of Brentano's position, see Kraus, Introduction to the 1924 edition of the Psychologie. 2 In his theory of judgment Brentano sought to distance himself from a solely predicative model of cognition. Traditionally, from Aristotle onward, the structure of judgment was seen to entail the relation between a subject and a predicate. Brentano suggests another type of judgment, which he refers to as existential judgment, which entails a subject and its existence. While Brentano agrees with Kant that existence is not a real predicate, he nevertheless questions Kant's presupposition that the proposition 'A exists' is a synthetic one. Brentano insists on distinguishing between existential propositions of the form 'A is' and categorical propositions of the form 'A is B' (Cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.7, §7). He further argues that all predicative propositions are reducible to existential ones. He later, in his 1911 edition of the Psychologie (cf., Appendices to this edition) qualifies this claim by stating that while this reduction is in principle possible in all circumstances, it does entail loss of psychological meaning. What Brentano is arguing for here is the distinction between predicative and non-predicative judgments. Inner perception is an example of the latter. What it gives with certainty is the information regarding the existence of mental phenomena and of the thinking subject (cf., Kraus, 1924). 3 This structural discussion of Brentano's inner perception as existential judgment will help illuminate the nature of his notion of abstraction and the methodological role it plays in descriptive psychology. 4 In 1874 he also includes inner feeling as a third type of inner consciousness; in his later view Brentano excludes feeling from this equation, rendering non-essential the link between inner cognition and inner feeling. 5 This however does not entail the multiple givenness of the act as object, rather self-consciousness (as multifaceted) involves a unified and singular relation to the act in question with the sole distinction of how the act is intended. These two types of inner consciousness are non-independent moments of the mental phenomenon as a whole (cf., Psychologie, Book II, Ch.2, §§4-5). 6 For a discussion of judgment and truth in Husserl (in the context of Brentano as well as Bolzano's claims regarding these issues), see Benoist (2000). 194 §4. Abstraction and Ideal Objects §4! . Brentano's Abstraction and the Status of Intended Objects Before 1904/05 Brentano claimed that the objects of thought (of acts) fall under two categories: they can be individual things (Realia) or modalities (such as possibility) and states of affairs (such as non-being) (Irrealia). Realia are best understood as individual things rather than external and real things; fictional objects such as unicorns are included in the category of Realia because they are 'individual'.1 By 1915 Brentano comes to hold that individuals (Realia) alone are the intended objects of thought, and that all universality is ultimately dependent upon these individual objects directly intended (in modo recto).2 But how can Brentano maintain this view and also uphold the accessibility and the validity of universals in the context of descriptive psychology as grounding for both logic and mathematics? For Brentano, abstraction is a process of simplification and synthesis–the resulting concepts are either simple or complex.3 External and internal perception function as the foundational intuitions for abstraction; thus, the process through which we grasp universals is tightly bound to experience; it begins with the intuition of facts about external (attributes of external objects) or internal objects (acts of consciousness). These ideas of individual things already present a level of generality conceived as indeterminacy.4 Brentano claims that abstraction, as movement toward the universal, is not difficult to explain because it does not begin with the particular; instead, it already entails the givenness of the object (either in external or inner perception) with a certain amount of generality and indeterminacy.5 1 In his later work (1914-1916) Brentano qualifies the concept of 'something individual' as synthetic and relative–the outcome of a process of abstraction. It is relative in so far as it does not represent the highest level of generality, which Brentano reserves for the concept of a 'thing' (cf., SNB, Part II, §1). 2 Cf., SNB, Part II, §§1-2 3 Cf., SNB, Part II, §§1-2 4 Cf., Franz Brentano, Wahrheit und Evidenz, Oskar Kraus (Ed.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig, 1930, Part 4 (WE hereafter). 5 Cf., SNB, Part II, §1, pp.86-87 195 Abstraction is thus for Brentano a process that involves reaching higher levels of generality based on an already granted (lower) indeterminacy. The process of abstraction is understood as simplification–a further elimination of determinations (spatial, temporal, or qualitative) resulting in simple abstract concepts.1 These concepts themselves become the foundation for further abstraction, this time understood as synthesis–the combination of simple concepts resulting in more complex abstract concepts.2 As simplification and synthesis, abstraction is ultimately reliant upon sensory intuition.3 Abstraction, as noetic thought, entails different levels of generality and a sense of incompleteness.4 As simplification and synthesis the process could unfold indeterminately, at least ideally. What this suggests is that universality is not only ideally not fixed, but it is also the outcome of an incomplete subjective process (and is therefore itself incomplete). This notion of universality is certainly different from the ideality Husserl seeks to secure in the Investigations. At most, we could agree that Brentano's abstraction can achieve higher levels of generality, but we ought to seriously question the claim that this generality, however high and indeterminate, could ever qualify as universality. Brentano's generality cannot in principle attain the status of universality conceived as entirely exclusive of anything singular, concrete, and determinate. A universality of this type (what Husserl would refer to as ideality proper) cannot be intended and grasped on the noetic thought model that Brentano offers. Whether Brentano's abstraction is any different from the versions proposed by the British empiricists is something worth asking. As much as Brentano wants to oppose empiricist nominalism, his model of intentionality, the lack of an established formal qualitative distinction between 1 Cf., SNB, Part II, §1 2 Cf., SNB, Part I, §2; see also Part II, §1 3 Cf., SNB, pp.86-87 4 Cf., SNB, Part II, §1 196 judgment and perception as mental phenomena, his theory of judgment and truth, and his model of abstraction all prevent him from escaping a form of nominalism, whose obvious outcome is the non-independence of universal validity. This twofold model of abstraction (as simplification and synthesis) withstands the shifts in Brentano's thought–what changes is the manner in which he views the abstract concepts themselves. As we have already seen, they are labeled as fictions in the later view, and as such they fall under two categories: useful and harmful fictions. Empirical concepts (such as the idea of 'red') and insights or ideas of axioms (as principles of mathematics or logic) are useful fictions able to aid the process of inquiry in both the positive sciences and in descriptive psychology.1 The former (i.e., empirical concepts) are the outcome of abstraction that has external perception or intuition as its starting point; the latter are the outcome of abstraction that begins in internal perception, which as we have seen gives its objects (i.e., mental phenomena) with certainty.2 Harmful fictions (such as the abstract concepts of possibility and being) are cumbersome; they complicate the view of cognition needlessly since ultimately judgments about modalities or states of affairs are reducible to judgments about Realia. By qualifying some abstract concepts as useful fictions, Brentano can still talk about universals despite the fact that he dismisses their existence as independent from mental processes. But how does this affect their universal validity? Brentano's answer to this question lies in his theory of evident (or insightful) judgment, which is the criterion through which truth and validity are established. 1 Cf., Psychologie, Appx.9 (1911) 2 This type of abstraction, i.e., judgment, plays a crucial role in the reflective analysis of consciousness descriptive psychology engages in (cf., Psychologie, Book 1, Ch.2). 197 Brentano's later theory of truth affects what he has to say regarding the validity of universals. Inner perception (conceived as existential judgment) grants the intuition of mental phenomena in the mode of presence and is the most basic and direct type of evident judgment.1 Other judgments, such as those regarding abstract concepts, ultimately rely on evident judgments about individual mental phenomena (Realia); they rely on inner perception conceived as simple or direct evident judgment.2 Thus, for Brentano, if an act of abstraction is founded on inner perception, and makes claims about the validity of the resulting concepts, these concepts are ultimately referred back to the immediate or present selfknowledge. Evidence, structurally pertaining to inner perception as evident judgment and to subsequently founded evident complex propositional judgments, is the guarantee of truth. Truth in its universal validity is dependent upon the evidence of inner perception.3 In this manner Brentano attempts to establish both universal validity as well as our ability to grasp it. Why then would Husserl still be dissatisfied with Brentano's model of consciousness and argument for universal validity? Not only does Brentano reject universals as objects of thought; we also saw him locate truth in the context of evident judgment as act. Truth is here dependent upon a subjective process– precisely what Husserl criticized Brentano for and exactly what Husserl's threefold structure of intentionality helps avoid. It seems therefore that Brentano cannot elude the charge of psychologism brought against him. He argues against this charge in his mature texts and claims that his theory of truth does not entail any form of subjectivism.4 He claims that his argument for universal validity stands as a successful answer to the charge of 1 Cf., WE, Part 4; cf., also SNB, Part II, §1 2 Cf., WE, Part 3; cf., also SNB, Part I, §§1-2 3 Cf., WE, Part 4 4 Cf., Psychologie, Appx.11 (1911) 198 psychologism. And yet his theory of evident judgment undermines the independence of this universal validity from subjective processes. Thus, there are two reasons for Husserl's dissatisfaction: first, Husserl views universal objects as mind-independent ideals not mind-dependent fictions; and second, universal validity and truth pertain to ideals not to judgments as acts.1 In the earlier view, which Husserl was most familiar with, Brentano argued against attributing a proper sense of 'being' as existence to universals as 'irreal entitites'. The later view dismisses their status as 'entities' altogether. For Husserl, ideals are not mere fictions, dependent upon subjective processes and their references to particular objects. For him, ideal are independent of both real particulars (external real objects) and reell particulars (structural elements of acts). While Husserl does not discuss universals or ideals (be they subjective or objective) in terms of 'being' or their ontological status, he does claim their independence in terms of validity and truth. For Husserl, evidence and truth pertain to ideals as objects of eidetic intentional acts; they are not qualities of judgments or acts. Husserl is seeking a model of abstraction able to break the barrier of the real and thus make possible the grasping of universals as ideal.2 Brentano's model of abstraction as simplification and synthesis is unsuccessful in securing the access to universals as radically different from real particular objects or attributes.3 In the Second Logical Investigation Husserl engages in an extensive discussion of the empiricist notion of abstraction. The reason for this detailed analysis goes back to Husserl's interest in emphasizing the validity of universal concepts as independent of subjective 1 This would qualify as a form of psychologism in Husserl's view. 2 For Husserl's early theory of abstraction, esp. in his critique of British empiricism as well as fellow Brentano students, see Rollinger (1993). 3 Brentano did emphasize the importance of qualitatively distinction between acts–he sought to secure this through founding (Fundierung). And yet Brentano failed to describe and clearly delineate this qualitative distinction; his model of abstraction–as a type of judgment, and its inability to establish universals as functioning on a different plane than individual Realia bear witness to this failure. 199 processes while also arguing for the possibility of grasping these concepts in the context of subjective acts. Empiricist abstraction is the process through which universal concepts are gradually distilled from the initial sensory experiences. In Husserl's view, the empiricists failed to distinguish between acts and objects. The external objects and their attributes are duplicated through images and as such are considered to be parts of the acts themselves. This representationalism, typical of sense data theories, blurs the distinction between act (reell), its content (reell), and the real, irreal, or ideal object.1 The attributes of external objects are confused with the immanent contents of the acts. According to Husserl, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume differ in how they explain the process of abstraction, but they all begin by failing to distinguish between act and object.2 What ultimately comes to the fore through Husserl's critique of empiricist abstraction is the need for a radical distinction between acts intending particular, transcendent, real objects and acts intending universal objects. For the empiricists the act of abstraction is placed on the same continuum with sensory experience–there is no qualitative 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, §§25-27. What must also be emphasized here is that all representations are individual not universal. 2 According to Husserl, abstraction is, for Locke, a separation of the attributes shared by different objects; since these attributes are parts of the acts themselves, the separated attributes, i.e., the general ideas as outcome of abstraction, are themselves parts of consciousness (Hua XIX/1, LU II, §7). Both external real objects and ideal universals are collapsed into consciousness. There is no qualitative distinction between the real and the ideal, and the latter is rooted and contained in the subjective acts themselves (Hua XIX/1, LU II, §§9-12). Berkeley's critique of Locke's abstraction reveals the former's adherence to particular ideas only. For Berkeley, the universal is nothing other than a name given to a particular idea, which as sign is replaceable: it can be substituted for any other similar particular idea. Berkeley's representationalism is a process of sign substitution– particular ideas are able to stand for other particular ideas. Universality is thus the product of mere permutation at the level of the real (i.e., the particular) (Hua XIX/1, LU II, §§28-30). Hume's theory of abstraction, though more sophisticated than Locke's due to Berkeley's influence, remains in the same vein. For Hume, abstraction is a matter of attention and association–after focusing on specific attributes of sensory objects, the process compares the attributes with previously encountered ones. Universality is the outcome of comparison and association, but the realm of the real and particular is not, in Husserl's view, left behind (Hua XIX/1, LU II, §§32-36). These three models of abstraction all fall prey to the illusion of immanence and the processes of separation, substitution, or attention and association, which are fueled by different versions of representationalism, are not qualitatively distinguished from acts intending particular objects. A clear distinction between the real and the ideal is impossible on these models. The nominalism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume stems from this very collapsing of the reell, the real, and the ideal; its outcome is the dependence of universal concepts upon subjective processes thus undermining the independence and possibility of universal validity. 200 difference between them. Empiricist abstraction does not offer access to universals; at best it offers an increase in generality while remaining at the level of real and particular objects and attributes. For Husserl, the consciousness of universality is a qualitatively different kind of consciousness, not the outcome of individual intuition.1 The act-character, as qualitative difference, is what renders various acts unique. An act intending ideal objects must exhibit a unique type of act-character, different from the act-character of external perception; this is exactly what Husserl claims about abstraction in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. We must seek to understand the structure of Husserlian abstraction as unique process and actcomplex; we must also ask ourselves in what horizonal consciousness this process unfolds. §4! . Husserl's Abstraction and its Ideal Objects In the Logical Investigations, Husserl adopts a type of abstraction, conceived as idealization (ideirende Abstraktion), as the long-sought unique phenomenological method.2 Here I will unpack what he means by idealizing abstraction3. For Husserl ideals, such as the principles of logic, are universal a-temporal truths, independent in their validity of anything subjective;4 their grasping entails a radically different experience than that of individual 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU II, §34 2 For a discussion of the early Husserlian theory of abstraction in the context of mathematical idealism, see Ortiz Hill (2004). 3 I here use idealizing abstraction, idealization, and ideation interchangeably to refer to eidetic inquiry broadly construed. 4 In the Second Investigation Husserl discusses ideals in terms of species or empirical concepts. He does so in the context of his critique of empiricist abstraction; he subsequently argues for abstraction understood as exhibiting a specific type of act-character–one that is fundamentally distinct from sensory perception and not dependent upon or bound by it. In the Third Investigation the ideal is explored in terms of structurally non-independent parts of wholes. This discussion is important in so far as he comes to apply the part-whole framework in his study of the structure and unity of consciousness in the Fifth and Sixth Investigations. In the last two Investigations, Husserl focuses exclusively on consciousness and claims here that its structures are ideal. The ideality of subjective structures points at their lawfulness. This discussion harbors a potent claim–one able to further Husserl's entire project in the Investigations. Simply put, Husserl's culminating argument in the Investigations is that consciousness is marked by ideality and can be known and studied as such; this entails two things: first, subjectivity should not be automatically equated with relativity, actuality, and particularity; and second, there is a science meant to study the ideal structures of consciousness and this science is eidetic, just like logic and mathematics, but unlike them, it focuses on subjective rather than objective ideals. For Husserl, the process 201 temporally-bound phenomena.1 The term 'abstraction', which gradually and subtly takes the center stage in the Investigations, is utterly ambiguous. Husserl employs it to refer to three distinct acts: special abstraction, categorial perception and its intuition2, and idealizing abstraction. I am here going to focus explicitly on abstraction as idealization or process of grasping ideal objects.3 4 In the Prolegomena Husserl argues for the distinction between scientific idealization and the thought of ideals (here understood as logical concepts and principles).5 In his view, ideals are to be grasped via insight (Einsicht)–i.e., eidetic intuition, Wesensschau, or the givenness of essences, and not through a process of detachment from singularity and actuality entailing a gradual elimination of particular determinations.6 This intuition is a priori (not conditioned by sensory experience).7 As such, it is fundamentally detached from the realizing-positional attitude in which all acts are motivated by the belief in the actuality and existence of the object given in external perception.8 Idealizing abstraction unfolds in the eidetic attitude. While this is not something Husserl himself explicitly states, his claims with respect to what idealizing abstraction is not heavily suggest this conclusion. The ideal can only be intended and grasped in a type of idealizing abstraction; in other words, the only through which ideals are grasped is a unique type of experience. He makes this claim both when referring to objective ideals as well as when discussing subjective ideals. They are both graspable through idealizing abstraction. In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl identifies two types of subjective ideals: the ideal principles or laws governing the dynamic of consciousness and of its acts, and the structures of consciousness proper (i.e., the structures of acts). The Sixth Investigation imports most of the features of objective ideals in the structural context of subjective ideals. 1 Cf., Hua XVIII, §§24, 39; cf., also, Hua XIX/1, LU V, Einleitung 2 For a discussion of categorial intuition as process of grasping universal objects, see Lohmar (2008a). 3 Husserl also discusses abstraction as both special abstraction and as categorial intuition. 4 It should be noted here that he employed this term already in 1900/01 and not in the 1913 edition of the Investigations; this type of abstraction mirrors the process he later describes in Ideas I as eidetic variation or ideation (Ideation), also understood as a type of idealization and further qualified as dealing solely with subjective ideal structures. For a discussion of eidetic variation as process of grasping ideals, see Lohmar (2005). 5 Cf., Hua XVIII, §23 6 Hua XVIII, §28 7 Cf., Hua XVIII, §§50-51 8 This 'belief' is what Husserl later will refer to as protodoxa. For Husserl's analyses of the protodoxa, see Hua III/1, Hua XI, and Erfahrung & Urteil. 202 propaedeutic path toward eidetic intuition is idealizing abstraction (ideirende Abstraktion).1 This is an important move that suggests the ultimate direction of Husserl's project: his goal of establishing a unique method of philosophical inquiry as distinct from the method of the positive sciences. In this he departs from his mentor, Brentano, one of whose main methodological credos was the reliance upon and trust in empirical-positive methodologies. Husserl further notes that this process of abstraction or idealization, while subjective, does not condition the universal validity of its objects.2 The reell structures of this subjective process, i.e., idealizing abstraction, do not affect the intended ideals.3 Let us now stress what we have thus far established about idealizing abstraction: it is a process that intends ideals4 as ideal possibilities (invariant and exhibiting universal validity, able to guide all manifestations and variations at the level of reality and irreality5) and terminates with an eidetic grasp or intuition of its objects.6 Idealizing abstraction, Husserl claims, is founded. Where then does idealizing abstraction begin and how does it unfold? In order to clarify how abstraction can be founded on sensory perception and yet divorced from it we need only remind ourselves of modification. The matter (Materie) and hyletic content that may become, through Fundierung, structural elements of the beginning stages of 1 Cf., Hua XVIII, §29 2 Cf., Hua XVIII, §§29, 39 3 Hua XVIII, §46 4 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §14 5 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU IV, §16 6 Husserl collapses ideals under one category–be they objective (logical or mathematical concepts and principles) or subjective (the structures of consciousness); since idealization is the only process through which ideals are grasped, it follows that subjective and objective ideals alike come to the fore through idealization. We see him argue for idealizing abstraction as the process leading to the grasping of objective ideals in the Prolegomena as well as in LU III (e.g., §9). LU V and VI make a similar claim regarding subjective ideals. The consequence of this is the lack of distinction between the methods of objective and subjective eidetic inquiries. This does not seem to bother Husserl much in 1900/01–he does not mind the methodological overlap between mathematics and logic on the one hand and phenomenology on the other. This overlap will soon enough trigger the search for major differences between the methods of these two types of eidetic sciences–a search that was to mark the decade of thought spanning between the Investigations and Ideas I. My suspicion is that Husserl was satisfied with claiming that idealizing abstraction was the path toward both objective and subjective ideals because as process of inquiry it was fundamentally distinct from all positive, empiricist, and psychological methods. It sufficed at this point to establish the eidetic character of the phenomenological method–establishing its uniqueness within the eidetic category had not become a priority yet. 203 the process of idealization are not merely founding here. They also undergo Modifikation such that from the beginning, they are relocated in a horizonal consciousness that does not intend its objects as real and actual particulars. Thus, along with the bracketing of ontic-doxic presuppositions abstraction is geared, from the very beginning, toward indeterminacy rather than determinacy (the latter pertaining explicitly to objects given in the realizing-positional consciousness). What exactly does Husserl claim about idealizing abstraction as phenomenological method–a method of describing, analyzing, and grasping the ideal structures of consciousness? It is a process that from the beginning evades the ontic and epistemic demands of the realizing-positional attitude.1 It intends the structures of consciousness as ideal invariant unities2 without affecting their invariant, universally valid character. Finally, it leads to the grasp or intuition of these ideals and as process of variation it terminates in eidetic intuition.3 At this point we must clarify how Husserl's idealizing abstraction is different from Brentano's abstraction, which begins in and is deeply reliant upon his notion of immanent perception as existential evident judgment. Husserl does not explicitly attack Brentano's abstraction. His explicit (as well as implicit) critique of the latter's unity of consciousness along with his two-fold structure of intentionality are sufficient to draw the above-stated conclusion. Husserl specifically targets Brentano's claims regarding the apodicticity of immanent perception and challenges the 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §14 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §25 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §27. While the language of variation and eidetic intuition pertains to Ideas I, I am employing these terms here to refer to the phenomenological focus on ideals and to the dynamic process through which it seeks to grasp them. These are both aspects already prevalent in Husserl's early work. I am not importing here the terminology of Ideas I in an unwarranted fashion–I am simply instead suggesting that ideation as eidetic thought, i.e., thought intending ideals, was from the beginning the process that constituted phenomenological inquiry. I am also claiming here that at difference stages in his thought ideation meant different things and entailed more or less distinct methodological tools. In 1900/01 ideation was idealizing abstraction; in 1913 it was eidetic variation, a process specifically focused on subjective ideals and exhibiting specific stages not encountered in mathematical or logical thought. 204 ability of immanent perception to give its objects with evidence or insight.1 For him, the ability of immanent perception to give its object immediately (i.e., not through a series of facets (Abschattungen)) does not necessarily entail certainty and adequate evidence.2 He thus questions Brentano's presupposition that all mental phenomena as objects are given with evidence;3 in other words, that inner perception, as opposed to external perception, ineluctably gives its object with certainty.4 Like all acts, immanent perception as actualized self-consciousness can unfold in the realizing attitude–a consciousness that cannot give any object with certainty due to its ontic motivations. As realizing, immanent perception is subject to error. The only type of immanent perception that Husserl would recognize as apodictic is the one unfolding in eidetic positional consciousness. Immanent perception as eidetic self-consciousness gives its object with evidence and insight (Einsicht) according to Husserl. The intuition of ideals does not occur in the context of empirical generalization but is instead the outcome of abstraction as the eidetic process through which ideals are sought. Because Brentano failed to distinguish between the realizing positional and the eidetic positional levels of consciousness, he failed, as a consequence, to locate and analyze abstraction in the eidetic positional horizon; subsequently he was also forced to discuss universals in terms of being, understood as actuality and existence. He concluded, as we saw, that they could not exhibit such being and therefore must be dismissed as possible objects of thought–they are mere outcomes or products of abstraction as forming (Formung).5 For Husserl, ideals are independent of thought yet graspable through it. The only manner in which Brentano could conceive universals was through bringing them forth as products of thought; as such, 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §27 2 Hua XIX/2, Beilage, §4 3 Hua XIX/2, Beilage, §2 4 Hua XIX/2, Beilage, §4 5 Brentano became a full-fledged nominalist because he could not conceive our ability to engage ideals other than through the concept of 'being'. Husserl's eidetic horizonal consciousness brackets any claims regarding the existence and actuality of ideals and explores them solely in terms of their independent validity. 205 universals became essentially dependent upon thought–their truth stemmed from judgment and the process of knowledge acquisition. Eidetic acts, be they presentations, judgments, or even memories and expectations, intend ideals. But for Husserl, as we have already seen, the truth of these ideals (their universal validity) is independent of their being intuited. Their validity is not guaranteed by or established through any subjective process. Abstraction as universalizing process aims at attaining the intuition of ideals, which Husserl refers to as fulfillment or the synthesis of identity between the intended and intuited object. In the case of idealizing abstraction such synthesis is a feasible goal. Thus, while the knowledge of ideals is dependent upon abstraction as subjective act, their truth and validity are not. Husserl himself does not, as in the later case of eidetic variation, explore or explain what he understands by idealizing abstraction. We are left to wonder as to how it unfolds as process aiming at grasping the structures of consciousness understood as ideal possibilities. We could safely assume that for Husserl idealizing abstraction is a process through which the gap between the intended and the intuited is gradually closed. The intended object (ultimately also to be given in intuition) is ideal, but the movement toward the ideal cannot already imply the givenness of the ideal. The ideal is not presupposed in this process because at first it is simply intended, not given. Abstraction as closure of the gap between the intended and the intuited is an epistemic filling. This is not to say that the intuited ideal is different from the intended one. As we have seen, for Husserl, the ideal is independent of any subjective epistemic process. What changes is our understanding of it. Our knowledge of the ideal as intuited rather than merely intended is 'heavier', but the ideal itself remains the same throughout the process; it remains unaffected by it. Idealizing abstraction consists of a series of presentations and judgments retrospectively motivated by intending the ideal and 206 gradually approaching fulfillment. Since they are intentionally bound, they function as a complex whose unfolding is essentially dynamic not narrative1. This is so because of the retrospective relation each has with respect to the initial intention of the ideal, and because they are also memorially as well as retentionally related to each other. Retention is at work as the core modification constituting the temporal structure of the phenomenological consciousness as consciousness of ideality (i.e., eidetic positional consciousness). Memories as acts unfold here at the horizonal level of eidetic consciousness and retrieve or recognize what was previously irreally given. Thus, abstraction is not a mere series of presentations or corresponding judgments; it is a dynamic movement in which retrospection (focused both on the initial intention of the ideal and on the intermediate intuitions of irreal possibilities) guides all subsequent irreal variations. Universalizing thought is thus a type of eidetic consciousness in which presentations, judgments, memories, and even expectations are at work.2 If Phantasiemodifikation understood specifically as the radical shift in level from realizing positionality to non-positionality is the only manner in which objects are engaged in a radically different way (i.e., as irreal), an equally radical modification must trigger the shift from non-positionality to eidetic positionality (from the irreal to the ideal). We could refer to this as eidetic modification. While Husserl himself does not employ this terminology, he nevertheless heavily employs the language of modification when referring to the intention and intuition of ideals.3 1 1 This is so unless, of course, we rethink 'narrative' to include constant retrospective reflection. 2 All of these acts are non-positional with respect to their intuition and eidetically positional with respect to their intention. 3 Understanding the similarities and differences between these two kinds of radical level modification will further illuminate to what extent certain facets of phenomenological reflection are relying upon imagining or eidetic consciousness, or to what extent they are relying on both. A difference that come to the fore between Phantasie and eidetic modification: the former is immediate and easily willed, the latter requires an arduous multi-stage process of leaving the irreal behind; while the former is natural the latter is artificial (künstlich). Despite this 207 §5. Husserl's Descriptive Phenomenology – The Carving of a Philosophical Path In the Investigations we see Husserl clearly arguing against an empiricist model of abstraction. He proposes that we conceive abstraction either as act exhibiting a distinct actcharacter and able to access the ideal. It also has a qualitatively distinct act-character–as unique type of act-complex and series of presentations and judgments. Husserl thus successfully establishes 'abstraction' as distinct from mere generalization unfolding in the realizing positional consciousness. We have the ability to both intend and intuit ideal objects. The beginning of phenomenology coincided with and was the culmination of Husserl's gradual detachment from his mentor's claims regarding consciousness and regarding the methods through which we ought to investigate it. The correlation between how Husserl and Brentano describe and view consciousness and what they claim regarding philosophical inquiry is by now, hopefully, obvious. The ultimate goal of the Investigations is to establish a rigorous method of inquiry able to clarify the ideal structures of consciousness. This method must be, for Husserl, free of all ontic and epistemic presuppositions;2 this is something Brentano's psychology had failed to achieve. We see Husserl easily posit, here as well as in Ideas I, our unencumbered freedom to detach ourselves from all such presuppositions, which, in his view, ineluctably lead to psychologism or nominalism (both positions that posed a significant threat to the integrity and independence of universal validity).3 The sought phenomenological method would thus important difference we ought to emphasize the radical nature of these two modifications as distinct from any other modifications (such as memorial or modality modification) occurring within the scope of the three levels of consciousness. 1 For a detailed discussion of eidetic modification in the context of idealizing abstraction as well as the later methodological process of eidetic variation see Chapters 5 and 6. 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 3 Later, in the Crisis, Husserl discusses the ways in which this freedom to 'bracket' is complicated by a blurring of distinctions between what counts as natural, scientific, or eidetic. 208 be able to describe consciousness outside the parameters of ontic and factual-epistemic motivations and presuppositions.1 What Husserl is seeking here is nothing other than a method or path of inquiry able to completely surpass the boundaries, demands, and goals of realizing consciousness. Without such presuppositions idealizing abstraction is free to focus solely on essences and ideals apart from any ontic and epistemic demands regarding the real, actual, or particular. As such, it would, from the very beginning, free itself from the holds that prevented the British empiricists from establishing genuine universality–the same holds that Brentano's descriptive psychology, guided by his twofold intentionality and uni-dimensional flat consciousness, also failed to negotiate. Without the structural possibility of horizonal levels of consciousness no truly universalizing thought can occur. By distinguishing between phenomenal and phenomenological experience,2 Husserl is ultimately claiming that to engage in phenomenological analysis and description as philosophical thought one must disbar oneself of all the demands that inevitably guide our thought in the realizing-positional attitude. Only in this new experiential attitude can one hope to attain the intuition granting access to the ideal structures of consciousness.3 The possibility of this insight is dependent upon a radical distinction between the real, the irreal, and the ideal, which stand for the three main ways in which an object can be intended and given in consciousness.4 They are the correlates of the three main horizonal types of consciousness or attitude: the realizing-positional, the imagining non-positional, and the eidetic. This distinction can only be made on a threefold model of intentionality, which leaves room for the possibility of intending objects other than real; it likewise requires a non- 1 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §11a 2 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §3 3 Cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §2 4 We must also avoid the illusion of immanence and clearly distinguish between the real and the reell (cf., Hua XIX/1, LU V, §7). 209 additive model of Fundierung, able to preserve qualitative difference between acts while also allowing for their interconnectedness; most importantly, it is absolutely dependent upon a horizonal, layered, and nexic structure of consciousness – a structure under which we distinguish between radically different attitudes or modes of consciousness whose manners of intending and intuiting their objects are in no danger of being collapsed. Modifikation, through its collaboration with Fundierung, secures this nexic horizonal layering as well as the integrity of these layers, which despite their fundamental differences are not utterly divorced. Modifikation (as able to secure a layered, nexic, and horizonal consciousness) comes to the fore as perhaps the most significant ally Husserl had in his search for an eidetic phenomenological method. The only manner in which we can hope to focus on ideal possibilities as invariant is by putting out of play the appeal and hold that real possibilities have on us. 210 Chapter 5 Phenomenological Reflection and the Natural Attitude In Chapter 4 I argued that abstraction and ideals or universals constituted the core of Husserl's break from Brentano's empiricist approach. What Husserl sought to establish in his early work was the possibility of engaging and grasping universal objects. While this argument was meant to explore the beginning stages of Husserl's phenomenological project, it sought, more importantly, to uncover the tight relationship between what Husserl revealed about the structure of consciousness on the one hand and what he proposed as his method of inquiry on the other. Husserl's dissatisfaction with Brentano's model of inquiry stemmed from the former's skepticism with respect to the methodological efficiency of the latter's model of consciousness. In what follows I will continue my discussion of the dynamic between the structure of consciousness and phenomenological methodological inquiry. What will eventually come to light is that the above-mentioned relationship is not uni-directional but bi-directional. Our journey into Husserl's mature transcendental phenomenology will show that what he came to discover about the structures of consciousness (both as a whole as well as imagining consciousness as primary nexic horizonal level of consciousness) influenced what he claimed about the method, and conversely, that the method he came to gradually carve facilitated new insights into the essential nature of consciousness (and the micro-phenomenological projects he engaged in). This dynamic – a veritable hermeneutical circle – is not vicious in character. My project unfolds in a manner that closely follows this circularity: through an in-depth discussion of Husserl's micro-phenomenological discoveries with respect to Phantasie, I seek to elucidate the methodological ambiguities he left behind. Examples of such conundrums include the mysterious source of our freedom and ability to perform the reductions or the extraordinary shift from the variant to the invariant in the process of eidetic variation. In doing so I hope 211 to establish ways in which the phenomenological project as a whole could continue, ways in which analyses of aesthetic consciousness, modal thought, hypothetical and experimental thought could unfold, as well as ways in which phenomenology could engage (i.e., inform and be informed by) other fields such as the epistemology of modalities or cognitive science. My goal in this chapter (and the one to follow) is to rethink Husserl's phenomenological reflection through the structures of consciousness his lectures and research manuscripts uncover. The discussion here will center around his extensive and long-lasting analyses of imagining consciousness. Despite what could be called my loyalty to these micro-phenomenological investigations, I will also follow the insights gained in Part I of this project where I argued against the pictorial nature of Phantasie and where I stressed its primacy, alongside perception, as fundamental level of consciousness – claims Husserl himself never explicitly made. The significance of these insights will soon come to light with respect to both the reductions and eidetic variation. There is therefore an important distinction to be made between what Husserl overtly states with respect to the imagination and his method, what he implies about them, and what I claim in the analyses to follow. Clarifying the abstruse nature of the reductions and of ideation entails going beyond Husserl's letter; however, this distancing need not entail philosophical betrayal. I consider my claims about the nature of consciousness and the phenomenological method to be very much attuned to Husserl's philosophical project. §1. The Transcendental Phenomenological Project as Artificial (künst l i ch) I. The 'artificial' in the Logical Investigations: The difficulties of clearing up the basic concepts of logic are a natural consequence of the extraordinary difficulties of strict phenomenological analysis [...] The source of all such difficulties lies in the unnatural (künstlich)1 direction of intuition and thought which phenomenological analysis requires. Instead of becoming lost in the performance of acts 1 Emphasis mine 212 built intricately on one another, and instead of (as it were) naïvely positing the existence of the objects intended in their sense and then going on to characterize them, or of assuming such objects hypothetically, of drawing conclusions from all this etc., we must rather practice 'reflection', i.e., make these acts themselves, and their immanent meaning-content, our objects. When objects are intuited, thought of, theoretically pondered on, and thereby given to us as actualities in certain ontic modalities, we must direct our theoretical interest away from such objects, not posit them as realities as they appear or hold in the intentions of our acts. These acts, contrariwise, though hitherto not objective, must now be made objects of apprehension and of theoretical assertion. We must deal with them in new acts of intuition and thinking, we must analyze and describe them in their essence, we must make them objects of empirical or ideational thought. Here we have a direction of thought running counter to deeply ingrained habits which have been steadily strengthened since the dawn of mental development.1 II. The 'artificial' in Ideas II: What is educational in the phenomenological reduction, however, is also this: it henceforth makes us in general sensitive toward grasping other attitudes, whose rank is equal to that of the natural attitude (or, as we can now say more clearly, the nature-attitude) and which therefore, just like the latter, constitute only relative and restricted correlates of being and sense. The new correlates thus refer back similarly to absolute consciousness in the phenomenological sense. They require, for their full clarification, a return to the originary and full nexus of the essence of this absolute consciousness. By means of the reduction to this nexus, we are capable at any time of putting in their correct relation, and of exploiting absolutely, the givenness of the various attitudes (or the fundamentally different modes of apperception pertaining to them). It is such a new attitude that we are now intent on; in a certain sense it is very natural, but is not a nature-attitude. 'Not a nature-attitude:' that means that what is experienced in it is not nature in the sense of all the natural sciences but is, so to say, something contrary to nature (Husserl's emphases). Obviously, the quite exceptional difficulty here lies not only in grasping this opposition but in understanding it from within, though not by actually adopting the attitudes. For if we abstract from the attitude, surely artificial (emphasis mine), toward pure consciousness, toward this residuum of the various reductions, then we constantly slip, quite effortlessly, from one attitude into another, from the naturalistic into the personalistic, and so to the respective sciences, from the natural sciences into the human sciences. The difficulties lie in the reflection and in the phenomenological understanding of the transformation of apprehension and experience and in the understanding of the correlates constituted by them.2 1 Logical Investigations (vol.II), Introduction, §3, p.170 2 Ideas II, pp.189-190. "Das Erzieherische der phänomenologischen Reduktion liegt aber auch darin, dass sie uns nun überhaupt für die Erfassung von Einstellungsänderungen empfänglich macht, die der natürlichen oder, wie wir jetzt deutlicher sagen, der naturalen Einstellung ebenbürtig sind, die also wie diese nur relative und beschränkte Seins-und Sinneskorrelate konstituieren. Die neuen Korrelate weisen also desgleichen auf das im phänomenologischen Sinn absolute Bewusstsein zurück; sie verlangen zu ihrer vollen Klärung den Rückgang auf den originären und vollen Wesenszusammenhang dieses absoluten Bewusstseins. Durch die Reduktion auf diesen Zusammenhang sind wir jederzeit in der Lage, die Gegebenheiten der verschiedenen Einstellungen (bzw. die ihnen zugehörigen grundverschiedenen Weisen der Apperzeption) in das rechte Verhältnis zu setzen und absolut auszuwerten. Auf eine solche neue Einstellung, die in gewissem Sinn sehr natürlich, aber nicht natural ist, haben wir es jetzt abgesehen. "Nicht natural", das sagt, dass das in ihr Erfahrene nicht Natur ist im Sinne aller Naturwissenschaften, sondern sozusagen ein Widerspiel der Natur. Selbstverständlich liegt die ganz ausnehmende Schwierigkeit, den Gegensatz nicht nur zu erfassen, sondern von innen her zu verstehen, nicht 213 III. The 'artificial' in the Krisis: With this first reduction, one has not yet arrived at what is essentially proper to the soul. Thus one can say: the genuine phenomenological-psychological epochê is an attitude which is completely strange and artificial not only to the whole of natural life but also to the psychologist of the past. Hence, in regard to what is essentially proper to the ego-subjects, in regard to their psychic aspect in general, the experiential field which is necessary for scientific description, as well as the familiar set of types that can arise only out of repetition, was lacking. 'Inner perception' in the sense of genuine psychology, and psychological experience in general, understood as the experience of souls according to their own pure being, is so far from being an immediate and everyday affair, something gained through a similar 'epochê' at the very beginnings, that it was not possible at all prior to the introduction of the peculiar method of the phenomenological epochê. Accordingly, anyone taking the phenomenological attitude first had to learn to see, gain practice, and then in practice acquire at first a rough and shaky, then a more and more precise, conception of what is essentially proper to himself and others. In this way, a true infinity of descriptive phenomena gradually becomes visible, and does so with the strongest and most unconditioned of all self-evidence, the self-evidence of this sole genuine 'inner experience'.1 §1! . Consciousness and the Phenomenological Method: Structures and Systems of Possibilities Whether in the case of early act-descriptive phenomenology, static transcendental analysis, or genetic phenomenology and its guiding import for phenomenological psychology there is an undeniable consistency in Husserl's claims throughout his philosophical career im Vollzug der Einstellungen. Denn sehen wir von der allerdings künstlichen2 Einstellung auf das reine Bewusstsein ab, dieses Residuum der verschiedenen Reduktionen, so gleiten wir beständig ganz mühelos von einer Einstellung in die andere, von der naturalistischen in die personalistische, in den bezüglichen Wissenschaften von der naturwissenschaftlichen in die geisteswissenschaftliche. Die Schwierigkeiten liegen in der Reflexion und in dem phänomenologischen Verständnis der Auffassungsund Erfahrungsänderungen und der durch sie konstituierten Korrelate" (Hua IV, pp.179-180). 1 Crisis, p. 248; emphases mine. "Mit dieser ersten Reduktion hat man noch nicht das Eigenwesentliche der Seele erreicht. Und so kann man sagen: die echte phänomenologich-psychologische Epoché ist eine dem ganzen natürlichen Leben, aber auch dem Psychologischen der Vergangenheit vollig fremde, künstliche Einstellung. Daher fehlte es für das Eigenwesentliche der Ichsubjekte, für ihr Seelisches überhaupt an dem der wissenschaftlichen Deskription notwendingen Erfahrungsfeld und an der erst aus Weiderholung entspringenden Bekanntheittypik. "Innere Wahrnehmung" im Sinne der echten Psychologie und psychologische Erfahrung überhaupt, verstanden als die von den Seelen nach ihrem eigenen reinen Sein, ist so wenig ein Unmittelbares und Alltägliches und schon durch eine schlichte "Epoché" des ersten Anfanges zu Gewinnendes, dass sie vor der Einführung der eigentümlichen Methode der phänomenologischen Epoché überhaupt nicht möglich war. Demnach musste der phänomenologisch sich Einstellende erst sehen lernen, Übung gewinnen und in der Übung zunächst eine rohe und schwankende, dann immer bestimmtere Begrifflichkeit von seinem und Anderer Eigenwesentlichem erwerben. Eine wahre Unendlichkeit von deskriptiven Phänomenen wird dadurch erst allmächlich sichtlich, und zwar in der stärksten und unbedingtesten aller Evidenzen, in der Evidenz dieser allen echten "inneren Erfahrung" (Hua VI, 251 (emphases mine)). 214 about the radically other character of phenomenological inquiry. This otherness of phenomenological reflection consists in its being essentially artificial (künstlich) – a term Husserl employs in order to distinguish it from the natural attitude of everyday experience1 and the positive sciences. The natural attitude – whether scientific or everyday – is essentially (directly or indirectly) bound to perceptual consciousness and its motivation and teleology (i.e., the preservation or regaining of epistemic certainty with respect to the ontic status of objects as real and present).2 Husserl's concept of protodoxa3 captures the core of this attitude. This is, in my opinion, the main insight that led him away from Brentano's empiricism, which relied on natural consciousness and the ensuing system of methodological possibilities. Brentano's failure to expose the horizonal, nexic, and layered character of consciousness (due to his act-additive model of founding and the overlooking of modification as organizing principle of consciousness) led to viewing consciousness solely under its natural guise. This, in its turn, foreclosed an entire array of possibilities translatable into methodological tools. Such missed possibilities include the intending and intuiting of non-real objects (irreal and ideal), the free variation pertaining to imagining (instead of the bound vacillation – or momentary doubt – typical of the realizing attitude), and any thought that is completely neutral with respect to doxic claims about the ontic status of the object. Instead, Brentano's method of abstraction relied heavily on structural consciousness possibilities such as simplification, comparison, association, composition, which, under the aegis of realizing motivations and teleology, remained fundamentally tied to the natural and the particular. Uncovering universal truths about subjectivity regardless of any of its concrete 1 Including anywhere from simple external perceptions to value judgments directly or indirectly founded upon these perceptions 2 For an extensive discussion of perceptual consciousness see Chapter 1. 3 Husserl discusses the notion of protodoxa (Urdoxa) extensively extensively in his Ideas I as well as his lectures on passive synthesis (cf., Hua XI). Cf., Ghigi (2005). 215 instantiations was, as Husserl rightly saw, not something Brentano's descriptive psychology could achieve. As the above-passages suggest, the artificial, radically other than the natural, is the product of a (willed) project that explicitly goes against the familiar (i.e., that which comes to us effortlessly). This does not surprise us in so far as Husserl's explicitly stated philosophical goal of questioning any engrained presuppositions has always taken center stage. We are also not surprised to learn that the move to the artificial, to that which is able to question what we so seamlessly taken for granted, is an arduous task – one extremely taxing on our ability to distance ourselves from the comfort of our thinking habits. What does, however, catch us unawares is Husserl's suggestion that we are not only essentially capable of this reflective move but that it follows from what is structurally essential to consciousness. Entering the phenomenological attitude through the reductions and sustaining the multiple-layer brackets throughout our eidetic analyses is something we will and carve but also something stemming from the very 'nature' of our consciousness: "Auf eine solche neue Einstellung, die in gewissem Sinn sehr natürlich, aber nicht natural ist, haben wir es jetzt abgesehen. "Nicht natural", das sagt, dass das in ihr Erfahrene nicht Natur ist im Sinne aller Naturwissenschaften, sondern sozusagen ein Widerspiel der Natur. Selbstverständlich liegt die ganz ausnehmende Schwierigkeit, den Gegensatz nicht nur zu erfassen, sondern von innen her zu verstehen, nicht im Vollzug der Einstellungen."1 Indeed, the difficulty lies in understanding what the shift from the natural to the artificial entails 'from within' as well as clearly establishing the intricacies of their relationship. This is my goal in what follows: to uncover the structure and dynamic of this shift thus exposing not only some of the essential 1 Hua IV, p.180 216 characteristics of the artificial method1 but also the ways in which it is fundamentally related to the natural attitude. The key in achieving this goal lies in uncovering the system of possibilities stemming from the very structures of consciousness – this is what makes the artificial 'natural': the fact that methodological possibilities stem from the structures of consciousness – that they are grounded in what essentially describes consciousness. We ought to dispel an ambiguity here. The expression 'system of possibilities' refers to: 1) those possibilities directly expressed in and through the primary structures of consciousness, such as the common putting out of play of doxic claims in imagining alternatives to everyday scenarios or the free variation of imagining consciousness – i.e., the unbound 'running through' alternative scenarios when a most desirable and fitting option is sought; and 2) the methodological possibilities brought to the fore through a 'working of' (translation of) primary structures and possibilities, such as the reductions and eidetic variation. We begin to see now that while recognizing the horizonal, nexic, and layered structure of consciousness is necessary for our understanding of phenomenological reflection, it is not sufficient. An additional mapping of this consciousness on the natural vs. artificial attitude model is also required. Phenomenological reflection (as artificial) is bound by the fundamental structures of consciousness such as memorial and modality modifications, and most importantly, by radical modifications, such as Phantasiemodifikation, able to trigger the shift from one level of consciousness to another.2 Husserl indeed recognized this 'binding' relation between the structure of consciousness and reflective possibilities (natural or artificial); despite this, however, he did not explicitly explore the significance of 1 Chapter 6 will focus on the technical discussion of the reductions and of eidetic variation. 2 The radical modification relocates these other modifications qua organizing principles (e.g., memorial and modality modifications) along with all of the noeses (i.e., reell consciousness structures such as act characters and their contents) and noemata (i.e., the corresponding non-reell objects 'as meant' of noeses) governed by these non-radical modifications). 217 Phantasiemodifikation for his methodological reflection:1 "The variety of the possible directions in which our glance can turn belongs essentially to the manifold of mutually related and reciprocally grounded intentionalities, and wherever we find analogous groundings – and in what follows we shall get to know many more of quite another kind – there arise analogous possibilities of a change of reflection."2 While we previously focused on the need to distinguish between the natural and the artificial attitudes given our interest in the beginnings of Husserl's phenomenological project, we now maintain the focus on this difference as well as complement it with our attempt to uncover the relationship between the two attitudes. As already mentioned, this interest need not be viewed as a departure from orthodoxy but rather an attempt to clarify the convoluted methodological processes at work in phenomenological analysis. The reasons for this interest in emphasizing the relation between the natural and the artificial will soon be exposed in the context of our technical analyses of the reductions and eidetic variation. For now, let us note that it was never Husserl's intention to divorce phenomenology from the everyday.3 In seeking to clarify the nature of bracketing or suspension as a process opening new inquiring possibilities, Husserl writes in his Ideas I: "This suspension has also the character of a change of indicator which alters the value of that to which the indicator refers, but if this change of indicator be reckoned in, that whose value it serves to alter is thereby reinstated within the phenomenological sphere. Or to put it metaphorically: the bracketed matter is not wiped off 1 He spoke clearly about the significance of memorial and modality modifications, as well as associational and attentional modifications in his Ideas I and Hua XI for philosophical and scientific reflection. 2 Ideas I, p.272; Husserl's emphasis. "Diese Mannigfaltigkeit der möglichen Blickrichtungen gehört wesentlich zur Mannigfaltigkeit aufeinander bezogener und ineinander fundierter Intentionalitäten, und wo immer wir analoge Fundierungen finden – und im folgenden werden wir noch manche ganz andersartige kennenlernen – stellen sich analoge Möglichkeiten wechselnder Reflexion heraus" (Hua III/1, §101, p.237). Cf., also Hua I, pp.83-84, and Hua IV, p.312 3 Unfortunately such crass misunderstandings of the reductions and their purpose have subsequently led to unwarranted claims about Husserl's transcendental idealism or about his notion of constitution as mark of covert types of nominalism and foundationalism. 218 the phenomenological slate but only bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of the inquiry."1 Our discussion of the primacy of perception as direct genuine intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung), able to directly access the world as real makes a strong case for Husserl's realism.2 This is an important step in what I believe is the right direction; what also needs to be acknowledged is the role of this realism in Husserl's method of inquiry.3 Understanding what becomes available to the phenomenologist post-reductions – what is given and what is taken in light of the bracketing of natural attitude and its correlates – is an important step toward clarifying the perplexing nature of eidetic variation: the main tool through which phenomenological knowledge is harnessed. §1! . Transcendental Reflection and the Demands of Ideation The meanings of the terms 'artificial' and 'natural' undergo gradual modifications from the Investigations onward given the shifts in emphasis in his project as well as his microphenomenological discoveries. What is discussed in Chapter 4 under the heading 'idealizing abstraction' (ideirende Abstraktion) – Husserl's early method of universalizing (i.e., eidetic) inquiry put forth in 1900/01 (and meant to permit the analysis of the reell structures of intentional acts) – is the artificial method of act-descriptive phenomenology. The transcendental apparatus consisting of the reductions and eidetic variation (in both their static and genetic variations) is likewise artificial. The structure of the artificial attitude morphs 1 Ideas I, p.194; Boyce Gibson translation, modified. "Die Ausschaltung hat zugleich den Charakter einer unwertenden Vorzeichenänderung, und mit dieser ordnet sich das Umgewertete wieder der phänomenologischen Sphäre ein. Bildlich gesprochen: Das Eingeklammerte ist nicht von der phänomenologischen Tafel weggewischt, sondern eben nur eingeklammert und dadurch mit einem Index versehen. Mit diesem aber ist es im Hauptthema der Forschung" (Hua III/1, §76, p.159). 2 Cf., Part I, Chapter 1 3 The role played by Phantasiemodifikation in the reductions as well as the role played by neutralized natural types in eidetic variation will hopefully make this abundantly clear. 219 over the course of Husserl's career1 – what he seeks to accomplish through his work and whatever insights he gains about consciousness (and its respective systems of possibilities) in his specific analytic endeavors reshape the structures and functioning of his methodological tools. What remains the same, regardless of changes in methodological structures and their pertaining modalities (i.e., possibilities), is his emphasis on the artificiality of the phenomenological method of inquiry. The relationship the artificial has to the natural likewise undergoes modifications;2 a telling example is the shift in Husserl's thought from solely focusing on reell structures to investigating experience through the constituting correspondence between the reell and the non-reell (i.e., noesis and noema).3 This is a shift from primarily labeling the lived intentional acts as 'natural' to expanding the term such that it covers the unfolding act, its meant transcendent object, as well as, most importantly, the constitutive intentional relationship between them.4 What is significant about this example is the fact that the modified natural (i.e., the artificial) as starting point for the phenomenological investigation and the method itself undergo these modifications in a parallel manner.5 The most efficient way of capturing this parallelism (or correspondence) is to clarify the status and nature of the modified natural once the reductions are performed and the realizing-positional epistemic structures are left behind. What does this transformation of the natural entail for our inquiring possibilities and 1 Part II as a whole will clearly exhibit these shifts in what the 'artificial' entails for Husserl at different points throughout his career. 2 To avoid confusion: the term is used here in a non-technical manner. 3 We shall have ample opportunity to discuss the status of the noema in Chapter 6. For now, I shall label it negatively as non-reell in order to signify that it is not structurally a part (or as Husserl unfortunately likes to refer to 'part' as 'content') of consciousness proper. 4 As we shall see in the case of genetic eidetic variation, Husserl later comes to further refine this model by recognizing that constitution is bi-directional – consciousness and noeses are constitutive as well as constituted through their intentional relation to their noemata. This translates at the level of the 'natural': the empirical subject carves its world by giving it meaning and is, in its turn, carved and granted meaning in and through its interaction with this everyday, cultural, social, political, and historical world. 5 Another way of formulating this would be to stress that the noetic-noematic relation describes all forms of consciousness, including artificial methodological ones. 220 what does it mean to say, with Husserl, that the world and our lived experiences retain all of their complexity and richness? In other words – phenomenological reflection as artificial descriptive analysis is itself a specific type of consciousness, marked by specific qualities and attitudes; as such, it has its own correlate (object) and its unfolding, and as in the case of all intentional acts, entails the forming and uncovering of meaning. What is the status of these objects? What kind of meaning comes to the fore through this phenomenological analytic work? If these objects and meanings are themselves artificial, to what extent then are they telling of the lived experience and its world? The answer to these questions will fully come to light in Chapter 6. Our task here is to uncover the overarching structure and conditions for the possibility of the shift from the natural (non-theoretical, non-methodological) attitude and its objects to the phenomenological attitude and its correlates. I have already alluded to transcendental phenomenological reflection as different from Husserl's early act-descriptive approach. While some may qualify this difference as stark, a close reading of the Logical Investigations reveals that despite the lack of an explicit mentioning of the phenomenological or eidetic reductions, Husserl's subtle and detailed analyses of reell structures – whose results he upheld and reincorporated in his transcendental investigations1 – rely on an implicit bracketing of the realizing-positional attitude2 (an attitude he later came to fully uncover in his studies of perception and passive synthesis). What essentially distinguishes the transcendental method from Husserl's method in 1900/01 is the focus on the correspondence (i.e., structural pairing or parallelism) of the reell and non- 1 In Ideas I (cf., §§88, 133) he maintained the validity of his insights with respect to quality (i.e., positional attitude), quality (act-character), matter (Materie), Stoff or sensible content (Inhalt). He claims, in 1913 and onward, that these structures could be easily transposed from the reell or noetic level to the non-reell and noematic level. Husserl's covert claim here is that the results and insights obtained in 1900/01 in a non-transcendental manner hold because they were gained through a method unmarked by realizing presuppositions – a method that necessarily relied on the reductions. 2 Cf., LU, Vol. II, Introduction, §3 (and extensive quote above) 221 reell – here the noesis and the noema.1 Consciousness (i.e., modified consciousness explored through the lens of the reductions) is analyzed on the transcendental model in and through its essential intentional and constitutive relation to the object, whose reality and actuality are put out of play. In the reduced artificial attitude the experiences under investigation are all described through this noetic-noematic structural pairing:2 The reference to the phenomenological reduction, and similarly to the pure sphere of experience as 'transcendental,' depends precisely on our finding in this reduction an absolute sphere of materials and noetic forms, to whose interlacings, nicely articulated in accord with an immanent essential necessity, belongs this wonderful conscious possession of something definitely or definably given in such and such a way, standing over against consciousness itself as in principle other, irreal, transcendent; and it rests on the recognition that here is the ultimate source for the only conceivable solution of the deepest problems of objectively valid knowledge of the transcendent.3 This transcendental approach entails, among other things, a doubling of structures and their systems of possibilities: one pertaining to the noesis and the other to 1 For a thorough discussion of the status of the noema, see Drummond & Embree (1992). 2 The reasons for this shift from focusing solely on the structures of acts to focusing on the structure of experience as entailing the correspondence between act and its object are many. We could mention here as essential two moments that marked this development between the publication of the Investigations and Husserl's Ideas I: 1) his studies of spatiality and perception in his 1907 Göttingen lectures (along with the five-lecture series now published as The Idea of Phenomenology (Hua II), which functioned as an introduction to the 1907 spatiality lecture); through these analyses Husserl first comes to realize the significance of his concept of constitution. And 2) his 1906/07 lectures on logic and theory of knowledge (Hua 24) triggered by what he describes in 1906 in his personal records (Persönliche Aufzeichnungen, ed. Walter Biemel and published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVI (1956), pp. 293-302) as a 'crisis' – one triggered by the core problem of knowledge: how through subjective processes knowledge about that which is radically other is gathered with validity (see quote above). We saw that in his Investigations the problem that concerned Husserl the most was finding a way to apodictically establish our ability to intend as well as intuit ideal/universal objects. While this issue remained central for him throughout his career – much of what he seeks to accomplish in his later programmatic texts stems from his resolute interest in his idealism, the issue of the conditions for the possibility of objective knowledge (even if only provisional realizing-positional knowledge) gradually emerges as equally important around 1906. A careful reading of his lecture manuscripts from this period reveals an increased interest in Carteasian and Kantian topics and language. 3 Ideas I, p.263. "Die Bezeichnung der phänomenologischen Reduktion und im gleichen der reinen Erlebnissphäre als 'transzendentaler' beruht gerade darauf, dass wir in dieser Reduktion eine absolute Sphäre von Stoffen und noetischen Formen finden, zu deren bestimmt gearteten Verflechtungen nach immanenter Wesensnotwendigkeit dieses wunderbare Bewussthaben eines so und so gegebenen Bestimmten oder Bestimmtbaren gehört, das dem Bewusstsein selbst ein Gegenüber, ein prinzipiell Anderes, Irreelles3, Transzendentes ist, und das hier die Urquelle ist für die einzig denkbare Lösung der tiefsten Erkenntnisprobleme, welche Wesen und Möglichkeit objektiv gültiger Erkenntnis von Transzendentem betreffen" (Hua III/1, §97, p.228; Husserl's emphasis). 222 the noema. These structures and their possibilities correspond to each other at all levels.1 The distinction between doxic and ontic modalities that we discussed extensively in Part I of this project could be easily mapped onto this parallelism: doxic modalities (e.g., assuming/annehmen) pertain to noetic structures and their possibilities (such as feasible founded links between acts of assumption and acts of doubting or negating) while ontic modalities (e.g., being-assumed) pertain to the noematic structures and their possibilities (such as feasible founded links between noemata of assumption and noemata exhibiting characters of being-doubted or being-negated).2 In Ideas I Husserl emphatically stresses the importance of not only recognizing the doubling of the objects under investigation (i.e., noesis-noema), but also of the doubling of the eidetic analysis itself.3 What then are the demands of transcendental ideation? Wherein lie the differences between act-descriptive idealizing abstraction and transcendental ideation? The answer to the second question is by now broadly clear. The reductions, the noetic-noematic correspondence and the respective doubling of eidetic analysis, and eidetic variation described by Husserl as the move from the variant to the invariant suffice as distinguishing marks of transcendental 1 Chapter 6 will explore the part-whole parallel structures of noeses and noemata. As we shall see Husserl successfully applied the principle of founding (Fundierung) to describe the complexity and richness of both of these structures: the act and its intended/meant object. It is important to note here that as we saw in the case of realizing positional as well as imagining non-positional consciousness in Part I, Fundierung can collaborate with various kinds of non-radical modifications (such as memorial and modality) as well as radical modifications as Phantasiemodifikation. Thus far, this latter has been the only radical modification we discussed. In what follows I will introduce two more radical modifications that occur specifically in the artificial attitude – one in the context of the reductions and the other in the context of eidetic variation. 2 This doubling of possibilities will become central in our attempt to clarify the structure of eidetic variation and its noema. 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §98. As we shall see in Chapter 6, this 1913 static transcendental position of a parallel/double eidetic investigations (one focusing on the noesis and one on the noema) is rethought later in his genetic transcendental approach. I will argue that instead of understanding eidetic variation as a doubling qua mirroring (which entails a sense of fragmentation and distance between the two analyses), the genetic model is far more successful in clarifying the process of ideation as a doubling qua co-variation – a model of investigation in which the two analyses do not simply mirror each other but rather affect each other. This co-affecting is something we witness occurring on the genetic model also between noesis and noema on the one hand and reell and non-reell on the other and between consciousness and its object and subjectivity and the world as transcendent. 223 reflection.1 Husserl's account of transcendental ideation (in both its static and genetic forms) allows for a much more robust model of phenomenological reflection. By 'phenomenological reflection' I mean both the reductions and variation (or ideation). As we shall see in Chapter 6, phenomenological reflection also includes post-ideation/post-eidetic intuition processes that facilitate the accumulation, adaptation, and transmission of eidetic knowledge both within a single phenomenologist's career and in the context of a community of thinkers (phenomenologists as well as those otherwise philosophically or theoretically inclined). As the above passage clearly shows (despite the shift to viewing reduced consciousness in its relation to the objective), the goal of idealization or genuine universalizing thought of the Investigations remains: to grasp and bring to adequate apodictic intuition the ideal essential structures of experience2. There are two fundamental demands of Husserlian phenomenological reflection: its goal (i.e., the attainment of eidetic intuition) and the ground from which the process seeking to attain this goal draws its sustenance. The formulation of these two demands receives in Ideas I a modal flavor. This modal angle – liminal in the Investigations – takes center stage here. There are several reasons for this, all of which will soon be thoroughly discussed. The ideal or universal structures of consciousness and its object are seen as being essential necessities as well as ideal possibilities.3 The ideals sought through phenomenological reflection are such necessities and ideal possibilities. The former term refers to the apodictic status of the ideal structures – they could not be otherwise. The latter 1 The introduction of the various notions of the ego (transcendental ego, the ego pole) is interpreted by most as the essential shift away from act-descriptive phenomenology. My views on this front are somewhat different on this front than what is commonly exhibited in the literature. I will say more about this in Chapter 6. For now it will suffice to say that I consider the unity of consciousness secured by organizing structuring principles such as temporality, founding, and modification. An ex nihilo positing of an ego as unifying counterpart of the object and its unity adds nothing to what Husserl's consciousness does not already exhibit. 2 "Experience" on Husserl's transcendental model entails the noetic-noematic pairing. 3 See quote above; also, cf., Hua III/1, §§46-47 224 term captures the relation between ideal structures and their individualizations (Vereinzelungen); these individualizations could occur at any of the non-ideal levels of consciousness-object relation:1 the realizing positional (in which case we would be dealing with concrete actualities or real possibilities) or at the imagining non-positional level (the level of indeterminate instantiations understood as irreal free possibilities):2 But if we can subject the forms under which our experience is inwardly lived, and in particular the basic experience of the perception of things to an eidetic study, looking out for their essential necessities and possibilities (as we can obviously do), and on these lines also eidetically track down the modifications of empirical connections that are essentially possible with their motivations: 'the real world,' as it is called, the correlate of our factual experience, then presents itself as a special case of various possible worlds and non-worlds, which, on their side, are no other than correlates of the essentially possible variations of the idea 'empirical consciousness,' with more or less orderly empirical connections.3 Given the central demands of transcendental ideation, the question becomes: What secures the successful attainment of the goal? What are the conditions for the possibility of engaging in such subjective eidetic descriptive-analytic projects?4 If the ideal is to be understood as ideal possibility and essential necessity, what allows for the success of eidetic modal thought? My answer is the same here as it was in Chapter 4 in my discussion of the 1 As such, we need to distinguish between real and irreal individualizations – the former are concrete and bear the marks of the protodoxic motivations behavior of realizing consciousness; the latter are indeterminate free, neutral possibilities. Nevertheless, despite this radical difference between them, as non-ideal they are both structurally and modally bound by the structure and the system of possibilities of the ideal. 2 Each of these levels (the realizing positional and the imagining non-positional) can be translated from the natural attitude to the artificial attitude of methodological inquiry. In Chapter 6 I will argue that Husserl's notion of types or concrete universals passively or actively formed in the natural realizing positional attitude can undergo the reductions as artificial non-positional modifications thus attaining artificial status and aiding/guiding the process of variation. Through the same non-positional reductive modifications, the free imagining possibilities attained through Phantasiemodifikation in the natural attitude become the artificial non-positional irreal variants through which variation unfolds. 3 Ideas I, p.134; italics mine. "Können wir aber die Erlebnisarten der Erfahrung und insbesondere das Grunderlebnis der Dingwahrnehmung einer eidetischen Betrachtung unterziehen, ihnen Wesensnotwendigkeiten und Wesensmöglichkeiten absehen (wie wir es offenbar können), demnach auch die wesensmöglichen Abwandlungen motivierter Erfahrungszusammenhänge eidetisch verfolgen: dann ergibt sich das Korrelat unserer faktischen Erfahrung, gennant "die wirkliche Welt", als Spezielfall mannigfaltiger möglicher Welten und Unwelten, die ihrerseits nichts anderes sind als Korrelate wesensmöglicher Abwandlungen der Idee "erfahrendes Bewusstsein" mit mehr oder minder geordneten Erfahrungszusammenhängen" (Hua III/1, §47, p.100; Husserl's emphasis; italics mine). 4 As already mentioned in Part I, eidetic projects can be objective in character also – mathematical inquiries fall in this category. In Chapter 6 I will discuss the essential aspects and structures of eidetic variation. Through this I will stress its uniqueness and specific appurtenance to phenomenological reflection as Husserl conceived it. 225 possibility of idealizing abstraction: Phantasiemodifikation and the overall structure, possibilities, and dimensions of non-positional imagining consciousness. The extensive and axial role played by the imagination in transcendental ideation, which includes both the reductions and eidetic variation, will far surpass the technical clarifications of Chapter 4. The reasons for this are the complexity and detailed account of the transcendental method put forth by Husserl in 1913 and onward as well as the significant discoveries Husserl made about imagining consciousness between 1904 and 1924.1 The main claim and argument I thus now turn to here and in Chapter 6 is that imagining consciousness facilitates entering into the phenomenological transcendental attitude and that ideational reflection relies heavily on Phantasiemodifikation.2 Phantasie will emerge as the facilitator of the shift from the natural to the artificial as well as the driving force behind ideation in its attempt to reach its goal of eidetic intuition. We commence here a technical and focused, detailed discussion of Husserl's method of phenomenological reflection. My hope, however, as shall be expounded in closing this project and looking forward beyond its disciplinary boundaries, is that what we learn here about the imagination, about universalizing thought, and about their relationship could be relocated in the context of other theoretical fields – eidetic or positive, philosophical or scientific. Simply put: as I explore the intricate structure of ideation I also aim at gaining new and exciting insights about the nature of theoretical and inquiring thought beyond fieldspecific parameters and requirements. 1 There are some traces of these latter insights in the Investigations, as for instance Husserl's notion of qualitative modification, which he later comes to identify with Phantasiemodifikation. 2 Phantasiemodifikation is at once the essential mark of natural imagining consciousness and, along with timeconsciousness, founding, and epistemic-ontic modalization, one of the primary structuring principles of consciousness as a whole. 226 §2. Phantasiemodi f ikat ion and The Roots of Theoretical Inquiring Consciousness Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we 'direct' ourselves to the perceiving itself and to its perceptual directedness to the house. In the natural reflection of everyday life, also however in that of psychological sciences (that is, in psychological experience of our own psychic processes), we stand on the footing of the world already fiven as existing – as when, in everyday life, we assert: 'I see a house there' or 'I remember having heard this melody'. In transcendental-phenomenological reflection we deliver ourselves from this footing, by universal epochê with respect to the being or non-being of the world.1 What Husserl identifies here as the 'universal epochê' marks the distinction between the natural-everyday and artificial-phenomenological reflection. What the reductions succeed in securing for the latter mode of reflection is ontic-doxic as well as protodoxic epistemic neutrality. This bracketing ability of the phenomenological reductions2 stems from neutrality, freedom, and irreal possibility as essential dimensions of imagining consciousness. Before we delve into the argument for this claim, let us revisit some of the core points I made in Part I about the structure and possibilities of imagining consciousness as well as about its relation to theoretical and inquiring thought broadly construed. These points are of crucial importance in our clarifying the modal character of Husserl's method. 1 CM, p.34. "Geradehin wahrnehmend erfassen wir etwa das Haus und nicht etwa das Wahrnehmen. In der Reflexion erst richten wir uns auf dieses selbst und sein wahrnehmungsmässiges Gerichtet-sein auf das Haus. In der natürlichen Reflexion des Alltagslebens, aber auch der psychologischen Wissenschaft (also der psychologischen Erfahrung von den eigenen psychischen Erlebnissen) stehen wir auf dem Boden der als seined vorgegebenen Welt; wie wenn wir im alltäglichen Leben aussagen: 'Ich sehe dort ein Haus' oder 'Ich erinnere mich, diese Melodie gehört zu haben' usw. In der transzendental-phänomenologischen Reflexion entheben wir uns dieses Bodes durch die universale epochê hinsichtlich des Seins oder der Nichtseins der Welt" (Hua I, §15, p.72; Husserl's emphases). 2 I employ 'phenomenological reductions' here in a broad manner, as Husserl himself sometimes does, to refer to all of the specific reductions (epochê, eidetic, phenomenological, transcendental) 227 §2! . Phantasiemodi f ikat ion as Natural Radical Modification The Two Levels of the Natural Attitude: Perceptual and Imagining Consciousness As we saw in Chapter 1, Husserl first attempted to explore Phantasie in terms of physical imaging consciousness1 – this method, though effective in illuminating the ways in which the two are differently structured acts, led Husserl at times to unwarranted moves such as importing some of the aspects of physical imaging into what he considers imagination proper (reine Phantasie). The main challenge faced here was to avoid thinking the structure of Phantasie in terms of mental images somehow 'in' consciousness. Sartre refers to this error in his Imaginary as the 'illusion of immanence'. Husserl's phenomenological instincts kept him from falling into this trap, but he occasionally relapsed and used what I referred to as 'Bildterminology' in analyzing immanent Phantasie. Even though he did not think there were mental images 'in' consciousness, nevertheless, the language and concepts that he employed made the matter confusing. He eventually successfully distanced himself from this way of describing Phantasie and settled for another, better approach – he focused on the differences and similarities between Phantasie as presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) and perception as presentation (Gegenwärtigung).2 This juxtaposition proved far more fruitful since the two acts are radically distinct and one is less in danger of superimposing some of their sub-structures. It also uncovered much about what I referred to as the two equiprimordial levels or types of consciousness: the realizing positional (perceptual) and the imagining non-positional, which are both natural. Our current attempt to understand the structure and system of possibilities of the Husserlian transcendental method (as artificial) hinges upon clarifying its relation to 1 I distinguish between 'physical imaging consciousness' and 'imagining consciousness' – the former is the equivalent of Husserl's Bildbewusstsein and the latter is that of Phantasie or reine Phantasie, which does not occur in the context of perceiving pictures. 2 For further discussions of the Phantasie-perception juxtaposition, see Fernández-Beites (2000), Eliott (2002), and Jansen (2005). 228 natural consciousness (and its structure and system of possibilities). It is my contention that this relation unfolds through non-positional imagining consciousness. Let us stress once more the essential structures and core dimensions of these two radically different natural equiprimordial levels of consciousness (one granting access to the real and the actual, the other to the irreal and the freely possible). Perception is the basic intentional act that not only gives access to the world as real and actual, but also gathers content that, once modified, functions at the level of other intentional acts. Perception offers an intuition of objects as present, or as Husserl refers to this – in propria persona1. For this reason, perception is a form of presentation. Phantasie is also an intentional act, but it functions in a radically different way than perception – it does not give access to the world as real and actual, i.e., as present. Phantasie makes present that which is non-present. It is important to note that Phantasie has a fundamentally different kind of object and moreover it gives this object in a radically different way than perception as presentation does. Unlike perception, Phantasie is a form of presentification.2 The imagined object (or possibility) is given 'as if' it were present and real and not merely in the sense of a past or future real object as in the case of memory and expectation.3 There are therefore two types of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) and two corresponding types of 'as if' – the 'as if' of Phantasie bears the mark of irreal non-presence whereas the 'as if' of any positional presentification refers to a non-presence tightly bound to reality (past or future). Phantasie 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.16-18 2 Memory and expectation are also presentifying acts, but there is one significant difference between them and Phantasie. The latter's object is given as non-present, however, this non-presence is not directly rooted in reality, it is (as Husserl repeatedly stresses) an irreal non-presence. The objects of memory and expectation are also given as non-present, but they are directly linked to reality – memory is memory of objects once given as real, and expectation is of objects that are anticipated to be given as real. 3 Cf., Hua XI, 182, and Hua XXIII, No.4 229 appears to be our sole link to irreality – we have a consciousness of irreality only through imagining consciousness.1 Establishing the uniqueness of imagining consciousness is central to this project – as well as what Husserl means by the irreality of the imagined object. It is worth stressing that despite the differences between Phantasie and perception, they are not completely divorced. Modification implies a relation between them. This is critical in seeing how reality and irreality are connected, and most importantly, where phenomenological inquiry is to be located in terms of the reality-irreality relation. The analysis Husserl engages in by juxtaposing perception as presentation and Phantasie as presentification provides many insights.2 We have already seen that the former's object is given as present or in person, while the object of the imagination is given as non-present, absent, elsewhere, non-existent, or irreal. This sharp difference stresses the fact that one should not confuse the two by placing them on a continuum varying in degree only (pace Hume). The difference between them is not one of degree, but of kind, and this difference comes about through what Husserl refers to as modification. An example why one must think of presentation and presentification as being different modes of intentionality is the fact that under a 'difference of degree' scenario an act of judgment (presentation) and imagining an act of judgment (presentification) could not be distinguished. The imagined judgment is a modification of the actual judgment, i.e., it is given as irreal or as mere possibility rather than actuality.3 1 Cf., Hua XXXI, §3 2 Hua XXIII, No.1 (1904/05), chs. 5-9 3 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp. 96-98, No.2 a-d, and No.2f. Here we also see that Husserl's analysis challenges the traditional epistemological view of thinking about perception, imagination, understanding in terms of faculties or functions of faculties. Through phenomenological analysis it becomes evident that these intentional acts are fundamentally intertwined and cannot be neatly categorized on their own and strictly in their 'functioning'. The above-mentioned example suggests the possibility of 'thought in the imagining mode or attitude'. 230 Presentation gives access to the 'real' and the 'actual'. It involves the present temporal dimension and it offers a sense of spatial coherence and order made available through the simple apprehension of the act of perception. Perception, as presentation par excellence, is for Husserl the very core of realizing-positional consciousness.1 Judging or any other doxic act functions in strict cooperation with perception – their focus too is primarily on the real and the actual.2 Any act as consciousness of the real is a form of realizing and positional consciousness – i.e., its object is given and posited as real and actual, its apprehension is positioned (and hence individualized) in the overall stream of realizing consciousness.3 The positional consciousness of perception constitutes the world as real and actual. Constitution in the context of positional consciousness is therefore a realizing constitution4 – one that is motivated toward the attainment of knowledge and one that presupposes the being, truth, and actuality of objects. Realizing consciousness is positional with respect to being and reality and motivated toward the attainment of truth and knowledge. Positional passive consciousness is motivated in and through the protodoxa 5 – the goal is the attainment of knowledge, or fulfillment as confirmation (Bewahrheitung). Any disruption in the flow of expectation results in doubt, or what Husserl refers to as modalization or modality 1 Cf., Hua XI, §§1-4 2 Judgment can also intend ideal objectivities, such as mathematical objects. We must therefore distinguish between real, irreal, and ideal objects. At the level of passive synthesis objects are either real or irreal – such objects can also be intended at the level of active synthesis. Ideal objects are the focus of an active and conceptual ego and, as we shall soon see, the positionality of consciousness with respect to ideal objects is of a radically different kind than the positionality of the realizing consciousness of perception and of doxic acts related to it. I would like to distinguish here between realizing-positional consciousness and idealizing-positional consciousness. 3 Cf., Hua XI, §30; cf. also Seefelder Manuskripte über Individuation in Hua X, 237-268 4 Unlike realizing-positional consciousness, which involves realizing constitution, constitution in imaginingneutral consciousness implies no ontic claim – the objects and world brought forth are irreal rather than real. 5 Cf., Hua III/1, §§104,114; see also the extensive discussions in Hua XI and EU. 231 modification.1 A shift occurs from the blind belief in the existence and truth of the object – 'is it a wax figure or a real person?'2 The moment of such questioning is the moment of doubt. However, in positionalrealizing consciousness such doxic vacillation and uncertainty must be resolved. The motivational structure of consciousness has not changed despite modalization; the goal remains the attainment of knowledge and truth and the tendency toward certainty cannot be abated. Hence, doubt and questioning – even at the level of passivity (i.e., prior to any inquiry and judgment of the active ego) – are resolved either positively in terms of affirmation, or negatively in terms of negation: 'Yes, it is a wax figure and not a real person.' The allure (Reiz) of two competing beliefs and of two real possibilities in contest with each other demands resolution – one must be opted for in favor of the other in order to put to rest the disruption of the basic doxic (and ontic) modality.3 Such reinstatement of peace in the form of definitive or even temporary certainty is a relief that realizing-positional consciousness relentlessly covets.4 The regained doxic balance is no longer naïve but modified in terms of passive confirmation (Bewahrheitung) or active verification (Bewährung).5 The scope of realizing-positional consciousness reaches beyond the boundaries of presentation and includes positional presentifications such as memory, expectation, and empathy. The epistemic goal of positional motivation is therefore at work in memory and expectation. If memory and expectation occur in the context of imagining consciousness, the situation is radically different.6 We have two primordial types of natural consciousness or attitudes that extend across passivity and activity as synthetic levels: realizing-positional 1 Hua XI, §§5-15 2 Hua XXIII, p. 40ff., 48ff. 3 Hua XI, §§10-13; cf., also EU, §§21,74 4 Hua XI, §§8-9 5 Hua XI, §12; cf., also Hua XI, §§16-25 6 Hua XXIII, No.2, Appx.19; see also Hua III/1, §101 and §112 232 consciousness and imagining or neutral non-positional consciousness. Let us now turn to the latter. Presentification grasps its object as irreal, non-actual, absent, other, and even as nothing in so far as its lack of presence can imply non-being. We should distinguish between irreal objects and non-real objects – the former are given non-positionally in so far as there is no belief in their existence or non-existence. The latter are given in a context of realizing positionality – their givenness involves the belief in their lack of existence or being.1 An irreal object is not accessible within the realm of perception – the imagination alone can give access to it. We saw earlier what the difference between imagination, memory, and expectation was. It seems therefore that the imagination is the only way of accessing the irreal. Phantasie lets the irreal appear, and along with it, an entire field or horizon that is completely separate from the real and actual world of perception and presentation. This is not the case with physical imaging,2 because it involves perception and it opens the world of imaging at the very core of the real world; there is a different dynamic at work between these two fields. They could potentially come into conflict since they find 1 A (tentative) more nuanced approach to this ambiguity would be to distinguish between the imagined object which is intended and the imagined objet as it is intended. The object as it is intended may be given non-positionally as irreal (a possible object that may or may not exist, e.g., my idea of an ideal umbrella (I owe this example to Professor David Carr)), positionally as real (the Eiffel Tower while I am away from it), or positionally as non-real (a centaur). However, imagining is fundamentally non-positional, as Husserl repeatedly stresses – the object which is intended does not imply a sense of positionality – it is an irreal object, given without any assumptions with respect to its ontic status. Imagining consciousness is doxically neutral with respect to its objects. Husserl himself seems to suggest this approach in his 1907 Thing and Space lectures (cf., Hua XVI, Section I, §9, pp. 2325)). Another way of thinking about this difference would be in terms of possibility and impossibility. I may imagine an existing but absent object, a potentially existing object, or a non-existing object, and yet regardless of these ontic connotations the imagined object is always given or appears without my assuming any doxic stance with respect to its ontic status (cf., Hua XXIII, Nos. 12-14). We could however map these ontic dimensions onto various types of possibilities: the absent object exhibits real possibility whereas the non-existing object involves real impossibility; the potentially existing object entails irreal possibility proper since no ontic status is attached to it. Objects such as round squares are ideally impossible. 1 The Bildobjekt is at once given in and through perceptual intuition and points beyond the real toward the irreal image sujet. Irreality is at work in physical imaging, but its relation to reality is very different than that of imagining irreality in so far as it involves a sense of conflict and tension that is lacking in the latter. 2 The Bildobjekt is at once given in and through perceptual intuition and points beyond the real toward the irreal image sujet. Irreality is at work in physical imaging, but its relation to reality is very different than that of imagining irreality in so far as it involves a sense of conflict and tension that is lacking in the latter. 233 themselves in such close proximity. There is no equivalent ambiguity in the case of Phantasie. The world of the imagined object stands 'aloof' – it is a different horizon.1 This world of objects is independent of the real in so far as it opens up apart from it; but it nevertheless remains related to it through modification. The content (Phantasma) and apprehension of Phantasie are modifications of the content and apprehension of perception. The imagination does not therefore abide by the same rules that govern the world of presentation, and in this sense it is free and independent. But modification does not preclude the possibility of some rules' being carried over from the realm of presentation into that of imaginative presentification – the imagined judgment maintains its structure, and the thinking involved in unfolding it can be clear despite the fact that belief in the actuality and reality of the judgment has been suspended. Thinking in the horizon of imagination has its order and unity.2 Imagining an irreal object can also be consistent and stable. This characteristic of the imagination as independent from the real yet bound by it secures its relevance to the real. In other words, it can be at once free from the real and related to it. This ambiguity (i.e., its opening of a relation between the real and the irreal) reveals how the imagination can point to new possibilities that are not completely divorced from reality.3 Imagination is a unique kind of natural consciousness. The main dimensions of the imagination are manifested in the ways in which the intended object is given. Since the imagined object is characterized as irreal non-presence, consciousness as a whole relates differently to it – Phantasie consciousness is consciousness of non-present presence. The object is given as non-present, but the fact that it is given – the very apprehension and intuition of it – 1 Hua XXIII, No.1, p.58, No.1 Appx.9, and EU, §39 2 Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.98-99 3 Cf., EU, §74 234 is present and real (reell).1 As conscious intentional act imagining is not nothing – it simply points toward that which is irreal and not present; in other words, it points toward something freely possible rather than actual. Thus, imagining consciousness is linked to possibility since imagination is that through which conceiving the otherwise as a distancing from the real and the actual becomes feasible.2 As we have seen, imagining consciousness of non-presence is consciousness of irreality. In this sense, it is a consciousness that frees itself from the real and thus surpasses its boundaries. Imagination entails freedom from the present and the actual, from that which is given as familiar or granted as that which is the case; and freedom to engage in a different kind of inquiry and thought. Freedom and the possibility of conceiving the otherwise are two of the primary aspects or dimensions through which the imagination as the source of modality (as possibility) par excellence affects phenomenological inquiry.3 As we have seen, acts do not function solely in the context of realizing-positional consciousness, they can also occur within the context of imagining or non-positional and neutral consciousness. The nature of acts changes in imagining consciousness – their object is no longer given as real, actual, and present, rather it is now a non-present, irreal object. The existence or non-existence of the object is not posited.4 The protodoxa, along with its 1 This is another way in which imagination is between reality and irreality. 2 Hua XXIII, No.10, No.15i, No.19 3 The notion of freedom that I emphasize as stemming from Husserl's analyses of Phantasie is not the equivalent of Sartrean freedom, despite what may present itself as an obvious similarity. Freedom the absoluteness of choice stood at the center of Sartre's attempt to put forth an ontological phenomenology. This project is very different from Husserl's attempt to ground phenomenology in a freedom understood primarily as ability to renounce and bracket the natural or theoretical attitudes (along with their assumptions) in order to uncover other ways of grasping the real. 4 External perception locates or grants a positioning (Stellung) to transcendent objects within the objective spatio-temporal world (cf., Hua XI, §1). Spatio-temporal positioning (Stellung) is one of the main dimensions of perception as direct intuitive presentation. Related to positioning but different from it is the notion of positing (Setzung) – which is the belief qua certainty in the present existence and truth of the given object. Phantasie involves the positioning (Stellung) of its objects in the irreal spatio-temporal world and of their givenness in the overall flow of consciousness (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §§7, 35), but involves no positing (Setzung) as doxic and ontic modality (cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, §37). 235 strong motivational hold, are put out of play.1 Thus, imagining consciousness does not answer to the same teleological-epistemic framework that marks realizing-positional consciousness. Phantasie is epistemically non-motivational and non-teleological.2 Uncertainty does not pose a threat to imagining consciousness, and vacillation (doxic and ontic) occurs in a motivation-free context but unfolds in an organized, coherent and yet unhindered way. Husserl refers to this fluid imagining vacillation as free variation. We could consider positional vacillation, in so far as it is bound by realizing motivation, to be real variation. It may only engage real possibilities (enticing or problematic) – a limited array of options given the perceptual content, realizing expectation, and the context and nature of the intended object.3 Unlike real variation, free variation is not bound in the same way by perceptual content and is unmarked by the motivational structure of realizing-positional consciousness.4 The possibilities it engages are not real but irreal – no doxic claim is made with respect to their ontic status; they are therefore not simply more abundant than real possibilities, but they are of a radically different kind. Irreal possibilities are fundamentally characterized by the freedom to engage that which is other regardless of its ontic status. Irreal possibility is the very freedom of the imagining attitude to bring forth objects that would otherwise remain forever hidden.5 Realizing-positional consciousness, along with its strict dependence on perception, could never tap into the reservoir of irreal possibilities. The otherwise that we are 1 Cf., EU, §74; Hua XI, §17 and Appx.8 to sections §§24-25, 365 2 Cf., Hua XI, Appx 2 to §§8-11, 350-351; see also, Hua XXIII, No.10, No.15i, No.19 3 Husserl mentions a type of picturing (Ausmalung) in the context of realizing vacillation and expectation – different options are being considered or engaged in this picturing (cf., Hua XI, 79-82, 211ff.). However reine Phantasie, or imagination proper, is not the vehicle of such picturing; it is radically divorced from the real and the realizing attitude while Ausmalung is positional (cf., Hua XI, 97). I would suggest that any fulfillment of perception that appears to occur through imagining consciousness is actually a type of Ausmalung in so far as it is drastically bound by the parameters of perceptual contents, expectation and memory, and the motivation of perceptual consciousness. This does not imply that Phantasie cannot cooperate with the positional-realizing attitude. 4 Cf., Hua XI, §10; cf., also Hua III/1, §§23, 70 5 EU, §74; Hua XI, §10, and esp. Appx. 17 to §28, 403-404 236 here exploring is not the otherwise of real possibility.1 It is the otherwise of irreal possibility, which lies beyond the reach of realizing motivation. The distinction between real and irreal possibility, along with that between real and free variation, are of the utmost importance if we are to understand how eidetic thought and inquiry can focus on ideal objects qua ideal possibilities and seek to attain them through modal (possibility-centered) eidetic variation. There is a parallel and a relation between real, irreal, and ideal possibility on the one hand, and real, free, and eidetic variation on the other. Chapter 6 will show that their relation is dependent upon the negative and positive freedom of Phantasie and that phenomenological analysis and inquiry via eidetic variation are fueled by this freedom that manifests itself in terms of engaging irreal possibilities through a modified free variation.2 §2! . Theoretical Inquiring Thought: Surpassing the Limits of the Natural Attitude The nexic, horizonal, and layered character of realizing positional and imagining nonpositional consciousness came to light in Chapter 4 in our discussion of founding (Fundierung) and radical modification (Modifikation). We established there the significance of this insight for idealizing abstraction (ideirende Abstraktion) as phenomenological method of inquiry. As genuine universalizing thought – i.e., able to go beyond the particular and the actual in a manner completely unbound by it – abstraction required the shift to nonpositional consciousness and irreal objects as free possibilities. The possibility of intending and intuiting ideals stems from this layered structure of consciousness, which Brentano failed to identify. The dire consequences of this failure for the latter's philosophical method have been emphatically stressed. Phantasiemodifikation emerged as a radical type of modification – one able to relocate an entire horizon and nexus of acts (i.e., noeses) along with 1 I expect the apple, which appears red from this side, to be red all over; I turn it and discover that instead of red the apple appears to have a green half. The green is here the otherwise (cf., Hua XI, 189). 2 Hua XI, Appx. 17 to §28, 403-404 237 their meant objects (i.e., noemata) from one level to another.1 However, while recognizing the importance of the shift from realizing positionality to non-positionality (along with the horizonal, nexic, and layered structure of consciousness) is doubtlessly crucial for our discussion of method, our investigation cannot stop here. This radical shift initially occurs in the natural attitude – a non-methodological, nontheoretical attitude whose motivational and teleological structure does not entail fulfillment as eidetic intuition (i.e., the grasp of ideal objects or essences). What must be uncovered if we are to fully expose the nature of Husserlian phenomenological reflection is the shift from the natural, everyday, non-theoretical attitude to the artificial, methodological attitude aiming at objects utterly unavailable in the former's epistemic structure. The natural realizing positional attitude (perceptual) cannot trigger and sustain this shift. To uncover the conditions for the possibility of this shift – it, too, radical like Phantasiemodifikation in so far as it implies relocating noeses and noemata at a new level of consciousness2 – we must look elsewhere. Natural realizing positional consciousness (which intends and intuits objects as either actual and real concrete singularities or real and actualizable possibilities bound by concrete past and present contexts) cannot surpass itself. It cannot engage and expose the otherwise and the unfamiliar. When conflict occurs at this level and the expected epistemic order is disrupted, the solution is sought not beyond the parameters of actuality and its expectations, but within this limited sphere or factual knowledge (essentially unstable and incomplete3). 1 Memorial, modality, or attentional modifications are not radical because the shifts they entail occur within the same horizonal level. They are able to structurally cooperate with radical modifications such as Phantasiemodifikation – once the radical modification completes the shift to non-positionality, the abovementioned modificatios can occur at the new level. 2 We will soon have ample opportunity to compare Phantasiemodifikation as radical and the shift to the artificial as radical. 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §27 238 As eidetic theoretical inquiry, phenomenological reflection must find a way of exposing the ideal and essential structures of consciousness and its correlates beyond their concrete and singular instantiations (Vereinzelungen).1 It must find a path consisting in a teleological flow of special kind of possibilities – non-real possibilities able to disclose ideal possibilities. To succeed, the phenomenological inquiring attitude must undergo a modification in 'sight'; it must look at (and beyond) that which is initially given as concrete and singular and identify that which is essential and universal – i.e., shared by and binding of all concrete instantiations: What makes the appropriation of the essential nature of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar meaning of its form of inquiry, and its relation to all other sciences (to psychology in particular) so extraordinarily difficult, is that in addition to all other adjustments a new way of looking at things is necessary, one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought. To move freely along this new way without reverting to the old viewpoints, to learn to see what stands before our eyes, to distinguish, to describe, calls, moreover, for exacting and laborious studies.2 Not all theoretical inquiry is eidetic in Husserl's strict sense of the term – for one, not all sciences focus entirely on the essential and universal; secondly, 'theoretical' is primarily explanatory in the case of the positive sciences whereas phenomenology is fundamentally descriptive and non-explanatory3 (i.e., not interested in causal accounts in its analyses). Nevertheless, positive sciences whose investigations are tightly bound to (and by) the realizing positional natural consciousness and its objects likewise require a 'distancing' 1 Cf., Ms.D8 (1918) 2 Ideas I, p.39. "In der Tat, das macht die Zueignung des Wesens der Phänomenologie, das Verständnis des eigentümlichen Sinnes ihrer Problematik und ihres Verhältnisses zu allen anderen Wissenschaften (und insbesondere zur Psychologie) so ausserörderlich schwierig, dass zu alledem eine neue, gegenüber der natürlichen Erfahrungsund Denkeinstellungen völlig geänderte Weise der Einstellung nötig ist. In ihr, ohne jeden Rückfall in die alten Einstellungen, sich frei bewegen, das vor Augen Stehende sehen, underscheiden, beschreiben zu lernen, erfordert zudem eigene und mühselige Studien" (Hua III/1, p.5; Husserl's emphasis). 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §§28, 30, 55. Positive scientific theories are, in Husserl's view, marred with presuppositions stemming from the natural realizing attitude. This, too, along with ideation and description, is a distinguishing feature of phenomenological reflection as theoretical thought. Chapter 6 will reveal why this mode of reflection should still be labeled as 'theory' – the most important reason being the fact that the 'thesis' of phenomenological thought is positional: eidetically positional. It claims the ideality and universal validity of its intuited objects (i.e., essences or ideals). 239 from the actual and the real in their attempt to causally explain it. I hope that my current project, despite its focus on Husserlian phenomenology, opens new ways of understanding positive scientific theoretical thought through the lens of imagining consciousness. This 'distancing' in phenomenological reflection requires engaging the same objects given in the natural realizing non-theoretical attitude in a manner able to unravel the essential structures and laws binding them. This manner necessarily entails turning our attention to the freely possible rather than the actual and its pertaining real possibilities, which are bound by local concrete contexts and expectations. The move to grasping the genuinely universal relies on indeterminacy understood both as the negative freedom from the concrete and singular and the positive freedom to conceive the otherwise (the unfamiliar that structurally free from concrete expectations yet still bound by the same ideal or essence concretely manifested in the real and particular at hand). It would seem that we would have to know what we are looking for (i.e., the ideal) before we actually find it – a Socratic conundrum? We will deal with this apparent petitio principii problem in our discussion of eidetic variation. For now let us stress the shift to the artificial as a 'freeing of possibilities' from the ontic and epistemic demands of the natural realizing positional attitude. The free conception of the otherwise entails an initial negative freedom from the ontic demands of perceptual consciousness. To foreshadow our discussion of the reductions: they will have to exhibit both of these moments – the negative as well as the positive freedom. This free conception will intend and intuit its objects as free possibilities (free nonpresent presences). Husserl refers to this mode of givenness as Veranschaulichung; a term he reserves exclusively for imagining non-positional consciousness and best translated in my opinion as exemplar illustration (i.e., the givenness of exemplars). Exemplar illustration is, like individualization (Vereinzelung), an instantiation of the ideal essence. Unlike individualization, 240 however, it is not bound by the ontic and epistemic demands of realizing attitude. Veranschaulichung1 can take the form of non-motivational, non-teleological 'running through' a series of free possibilities; it can also take the form of presenting imaginative essences understood as indeterminate exemplars representative of larger classes of possibilities.2 What these two abilities show is that this illustration gives access to exemplars at different grades of generality: they can be lower grade free possibilities (closer to the concrete particular but free from the constraints determining the latter) or higher order free possibilities under which lower grade free possibilities are subsumed. It would seem that phenomenological reflection (as artificial theoretical inquiry attempting to grasp ideals (i.e., essential necessities or ideal possibilities)) is reliant upon our natural ability to engage these free possibilities and imaginative essences. As we shall see in Chapter 6, one of the core differences between natural free imaginative variation and artificial eidetic variation lies in the former's lack of motivation and telos. In the case of eidetic variation, grasping the ideal is the telos of entire process – one that motivates and structures (or organizes) the process accordingly. §3. The Shift from the Natural to the Artificial In what follows I will seek to show that natural imagining consciousness – more specifically, its structure, dimensions, and system of possibilities – secures the conditions for the possibility of Husserl's phenomenological reductions. In doing so, I will go against Husserl's claims about these conditions for possibility – claims widely accepted in the literature. There are several reasons (unjustified in my opinion) for the wide acceptance of Husserl's claims. These too will come to light and be consequently dispelled. In rethinking the structure of the reductions I aim at relocating their source (Ursprung) completely within 1 Like Husserl, I employ this term to refer to the presentifying act itself as well as the presentified non-posited object. 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §68 as well as Hua XLI, Part III. As we shall see in Chapter 6, this ability of exemplar illustration plays a crucial role in eidetic variation. 241 the realm of imagining consciousness – a move Husserl himself always seemed tempted to perform but abstained for the same reasons mentioned above (and soon to be discussed). Instead now of remaining at this standpoint, we propose to alter it radically. Out aim must be to convince ourselves of the possibility of this alterations on grounds of principle [...] We do not abandon the thesis (i.e., natural) we have adopted, we make no change in our conviction, which remains in itself what it is so long as we do not introduce new motives of judgment, which we precisely refrain from doing. And yet the thesis undergoes a modification – whilst remaining in itself what it is, we set it as it were 'out of action' we 'suspend it,' 'bracket it.' It still remains there like the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the connexional system [...] This transvaluing is a concern of our full freedom, and is opposed to all cognitive attitudes that would set themselves up as coordinate with the thesis, and yet within the unity of 'simultaneity' remain incompatible with it, as indeed it is in general with all attitudes whatsoever in the strict sense of the word.1 We learn here from Husserl that the epochê – the bracketing of the natural standpoint or attitude as a whole – like all of the reductions, occurs through an essential possibility: we are structurally able to perform this shift in attitude. What I have been arguing for thus far is in agreement with Husserl. What Husserl fails to mention or discuss, however, here in his 1913 programmatic opus and elsewhere, is the source of this essential possibility. My goal is to render explicit that which Husserl covertly and haphazardly implied – to show that that which structurally or essentially warrants our ability to suspend the natural, pre-reflective, protodoxic and factically-oriented positional realizing attitude is the imagination understood both as primordial level of consciousness as well as direct and genuine intuitive presentation. We are also told here that the essential possibility of trans-locating an entire array of objects of inquiry from the natural to the artificial phenomenological level of consciousness 1 Ideas I, pp. 96-98; Boyce Gibson translation modified. "Anstatt nun in dieser Einstellung zu verbleiben, wollen wir sie radikal ändern. Es gilt jetzt, sich von der prinzipiellen Möglichkeiten dieser Änderung zu überzeugen [...] Die Thesis, die wir vollzogen haben, geben wir nicht preis, wir ändern nichts an unserer Überzeugung, die in sich selbst bleibt, wie sie ist, solange wir nicht neue Urteilsmotive einführen: was wir eben nicht tun.1 Und doch erfährt sie eine Modifikation – während sie in sich verbleibt, was sie ist, setzen wir sie gleichsam 'ausser Aktion", wir 'schalten sie aus", wir "klammern sie ein". Sie ist weiter noch da, wie das Eingeklammerte in der Klammer, wie das Ausgeschaltete ausserhalb des Zusammenhanges der Schaltung [...] Diese Umwertung ist Sache unserer vollkommenen Freiheit und steht gegenüber allen der Thesis zu koordinieren und in der Einheit des "Zugleich" mit ihr unverträglichen Denkverstellungnahmen, wie überhaupt allen Stellungsnahmen im eigentlichen Wortsinne" (Hua III/1, §31, pp.61-63; Husserl's emphases). 242 or attitude is something we can perform with full freedom.1 Nothing precludes our will and ability to suspend the natural attitude. An entire array of new possible objects – within our grasp at our whim! It appears that neutrality, freedom, and possibility are the fundamental marks of the reductions – the bracketing (Einklammerung) or suspension (Ausschaltung) is performed in each case as a neutralizing – a freeing oneself from previously held presuppositions. This freeing in its turn entails the opening of new inquiring possibilities by bringing forth new objects to be descriptively analyzed. The question becomes: Is the source of the neutrality, freedom, and possibility exhibited by the reductions other than Phantasie? If we succeed in showing that these dimensions are the very dimensions pertaining to imagining consciousness (and it alone), then our case for the centrality of the imagination for Husserl's phenomenological reflection will have been partially made. We would then have to show to what extent (if any), the imagination aids the process of eidetic variation in its attempt to intuit essences or ideals. Let us now turn to a succinct discussion of the nexic and horizonal structure of imagining consciousness and of its core dimensions – freedom, possibility, and neutrality – which were extensively discussed in Part I of this project and are now brought once more to the fore as the essential structural possibilities of imagination as natural nonpositional consciousness. To fully capture (or recapture, given our previous discussions) the structure and system of possibilities of Phantasie we need only look at Phantasiemodifikation as one of the main organizing principles of consciousness and the radical modification through which the modal (possibility) world of the imagination is opened. §3! . Phantasiemodi f ikat ion : A Multifaceted Affair Phantasiemodifikation involves a radical transformation. This transformation occurs at several different levels but it is the shift from presentation to presentification, from an object 1 Cf., also Hua III/1, §32. Husserl later (in the Crisis) comes to question the extent of this freedom. 243 being given as present to it being given 'as if' it were present.1 First and foremost, Phantasie modification is a transformation in terms of content and apprehension (at the noetic level) – sensation (the content of perception) and perceptive apprehension give access to reality and actuality. In Phantasie, the sensation and apprehension of perception are reproductively modified and gain this 'as if' (gleichsam) character – Phantasma (the content of Phantasie) and imaginative apprehension give access to the object 'as if it were present'. Husserl claims that Phantasie modification involves reproduction to point to the fact that it reworks the content and apprehension of perception such that its content and its apprehension are not brought forth ex nihilo.2 The result is that while everything in the context of perception occurs in actuality (wirklich), the context of Phantasie is marked by this 'as if' character (gleichsam). Both positional and non-positional presentifications are labeled by Husserl as reproduction.3 However, we need to make a clear distinction between the nature of reproduction in positional memory and expectation and that of reproduction in Phantasie.4 Reproduction in the context of non-positional consciousness involves a radical modification of the content and of its apprehension, and of the spatio-temporal constitution of the object. The apprehension of the imagined object is not inserted, i.e., given a position (Stellung), in the flow of realizing time-consciousness, and the imagined object is not part of the real spatiotemporal world brought forth through constitution as realization. Phantasie consciousness is constitutive, but its constitution is not realizing. Phantasie constitution can be coherent and holistic. As constitutive, consciousness it is governed by the same organizing structural principles as the realizing consciousness – principles such as time-consciousness, attentional and perspectival givenness (Abschattung), founding, and non-radical modifications. Imagining 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.8 2 Hua XXIII, p.265ff. 3 Hua XI, Erste Fassung, p.243 4 Hua XI, §§26, 40-41; Hua XXXI, §3 244 consciousness can thus unravel a world of possibilities correspondingly marked by the structural unity exhibited by the world of actually – temporal, perspectival spatial unity, and identity in the objects' givenness across different acts or the same temporally-unfolding act. However, this world as ontically neutral and irreal (a world of free possibilities) stands apart from the world as real and actual.1 Phantasiemodifikation is not the sole type of modification,2 but it is the only one that leads to a shift from reality to irreality because it implies not only non-presence (object 'as if it were present') but also irreality (object 'as if it were real'). We see therefore that this radical type of modification affects both the noetic structures of consciousness, and the noematic structures of its correlate. It involves a transformation of all doxic acts occurring at the level of presentation (i.e., actuality and reality) and of all their pertaining ontically posited objects.3 One can imagine that one recollects, believes, hopes, expects, judges, and so forth but in the context of imagining consciousness all of these acts occur under the aegis of possibility rather than that of actuality and certainty: they are doxically neutral and their objective counterparts are ontically neutralized. The object of these doxic acts is given 'as if' it were judged, hoped for, etc. Its irreality and nothingness (Nichtigkeit) are passively experienced or actively acknowledged. Although judging in the imagining mode is not 'actual' judging (i.e., judgment about actual objects), it nevertheless, as modified reell act, maintains its structure and coherence – its act-quality, apprehension of hyletic content, relation to matter (Materie) continue to function in the same manner.4 What changes is the doxic modality of the act and 1 Hua XXXI, §3 2 Husserl also explores retentional, memorial modification, and modality modification. 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.13 4 Hua XXIII, Lecture No.10 (1909), pp.282-283 245 the ontic modality of its object – they are neutralized. The imagined object as irreal should be understood as free possibility, not actuality or real possibility.1 An important point: we should note that imagining acts (such as judgment) can be passive or active – as passive they can occur without our self-reflectively engaging them. Nevertheless, self-reflection is an essential, structural moment of imagining acts and consciousness and can always be actualized. Even in our passive lived experience of imagining judgment (e.g., judgments we may make – or better yet, 'find ourselves' making – as we consider alternatives to actual options or judgments we make about a visual or literary work of art) we do not become engulfed in the irreal world we engage – we do not mean it (meinen) as real and actual. In my discussion of method I will focus primarily on acts unfolding in active imagining consciousness since methodological thought is active – i.e., self-reflective and post-doxic (i.e., non-coordinate with the protodoxa).2 The Phantasiemodifikation of doxic acts (implying the shift from actuality to possibility)3 thus places the acts in a context of freedom from the real and the actual.4 Imaginative expectation can engage in an infinite modulation of free possibilities (i.e., free variation). It can do so for two main reasons: it uproots the act and its intended object (noesis-noema) from any real and particular context; it also grants them a sense of 1 In his Logical Investigations Husserl refers to Phantasie modification as qualitative modification in so far as the quality of acts would shift from being positional to being non-positional. In this earlier study Husserl focuses primarily on quality modification in terms of physical imaging. The account given in 1904/05 and onward is much richer; nevertheless it is obvious that Husserl grasps the importance of the shift from positionality to non-positional even prior to his extensive study of the imagination (cf., Hua XIX/1, 504, 505ff., 509ff., 512). 2 In is 1920s analyses of active and passive synthesis Husserl employs the term 'active' to denote both the performance of the self-reflective moment in various acts as well as to refer to acts that are not pre-reflective (or post-doxic or not co-ordinate with the protodoxa), such as everyday beliefs that do not entail an actively sought epistemic fulfillment but instead a passive tendency to resolve epistemic conflicts (thus regaining the balance exhibited by the protodoxa, i.e., factual certainty). 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §99 4 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.10 and 19 246 indeterminacy once certainty and the search for it are left behind in favor of possibility.1 The same holds for the other doxic acts occurring in the imaginative attitude. The irreal or free possibility brought to the fore through Phantasiemodifikation is a new object. It may take several different forms and its novelty can be classified as follows: 1) it can be a neutralized actual object (e.g., I shift from perceiving the Eiffel tower to imagining it), 2) a conceived object (actual or really possible) never before perceived (the Eiffel tower without my ever having seen it or a most comfortable shoe), 3) conceived fantastic objects through a combination of neutralized once-perceived objects (e.g., imagining a centaur), 4) conceived impossible objects given in empty intentions (e.g., round square),2 5) conceived (and sought-after) alternatives of real objects or scenarios through a process of really (real)bound free variation,3 and 6) conceived alternatives to free possibilities (irreal objects) through an ideally-bound free variation. In what follows I will be primarily engaging the irreal objects or free possibilities I placed in the fifth and sixth categories. The objects in the first four categories, though all irreal – i.e., unmarked by any ontic modalities – are all, not only directly or indirectly bound by the real objects of the realizing positional attitude, but they arise mostly in inquiring projects that focus on objects and the world as real. Free possibilities as conceived alternatives to real objects (5) and free possibilities as conceived alternatives to other free possibilities (6) will play a central role in my analysis of eidetic variation.4 Both types of 1 Cf., Hua XI, §10, Appx. 17 to §28, 403-404 2 This process is an attempt to superpose two mutually exclusive objects, which leads to experiencing frustration manifested as our 'living' their repulsion. 3 This variation is also bound by ideal principles such as the principle of non-contradiction or the subjective principle of retention. 4 The objects placed in the fifth category are what I refer to in Chapter 6 as 'neutralized types,' which guide the beginning stages of eidetic variation; the objects in the sixth category will be revealed as the true or genuine variants of eidetic variation once the reductions and the beginning stages are completed. The import of these two types of irreal possibilities for eidetic variation does not exclude the fruitful role they may play in positive scientific projects closely attached to the natural attitude and its objects. 247 objects are instantiations of essences (Veranschaulichungen) – they are exemplars. The difference between them lies in the nature of their indeterminacy: the former are lower grade exemplars informed (and bound) by the passively formed general types (Typen) of objects given in the realizing positional attitude and the ideals they instantiate, whereas the latter are higher grade exemplars or imaginative essences bound by other free possibilities and the ideal they instantiate. They are both bound by the ideal but only imaginative essences are free from the demands of reality.1 Conceivability – i.e., the bringing forth of possibilities related (relatable) to the actual and the particular yet free from the latter's ontic and epistemic contexts – is one of the core dimensions or abilities of natural imagining consciousness resulting from its structure of radical modification (an ability, as we shall soon see, fully functional in the artificial context of phenomenological methodology). To conceive is to freely engage irreal possibilities, which are intuitively available solely through imagining acts (be they simple presentations or more complex founded acts such as judgments and volitions). In Part I, I argued forcefully against viewing the imagination as 1) pictorial (bildlich), 2) as derivative non-genuine type of presentation (uneigentliche Vorstellung), and 3) as solely a type of singular act. Chapter 1 revealed the imagination as being 1) non-pictorial (structurally lacking a Fiktum understood as mental image), 2) a direct, and genuine intuitive intuition (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung), and 3) as both act (i.e., cogito with a specific act-character and apprehension) as well as primordial level of consciousness able to house all of the positional acts unfolding in realizing positional consciousness – all but external perception. Chapter 4 stressed the dynamic character of the nexic, layered, and horizonal consciousness as a whole through founding (Fundierung), non-radical modifications, and Phantasiemodifikation as 1 The interplay between these two kinds of irreal possibilities will uncover process through which we move away from lower level indeterminacy to higher level indeterminacy and the eventual grasping of the ideal. 248 radical modification. We here need to emphasize a point of immense consequence for the analysis of the reductions and of eidetic variation. First, by stressing the significance of imagining consciousness as distinct level of consciousness I am not doing away with imagination understood as specific act. Like external perception – the core act-character around which the entire level of realizing positional consciousness is built – the imagination is the core act-character, the act-axis and primary (founding) mode of imagining givenness. Thus, each of the two equiprimordial natural levels of consciousness we have explored thus far (realizing positional and imagining non-positional) has a core type of Vorstellung – the simplest most direct givenness of objects in presentation: external perception and imagination as act. When Phantasiemodifikation is performed, external perception is not translatable into a corresponding reproduced 'imagining perception'. This is so because external perception structurally entails receiving hyletic information through the sense organs and because prodoxic epistemic modality is likewise essential to perception – without it, the act loses its character as 'external perception'.1 This untranslatability of external perception at the imagining non-positional level does not entail the loss of a direct givenness of the object in imagining. Phantasie as act is this simple genuine givenness of the object as irreal and without any predicative, volitional, or emotive layers. This givenness of the object is not pictorial – i.e., not reliant, like imaging (Bildbewusstsein), on a founding perceptual apprehension of the object. We should, as previously argued in Chapter 1, not confuse the mental image with the very givenness and experience of the irreal object. This insight frees our conception of imagination from an unfounded misunderstanding with most debilitating implications: namely, that the only 1 Cf., Husserl's extensive discussions of the spatiality of perception in his 1907 lectures, Hua XVI. 249 objects of imagining are pictorially given – objects we can 'picture', objects bound by spatial perspectival givenness, like those of perception. This representationalist image-theory view, ungrounded given its confusion of mental images with the apprehended phenomena, binds the imagination to the ontic and epistemic demands of the realizing attitude – in Humean terms: what we imagine (i.e., conceive) is directly or indirectly bound by what we perceive through a process of 'copying' and 'fading away.'1 We clearly see here that while Hume's account equates the imagination with conceivability, his notion of conceivability is very restricted. Husserl does not equate the two; instead he frees conceivability from the bonds of the realizing attitude and stresses it as one of the facets or dimensions of the imagination (not imagination as a whole). This most pernicious (and luring) representationalist thought, paraded initially by Aristotle in his De Anima, has had the strongest hold on philosophical analyses of the imagination2 – a hold that prevented us from viewing the imagination as non-pictorial direct intuitive presentation of free possibilities and fundamental level of consciousness where all acts can unfold; it prevented us from recognizing it can and does play a crucial role in universalizing-idealizing thought and the movement away from the actual and the particular. The problem of induction and the failure of empiricist abstraction stem from just this unhappy misunderstanding, now, hopefully, to be successfully dispelled through Husserl's hard-earned insights into the structure and system of possibilities of the imagination as both specific act-character and fundamental level of nexic and horizonal consciousness. Free possibilities as irreal objects need not solely be objects that are perspectivally and spatially given. I can imagine a centaur weeping – it will be perspectivally given; its givenness will 1 As categories 1-4 of irreal objects listed above suggest, imagining can entail the givenness of objects once given or givable in the realizing attitude, but this does not, however, entail that they manner in which and through which these objects are given entails mental images. 2 Kant's schemata are likewise marred by this spatial-pictorial presupposition. 250 even have an indirectly-intended and intuited background (i.e., without our attentional focus). But I can also conceive alternatives to my current existential path. I do so in a nonspatial, non-perspectival manner in the natural attitude. What we must investigate is the functioning of this ability in an artificial, methodological, theoretical context. In other words – as we began to see in Chapter 4 – we must understand to what extent and in what manner the structures and systems of possibilities of the natural attitude condition and render feasible (qua abilities) the structures and systems of possibility of artificial methodological consciousness. We must further seek to understand the hermeneutical circularity at play in the dynamic between the structures and possibilities of artificial consciousness and the apparatus of the phenomenological method. Everything we have thus far uncovered about the imagination (as act and level of consciousness) are the structures and possibilities pertaining to it in the natural attitude – in the non-theoretical, non-methodological context. Our task ahead is to clarify the ways in which that which essentially pertains to the imagination in the natural context has methodological import. §3! . Whence Neutrality? Dispelling the Myth of Self-Standing Neutrality Modification So far we have focused on possibility and freedom as essential dimensions of imagining consciousness and its noeses; they are also essential characteristics of their corresponding noemata since Phantasiemodifikation, like all modifications, affects the entire noetic-noematic complex. It is time we better understood the nature of neutrality as a third structural dimension. We have already explored neutrality in great detail as ontic and doxic bracketing; we must ask now whether it is something that pertains specifically to the imagination or whether it may stem from other sources as well. 251 In his Ideas I Husserl claims that Phantasiemodifikation is a type of neutrality modification.1 But another dangerous ambiguity of the expression 'mere supposal' comes in for consideration. We must protect ourselves here against a very closely besetting confusion namely, that between neutrality modification and imagination. The confusing element here, and one not lightly to be disentangled, lies herein that imagination is itself in fact a neutrality modification, that in spite of its being of so special a type its significance is universal and applicable to all experiences, and that it also plays its part in most of the formations of supposal, and must then be distinguished from the general neutrality modification with its manifold formations that conform to all the types of the positing function.2 This passage rightly identifies making the distinction between Phantasiemodifikation and neutrality modification as a difficult affair. The source of this difficulty, according to Husserl, is the fact that Phantasiemodifikation is a type of neutrality modification – it is nonpositional: its noeses are doxically neutral and its noemata are ontically neutral. Husserl forcefully claims here that neutrality modification is broader and more inclusive than Phantasiemodifikation. Whatever overlap there is between them is causing the abovementioned ambiguity and potential confusion. I agree with Husserl that this is a difficult distinction to make; I disagree with him about the source of this difficulty. The overlap between them is easily cleared – and for those who have carefully considered the three dimensions of the imagining consciousness we have extensively analyzed the answer is clear. The difficulty has a covert and much more pernicious source: the ungrounded presupposition that imagining consciousness is pictorial. In Chapter 1 I traced the arduous path Husserl took toward eventually disbarring himself from this presupposition (or at least identifying structures able to challenge it once and for all). We saw there that not until 1918 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §111 2 Ideas I, p.285; Boyce Gibson translation modified. "Aber noch eine gefährliche Äquivokation des Ausdruckes "sich-bloss-denken" kommt in Frage, bzw. einer sehr naheliegenden Verwechslung ist zu wehren, nämlich der zwischen Neutralitätsmodifikation und Phantasie. Das Verwirrende und wirklich nicht leicht Auseinanderzuwirrende liegt hier darin, dass die Phantasie selbst in der Tat eine Neutralitätsmodifikation ist, dass sie trotz der Besonderheit ihres Typus von universeller Bedeutung ist, anwendbar auf alle Erlebnisse, dass sie bei den meisten Gestaltungen des Sich-denkens auch ihre Rolle spielt und dabei doch von der allgemeinen Neutralitätsmodifikation mit ihren mannigfaltigen, allen Setzungsarten folgenden Gestaltungen unterscheiden werden muss" (Hua III/1, §111, p.250; Husserl's emphasis). 252 and the early 1920s did Husserl come to fully recognize the simplicity and non-pictoriality of imagining intuitive presentation. In 1913, Husserl was still very much under the alluring veil of mental images and those who rely on these provisional claims about the nature of Phantasiemodifikation easily fall into the trap of taking him at his word – an easy feat given that his later insights were delivered in lecture courses published in a volume of the Husserliana few are familiar with (Hua XXIII).1 This is the main reason why most scholars have been reluctant to consider the imagination as the source of the neutrality, freedom, and possibility necessary for the successful performance of the reductions and eidetic variation. Only by revealing the structure and system of possibilities of imagining consciousness can we hope to uncover its import for phenomenological reflection. Part I's extensive discussions guide us in this tremendous task. The significance of the argument against the pictoriality of the imagination will fully assert itself in Chapter 6. If this presupposition is hard at work as Husserl prepares to explore the nature and conditions of possibility for the performance of the reductions, he is going to be little inclined to rule in favor of Phantasiemodifikation as the sole source of neutrality qua nonpositionality. The bracketing method ultimately aiming at facilitating the grasp of ideal structures (which are not pictorial) cannot be tied to the limitedness of a neutrality that is essentially pictorial and therefore individualized.2 Indeed, Husserl's discussion of neutrality modification in Part III of Ideas I is punctuated by numerous references to the pictoriality of imagination. On the other hand imaginative modification belongs to another series of modifications. It represents 'in' the form of an 'image.' But the image can appear in a primordial form, e.g., the 'painted' picture (not indeed the picture as a thing, of which we say, for instance, that it hangs on the wall) which we grasp in and through perception. But image can be also 1 For a detailed account of the later courses and the main points Husserl makes there about neutrality and Phantasiemodifikation, see Chapter 1. 2 This is not the case with exemplars or irreal possibilities as instantiations of essences. 253 something that appears as reproduced, as when we have presentations of imagery in memory or free imagination.1 This actuality of the act of positing it as being there is, in accordance with previous findings, neutralized in the perceptive consciousness of an image. With the glance turned towards the 'image' (not towards that of which it is the copy), we do not apprehend anything real as object, but an image, a fiction. The 'apprehension' has the actuality of the directing activity, but is not 'real' apprehension, but mere apprehension in the modified form of the 'as if'; the positing is not actual positing, but modified into the 'as if'.2 In the metaphorical speech concerning shadows, reflection, and image, there should of course be no suggestion of mere illusion or deceitful intention, for thereby real acts or positional correlates would be given. Nor need the warning be renewed against the other tendency so ready to hand, to confuse the modification here in question with Phantasie modification with likewise creates for every experience in the inner consciousness of time a counterpart, its own imagination-image.3 Not only do these passages show us the confused stage of Husserl's analyses of the imagination; they further show that he has yet to fully recognize the structural differences between Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, and Erinnerung. He collapses all of them here in the process of trying to distinguish between Phantasiemodifikation and neutrality modification. What is at stake in making this distinction is identifying the very source of neutrality – the most important factor facilitating the reductions along with possibility and freedom. Thus, by arguing against Husserl on this front I am relocating the conditions for the possibility of the reductions in the sphere of imagining consciousness. 1 Ideas I, pp.268-269; Boyce Gibson translation modified. "Anderseits gehört die verbildliche Modifikation einer anderen Modifikationsreihe an. Sie vergegenwärtigt 'in' einem "Bilde". Das Bild kann aber ein originär Erscheinendes sein, z.B. das "gemalte" Bild (nicht etwa Ding Gemälde, dasjenige, von dem es z.B. heisst, dass es an der Wand hängt), welches wir perzeptiv erfassen. Das Bild kann aber auch ein reproduktiv Erscheinendes sein, wie wenn wir in der Erinnerung oder freien Phantasie Bildvorstellungen haben" (Hua III/1, §99, p.234; Husserl's emphases). 2 Ideas I, p.291. "Diese Aktualität der Daseinssetzung ist, nach dem früher Ausgeführten, neutralisiert im perzeptiven Bildbewusstsein. Zugewendet dem "Bilde" (nicht dem Abgebildeten), erfassen wir als Gegenstand kein Wirkliches, sondern eben ein Bild, ein Fiktum. Die "Erfassung" hat die Aktualität der Zuwendung, aber sie ist nicht "wirkliche" Erfassung, sondern blosse Erfassung in der Modifikation des "gleichsam", die Setzung ist nicht aktuelle Setzung, sondern im 'gleichsam" modifizierte" (Hua III/1, §113, p.256; Husserl's emphasis). 3 Ideas I, p.294; Boyce Gibson translation modified. "Natürlich darf man in die bildlichen Reden von Schatten, Spiegelung, Bild nichts von blossem Schein, nichts von trügerischer Meinung u. dgl. Hineinbringen, womit ja wirkliche Akte, bzw. positionale Korrelate gegeben wären. Von der anderen so naheliegenden Verwechslung der hier fraglichen Modifikation mit der Phantasiemodifikation, die ebenfalls zu jedem Erlebnis – als Erlebnisgegenwart im inneren Zeitbewusstsein – ein Gegenstück, sein Phantasiebild, schafft, braucht nicht von neuem gewarnt zu werden" (Hua III//1, §114, pp.259-260). 254 Instead of viewing Phantasiemodifikation as a type of neutrality modification, I consider the situation to be, in a qualified sense, the reverse – neutrality modification is a type of Phantasiemodifikation. The latter has a much broader spectrum – it covers: 1) neutrality modification as a putting out of play of all doxic claims with respect to the ontic status of objects (the shift to irreality, i.e., doxic-ontic neutrality), 2) the movement away from certainty and the epistemic telos of realizing motivation (epistemic neutrality), and 3) the movement away from determinacy and individuality toward indeterminacy and universality through engaging irreal possibilities as open or free instantiations (Veranschaulichungen) of essences (free variation). Because of these three dimensions, as I shall show in Chapter 6, Phantasiemodifikation makes possible the focus on ideal objects or essences and the process of grasping them. What I am ultimately claiming here is that all non-positional acts are imaginative – some simple and direct others complex and of a higher order (i.e., brought forth through a process of founding (Fundierung) unfolding at the imagining level of consciousness).1 Thus, Phantasiemodifikation and neutrality modification are indeed distinct – but not as Husserl would have us believe. Neutrality modification (as ontic-doxic non-positionality) is, along with epistemic neutrality and free variation, a facet of Phantasiemodifikation.2 Each of these facets, I will argue, plays a crucial role in Husserl's methodological apparatus. 1 Husserl does not seem to offer a thorough analysis behind the claim that Phantasie modification is a type of neutrality modification. The scholarship touching on this issue agrees with his position (cf., e.g., Saraiva (1970), Caeymaex (1996), Brainard (2002), Elliott (2002, 2005), Mohanty (2008), Rizzoli (2008). The reason for this is their failure to recognize the imagination as level of consciousness – within which all acts, including higherorder judgments – can unfold, along with their antiquated view of the imagination as pictorial act. Elliott's study of Husserl's phenomenology of the imagination completely misses the point by claiming that ratiocination cannot occur in imagination and because of this, the latter cannot play a role in Husserl's 'rationalist' inquiry. It is not hard to guess Elliott's Heideggerian allegiance in this latter claim. It is also unfortunate that the rich and complex discoveries Husserl provided in his lecture courses – all pointing at viewing the imagination as level of consciousness – completely elude this thinker's study. 2 This is something Husserl himself comes to recognize in the early 1920s (cf., Hua XXIII, No.20). 255 The overt reason Husserl gives in 1913 for his claim (besides the covert one I suggested) is the fact that neutrality modification is non-iterative whereas Phantasiemodifikation is.1 This in itself does not suffice to prove that the latter is a type of the former. As already discussed, there is a tight cooperative relationship between founding (Fundierung) and the modifications (radical or non-radical). Once the radical modification is performed, the noeticnoematic complexes can undergo subsequent founding process thus becoming founding lower-level structures for higher-order noeses-noemata. This is what renders Phantasiemodifikation iterative in so far as the founded complexes are also non-positional; it also explains why neutrality modification, as facet of Phantasiemodifikation, is, on its own – i.e., apart from the founding process unfolding at the imagining level of consciousness – noniterative.2 While Husserl is right in his claim about the iterative character of the imagination, he does not qualify its nature via founding. Because of this, he overlooks its significance: the fact that neutrality modification cannot be an independent organizing principle of consciousness like Phantasiemodifikation. It is a non-independent element of the latter understood as the much broader structure. Husserl's claim about neutrality modification made about its structure and functioning in the natural attitude was meant to secure for it a privileged methodological position; however, as we saw, this methodological import lacks the appropriate grounding. By recognizing the covert presupposition behind Husserl's claim and by disclosing the weakness of his argument for the claim he put forth, we find ourselves ever closer to our goal: relocating the imagination at the heart of phenomenological inquiry. We now turn to our explicit and technical discussion of how Phantasiemodifikation as structuring principle of 1 Cf., my discussion in Chapter 2, §3. Cf., also Hua III/1, §112 2 What makes imagining consciousness a dynamic nexus 256 natural consciousness makes possible – and suffices as ground and source of – the phenomenological reductions. §3! . The Ambiguity of Non-Positional Consciousness In order to understand in what ways the structures and system of possibilities of natural Phantasiemodifikation function as the conditions for the possibility of the reductions we need to stress, following the overarching distinction between natural and artificial consciousness, an important distinction. Non-positionality entails all three of the core dimensions of imagining consciousness: freedom, possibility, and neutrality. Our discussions of conceivability and neutrality have made this by now hopefully, clear. We cannot conceive and we cannot bracket our beliefs about the ontic status of objects without imagining – more specifically, without Phantasiemodifikation. All non-positional acts are imagining acts. The reductions as we have already seen (and shall soon further discuss) are heavily reliant upon non-positionality. It will thus follow seamlessly from out extensive previous arguments that Phantasiemodifikation is necessary for the reductions – the gatekeepers of phenomenological reflection. Two questions arise: 1) While Phantasiemodifikation is necessary for the reductions, is it a sufficient condition for their possibility? And 2) Is Phantasiemodifikation a necessary or sufficient condition for eidetic variation? Chapter 6 will offer answers to both of these questions. The distinction I emphasize here – a distinction Husserl himself did not make – will help us answer these important questions. A note: Even if my project were to only establish the necessity (and not also the sufficiency) of imagining consciousness for the possibility and success of phenomenological reflection, it would be no meager accomplishment. The deeply engrained presuppositions about the imagination have prevented Husserl and scholars alike from giving Phantasie its due. We could still say "there is 257 no phenomenology without imagining." My project is slightly more ambitious – hopefully I can prove myself a worthy advocate of this – as Hume and Kant emphatically reminded us – 'mysterious' faculty or ability.1 The following discussion goes beyond Husserl's analyses of Phantasie; it nevertheless stems from the insights he gained in these studies. The distinction I want to make here is meant to clarify the ambiguity of nonpositional or imagining consciousness, which can be either natural or artificial. If we were to rethink the three levels of consciousness already discussed as being horizonal and nexic in Chapters 1-4 (realizing positional, imagining non-positional, and eidetic positional) on the artificial vs. natural model, we would have:2 1 It is by now clear that Husserl's analyses of the imagination have painted a different picture of the imagination than Hume and Kant, for whom it was a specific faculty or mental act somehow able to cooperate with other acts such as perception, memory, or judgment. Husserl gives us a solid foundation upon which to build a non-faculty psychology theory of the imagination. Needless to say, Husserl's picture is infinitely richer and promises even richer rewards for those of us interested in thinking about the nature of inquiring, experimental, or hypothetical thought. 2 In the subsequent sections I will employ the abbreviations listed in parentheses. 258 Map of Leveled Nexic-Horizonal Consciousness Looking at these levels of consciousness more carefully several points become clear; some of the points raise important questions: I) The shift from Nat.P1 to Nat.N-P occurs through Phantasiemodi f ikat ion . We have already explored the nature of this shift at length here and in Part I. Phantasiemodi f ikation is primarily a radical modification of the natural attitude. II) Nat. P1 is not, as such, translatable through Phantasiemodi f ikat ion. Question1: Is Nat.P1, thus, fully left behind in the shift to Nat.N-P? Answer1: In Part I, I stressed the importance of distinguishing between the realizingpositional and imagining levels of consciousness; nevertheless, I also argued that Consciousness Natural (pre-theoretical; non-methodological) Realizing-Positional (Nat.P1) (unmodified; allows for nonradical modifications) Imagining Non-Positional (Nat.N-P) via Phantasie Modifikation (allows for non-radical modifications) Artificial via Reductions as Phenomenological Modifications (Phen.Mk1) (theoretical; methodological) Imagining Non-Positional (Art.N-P) (allows for non-radical modifications) Eidetic-Positional (Art.P2) via Eidetic Modification (Phen.Mk2) (allows for non-radical modifications) 259 Phantasiemodifikation needs to be understood as link between these two levels of consciousness and not simply as distinguishing element. The information we gain in Nat.P1 is translatable in Nat.N-P; whether we simply engage the same object (in a non-positional manner) or seek alternatives to actualities and real possibilities, Nat.P1 informs Nat.N-P. We will say more about this in Ch.6§§1-2. III) The shift from the natural to the artificial occurs through the transcendentalphenomenological reductions understood as non-positional radical modifications. Their 'radical' character lies, as in the case of Phantasiemodi f ikat ion , in their ability to shift from one level of consciousness to another. Question1: What is the relation between Phantasiemodifikation and Phen.Mk1? Answer1: Chapter 6§1will discuss this. Question2: What happens with Nat.P1 and Nat.N-P in Phen.Mk1? Answer2: The information translated from the natural to the artificial attitude through Phen.Mk1 will be the subject of our discussions in Chapter 6§§1-2. IV) Art.P2 – the eidetic level of consciousness – occurs only in artificial consciousness; its objects (i.e., essential necessities or ideal possibilities) are not attainable (intendable or intuitable) in natural, pre-theoretical and nonmethodological consciousness. The concrete universals passively or actively given in the natural attitude do not qualify as essences. V) Art.P2 is attained via Phen.Mk2 as radical modification away from Art.N-P. Question1: What is the nature of Phen.Mk2 and what are its conditions of possibility? Answer1: Our discussion of eidetic variation in Chapter 6§2 will uncover the answers to both of these questions. Question2: What is the relation between Phen.Mk1 and Phen.Mk2? 260 Answer2: This too will become clear in Chapter 6§2 (and foreshadowed in 6§1). Question 3:How does this layering of consciousness into natural and artificial through Phen.Mk1 and Phen.Mk2 help us analyze and understand the nature of the natural attitude and consciousness? Why are all of these radical modifications necessary? Answer 3: We will explore this question through a discussion of the modal and hermeneutical nature of phenomenological reflection in Chapter 6§2. Question 4: Is Art.N-P not translatable through Phen.Mk2? Is imagining left behind (along with conceivability) in Art.P2? Answer 4: Art.N-P (like Nat.P1 through Phantasiemodifikation) is not translatable through Phen.Mk2. In this regard, Phantasiemodifikation and Phen.Mk2 are parallel. The reason for this is that just like realizing-positionality must be left behind for non-positionality to arise, so too, non-positionality must be surpassed if eidetic positionality is to occur. This is the case with respect to the distinct levels of consciousness. In so far as direct intuitive presentation is concerned, the situation is parallel: perception; direct Nat.P1 presentation, imagination as direct Nat.N-P (and as we shall see imagination as Art.N-P), and finally, eidetic intuition as direct Art.P2 presentation are mutually exclusive. The real, irreal, and ideal objects while related through both Vereinzelung (from the ideal toward the real directionally) and Veranschaulichung (from the real toward the ideal) are fundamentally distinct. The fulfillment of eidetic variation in eidetic intuition entails 'leaving behind' the imagination and its objects. N.B. We catch a glimpse here at a potential answer to the question whether Phantasie and its radical modification are both necessary and sufficient for phenomenological reflection or not 261 – the answer has to be both 'yes' and 'no' depending on what we understand by 'phenomenological reflection' (i.e., how broad its scope is). VI) Last but not least, the only level of consciousness occurring in both the natural as well as artificial attitude is imagining non-positional consciousness (N-P). Therein lies the most significant ambiguity of imagining non-positional consciousness. Question1: How should we understand this ambiguity? What are the objects corresponding to each of these attitudes? Is this one level able to function in two attitudes or are we actually looking at two distinct levels of consciousness? Answer 1: The rest of this section will begin the discussion of these important questions. The discussion will continue in Chapter 6. Question 2: What is the significance of this ambiguity for the possibility of the reductions (Phen.Mk1)? Answer 2: Chapter 6§1 will explore this significance in great detail. Let us now turn to the discovered ambiguity of imagining non-positional consciousness. It is important that we stress from the beginning that Nat.N-P and Art.N-P (linked via Phen.Mk1) are neither two self-standing levels of consciousness nor two distinct types of direct intuitive presentation (anschauliche Vorstellung). We are looking at the same level of consciousness and same type of presentation in two distinct attitudes: the natural and the artificial. What sets these two attitudes apart? The most elegant way of mapping the differences between these two attitudes is to acknowledge the distinction in terms of their motivation and telos. While the natural attitude, bound by the protodoxa, seeks knowledge, evidence, and certainty with respect to facts in a non-methodological, non-theoretical 262 manner, the artificial attitude is motivated by the search for genuinely universal knowledge (i.e., knowledge of ideal objects) through a consistent employment of and reliance upon a methodology able to secure the sought results. We have already outlined the more detailed distinctions between these two attitudes earlier in this chapter. Going back to our initial claim regarding the relationship between the structure and system of possibilities of consciousness on the hand and the structure and system of possibilities of methodological inquiry (and its pertaining consciousness) on the other, it remains for us to see in what specific sense the artificial attitude draws its sustenance from the natural while being radically different from it. According to Husserl, the artificial attitude disbars itself of an entire array of presuppositions that deeply affect the natural attitude, the most important of which being the engrained belief in the existence and actuality of objects given in experience. This artificial ability has natural roots – it stems from the very structures of natural consciousness. This is due to the ambiguity of imagining non-positional consciousness; Phantasie functions as the link between the natural and the artificial through this very ambiguity, which it alone possesses. Before making the full-fledged argument for this claim in Chapter 6§1, let us stress the structure of this ambiguity and the possibilities it opens up. Artificial non-positional consciousness (Art.N-P) shares the structure and dimensions of natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). They are both direct presentations as well as levels of consciousness wherein other acts can unfold. They are both marked by freedom, possibility, and neutrality; they both bring forth the irreal. The core distinction between them has to do with their motivation and teleology. While Nat.N-P is free from all motivation and has no telos (or adopts the motivation of Nat.P1), Art.N-P is marked by the teleology of the theoretical project: (in Husserl's case) the grasp of ideal 263 objects in eidetic intuition. Instead of merely engaging irreal (free) possibilities in a random fashion or presenting possibilities related to Nat.P1 projects, Art.N-P channels its ability to conceive alternative possibilities toward the attainment of the eidetic goal. Does this threaten the freedom of the possibilities? Structurally, the freedom of these possibilities (i.e., their being free from the Nat.P1 protodoxic and epistemic bond) is completely unaffected. When Husserl refers to the spontaneity of imagination he means just this negative freedom. We should therefore distinguish between the 'randomness' and 'spontaneity' of imagination. Teleologically, the irreal possibilities brought to the fore in Art.N-P are bound by the goal of eidetic intuition in so far as they strive to render the latter feasible. So what happens to conceivability in the context of Art.N-P? Once we recognize the difference in motivation (or potential1 lack thereof in the case of Nat.N-P) the answer is straightforward: the ability to bring forth free irreal possibilities (i.e., the ability to conceive) is relocated and put to work in the teleological context of the artificial theoretical project. The irreal brought forth in Art.N-P is equally free from the real as the one given in Nat.N-P; it stands out, however, as being tightly and overtly bound to the ideal. While the irreal possibilities of the natural imagining attitude (Nat.N-P) are either free alternatives to real scenarios or alternatives to irreal possibilities (the latter being more or less indeterminate or general), their status as Veranschaulichungen (i.e., exemplars as instances of ideal possibilities) is covert – it is not openly acknowledged and stressed. As such, natural irreal possibilities (the correlates of Nat.N-P) are for the most part passively experienced in a random and playful manner. They may be actively sought as alternatives to real or irreal possibilities; this active natural imagining is in itself (structurally) without goal or motivation. 1 I say 'potential' here because in the Nat.N-P attitude imagining presentation and other higher order acts can borrow the telos and motivation of Nat.P1 projects seeking alternatives to the actual or the really (real) possible. 264 If we engage this attitude in our everyday dealings as we attempt to conceive alternatives to real scenarios, we attach a goal to them that pertains to the realizing attitude (Nat.P1). Simply put, natural irreal possibilities are either self-standing motivation-less, randomly conceived possibilities or alternatives to real scenarios meant to aid with realizing positional projects (projects that engage objects as real and actual). If the irreal possibilities are in their turn alternatives to irreal possibilities – a higher level of indeterminacy is involved, as we already saw earlier in this chapter. Imaginative essences could be given in Nat.N-P, but they would be either passively given or their status as exemplars of ideals or essences would remain unacknowledged in so far as the natural attitude does not concern itself with intending and intuiting ideal objects. Natural imagining consciousness unfolds as either reverie or it cooperates – in a secondary way – with the natural realizing level of consciousness. This is not the case with artificial imagining consciousness (Art.N-P).1 Art.N-P is completely divorced from realizing projects. The everyday is completely put out of play. Instead of cooperating with Nat.P1, artificial imagining consciousness cooperates with eidetic positional projects – projects whose objects are ideal rather than real. The irreal possibilities given in Art.N-P are genuine exemplars – they are acknowledged illustrations of essences. I will be referring to these irreal possibilities as variants from now on. Unlike the irreal possibilities given in the free variation of Nat.N-P, which are exemplars (Veranschaulichungen) only in a covert and passive manner, variants are given primarily in and through their relation to the ideal they instantiate. Our discussion of eidetic variation in Chapter 6 will make this clear. 1 The distinction between Nat.N-P and Art.N-P is going to help us clarify the distinction between positive scientific thought on the one hand (in its hypothetical and experimental guises) and eidetic projects (be they subjective or objective) on the other. 265 We could say here that the fundamental difference between Nat.N-P and Art.N-P is what levels of consciousness they cooperate with. In essence, however, the two are not two self-standing levels of consciousness. They are the same level behaving in different ways, adopting different projects with radically different goals (or in some Nat.N-P cases, with no goals at all). This versatility of imagining in conceiving alternatives in different motivational contexts is what grants it its status as link between the natural and the artificial attitudes. Per our previous argument that freedom and possibility are the dimensions pertaining primarily and solely (source-wise) to imagining consciousness and given that Husserl's phenomenological reflection as artificial cannot begin and unfold without these two dimensions, it follows that imagining consciousness is not just a link among others, but the sole link between these two important attitudes. One more question remains: What happens with neutrality on this ambiguous model of imagining consciousness? Does Nat.N-P forfeit the neutrality of the irreal possibilities it brings forth when it lends its power to conceive to natural realizing projects? Our discussion of the radical difference between perceptual and imagining consciousness in Part I proves helpful here: structurally, imagining consciousness cannot be other than it is – doxic and epistemic neutrality are its essential features. It likewise cannot be motivational on its own. But it has the ability to adopt the project, telos, and motivation typical of other levels of consciousness. The irreal possibilities themselves are ontically neutral and doxically neutrally engaged. Herein lies the difference between Nat.P1 real vacillation and Nat.N-P free variation. Whereas real vacillation is tightly bound to past real experiences and cannot sustain itself indefinitely, free variation can surpass the horizon of past real demands as well as real expectations; it can also sustain itself indefinitely. Real 266 vacillation (like real doubt) structurally seeks, as we saw in Part I, the resolution granted by passive confirmation (Bewahrheitung) or active verification (Bewährung). Broadly, the free variation of conceivable alternatives typical of imagining consciousness irrespective of the attitude it adopts can be either random when the imagination remains 'unaffiliated,' or it can be guided by a goal when it cooperates with Nat.P1 or Art.P2. Perhaps we should identify here for the sake of clarity three 'kinds' of imagination: 1) the unaffiliated one, without motivation and telos, 2) the Nat.P1 affiliated one, guided by the factual epistemic project, and 3) the Art.P2 affiliated one, guided by the eidetic project. I am hesitant to label these as 'kinds' of imagining consciousness because the difference between them is one of teleological behavior. The structure and the three dimensions of freedom, possibility, and neutrality remain unaffected. Furthermore, the unaffiliated unfolding of the imagination (while a possibility ideally guaranteed by the structure of imagination) is the less frequent 'varietal.' We can let ourselves float on the sea of reverie in an utterly random fashion; I think however, that Husserl would agree with me in saying that we are, for the most part, project-driven in our cognitive behavior. Furthermore, we could easily locate 'random fancy' in the context of the natural attitude in so far as it is non-theoretical and non-methodological. Unlike natural realizing attitude, Nat.N-P is non-thetic – it posits no thesis with respect to the reality of its objects and world; however, like Nat.P1, it is pre-reflective.1 Now that we have clarified the ambiguity at the heart of non-positional consciousness it is time to unravel its potency – its import for the reductions and for eidetic variation. In what follows my goal will be to expose and seek to understand the role played by the imagination (Art.N-P) in phenomenological reflection. We have yet to see whether 1 By 'pre-reflective' I do not mean pre-predicative. Predication occurs in the natural attitude at both levels (P1 and N-P). 267 Phantasie is merely necessary for Husserlian eidetic reflection (along with other core moments) or whether it could be viewed as sufficient for the ideational endeavor. We also have yet to determine to what extent the structure and system of possibilities of Husserl's artificial method of inquiry is grounded in the natural structures of consciousness. If we succeed in uncovering the grounding of artificial methodological thought in the natural attitude we would reveal anew the meaning behind Husserl's realism – one not solely expressed in his analyses of perceptual consciousness, but one able to inform and be very much attuned to his transcendental idealism. 268 Chapter 6 Phenomenological Reflection Rethought Our discussion of the relationship between the structure and system of possibilities of natural consciousness and the structure and system of possibilities of Husserl's artificial method of inquiry culminates in this chapter with a detailed analysis of the transcendentalphenomenological reductions and eidetic variation. What will also eventually come to light is the fruitful dynamic at the heart of phenomenological reflection between Husserl's transcendental idealism on the one hand and the relation between the natural and the artificial attitudes on the other. In my attempt to elucidate the nature of phenomenological reflection I will focus on what I consider to be its three main dimensions: the reductions, eidetic variation, and post-ideational thought.1 Both in the case of the phenomenological-transcendental reductions and in the case of eidetic variation I adopt a multifaceted clarifying approach. I focus on: 1) what Husserl explicitly states about each (in a historically-informed manner), 2) what is implied or lacking from his developing account, and 3) what my model of natural vs. artificial nexic-horizonal consciousness2 uncovers about the structure, functioning, and system of possibilities of each of these methodological tools. In the case of post-ideational thought I appeal to my model of layered, horizonal, and nexic consciousness in order to uncover the hidden reservoir of possibilities employed in phenomenological reflection understood as Rückgang. I will discuss this notion in its historical, intersubjective, communicative, and adaptive guises. My previous mentioning of Husserl's hermeneutical approach regarding his microand macro- 1 For discussions of Husserl's phenomenological-transcendental reductions as methodological tools of phenomenological investigation – which explore them through venues other than the imagination, see Kern (1962, 1975), Boehm (1965), Rang (1973), Cunningham (1976), Luft (1998, 2004), Lohmar (2002), Ierna, Jacobs, & Mattens (2010). There are very few studies dealing with the exact structure and unfolding of eidetic variation. The two scholars whose work stands out are Sowa and Lohmar. For references to their specific studies, see my discussion of eidetic variation. 2 This model stems from Husserl's micro-phenomenological analyses yet in many ways surpasses them. 269 phenomenological analyses will likewise aid us in this concluding and most exciting attempt to understand the cross-disciplinary contributions Husserl's work could make. It is my contention that the relationship between the natural and the artificial attitudes I am here focusing on had always informed Husserl's programmatic thought; thus, we can stress the import of the natural attitude and of his realism for his method as well as fully embrace his transcendental idealism (revealed anew through this relationship). The openness toward the natural attitude does not entail betraying the 'purity' of his method – that is, as long as we disambiguate this 'purity' and grasp it for what it is, namely, Husserl's demand that phenomenological eidetic inquiry disbar itself of the ontic, doxic, and epistemic presuppositions along with the demands of realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1) through a radical shift in standpoint (Einstellung), not an elimination of anything 'natural'. What we must come to see is that there is a structural and inherent modal link between the natural and artificial attitudes and that we can meet Husserl's demand for purity without isolating these two attitudes; that in fact, to meet this demand, we must understand and secure the dynamic relation between them. In other words, in order to successfully enter the phenomenological attitude and perform phenomenological analyses, we must let the natural guide us – both in terms of methodological structural possibilities as well as modified information. While the phenomenological standpoint is indeed fundamentally other than the pre-theoretical natural one, it does not commence ex nihilo. So what currency does it play the eidetic game with? In closing, we will explore the extent and richness of phenomenological reflection beyond the boundaries of specific ideational analyses (i.e., specific eidetic variation projects each culminating in eidetic intuition). We will see what role concepts and expressions play in the phenomenologists' attempt to fix the results of their work as well as communicate them; 270 we will investigate the functioning of memory, expectation, and judgment in the artificial methodological attitude at the level of the phenomenological community as well as identify the ways in which fruitful communication can occur beyond field-specific boundaries. We will seek to perform the task that Husserl placed before us and abide by its high standard – our task as philosophers, that he so powerfully penned in the introduction to his Cartesian Meditations, namely, to collaborate in the spirit of genuine transcendental thought;1 to move together and ever closer to this thought's fulfilled ability of revealing the nature of consciousness in and through its relationship to what is other: The splintering of present-day philosophy, with its perplexed activity, sets us thinking. When we attempt to view western philosophy as a unitary science, its decline since the middle of the nineteenth century is unmistakable. The comparative unity that it had in previous ages, in its aims, its problems and methods, has been lost. When, with the beginning of modern times, religious belief was becoming more and more externalized as a lifeless convention, people of intellect were lifted by a new belief, their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science. The whole of human culture was to be guided and illuminated by scientific insights and thus reformed, as new and autonomous. But meanwhile this belief too has begun to languish. Not without reason. Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in that very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of their underlying convictions, and an answering belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and pseudocriticizing, a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously with and for one another. This hardly attests a mutual study carried on with a consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that characterizes serious collaboration and an intention to produce objectively valid results. 'Objectively valid results' – the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism. But how could actual study and actual collaboration be possible, where there are so many philosophers and almost equally many philosophies? To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack unity of a mental space in which they might exist for and act on one another. It may be that, within, each of the many different 'schools' or 'lines of thought', the situation is somewhat different. Still, with the existence of these in isolation, the total philosophical present is essentially as we have described it.2 1 Cf., als Hua VI, §15 2 CM, pp.4-5 (Cairns translation modified). "Die Zersplitterung der gegenwärtigen Philosophie in ihrer ratlosen Betriebsamkeit gibt uns zu denken. Seit der Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts ist, wenn wir die abendländische under dem Geschichtpunkt der Einheit einer Wissenschaft zu betrachten suchen, gegenüber den vorangehenden Zeiten der Verfall unverkennbar. In der Zielstellung, in der Problematik und Methode ist diese Einheit verloren gegangen. Als mit Anfang der Neuzeit der religiöse Glaube sich immer mehr in unlebendige Konvention veräusserliche, erhob sich die intellektuelle Menschheit an dem neuen grossen Glauben, dem an eine autonome Philosophie und Wissenschaft. Die gesamte Menschheitkultur sollte von wissenschaftlichen Einsichten geführt und durchleuchtet und dadurch zu einer neuen autonomen Kultur reformiert werden. Aber 271 It is my hope that equipped with a better understanding of Husserl's methodological reflection we cover precious ground toward establishing this community of thought that Husserl so dearly yearned for. Could it be that one essential facilitator of this communication – and of the open horizon of thought it requires – is the imagination? Could it be that Husserl's fleetingly-announced thought of Ideas I (i.e., that fiction is the source whence inquiring thought draws its sustenance) holds the key to stretching open this horizon of thought? §1. Phantasiemodi f ikat ion and the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reductions My goal in this first section of Chapter 6 is to show that the structure and systems of possibilities of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reductions stem seamlessly from the structure and possibilities of natural non-positional imagining consciousness. It is my contention that Phantasiemodifikation – the core organizing principle of natural non-positional consciousness (Nat.N-P) – is not only necessary but also sufficient for the grounding and performance of the reductions (Phen.Mk1). To do so I lay out Husserl's claims about the nature and functioning of the reductions and subsequently map his programmatic discussions onto what I establish with respect to the natural and artificial attitudes and the levels of nexic-horizonal consciousness inzwischen ist auch dieser Glaube in Unechtheit und Verkümmerung hineingeraten. Nicht ohne Grund. Statt einer einheitlich-lebendigen Philosophie haben wir eine ins Uferlose wachsende, aber fast zusammenhagslose philosophische Literatur; statt einer ernsten Auseianderseztung widerstreitender Theorien, die doch im Streit ihre innere Zusammengehörigkeit bekunden, ihre Gemeinsamkeit in den Grundüberzeugungen und einen unbeirrbaren Glauben an eine wahre Philosophie, haben wire in Schen-Referieren und Schein-Kritisieren, blossen Schein ernstlichen Miteinanderund Füreinanderphilosophierens. Es bezeugt sich darin nichts weniger als ein veranwortungsbewusstes wecheselseitiges Studium im Geiste einer ernsten Zusammenarbeit und eines Absehens auf objektiv gültige Resultate. Objektiv gültige, – das besagt doch nichts anderes als durch wecheselseitige Kritik geläuterte und jeder Kritik standhaltende Resultate. Aber wir wäre auch wirkliches Studium und wirkliche Zusammenarbeit möglich, wo es so viele Philosophen und fast eben so viele Philosophien gibt? Wir haben zwar noch philosophische Kongresse – die Philosophen kommen zusammen, aber leider nich die Philosophien. Ihnen fehlt die Einheit eines geistigen Raumes, in dem sie füreinander sein, aufeinander wirken könnten. Mag sein, dass es innerhalb einzelner Schulen oder Richtungen besser steht; aber bei ihrem Sein in Form der Vereinzelung und in Ansehung der gesamten philosophischen Gegenwart bleibt es doch im wesentlichen bei unserer Charakteristik" Hua I, pp.46-47 (Husserl's italics). 272 pertaining to each. What will come to the fore is the heavy language of freedom, possibility, and neutrality that Husserl employs in his discussions of the reductions (throughout his career) as well as my model's ability to uncover for the source of these heretofore unaccounted abilities. Husserl's discussion of neutrality modification in Ideas I was, as we saw in Chapter 5, an attempt to establish the source of the neutrality and negative freedom seminal for the phenomenological reductions. He saw the importance of clarifying this ground. Subsequently, in his later programmatic texts, he set aside the question of the source of freedom, neutrality, and possibility in his discussions of method and focused instead on the functioning and purposes of his methodological tools. He nevertheless successfully pursued the question of these three dimensions (qua abilities of natural pre-theoretical, nonmethodological consciousness) in his analyses of Phantasie well into the mid-1920s.1 My model accounts not only for the neutrality and negative freedom (i.e., freedom from Nat.P1), but also the positive freedom (freedom to conceive the otherwise) and possibility at work in the reductions and eidetic variation. Following the above-mentioned multifaceted clarifying approach, I focus on what Husserl states explicitly about the reductions over the course of his career, what he implies or leaves ambiguous as well as the ensuing questions, and what my model uncovers about the source, structure, and system of possibilities of the reductions and eidetic variation. Let us begin by looking at the specific dimensions of the reductions that he explicitly identifies. §1! . Husserl's Reductions As already discussed in Chapter 5, the success of phenomenological reflection hinges, in Husserl's view, upon its ability to utterly divorce itself from the presuppositions and doxic systems of the natural attitude. The phenomenological attitude (or standpoint) is 1 Cf., Hua XXIII 273 one of a radically different kind and it entails a novel way of 'seeing' (i.e., intuiting and gaining insight). We also discovered that this unique inquiring attitude is, according to Husserl, within our freedom – that we can access it given the very structure and abilities of our consciousness.1 This claim Husserl makes in 1913 about our freedom to perform the reductions remains central to his transcendental phenomenological project. As late as 1929, in his Cartesian Meditations, he informs us that freedom – the freedom from (i.e., negative freedom) the realizing positional natural consciousness – is not only feasible but also absolute. The phenomenological-transcendental description and analysis are grounded in this structural ability to bracket the protodoxic hold.2 What makes the appropriation of the essential nature of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar meaning of its form of inquiry, and its relation to all other sciences (to psychology in particular) so extraordinarily difficult, is that in addition to all other adjustments a new way of looking at things is necessary, one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought. To move freely along this new way without reverting to the old viewpoints, to learn to see what stands before our eyes, to distinguish, to describe, calls, moreover, for exacting and laborious studies.3 This structural facility with which the transition from the natural to the artificial occurs does not suggest, however, an easily accomplished feat. We can will our entrance into the phenomenological attitude, but much practice and phenomenological experience is required for the successful navigation of this new world of objects. The peril of relapsing into habitual modes of thought threatens the novice's journey at all times. Husserl became gradually more sensitive to the import of habituation. In his Crisis he performs a nuanced analysis of the intricacies at work in habituation processes pertaining to the realizing 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§31-32 2 Hua I, p.74 3 Ideas I, p.39. "In der Tat, das macht die Zueignung des Wesens der Phänomenologie, das Verständnis des eigentümlichen Sinnes ihrer Problematik und ihres Verhältnisses zu allen anderen Wissenschaften (und insbesondere zur Psychologie) so ausserörderlich schwierig, dass zu alledem eine neue, gegenüber der natürlichen Erfahrungsund Denkeinstellungen völlig geänderte Weise der Einstellung nötig ist. In ihr, ohne jeden Rückfall in die alten Einstellungen, sich frei bewegen, das vor Augen Stehende sehen, underscheiden, beschreiben zu lernen, erfordert zudem eigene und mühselige Studien" (Hua III/1, p.5 (Husserl's emphasis). 274 positional natural attitude. We shall soon have the opportunity to discuss his discoveries with respect to the limits of negative and positive freedom on this genetic model in our discussion of the relation between the transcendental epochê and his concept of Lebenswelt. In order to understand the unique character of the phenomenological attitude we must seek to clarify in what ways and to what extent it is 'radically' other than the natural standpoint. The venue we shall take in order to accomplish this goal is one that focuses on the reductions as modifications (Modifikationen)1 – to be more precise, as radical modifications or shifts able to relocate and translate acts and their corresponding information from one level of consciousness to another. Radical modification emerges once more as the key concept behind our project of disentangling Husserl's convoluted method; Chapter 4 showed us the nefarious philosophical consequences of overlooking its significance. But what levels are we referring to here given that the shift is prima facie one from the natural to the artificial attitude (or standpoint) broadly construed? What are the levels of consciousness involved in the reductions as radical modifications? To answer these questions we must delve deeper into Husserl's claims about the epochê, the phenomenological reduction, and eidetic reduction. §1!1. The Epochê In the natural attitude one is always aware of the world: the spatial and temporal world of the everyday given as background (Hintergrund) in realizing positional (Nat.P1) intuitions without attentional engaging.2 The world as a whole is co-perceived and co-present (Mitgegenwärtigen)3 as real and actual through my intentional dealings with real and actual 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§89, 92, 101 2 Hua III/1, §27 3 Hua III/1, p.57 275 objects.1 As already discussed in Part I and Chapter 5, my epistemic interaction with real objects and their world is essentially bound to remain indeterminate.2 The perspectival nature (Abschattung) of this interaction harbors infinite and multifarious aspects to be grasped and experienced. These aspects are real intuitive possibilities – ontically aligned to already engaged actualities; they are for the most part well-informed presumptions (Vermutlichkeiten).3 Despite the epistemic indeterminacy necessarily or structurally pertaining to the natural realizing-positional attitude, a sense of certainty and evidence – of immediacy of givenness never falters.4 The world and the things in the world are directly grasped as real and actual (cf., protodoxa). And yet this natural world-about-us is ever changing;5 Husserl's modality modification, extensively discussed in Part I of this project, captures this volatility manifested at both doxic-noetic and ontic-noematic levels. Modalization – i.e., the loss, search, and regaining of epistemic certainty with respect to facts in the realizing positional attitude – affects our specific interactions with objects in the world; it does not, in the end, modify our belief in the existence, immediate availability, and actuality of this world.6 The realizing-positional consciousness sees itself as being part of this world of things, goods, and values. Its standpoint is not one of detachment from this world – it is one of utter immersion. And this includes the inquiring consciousness of the natural sciences given their inherent unquestioned belief in the actuality and existence of their objects. The explanatory and classifying efforts of these sciences occur in the natural attitude.7 The situation is not the same with the eidetic sciences. Husserl's example par excellence here is 1 Hua III/1, pp.56-57 2 Hua III/1, p.57 3 Hua III/1, p.57 4 Hua III/1, pp.57-58 5 Hua III/1, p.58 6 Hua III/1, p.58 7 Cf., Hua III/1, §28 276 mathematics as objective eidetic science.1 The intuition of ideal universal mathematical objects occurs in an attitude radically other (Einstellung) than the intuition of facts in the realizing natural attitude. The two intuitions share only one aspect in common: their immediacy or direct mode of givenness.2 The real world of facts and values is a shared world – an intersubjectively constituted world whose meaning we all are (and each of us individually) responsible for. As world for us, this world exhibits unity, harmony, and identity through change.3 While the natural realizing attitude is primarily non-theoretical (i.e., it undergirds the descriptive and explanatory efforts of positive natural sciences), it is thetic or described by a doxic thesis: the protodoxa and its modalizations. This thetic yet non-theoretical world (i.e., prior to any theoretical efforts) constitutes, according to Husserl, the entrance gate (Eingangspforte) and starting point of phenomenology.4 Phenomenological reflection begins, according to Husserl in 1913, with the bracketing of this real and natural world. Given the relationship the positive sciences have to this world, they are suspended along with it.5 Since Husserl's goal is to secure the purity of the artificial phenomenological attitude, any philosophical theories, though not natural, are likewise put out of play (i.e., philosophical epochê).6 Lastly, the objective eidetic sciences, their goals, and their results must also be set aside if the phenomenological project is to begin and proceed in an utterly presuppositionless manner (eidetic objective epochê). 7 All of these types of epochê are suspensions of entire attitudes and their corresponding worlds of 1 Hua III/1, §28 2 As I stressed in Chapter 5, this is the case with all levels of consciousness (be they natural or artificial) – each has a core direct intuitive presentation (i.e., external and immanent perception in Nat.P1, imagination as act in Nat.N-P and Art.N-P, and eidetic intuition in Art.P2). 3 Hua III/1, §29 4 Hua III/1, p.61 5 Hua III/1, §30 6 Hua III/1, §18 7 Hua III/1, §60 277 objects and results. Unlike the phenomenological reduction, which should be primarily narrowly construed as the suspension of the doxic-ontic modalities of specific acts and their respective objects (a modification that makes available a new kind of object: phenomena rather than real and actual things), the epochê is the neutralization of entire ontic and epistemic theses – be they factual, philosophical, or objective-eidetic. Let us take a closer look at the bracketing occurring in the epochê understood as the suspension of the natural thesis (i.e., the primary epistemic attitude and basis for all positive or eidetic theoretical endeavors). We learn that the suspension (Ausschaltung) or bracketing (Einklammerung) of the natural thesis (natürliche Thesis) is a radical change (radikale Änderung).1 It is Husserl's intention here to show that this radical shift, though artificial, is something we are able to perform given an essential or structural possibility (prinzipielle Moglichkeit).2 We are free and able to surpass the natural thesis. To do so, we must put out of play its ontic-doxic commitments (i.e., modality) as well as its epistemic motivational and teleological structure (i.e., the search for certainty and factual evidence),3 which are incompatible with the doxic, ontic, and factually epistemic neutral character of the phenomenological attitude.4 Natural consciousness and phenomenological-artificial consciousness are not co-ordinate. The latter is essentially without factual-existential positing (ohne Setzung).5 It is non-positional (exhibits ontic-doxic neutrality). This shift away from the positional is, according to Husserl, a 1 Hua III/1, §31 2 Ibid. 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §31 and Hua V, Nachwort, pp.145-146. We should note here that Husserl's discussion of the natural thesis in 1913 already exhibits a high degree of sophistication – one that will reach its peak in his 1920s lectures on passive synthesis (Hua XI). 4 Ibid. 5 This non-positionality requires clarification – it is not factual, realizing positionality; the phenomenological attitude is, however as we shall soon clearly see, 'positional' in so far as it posits its objects as essences. 278 transvaluation (Umwertung) of realizing-positional objects and meanings we perform under the aegis of full freedom (volkommene Freiheit).1 The issue of our full negative freedom to perform the epochê, extensively explored for the first time in Ideas I, is also taken up by Husserl in his later genetic discussions of method. As already noted, his 1929 Cartesian Meditations do not signal any radical shift in his methodological perspective. It is not until his 1936 Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology that he further qualifies this negative freedom. The main reason behind Husserl's reconsideration of the scope and nature of methodological freedom stems from his discoveries with respect to the historical and scientifically-informed nature of the prescientific, pre-theoretical attitude. In 1913, he painted the natural world and correlate of the realizing attitude as an easily mappable world – one whose parameters could be clearly delineated; the result of this view was an unproblematic bracketing of the world, given that what is clearly identifiable can be easily put out of play. The Lebenswelt of the Crisis – also the correlate of the natural realizing attitude – is a much more complex and dynamic affair. According to Husserl, such a world is not solely exhibiting easily identifiable ontic and doxic presuppositions; it is, rather, a historically dynamic world constituted through intersubjective endeavors and permeated by socio, cultural, and political valuations.2 3 Furthermore, it exhibits historically-manifested belief systems stemming from the scientific attitude as Husserl's discussion of the Galilean scientific outlook clearly shows;4 these deeply engrained beliefs function, along with ontic, doxic, socio-cultural, practical, and valuational positings (Setzungen), as complex and interrelated presuppositions. Thus, there is a covert dynamic between the natural pre-scientific and the scientific attitudes that could derail 1 Hua III/1, p.63 2 Cf., Hua VI, §28 3 For extensive and elegant discussion of the historical character of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology see Carr (1974, 1987); see also Carr (2010). 4 Cf., Hua VI, §9; cf., also Hua VI, §33 279 the phenomenological bracketing attempts. This dynamic is bidirectional. While all scientific (i.e., naturalistic) claims have the power to reshape our doxic and epistemic presuppositions regarding the Lebenswelt, all of these endeavors are grounded in the Lebenswelt and our consciousness of it. These endeavors pertain to what Husserl refers to, Ideas II and onward, as the personalistic attitude1 (i.e., the intersubjective and historical constituting attitude of realizing lived experiences). Such a convoluted dynamic is bound to render entering the phenomenological attitude difficult; the reductions as radical changes or modifications would have to necessarily engage and dissolve these various systems of presuppositions. Entering the phenomenological attitude would take nothing less than a critical historical attitude2 able to track and identify these presuppositions along with their sources and trajectories.3 Could we still, then, say that we have the full freedom to perform these reductions as successful pathways to pure and genuine phenomenological inquiry? Despite these legitimate concerns, Husserl's trust in philosophical autonomy remains firm; despite the complex scientific, cultural, and historical forces at work in the forging of the Lebenswelt we are, according to Husserl, still able to free ourselves from its bonds. Recognizing that our ability to perform the phenomenological-transcendental reductions is intimately tied to our acknowledgment and handling of complex and historically dynamic presuppositions constitutes the viable path toward such philosophical autonomy.4 The transcendental task remains the same despite the difficulties Husserl brings to the fore through his historical and genetic analysis of world and world-consciousness. It withstands this rectification by acquiring a critical dimension – one already witnessed in the introduction 1 Cf., Hua IV, §49 2 Hua VI, §§7, 15 3 We shall have more to say about this in our discussion of post-ideational thought in section 3 of this chapter. 4 Cf., Hua VI, §§15, 26. The task of the natural sciences investigating this complex world that is prima-facie untouched by subjective and theoretical projects is also infinitely more difficult as they, too, must recognize the presuppositions undergirding their 'objective' knowledge and claims of validity (cf., Hua VI, §34). 280 to the Cartesian Meditations. Universal eidetic knowledge is therefore very much the goal of phenomenological inquiry despite the historically (intersubjectively, scientifically, and culturally) volatile character of the starting point of its investigations. The task of the epochê is to bracket all of these systems of presuppositions and their claims to knowledge and validity – be they overtly or covertly pre-scientific or scientific.1 What this bracketing is meant to open is an entire array of non-positional possibilities. The non-positionality exhibited here excludes not solely the ontic-doxic modalities we witnessed in Ideas I, but all of the presuppositional systems mentioned above.2 The critical task of phenomenology lies in identifying and tracking historically and intersubjectively developed realizing presuppositions. It is a leaving behind of all forms of naïveté (i.e., natural attitude here reconsidered)3 through what Husserl refers to as 'a completely unique, universal epochê' – a total shift in attitude.4 Due to the extensive and dynamic character of these doxic systems only a total bracketing (one exhibiting and unfolding through a full freedom) could rise to the occasion: Instead of this universal abstention in individual steps, a completely different sort of universal epochê is possible, namely, one which puts out of action, with one blow, the total performance running through the whole of natural world-life and through the whole network (whether concealed or open) of validities – precisely that total performance which, as the coherent 'natural attitude,' makes up 'simple' 'straightforward' ongoing life.5 It appears that Husserl's trust in our full negative freedom did not stagger despite the daunting task pained in the Crisis: 1 Hua VI, §§35, 39-40 2 Hua VI, §§36-37 3 Cf., Hua VI, §38 4 Hua VI, p.151 5 Crisis, p.150. "Es ist aber anstatt dieser Universalität der Enthaltung in Einzelschritten eine ganz andere Weise der universalen Epoche möglich, nämlich die mit einem Schlage den durch die Gesamtheit des natürlichen Weltlebens und durch das gesamte (ob verborgene oder offene) Geflecht der Geltungen hindurchreichenden Gesamtvollzug ausser Aktion setzt, eben den, der als einheitliche 'natürliche Einstellung' das 'schlicht' 'geradehin' Dahinleben ausmacht" (Hua VI, p.153). 281 [...] it is through this abstention that the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully free: above all, free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world.1 It is from this very ground [i.e., the ground of the pregiven world] that I have freed myself through the epochê; I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in quite a peculiar sense, a phenomenon.2 And the gaze made free by the epochê must likewise be, in its own way, an experiencing gaze. [But] the accomplishment of the total transformation of attitude must consist in the fact that the infinity of actual and possible world-experience transforms itself into the infinity of actual and possible 'transcendental experience,' in which, as a first step, the world and the natural experience of it are experienced as 'phenomenon.'3 The above-passages exhibit not only Husserl's trust in the negative freedom we have already discussed, but also his trust in the positive freedom made manifest and brought to the fore through this radical bracketing and attitudinal modification. What is ultimately brought to the fore is an infinite array of non-positional possibilities or phenomena. Yet this freedom, full as it may be, must, in order to be genuinely critical, acknowledge its own limits.4 These limits, as we shall soon discuss in the following subsection, are best revealed as the structural a priori principles of (inquiring) consciousness. The system of possibilities brought to the fore through the epochê's positive freedom is just that – a system: an organized holistic field of inquiry. Whether analyzing reell or non-reell objects, the phenomenological consciousness is bound by a priori subjective principles; for instance, it must recognize and 1 Crisis, p.151 (my underlining). "[...] mit ihr der Blick des Philosophen in der Tat erst völlig frei wird, und vor allem frei von der stärksten und universalsten und dabei verborgensten inneren Bindung, von derjenigen der Vorgegebenheit der Welt" (Hua VI, p.154). 2 Crisis, p.152 (Husserl's emphasis; my underlining). "Gerade dieses Bodens habe ich mich durch die Epoché enthoben, ich stehe über der Welt, die nun für mich in einem ganz eigenartigen Sinne zum Phänomen geworden ist" (Hua VI, p.155). 3 Crisis, p.153 (my underlining). "Und so muss auch der Blick, den die Epoché frei macht, ebenfalls ein in seiner Weise erfahrender Blick sein. Die Leistung der totalen Umstellung muss darin bestehen, dass sich die Unendlichkeit wirklicher und möglicher Welterfahrung umwandelt in die Unendlichkeit wirklicher und möglicher 'transzendentaler Erfahrung', in der als Erstes die Welt und ihre natürliche Erfahrung erfahren wird als 'Phänomen'" (Hua VI, p.156). 4 Hua VI, §42 282 follow the constitutive interaction between realizing consciousness and its corresponding objects and world.1 Does this self-reflective, critical attitude of phenomenological inquiry help steer it clear of all presuppositions? Can it really attain universally knowledge despite its historically and intersubjectively volatile point of departure? What kind of description are we looking at on the genetic phenomenological model? Can such description free itself from the demands of the natural attitude and also accomplish the tremendous task of capturing the essential invariant principles behind the lived 'Heraclitean flux' of 'constituting life'? Husserl himself asks these most important questions.2 Our discussion of genetic eidetic co-variation in section 3 will seek to clarify his methodological model as well as further unravel the limits of the positive freedom at work in genetic investigations. We shall then rethink once more, beyond the context of the reductions, the relation between the natural and artificial attitudes. To return to the issue of the neutrality exhibited by the epochê as radical bracketing, we must qualify, with Husserl, the distinction between neutrality and negation (i.e., supposition of non-being, Ansetzung des Nichtseins).3 It is not an anti-thesis – i.e., the positing of the opposite thesis. This is why Husserl's reductions do not function on the model of Cartesian doubt (Zweifel), which is a supposition of non-being and as such, functions at the level of natural realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1) without escaping its factual epistemic demands.4 This is also why Husserl later claims in his Cartesian Meditations that Descartes' ego, though seeking the transcendental attitude (i.e., an attitude necessarily entailing the nonappurtenance of the subject to the natural world) is still very much part of the world, a 'tag- 1 Cf., Hua VI, §§46-50, 53 2 Hua VI, §52 3 Hua III/1, p.63 4 Cf., Hua III/1, p.62 283 end of the world' (Endchen der Welt.)1 As discussed in Part I, negation is merely a modalization of the protodoxa and its certainty; doubt (a more complex type of modalization) relies on negation. Doubt in the natural realizing attitude cannot be indefinitely sustained. Any doxic vacillation between two real factual ontic poles is bound to terminate in temporary confirmation (Bewahrheitung) or verification (Bewährung). This is the closest realizing positionality comes to 'neutrality' – a transient and necessarily soluble vacillation. Non-positional neutrality is genuine neutrality – one indefinitely and essentially free from any protodoxic demands. Herein lies the epochê's epistemic neutrality; it neither seeks nor craves the realizing telos of factual certainty. This, too, is something Cartesian doubt fails to accomplish.2 Despite these clear differences between Cartesian doubt and the epochê, Husserl, unlike most thinkers, explores whatever parallels there might be between Descartes' project and his own philosophical endeavors. Husserl's reductions are primarily meant to open a field of inquiring possibilities free of all ontic and doxic presuppositions. For the reasons listed above, doubt is a poor candidate for the venue meant to secure this shift. Nevertheless, according to Husserl, Descartes' adamantly manifested desire to wipe the philosophical slate clean is worthy of admiration and even emulation (with the proviso of methodological improvement).3 Like Descartes, Husserl appears to be seeking an absolute foundation upon which to build an edifice of apodictic knowledge.4 Tempting as it might be to take Husserl's foundationalism for granted, we need to further qualify it.5 Instead of a minimal fixed point meant to sustain this edifice, what 1 Hua I, §10, pp.63-64. Cf., also, Hua VI, §18, pp.81-82 2 Hua VI, §19 3 Cf., Hua VI, §17 4 Ibid. 5 For discussions of Husserl's qualified foundationalism, see Mohanty (1988), Drummond (1990, 1991), Drummond & Embree (1992), Zahavi (2003), Shim (2005), and Hopp (2007). 284 Husserl attempts to bring to the fore is an entire horizon of possibilities as phenomena – i.e., possibilities that essentially (structurally) pertain to the sphere of pure consciousness.1 It is a holistic and dynamic inquiring attitude that comes to the fore as 'foundational' or the 'basis' for organizing and accumulating all phenomenological knowledge stemming from descriptive analyses. As we shall see in our discussion of ideational and post-ideational thought, this dynamic 'foundation' constantly and self-reflectively reshapes itself. The justification of apodictic or genuine universal knowledge, lies, for Husserl, in the 'purity' of this dynamic 'foundation' – a purity expressed as transcendental non-positionality motivated by eidetic goals. Husserl's claims about the epochê as universal radical reduction in the Crisis explicitly express this dynamic character of the phenomenological system of inquiring possibilities. The success of this generation and regeneration of possibilities: "[...] is actually to accomplish a reduction to the absolutely ultimate grounds and to avoid unnoticed, nonsensical admixtures of naturally naïve prior validities."2 Unlike the epochê of Ideas I, which is a reduction to an apparently empty inquiring field,3 the genetic epochê Husserl refers to here is less a leap than a sustained self-referential process: "[...] it [the transcendental epochê] has not only been enriched by the samples of significant insights attained along the way; it has also attained a self-understanding in principle which procures for these insights and for the epochê itself their ultimate meaning and value."4 We are thus encouraged here to think of this residual horizon of possibilities as having 'content' or, simply put in less daunting 1 Hua VI, pp.79-80 2 Crisis, p.154. "[...] wenn sie wirklich die Reduktion auf die absolut letzten Gründe leisten und die unvermerkten, sinnwidrigen Einmengungen natürlich naiver Vorgeltungen vermeiden soll" (Hua VI, p.157). 3 Cf., Hua VI, p.p.158 4 Crisis, pp.154-155. "[...] nicht nur bereichert durch die Stücke erarbeiteter bedeutsamer Einsichten des durchgeführen Weges, sondern in einem prinzipiellen Selbstverständnis, das ihnen und der Epoché selbst ihren letzten Sinn und Wert verschafft" (Hua VI, p.157). 285 language,1 as having access to the information harnessed in the natural pre-theoretical attitude. What kind of information is this, and, to what extent does it still play a role in ideation? We will engage these questions momentarily; for now, we note that the 'elimination' of presuppositions with respect to the correlate of the natural realizing consciousness (in the genetic case, this correlate is the Lebenswelt), entails having a positive relation to them. The information they hold, once stripped naked of protodoxic modalizations, becomes part of the currency employed in ideational projects. As transvaluation – a shift to ontic-doxic and epistemic neutrality – the epochê does not solely exhibit neutrality manifested as negative freedom (or freedom from the natural thesis). It is also marked by positive freedom. What it puts out of play are the ontic-doxic and epistemic characters of the natural thesis and its object – i.e., the world. But the natural consciousness and its world are not, through this bracketing, eliminated.2 They are revealed anew from a different perspective: as phenomena or objects without assigned ontic status and without built in epistemic modalities. What Husserl means by stressing the natural attitude as the 'entrance gate' (Eingangspforte) for phenomenological reflection is not solely 'starting point' understood as 'that which is left behind' (i.e., the doxic and epistemic commitment); he also means 'starting point' as raw material for phenomenological analyses, namely, the given phenomena as phenomenological objects of investigation: This thetic reality, if our judgment is to be the measure of it, is simply not there for us. And yet everything remains, so to speak, as of old. Even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual experience is a perception of 'this blossoming apple tree, in this garden, and so forth,' and likewise the reduced pleasure, a pleasure in what is thus perceived. The tree has 1 The language of 'content,' heavily employed by the early moderns in their sense date theories, has a baggage in need of serious qualification. Husserl employs this language with more or less frequency over the course of his career; it eventually becomes one of the venues he employs in order to signal the essential difference between formal and material eidetic studies (phenomenology falling into the latter, the theory of multiplicities, for example, in the former). 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §76 286 not forfeited the least shade of content from all the phases, qualities, character with which it appeared in this perception, and 'in' this pleasure proved 'beautiful,' 'charming,' and the like.1 The passage above also reveals the fact that the epochê affects both doxic and ontic modalities; it affects both noeses and their corresponding noemata.2 As such, they can each subsequently become the objects of phenomenological analyses. The reell and the real are both relocated from the realizing-positional level to the non-positional one.3 What the epochê succeeds in doing is bring to the fore a whole new field of inquiring possibilities – i.e., the 'pure' artificial non-positional consciousness and its correlates. This field is ambiguous. It is both the field of performing phenomenological consciousness and the field of reell and nonreell structures under investigation. The epochê as radical modification affects, like Phantasiemodifikation in the natural attitude, both noetic and noematic structures. The inquiring consciousness is itself also free of doxic presuppositions as it investigates ontically and epistemically neutralized reell structures and their (now) non-positional correlates. I will have more to say about this in the next section on the 'given and the taken' of phenomenological reflection. The phenomena mentioned above as the expressions of the positive freedom at work in the bracketing process are nothing other than non-positional possibilities.4 What the reductions open is a realm of both noetic and noematic possibilities. The epochê suspends natural consciousness and its world and in doing so it opens the sphere of possibilities pertaining to 1 Ideas I, pp.239-240 (Boyce Gibson translation modified). "Diese thetische Wirklichkeit ist ja urteilsmässig für uns nicht da. Und doch bleibt sozusagen alles beim alten. Auch das phänomenologisch reduzierte Wahrnehmungserlebnis ist Wahrnehmung von "diesem blühenden Apfelbaum, in diesem Garten usw.", und ebenso das reduzierte Wohlgefallen Wohlgefallen an diesem selben. Der Baum hat von all den Momenten, Qualitäten, Charakteren, mit welchen er in dieser Wahrnehmung erscheinender, "in" diesem Gefallen "schöner", "reizender" u.dgl. war, nicht die leiseste Nuance eingebüsst" Hua III/1, p.204 (Husserl's emphases). 2 Cf., also Hua III/1, §§91, 97 3 As we shall soon see in our discussion of eidetic variation in Husserl's static and genetic models, there are two levels of this variation – two analyses so to speak: a noetic and a noematic eidetic variation. The two are parallel. What changes on the genetic model is the nature of their 'parallelism' from a static-fragmentary one to a dynamic bi-directional one. 4 Cf., Hua III/1, §77 287 artificial non-positional consciousness (Art.N-P) and its correlate, the world of phenomena. The latter includes, along with alternatives to irreal possibilities (i.e., genuine variants), the world of the realizing positional attitude stripped of its ontic modality and epistemic motivation (reduced or translated Nat.P1 information).1 The richness of Nat.P1 experiences (e.g., the richness of perceiving the beauty of a blossoming apple tree) is not lost but revealed anew. Once the factual epistemic teleology of Nat.P1 is put out of play, the phenomenological search for the essential structures of experiences can commence given that the latter's eidetic positionality and the former's realizing positionality are mutually exclusive. The epochê must therefore be conceived as a reduction affecting the natural world and bringing forth the artificial world of phenomenology. Such large-scale bracketing is extensively exhibited for the first time, in Ideas I, Husserl's first holistic account of his transcendental thought. His prior discussions of the reduction were primarily focusing on the shift from engaging objects as real and actual things to engaging them as phenomena.2 We see this model of large-scale reduction expressed for the first time in Husserl's 19101911 lecture entitled "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology."3 In this lecture course Husserl explores the import of entire attitudes in the development of his phenomenological method. The notion of attitude (Einstellung), though here methodologically considered, is something that came to the fore for the first time in his 1904/05 lectures on Phantasie and 1 As we shall soon see in the following sections, Art.N-P and its correlate – the world of irreal possibilities qua phenomena – ought not to be equated scope-wise with the reduced or translated Nat.P1 and its correlate. The former's scope is much broader as includes both Nat.N-P possibilities now located in a teleological context as well as variants or free irreal possibilities as alternatives of irreal possibilities. 2 This is how Husserl discusses the phenomenological reduction in the decade preceding Ideas I – a time when Husserl was still very much focusing on the act-descriptive analyses we saw in the Investigations. His lectures on thing and space – Hua XVI – (along with his 5 introductory lectures published in Hua II) are the first to exhibit Husserl's gradual move toward a transcendental inquiring model – one that focuses on acts and their objects. The reason for this shift around this time is his development of a nuanced notion of constitution – a notion that will later come to condition much of his programmatic thought. 3 Cf., "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie", in Hua XIII. 288 Bildbewusstsein. It was through his study of imaging and imagining consciousness as radically different from perceptual consciousness that the attitudinal structures of consciousness came to the fore for the first time. The novelty of Husserl's insights in 1910-1911 lies less in stressing different attitudes (he has already done so to a fairly large extent, esp. in the lectures courses on Phantasie dated 1908-1909) than in his insistence on what they are and engage as their correlates, namely, different horizons of possibilities. Thus, the imagining attitude and its correlate become novel, exciting, and most importantly, methodologically recognized spheres of inquiry. Thus far we have established that according to Husserl's model of natural thesis and world bracketing requires: 1) negative freedom, 2) ontic-doxic neutrality, 3) epistemic neutrality, and 4) positive freedom as the bringing forth of 5) non-positional possibilities. Our discussion of the phenomenological reduction will further emphasize these dimensions. §1!2. The Phenomenologi ca l Reduct ion What we have thus far uncovered about the epochê holds in the case of the phenomenological reduction as well. To better grasp the subtle differences between these two types of bracketing we need to disambiguate the term 'phenomenological reduction,' which Husserl employs in two ways: 1) broadly, as an umbrella term for all of the transcendental reductions (be they the overall bracketing of natural consciousness, its thesis, and its world; the shift to phenomena; or the shift to posited essences), and 2) narrowly, to refer to the radical modification of standpoint from viewing objects as real and actual things (and ontic modalizations thereof) to engaging them as phenomena (i.e., objects without ontic modality). Correspondigly, this narrow conception of the phenomenological reduction also entails the shift from actually posited reell noeses to non-positional ones. Like the epochê, the phenomenological reduction affects both noeses and their noemata, now both intended and given as phenomena – i.e., 289 the new objects brought to the fore through this reduction or the post-suspension 'residua'. We shall have ample opportunity to explore the nature and status of these noetic-noematic residua in the next section. For now, let us note that the phenomenological reduction makes possible a new kind of object – phenomena. Thus, while Husserl discusses the epochê specifically in the context of the suspension of the natural thesis and its world, he stresses the phenomenological reduction as the radical modification from natural consciousness (one that is part of the world whose actuality it posits and about which it makes pre-reflective and reflective doxic and epistemic claims) to pure consciousness.1 What Husserl aims at in emphasizing this aspect of the reduction is not the sole focus on consciousness and its acts (as he does in the Logical Investigations), but the opening of a new field of inquiring possibilities – one centered around a consciousness that is not taken to be part of the natural world (i.e., not 'a tag-end of the world').2 By 1913 Husserl leaves behind his solely act-descriptive approach; nevertheless, his primary focus on consciousness and its noeses remains. The phenomenological reduction as radical modification is important because it affects both consciousness and its correlate as objects of study and the inquiring consciousness itself. The former's purity lies in its non-positionality understood as ontic neutrality. The latter's purity is its non-positionality as doxic and epistemic neutrality along with its freedom from the bonds of the natural realizing attitude and its concern with facts and factual evidence.3 This modification grounds the possibility for a new kind of reflection, namely, for phenomenological inquiry, which studies its objects (i.e., phenomena) without intending, living, and focusing on their existence. This radical modification, like the epochê, is 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§50-51 2 Hua III/1, §49 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §§50-51 290 performed through negative freedom, or the absolute freedom from the ontic and epistemic demands of the natural realizing attitude (Nat.P1).1 The phenomenological reduction is neither a negation,2 nor an elimination,3 nor an abstraction.4 Negation as modalization of protodoxic behavior is, as already stressed, not involved in the unfolding of suspension. We have also discussed the non-eliminative character of bracketing or suspension; natural consciousness and its world maintain their richness – they are not lost and still very much available to the phenomenological study. What is 'eliminated' (durchgestrichen) are the ontic-doxic commitments of these correlates. The phenomenological reduction is also not an 'abstraction from' – a separation of certain aspects from others, which on the empiricist model is nothing other than simplification as we saw in Brentano's case. Husserl has two important reasons for making this distinction here. First, he must, as always, distinguish his project from an empiricist one, and second, he must disambiguate his own usage of the term 'abstraction', which prior to Ideas I he employed liberally to refer both to the phenomenological reduction and phenomenological idealizing thought (as we saw in Chapter 4). Because 'abstraction' is a term evocative of both empiricism and its problem of induction as well as mathematics, which is a different type of eidetic science, Husserl must now, in his first mature attempt to lay out a coherent method for a unique and self-standing phenomenological investigation, clarify his terminology and views with respect to abstraction once and for all.5 1 Cf., Hua I, p.74 2 Hua III/1, §55 3 Hua III/1, §§50, 76, 90 4 Hua III/1, §51 5 The reductions must be distinguished from abstraction, the latter being a type of formalization and generalization typical of objective eidetic sciences such as mathematics. Abstraction necessarily implies a movement away from anything subjective – it aims at objective ideals, while the reductions ultimately aim at the essential structures of consciousness and the phenomenological ego, which are subjective idealities. During the formative period of Husserl's phenomenology – from 1900/01 until 1913 Husserl shifts from claiming that abstraction is the method in phenomenology (1900-approx.1905), to recognizing the significance of the phenomenological reduction but equating it with abstraction (approx.1905-1909), to finally seeing that 291 Along with the bringing forth of new objects, i.e., phenomena, the most important feature of the phenomenological reduction is its transcendental character. Because this reduction functions as an umbrella term, what we stress here as its core transcendental feature holds for all of Husserl's reductions. We have already seen that the phenomenological reduction brings to the fore phenomena. This is not all that it accomplishes. As transcendental, it also brings to light the radical difference between consciousness and its non-reell objects. As transcendental, the phenomenological reduction opens the sphere of pure consciousness – i.e., a sphere of inquiring possibilities that are fundamentally distinct from the transcendent world, which it intends and constitutes.1 Pure consciousness (both inquiring consciousness as well as the object of phenomenological inquiry) is neither realizing consciousness nor the empirical consciousness of psychology, of the positive sciences,2 or of humanistic sciences.3 It is neither naturalistic (realizing scientific) nor personalistic (realizing intersubjective) consciousness.4 It is the sphere within which and through which the ideal structures and principles that organize subjectivity can be fully exposed and understood: "The realm of transcendental abstraction and the phenomenological and eidetic reductions are radically different given their aiming at two distinct types of ideals – objective and subjective. What is worth mentioning here is the fact that the imagination, given its neutrality and indeterminacy, plays a crucial role in both abstraction and the reductions. It is also interesting that Husserl's first mentioning of the phenomenological reduction in the summer of 1905 (cf., Seefelder Manuskripte in Hua X) follows his first and main lectures on Phantasie given in the winter of 1904/1905. For a discussion of Husserl's notion of abstraction and of universalizing thought prior to the Logical Investigations, see Eliott (2002). For relations between Husserl's theory of abstraction and idealization (prior to the Logical Investigations) and its relation to Cantor's set theory and Lotze and Bolzano's idealism, see Ortiz Hill (2004) in Idealization XI. Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization (Coniglione, Poli, Rollinger, eds.) and Ortiz Hill (2009). For Husserl's notion of idealization in the 1920s – discussed as engaging the ideal limit and thus of ideal possibilities, cf., Hua XI, 147-148. For Husserl's relation to Brentano's intellectual heritage and Husserl's attempt to distance himself from it during the late Halle years see Rollinger (1999). 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§76, 88, 97 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §55; cf., also Hua V, Nachwort, pp.138ff. By employing 'pure consciousness' here I do not mean the absolute time consciousness Husserl discusses in his Hua X. I am here interested in stressing the transcendental character of the phenomenological inquiring consciousness and of the reduced consciousness (along with its corresponding objects and world) as phenomenological fields of inquiry. 3 Cf., Hua IV, pp.367ff. 4 Cf., Hua IV, §49 292 consciousness has proved, as a result of phenomenological reduction, to be, in a certain definite sense, a realm of 'absolute' Being." 1 Transcendental consciousness is essentially related to something fundamentally other – the transcendent, intended object. This intentional relation it has to the object is inherently constitutive; through it, consciousness gives meaning to its object and to the relation it has to it.2 The uniqueness of phenomenological inquiry stems, partially, from having this pure transcendental and constitutive consciousness as its field of inquiry.3 It is time here to briefly qualify transcendental consciousness on the background of Husserl's claims regarding the transcendental ego in Ideas I and onward. First, I would like to note that for the purposes of my analysis, which aims at clarifying the nature of phenomenological inquiry and its method, I consider an in-depth discussion of transcendental consciousness to be the most fruitful venue; this is so given the latter's structural richness, its self-standing intentionality, as well as our ability to analyze and describe it in great detail. It is my contention that a thorough understanding of transcendental consciousness, with its nexic-horizonal layers, suffices for clarifying the source, structure, unfolding, and fulfillment of Husserlian phenomenological reflection. What Husserl claims about the transcendental ego in Ideas I and later in Cartesian Meditations and other genetic programmatic texts,4 can easily be claimed of transcendental consciousness. The phenomenological project can thus be understood solely in terms of consciousness, without bringing an ego into the picture. Like Husserl's ego, transcendental consciousness is not part of the natural world,5 it intends entire horizons of non-positional 1 Ideas I, p.194. "Durch die phänomenologische Reduktion hatte sich uns das Reich des transzendentalen Bewusstsein als des in einem bestimmten Sinn 'absoluten' Sinn ergeben."Hua III/1, pp.158-159. Cf., also Hua IV, pp.179-180 2 Hua III/1, §86. We will discuss eidetic variation as just such a meaning-giving/meaning-uncovering process. 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §88 4 Such as the Crisis or later additions to his earlier Ideas I project (cf., 1930 Epilogue to Ideas I, published in Hua V, p.135ff.). 5 Hua I, §10, pp.63-64 293 possibilities (and it itself functions as horizon of possibilities), it is essentially constitutive,1 it exhibits traces of inter-subjectivity in its very core (i.e., its constitutive endeavors are not solipsistic),2 and it has its own history of phenomenological reflection3 – a history that is not divorced from its everyday realizing experiences.4 In our discussion of the phenomenological 'given and taken' (of the phenomenological residuum and its inherent ambiguity) we shall have ample opportunity to explore the self-standing character of phenomenological inquiring consciousness as noetic residuum. We will focus there on the nature of immanent acts (e.g., immanent presentation as founding of higher-order acts) and the role they play in Husserl's inquiry. For now let me stress that 'transcendental subjectivity' for the purposes of this project's analyses refers to transcendental consciousness.5 Any act (cogitatio) involved in the various facets of phenomenological reflection (reductive, ideational, post-eidetic intuition) can be clarified in the context of pure transcendental consciousness understood as reflective and self-reflective transcendental subjectivity. By shifting the emphasis away from the transcendental ego to transcendental consciousness we place ourselves in the fortunate situation of being able to offer a robust analysis of Husserl's otherwise abstruse eidetic method. The main reason for this lies in our ability to access and rely on all of Husserl's insightful micro-phenomenological studies of the structures of consciousness. The mere relocation of founding and radical modification from a micro-phenomenological context to the macro, self-reflective phenomenological one, has 1 Cf., Hua VI, §§49, 52-53 2 Cf., Hua V, pp.150-151; cf., also Hua VI, §§50, 52-53, and Hua I, §44 3 Cf., Hua VI, p.58ff., and §§15, 26 4 We shall have more to say about the historical dimension of phenomenological reflection in section 3 of this chapter where we will seek to uncover the hermeneutical flexible adaptability of this reflection through Husserl's notion of Rückgang. This discussion will occur in the context of our analysis of the relationship between ideational and post-ideational reflection. 5 For an interesting discussion of the dynamic between the ego and consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology, see Marbach (1974). 294 already granted us invaluable insights into the unfolding of non-positional artificial reflection. Thus, Husserl's genetic rectifications of the method and of inquiring subjectivity rather than threaten our current endeavor support it. What Husserl uncovered about consciousness through his genetic method continues to inform his claims and views about his method. For instance, what we uncovered about Husserl's parallel analysis of perception and Phantasie after 1918 and during the 1920s – a synthetic view of these two primordial levels of natural consciousness – has played a crucial role (and will continue to do so) in our discussions of artificial non-positionality (Art.N-P), which is, along with Art.P2, one of the two core consciousness levels at work in ideational inquiring processes. By shifting gears away from the language of the transcendental ego we lose none of the requirements that Husserl places on the phenomenological attitude: the transcendental consciousness is not doxically and motivationally bound by the realizing positional attitude, it is absolutely free to engage the otherwise (i.e., the non-real and non-actual),1 its intentionality is meaning-granting and meaning-seeking,2 its correlative relation to its object is a constitutive one,3 the disinterested onlooker perspective describes this pure inquiring consciousness,4 which is not a tag-end of the world,5 its unfolding and synthetic6 acts are fully equipped to engage in descriptive7 analyses8 aiming at absolute apodictic evidence. We lose none of Husserl's subjective eidetic demands yet we gain access to a vast reservoir of 1 Cf., Hua I, p.74 2 Cf., Hua I, p.72 3 Cf., Hua I, p.75 4 Cf., Hua I, p.73 5 Hua I, pp.63-64 6 Cf., Hua I, p.79 7 Cf., Hua I, p.74 8 Cf., Hua I, p.83ff. 295 phenomenological knowledge able to guide us as we attempt to bring clarity to that which Husserl either left ambiguous or remained silent about. A project such as this would benefit very little if it relied primarily on Husserl's notion of 'ego' as transcendental subjectivity. A pure ego pole as non-experienceable residuum1 accomplishes nothing on the disambiguating front. As something we experience only indirectly through reflection on the stream of consciousness,2 the ego cannot sustain a phenomenological self-reflective endeavor. Though all of these are characteristics exhibited by the transcendental ego, according to Husserl, they are obvious dimensions of the pure consciousness as noetic residuum. The transcendentality of inquiring phenomenological subjectivity is not one essentially bound (and solely pertaining) to the notion of the ego; regardless of whether we see it as ego pole (i.e., center of constitutive intentional rays)3 or as horizon of possibilities.4 Transcendentality is a feature of all reduced acts as noetic residua. The question becomes: Can consciousness secure its own unity and identity independently of an 'ego'? Our previous extensive discussions of time-consciousness, founding (Fundierung), non-radical modifications (e.g., modality and memorial modifications), and radical modification (Phantasiemodifikation) – all understood as structuring principles of consciousness – suffice to show that consciousness is essentially autonomous. The 'in principle' necessity5 of the transcendental ego lacks philosophical appeal. Transcendental consciousness exhibits identity and unity through its organizing principles (time consciousness, founding, modifications) without the aid of the ego. Intentionality – organized on this very 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §57; cf., also, Hua I, §31 2 Cf. Hua III/1, §78 3 Hua III/1, §78 4 For an insightful discussion of Husserl's transcendental subjectivity on the background of the transcendental tradition as a whole, see Carr 1999. 5 Hua III/1, p.123 296 model of identity and unity – pertains to acts; these in their turn, on the part-part and partwhole model Husserl himself refined as early as the decade preceding the Logical Investigations, are organized, identified, and unified through these principles of consciousness. Sartre, in his The Transcendence of the Ego saw this clearly and sought to emphasize the possibility of transcendental phenomenology without the ego. He argued there that the unity and identity of consciousness are not the gifts of an ego. For Sartre, this unity and identity are guaranteed by time-consciousness and by intending a transcendent individual object.1 I agree with Sartre that consciousness is its own source of unity and identity. I disagree with him that intentionality and time-consciousness are the sole sources of this unity; founding, radical, and non-radical modifications are equally important organizing principles. Sartre's overlooking of these important sources of coherent and holistic structure led him to argue for the (albeit secondary) emergence of an ego at the reflective level. Through founding and modification we can rethink the reflective level of inquiring phenomenological consciousness apart from all egological aids and hence recognize its self-standing character. Through the multi-level and attitudinal understanding of the structure of consciousness (and of its possibilities), we can structurally describe any and all self-reflective processes – be they natural or artificial – without the aid of an ego. If by 'transcendental ego' we are to understand: 1) a horizon of noetic residua that we can experience as inquiring possibilities radically distinct from the actual real world yet related to it (in other words, as system of possibilities that are neither actual instantiations (Vereinzelungen) of essences nor essences themselves (eide), but illustrative exemplars 1 Cf., TE, pp.38, 60 297 (Veranschaulichungen) of essences able to guide the phenomenologist in their eidetic quest),1 or 2) a unified self-identical whole exhibiting intentionality and various attitudes as essential features, or better still, 3) a dynamic meaning-bestowing nexus capable of self-reference, then we are, given everything we have thus far uncovered, talking about 'transcendental consciousness'. As something we can bring to the fore only in the context of the reductions, transcendental consciousness no longer entails an actual individualization (Vereinzelung) of eidetic structures, like positional realizing consciousness does; it remains at the level of essence instantiation (here Veranschaulichung) – at least initially. To qualify: the phenomenological inquiring consciousness does not commence its ideational endeavors at the eidetic positional level (Art.P2); only eidetic variation is able to grant it access to this level of consciousness. Simply put, not every transcendental consciousness is phenomenological inquiring consciousness but every phenomenological inquiring consciousness is transcendental. To return to our initial discussion of Husserl's phenomenological reduction: like the reell (or the immanent), the non-reell (or the transcendent) is not lost; phenomenological inquiry into the essential structures of consciousness necessarily entails an analysis of the intentional and constitutive relation to its objects. Whether these objects are now approached as immanent (reell non-positional) or transcendent (non-reell non-positional) phenomena, they are no longer taken to be actual or real things in a world that consciousness shares with them: This suspension has also the character of a change of indicator which alters the value of that to which the indicator refers, but if this change of indicator be reckoned in, that whose value it serves to alter is thereby reinstated within the phenomenological sphere. Or to put it metaphorically: the bracketed matter is not wiped off the phenomenological slate but only 1 Husserl occasionally refers to the 'eidos ego' (cf., Hua I, p.105) to signal an essence or ideal structure. The transcendental ego – or what I prefer to refer to as 'transcendental consciousness' – exhibits ideal structures such as intentionality, meaning constitution, etc., as its core features. 298 bracketed, and thereby provided with a sign that indicates the bracketing. Taking its sign with it, the bracketed matter is reintegrated in the main theme of the inquiry.1 Interestingly enough, when referring to phenomena, Husserl furtively describes them as irreal.2 This occasional employment of the language of imagining consciousness in his methodological discussions is random and without explicit grounding. Such comments are nevertheless a strong indication that had Husserl applied himself to uncovering the source of his methodology's main dimensions, he would have inevitably stumbled upon his own hardearned insights into the structure and dimensions of imagining. If we are to understand the nature of the phenomenological residuum – what eidetic phenomenological reflection gets to work (and play) with – we must further clarify the nature of these possibilities or phenomena. §1!3. The Eidet i c Reduct ion Along with the epochê and the phenomenological reduction narrowly defined, the eidetic reduction is the last type of transcendental-phenomenological reduction. We know that the phenomenological reduction is meant to secure the access to phenomena (i.e., objects nonpositionally considered). Unlike in the case of the two other types of reduction, Husserl says very little about eidetic reduction in Ideas I and elsewhere. There is a good reason for this. We learn from Husserl that this reduction brings to the fore yet another type of new objects – essences. This appears, prima facie, to be a claim very much in line with his previous statements about the nature of phenomenology as eidetic science3 meant to grasp and describe the ideal structures of consciousness and its correlates, which are not co-ordinate 1 Ideas I, p.194 (Boyce Gibson translation, modified). "Die Ausschaltung hat zugleich den Charakter einer unwertenden Vorzeichenänderung, und mit dieser ordnet sich das Umgewertete wieder der phänomenologischen Sphäre ein. Bildlich gesprochen: Das Eingeklammerte ist nicht von der phänomenologischen Tafel weggewischt, sondern eben nur eingeklammert und dadurch mit einem Index versehen. Mit diesem aber ist es im Hauptthema der Forschung" (Hua III/1, §76, p.159). Cf., also Hua III/1, §97. 2 Hua III/1, §97 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §§47, 59, 71, 74, 75 299 with facts. What phenomenology seeks is the intuition of essence (Wesensanschauung) – the primary venue for the attainment of knowledge of essences (Wesenserkenntnis).1 The eidetic reduction is somehow meant to secure the success of this project: "The corresponding reduction which leads from the psychological phenomenon to the pure 'essence,' or, in respect of the judging thought, from factual ('empirical') to 'essential' universality, is the eidetic reduction."2 Upon closer look, however, Husserl's notion of eidetic reduction becomes questionable or at least in need of further qualification. According to him, the objects of transcendental phenomenological reflection are irreal (irreal or non-real). The eidetic reduction somehow manages to trigger the shift from merely irreal objects to ideal ones. Is this 'shift' structurally similar to the shift at work in the phenomenological reduction (i.e., the shift from the real to the non-positional)? As I shall show in the following subsection, the shift from the real to the non-positional occurs through the facets or dimensions facilitated by Phantasiemodifikation; these dimensions are not the product of artificial processes but stem rather seamlessly from the structure and system of possibilities of natural non-positional imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). The same cannot hold in the case of the shift from the non-positional to the ideal. Husserl's discussions of eidetic variation, consisting, in 1913 and later on, of vague and disparate statements, nevertheless manage to reveal it as a complicated artificial multi-step process. We may not know exactly the structure and unfolding of the shift from the variant to the invariant but we do know it is arduous. A simple shift – eidetic reduction – cannot possibly grant access to that which requires significant phenomenological effort. Thus, we 1 Hua III/1, p.6 2 Ideas I, p.40. "Die zugehörige Reduktion, die vom psychologschen Phänomen zum reinen 'Wesen', bzw. im urteilenden Denken von der tatsächlichen ('empirischen') Allgemeinheit zur 'Wesens' allgemeinheit überführt, ist die eidetische Reduktion" (Hua III/1, p.6 (Husserl's emphasis)). 300 ought to take with a grain of salt his innocent claim about the potency of eidetic reduction: "The transition to the pure essence provides on the one side a knowledge of the essential nature of the real, on the other, in respect of the domain left over, knowledge of the essential nature of the irreal."1 While it is indeed important to recognize that knowledge of essences secures knowledge of that which binds the real and irreal alike, it is also important to note that this knowledge comes less effortlessly than the performance of a shift in inquiring (or viewing) attitude. This is the reason why Husserl was fairly quiet with regard to the exact functioning of the eidetic reduction. He wanted it to grant the givenness of ideals but knew he could not secure this through a 'reduction.' How then are we to understand this 'reduction'? What kind of new objects does it bring forth if it cannot secure the intuition of essence? A comment Husserl makes in Ideas III points us in the right direction. According to him, the performance of the eidetic reduction invites one to proceed on a certain path: the inquiring path of ideation: "[...] rather, we can undertake an 'eidetic reduction,' exclude all questions about real factual existence, about the judgment-positing of the latter, and carry through the attitude of purely eidetic investigation."2 Unlike the phenomenological reduction, which leads to the givenness (both the intention and intuition) of phenomena as new non-positional objects qua irreal possibilities, eidetic reduction does not intuitively bring to the fore any new objects. Post-eidetic reduction we are left with the same phenomena the previous reduction secured. What changes is the overall motivational and teleological structure of the phenomenological endeavor. Rather than merely engaging phenomena as 1 Ideas I, p.40; Boyce Gibson translation modified). "Der Übergang zum reinen Wesen liefert auf der einen Seite Wesenserkenntnis von Realem, auf der anderen, hinsichtlich der übrigbleibenden Sphäre, Wesenserkenntnis von Irrealem" (Hua III/1, p.7). 2 Ideas III, p.53. "[...] vielmehr können wir eine 'eidetische Reduktion' vornehmen, alle Fragen nach realem Dasein, nach Urteilssetzung von solchem ausscheiden und die Einstellung rein eidetischer Forschung vollziehen" (Hua V, p.40). 301 'irreal' or non-positional, we are now in the position to investigatively work with these nonpositional objects in order to uncover their ideal or essential structures. And so the search for essences begins. This eidetic positionality – one that initially (prior to any phenomenological analyses but post-reductions) entails the empty intention of ideals or essences and only gradually coming to fulfillment or intuition – does not threaten the initial non-positionality established through the reductions. In fact, it very much depends on maintaining this non-positionality throughout inquiry. This is so because in order to intend ideals and seek the intuition of them, the inquirer must set aside all intentional relations to the correlate of realizing positionality. Interesting questions stem from these observations: If the phenomenological attitude is at once non-positonal (Art.N-P) and eidetically positional (Art.P2), then does it span across two levels of consciousness? If two levels of consciousness are involved in phenomenological reflection, what is then given (intuited) as the phenomenological analyses commence? What is intended and what is intuited in the process of these analyses? Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter will seek to answer these questions employing the consciousness model outlined in Chapter 5. Seen in this way, the eidetic reduction does not seem to share any of the 'reductive' characteristics of the epochê and phenomenological reduction, which is each dependent upon neutrality, freedom, and possibility in their successful unfolding. Granted, the eidetic reduction maintains the non-positionality of phenomena, but it does not employ anything but what appears to be sheer motivation and will, or the decision to seek essences – a feasible quest now that the real and its corresponding protodoxic demands have been put out of play. Is this freedom to posit eidetic intuition as goal of phenomenological inquiry conditioned by anything? Our discussion of Phantasiemodifikation will hopefully have 302 something insightful to say about this. A note: I have employed the term 'non-positional' (nicht setzlich) to refer to the character of the reductions. Husserl himself uses it in the same context. It remains to see what the source of this non-positionality is; however by using it, I have not engaged in petitio principii – if we show that this non-positionality, referred to here as essentially characterizing the reductions, stems from Phantasiemodifikation we are logically in the clear. We now turn to examining the relationship between Husserl's reductions as artificial on the one hand, and imagining consciousness, as both natural and artificial, on the other.1 §1! . Rethinking the Reductions as Transcendental Non-Positional Modifications The dimensions Husserl identifies as seminal for the possibility of the reductions are: 1) ontic-doxic neutrality, 2) epistemic neutrality, 3) negative freedom, 4) positive freedom, and 5) non-positional possibility. We have yet to see whether these are all of the conditions for possibility that the reductions require. We must exercise caution in answering this question because while Husserl's explicit claims in Ideas I about the nature and functioning of these reductions are abundant and fairly detailed (especially compared with his far more convoluted discussion of eidetic variation in the same text and elsewhere), much is omitted from his account. The most obvious lacuna is the clarification of the source of these core dimensions. Apart from his failed attempt to establish neutrality modification as this source, no other has been explicitly explored or even suggested. Unless of course we take his passing remarks about the irreal status of phenomena and about 'fancy' as the source and ground of all eidetic inquiries for covert landmarks. This is precisely what we shall do now that we have an in-depth grasp of Phantasie as nexic-horizonal consciousness and as direct genuine intuitive presentation. 1 See chart in Chapter 5. 303 Other lacunae have to do with the specific structural moments and features of the reductions. For instance, how are we to understand the eidetic reduction's ability to bring forth new motivational and teleological possibilities and what secures the transcendental character of the reductions broadly construed? In our attempt to identify the source of the conditions for the possibility of the reductions, we must carefully identify all of the structural features of the reductions and proceed in a manner attentive to their overall dimensions as well as their covert moments. Everything we have established thus far about imagining consciousness comes to our aid in putting forth a clarifying model of the reductions. Let me emphasize once more that in going beyond Husserl's letter in the attempt to uncover the structure, possibilities, and source of his method we need not also depart from the demands he placed on successful ideation: the purity of consciousness and the successful attainment of eidetic intuition. We proceed by focusing initially on the shared and explicitly identified dimensions of the reductions and by subsequently identifying the lacunae and potentially problematic aspects of Husserl's account along the way. We will then shift gears and focus our discussion on some of the axial aspects of the specific reductions that are also in need of clarification (structure and source-wise). We will perform these analyses on the historical background of the development of Husserl's thought from Ideas I onward. Despite Husserl's silence regarding the source of the conditions for the possibility of the reductions (minus his failed attempt to establish neutrality modification as such a source), his discussions of the transcendental-phenomenological reductions make it abundantly clear that he views them as radical modifications – i.e., noetic-noematic relocating shifts from one level (or attitude) of consciousness to another.1 Husserl himself does not 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §78 304 explicitly link the reductions with the only radical modification his studies had uncovered (i.e., Phantasiemodifikation). He is no stranger to (successful) comparative projects (cf., his study of perception and Phantasie), yet he shuns what seems to be the most fruitful venue for clarifying the structural features of the reductions. I have already alluded, in my argument against the self-standing character of neutrality modification in Chapter 5, to the reason why he might have chosen to ignore this path (the assumed pictoriality of imagination). In making that argument I also stressed why, in our attempt to understand the parameters, features, and functioning of his method, we should choose otherwise. Husserl's post-1913 discoveries with respect to imagining consciousness and its three core dimensions are far better guides than his Ideas I programmatic claims. Thus, our approach here will be one of drawing the similarities and distinctions between Phantasiemodifikation and the reductions as radical modifications. The goal of this endeavor is not one of merely comparing and contrasting these modifications; rather, through comparatively-gained insights we seek to uncover Phantasiemodifikation (structurally pertaining to the natural attitude) as the source of all of the conditions for the possibility of the reductions qua radical modifications (i.e., unfolding as shifts from the natural to the artificial attitude). We will proceed by identifying all of the core dimensions of the three transcendental reductions as primarily pertaining to natural non-positional imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P), the level of consciousness secured by Phantasiemodifikation. Once the overall as well as specific features of each of these reductions is exposed in this manner (Ch.6§1!), we will conclude our discussion of the reductions by further unpacking the relationship between the natural and the artificial attitudes in light of the newly illuminated relationship between Phantasiemodifikation on the hand and the reductions on the other. 305 We saw, at the end of Chapter 5, that natural and artificial imagining consciousness are not two distinct levels of consciousness – that they are rather one level functioning in different motivational and teleological contexts. We emphasize this here as an important point in the overall argument for the necessity and sufficiency of Phantasiemodifikation for the successful performance of the phenomenological reductions. We will thus rely on the structure and system of possibilities of Nat.N-P and unearth it as the hidden source of the conditions for the possibility of entering the artificial phenomenological attitude. We also note that Art.N-P (artificial non-positional imagining consciousness and its dimensions) mirrors Nat.N-P with the exception of the latter's lack of eidetic motivation along with the modalities stemming from this project. Art.N-P is the outcome, the noetic-noematic residuum of Phen.Mk1. I employ Phen.Mk1 as an umbrella term for all of Husserl's transcendental reductions. As artificial, Phen.Mk1 requires natural dimensions to fuel the emergence of the artificial. The dimensions Husserl identifies as pertaining to the reductions have a natural source as necessary point of departure for phenomenological inquiry. They become artificial dimensions in the context of the phenomenological project, that is, once they attain an eidetic motivational and teleological structure. All of the reductions exhibit ontic-doxic and epistemic neutrality. As already established, these types of neutrality are brought forth specifically through Phantasiemodifikation in the natural attitude (Nat.N-P). Our previous extensive discussions in Part I of this project1 offer plenty of support for our contending that the bracketing of onticdoxic (i.e., noematic-noetic) modalities and of the motivational and teleological hold of the natural attitude (Nat.P1) are natural abilities of Nat.N-P. As established in Chapter 5§3!, all 1 Here in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 5 and Part I (esp. Chapter 3§1) 306 neutral acts are directly or indirectly stemming from Phantasiemodifikation and occur primarily at the level of natural non-positional consciousness (Nat.N-P). The same can be said about freedom understood both as freedom from the protodoxic hold (Nat.P1) and freedom to conceive the otherwise (i.e., irreal possibilities).1 This freedom likewise stems from Phantasiemodifikation. Let us take a closer look at its features. The first thing to note about the freedom of Nat.N-P (both the minimal, negative aspect as well as the positive modal one – the one essentially linked to irreal possibility) is that it is fundamentally a freedom from the actuality and reality of the now. It is a freedom from finite contingent contexts. Yet it is important to keep in mind that this freedom is a bound freedom – i.e., it is not a free play imagining without self-consciousness.2 Such a consciousness would be 'lost' in the imagined world, not taking it 'as if' it were real but actually believing in its reality.3 Not even aesthetic experience is possible without consciousness of irreality, and the latter is a consciousness that only a self-reflective imagining consciousness can have. The freedom of natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P) is inherently bound given its structure, even without its motivational and teleological affiliations (be they those of Nat.P1 or Art.P2). First, it is bound by the fact that it is rooted in the radical modification of the content and apprehension of realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1). As such, its content and apprehension retain a certain determinate order (without the impact of the protodoxa). Nat.P1 and Nat.N-P are therefore related and not separated by Phantasiemodifikation. This limit, as we shall soon see, has a tremendous import on the nature of the post-reductions residuum and the successful unfolding of eidetic variation. Let us qualify this by noting that not all non-positional objective correlates are such residua (i.e., 1 For my extensive discussion of freedom, see Chapter 3§§2-3 2 Cf., Chapter 3§2 3 Such can be liminal cases of psychological disorders or perhaps children who create their own imaginary worlds. 307 relocated Nat.P1 information); some correlates are conceived irreal alternatives to actualities and some are variants or alternatives to irreal possibilities. Second, the modified doxic intentional acts and their contents are not completely arbitrary in their functioning in the imaginative attitude. As we have seen in the case of imagining a judgment, the latter could very well maintain its structure and unity. The functioning of the Nat.N-P judgments or any other acts is bound by the same act-character reell or noetic structures pertaining to the realizing attitude (Nat.P1).1 Third, the freedom of Nat.N-P is also bound by self-reflection; an imagining consciousness lost in the imagined world would not make the aware distinction between fact and irreality.2 Fourth, Nat.N-P freedom is bound by subjective organizing principles such as the constitution of time consciousness (including its principles of succession and simultaneity), founding (Fundierung), and non-radical modifications (e.g., memorial or modality modifications). We already saw that Phantasiemodifikation as radical modification conditions this freedom. We also stressed that radical modifications, such as Phantasiemodifikation, are able to collaborate with founding and non-radical modifying processes. All of these structures manifestly organize natural nonpositional consciousness. Last but not least, freedom is bound by objective ideal principles such as the principle of non-contradiction. The bound character of Nat.N-P freedom is of the utmost importance for phenomenological inquiry. Imagining consciousness must unfold as a bound play if it is to be that which grounds and moves phenomenological thought, which is organized around a structured and coherent method. In addition to its structurally inherent necessary bonds, 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.18 (1918), pp.521-524; cf., also No.18, Appx.57 2 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1, pp.58-59, No.2a, No.2b 308 Nat.N-P freedom, which becomes Art.N-P freedom1 in the context of the phenomenological project, is also bound by the motivation and telos that this inquiry gives to itself – i.e., eidetic intuition and the grasping of subjective and objective essences and ideals. The irreal possibilities brought to the fore through Phantasiemodifikation – i.e., illustrative exemplars (Veranschaulichungen) – function post Phen.Mk1 (in Art.N-P) under the aegis of eidetic positionality;2 they are motivationally and teleologically bound by it. Given the intimate relationship between positive freedom and irreal possibility (what I have labeled as conceivability), the above-mentioned limits or bonds affect them both. Conceivability in both Nat.N-P and Art.N-P (the former stemming from Phantasiemodifikation, the latter brought to the fore through the phenomenological reductions) entails the bringing forth of structurally bound free non-positional possibilities. Husserl's discussion of Lebenswelt in his Crisis and various manuscripts in the mid and late 1920s3, further qualify the bound character of the freedom fueling the reductions. While the freedom exhibited by the epochê and the phenomenological reduction in Ideas I is unqualifiedly described as freedom from the natural thesis and its epistemic demands as well as freedom to engage objects in a non-positional manner (nicht sätzlich), the freedom of the transcendental reductions attains new features on Husserl's genetic methodological model. As pointed out earlier, the Lebenswelt described in the Crisis is very much the correlate of the natural realizing attitude; the difference lies in the constitutive relationship between this consciousness and its objects. The 'natural world' is one of lived dynamic historical, sociocultural, and scientific meaning-laden interactions. Can a full freedom still be exercised in this context – can we still disbar ourselves of this significantly more complicated protodoxic 1 As per our discussion of the ambiguity of non-positionality at the end of Chapter 5, the sole distinction between freedom, neutrality, and possibilities in Nat.N-P vs. Art.N-P stems from the latter's motivation and telos attained through its affiliation to Art.P2 and its eidetic goal. 2 Cf., Hua XXXI, §3 3 Cf., Hua VI and Hua XXXIX 309 system? Husserl's answer is clear.1 As long as we recognize the historical, intersubjective, and synthetic character of the genetic Nat.P1 and its correlate (i.e., Lebenswelt) and as long as we acknowledge the significance of the (co)-constituting dynamic between consciousness and world, we can perform the reductions in a manner informed by these new binding limits. Co-constitution and the synthetic correspondence of consciousness and world become the further limits to bind the negative and positive freedom necessary in performing the reductions. This freedom is the freedom of the genetically considered natural nonpositional consciousness (Nat.N-P) – i.e., the outcome of a synthetic Phantasiemodifikation. Thus, what Husserl discovers about the structures of consciousness in his genetic microphenomenological quests – such as his studies of Phantasie in the early 1920s or his contemporaneous studies of passive synthesis – influence his methodological model. The structure and system of possibilities of natural consciousness are the reservoir supplying the methodological possibilities – be they static or genetic. Synthetic Phantasiemodifikation puts out of play the synthetic protodoxa and its epistemic motivation. It had always been clear to Husserl that his method of inquiry must match the character of its field and objects. What triggered the constant rethinking of the features of this method were his discoveries about the subject matter of phenomenology: consciousness and its correlate. Alternatively, his rethought methodological tools made possible new micro-phenomenological discoveries. The shift to the genetic model is no exception to this hermeneutical development. The non-positionality of natural imagining consciousness includes neutrality, negative and positive freedom, and possibility. Unlike neutrality and negative freedom, the dimensions of the reductions that we have already established as pertaining to natural non-positional imagining consciousness, the possibility in its relation to positive freedom (i.e., conceivability in a qualified 1 See the previous discussion of the epochê on the genetic model. 310 non-positional sense) at work in the reductions requires further discussion before it can be claimed to stem from Nat.N-P. Conceivability occurs in the context of neutrality and exhibits freedom from the protodoxic hold; it also essentially entails positive freedom. The non-positional possibilities brought to the fore through Phantasiemodifikation are free possibilities bound by the above-mentioned limits. In order to show that all of the five features of the reductions (ontic-doxic neutrality, epistemic neutrality, positive and negative freedom, and possibility) are Nat.N-P dimensions stemming from Phantasiemodifikation, we need to explore the dynamic between positive freedom and possibility in the context of each of the three transcendental reductions. Possibility exhibits specific features in the context of each of the reductions; we will focus on each of these features in our attempt to establish their source. The dimensions of non-positional possibility and positive freedom require significant qualification. Not only did Husserl fail to identify their source – as happened in the case of neutrality and negative freedom; he also remained silent about important aspects of their artificial functioning. As natural dimensions or abilities they morph once they undergo Phen.Mk1. Understanding the structure of these dimensions in the natural and artificial contexts will help clarify both the functioning of the phenomenological method and its relation to the information gained in the pre-theoretical thetic attitude. Simply put: we need to carefully look into the nature of natural and artificial conceivability in the case of each of the reductions and ask questions such as: What are the natural non-positional possibilities at work in the reductions? What happens to possibilities qua noetic-noematic residua post-reductions? All of the reductions rely on natural non-positional neutrality (ontic-doxic, and epistemic) and negative freedom (i.e., freedom from). If we can show that the modal idiosyncrasies (i.e., unique types of possibilities) they rely on (as all of their remaining 311 conditions for possibility) are likewise natural non-positional, then we complete our argument for the necessity and sufficiency of Nat.N-P (via Phantasiemodifikation) for the possibility of the transcendental-phenomenological reductions. While each reduction might employ and subsequently bring to the fore different types of non-positional possibilities, all of the reductions are described by radical conceivability. This is so because in each and every case the reductions are shifts from one level of consciousness to another. These shifts are horizonal and nexic; they do not unfold in a piecemeal fashion as series of specific noetic-noematic changes. Whether the bracketing involves the entire natural attitude and its correlate or the actuality and existence of reell and non-reell objects, the reductions involve the entire level of natural realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1) and lead to the emergence of a whole new level: the artificial nonpositional one (Art.N-P). The reductions are radical modifications involving entire horizons of experience. That they cannot accomplish this extraordinary feat – i.e., the radical change (radikale Änderung) from one horizon to another – through the resources of natural realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1) is by now, hopefully, clear.1 What best captures the impotence of Nat.P1 to sustain radical modification is not its inability to conceive something fundamentally other than it is (though this is so – Nat.P1 conceivability is bound by past experience whose epistemic demands predetermine all expectations); it is modalization. The radical shift from positionality to non-positionality (be it natural or artificial) cannot occur through the modalizations of the protodoxa. Negation, doubt, assumption, presumption all fail to accomplish the nexic-horizonal level shift; they are at best anti-theses and necessarily 1 See our discussion of perceptual consciousness (i.e., realizing positional consciousness) in Chapter 1. 312 unfold within each consciousness level. A much more potent modification is required for this non-coordinate relocation of noetic-noematic structures, information, and meaning. Our extensive analyses up to this point, following in Husserl's footsteps and thinking with Husserl and his project, have uncovered only one such radical modification in the natural attitude – Phantasiemodifikation. We already witnessed its potency in Chapter 4 where Husserl's early methodological breakthrough was discussed in terms of this modification. We saw there the large extent to which methodological possibilities were open by recognizing and employing this modification, which is at once typical of the natural consciousness and constituting our passage beyond it. Natural irreal possibilities hold the key to unlocking the mysteries of Husserl's reductions, whose grounds, structures, and dimensions are all modally bound. §1!1. The Epochê Rethought Our discussion of non-positional (imagining) possibility in the context of the epochê must necessarily focus on its ability to affect the natural attitude and its correlate (the natural world of Ideas I or the Lebenswelt of the Crisis) in their horizonal entirety.1 The bracketing of the natural standpoint as a whole is the essential feature of the epochê. It affects both noetic and noematic structures (i.e., the reell and the non-reell) by relocating them away from the sphere of actuality and existence. In order to do so, it must rely on the neutrality and negative freedom of natural imagining consciousness. To succeed, the epochê requires the negative freedom, the ontic-doxic neutrality, and the epistemic neutrality of the natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). 1 Given the overall reluctance among commentators to explore the imagination in all of its facets and abilities, what follows is the first thorough discussion of the relationship between imagination and modality. Some ventured to consider the significance of modality in Husserl's work (cf., Hintikka (1975) and Mohanty (1984, 1999), Baptist (2008)), but their discussion stems mostly from Husserl's notion of real possibility or from the claims he makes in his programmatic studies about 'open possibilities'. 313 These dimensions of Nat.N-P emerging through Phantasiemodifikation purge the realizing positional meanings of their ontic, doxic, and epistemic layers. We must guard ourselves from equating the epochê with Phantasiemodifikation, however tempting this might be. The latter exhibits multiple facets, including the triggering of free variation, which plays no part in the epochê; the former, unlike the latter, is not the shift to natural non-positionality but the artificial one instead. Thus, the epochê employs neutrality and freedom as dimensions of the natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P) and facilitated by Phantasiemodifikation, only it does so in the different motivational and teleological context of the phenomenological project. Because of this, the epochê cannot be said to bring to the fore the same kinds of possibilities as Phantasiemodifikation. Unlike the phenomenological and eidetic reductions (as we shall soon see) the epochê may not take its starting point at any of the two levels of the natural attitude – i.e., the realizing positional (Nat.P1) and the imagining non-positional (Nat.N-P). This is so because what essentially characterizes the epochê is its suspension of the natural positional thesis (Nat.P1). As such, it could not be said to begin with either actual or irreal possibilities. The epochê must begin with actualities and real possibilities. Because of this constraint, the epochê is the reduction that resembles Phantasiemodifikation the most. However, what it brings to the fore are artificial non-positional possibilities, which share much in common with natural irreal possibilities but are not their attitudinal equivalent. This is why it is important to disambiguate non-positionality in all of its dimensions (possibility, along with freedom and neutrality). As discussed in Chapter 5, the easiest and most elegant way of distinguishing between natural and artificial non-positionality is through their motivation and telos (or lack thereof). Natural irreal possibilities and artificial possibilities may share all aspects but one – their motivation. The former inherently have none. The latter are structurally bound by the eidetic goal of grasping essences. The reason 314 why the epochê secures, like Phantasiemodifikation, the emergence of irreal possibilities (imaginative free non-positional possibilities) is its reliance upon ontic-doxic and epistemic neutrality along with negative freedom, which are the dimensions of imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). The epochê, as radical modification, is not Phantasiemodifikation in so far as its irreal possibilities are motivationally bound by the phenomenological goal of eidetic intuition. We cannot qualify this by saying that the epochê is simply Phantasiemodifikation in the context of the phenomenological eidetic project, given that the epochê does not rely on other facets of Phantasiemodifikation, such as its triggering of free variation. This facet, as we shall son see, is something the eidetic reduction requires and employs. There is no full overlap between the epochê and Phantasiemodifikation. In fact, no reduction fully overlaps with Phantaie Modifikation. Nevertheless, despite this lack of modification overlap, the artificial conceivability specific to the epochê will exhibit all of the features of natural conceivability minus its lack of motivational drive. What makes the irreal possibilities (i.e., the horizonal non-positional consciousness and its correlate) artificial residua of the epochê is their eidetic motivation and goal. Once we take into account this teleological distinction, we recognize that the unity and identity exhibited by the residual artificial non-positional consciousness (Art.N-P) are the same as those of natural imagining consciousness. (Nat.N-P). In other words, the principles organizing imagining consciousness (time consciousness, founding, non-radical modifications) qua horizonal nexus are also at work at the artificial non-positional level, with the proviso that the latter also responds to the demands of eidetic motivation. §1!2. The Phenomenologi ca l Reduct ion Rethought In order to capture and clarify its unique structure and functioning, we will focus here on the phenomenological reflection narrowly understood as the bringing forth of 315 phenomena as objects non-positionally intended. Thus the details and perspectival richness of perceiving a blossoming apple tree are not lost; they are simply experienced anew under the aegis of non-positional possibility and without any factual epistemic motivation. Like the epochê, the phenomenological reduction relies on the ontic-doxic and epistemic neutrality along with the negative freedom of Nat.N-P. Unlike the epochê (and like the eidetic reduction) it can begin at any of the two levels: the realizing positional (Nat.P1) or the imagining non-positional (Nat.N-P). This is so because while the phenomenological reduction aims, like the epochê, at ontic, doxic, and epistemic neutralization, the phenomena it brings to the fore are meant to individually function as objects of the eidetic study. In other words, while the epochê aims at a broad attitudinal shift – a shift that captures the radical character of the phenomenological inquiring stance as a whole – the phenomenological reduction is seminal for all microphenomenological analyses. Some of these studies may commence with information that is already neutralized but lacking the eidetic motivation of a phenomenological project. For instance, the phenomenological reduction makes possible the study of natural non-positional memory. As non-positional (i.e., the outcome of Phantasiemodifikation and unfolding at the level of imagining consciousness), this object of inquiry already exhibits ontic, doxic, and epistemic neutrality as well as negative freedom. As natural, however, it requires a further attitudinal shift, namely, the shift to the artificial, methodological and theoretical level. This is what the phenomenological reduction accomplishes when it takes its starting point in Nat.N-P. While Husserl remained silent with respect to the difference in potential starting points among the reductions, he did paint Phantasie as a more suitable beginning for the 316 reductions and the subsequent ideational process.1 The reason behind this prima facie puzzling preference lies in the 'safety' afforded by imagining consciousness and its correlate as objects of inquiry. As already neutral and free, it poses less of a threat for the project; relapsing into tempting habitual epistemic patterns is less likely to occur in this context than if the inquirer were to take Nat.P1 as their initial reference. Along with neutrality and negative freedom, the phenomenological reduction requires one more dimension for its successful performance – non-positional possibility. Like the epochê, the phenomenological reduction is a shift from the natural to the artificial; the phenomena qua possibilities that arise through it exhibit specific features that we should consider here. Given the two distinct starting points that this reduction may adopt, it initially leads to the intuition of two different types of artificial non-positional possibilities. If the phenomenological reduction commences in Nat.P1, then the phenomena will be objects once given as real and actual in the realizing attitude that are now non-positionally given or presented. This shift is important because through it precious Nat.P1 information is retained; our discussion of eidetic variation will argue that this transformed information (i.e., meaning) plays a pivotal role in specific ideational inquiries. If the reduction takes Nat.N-P as point of departure, then the phenomena brought to the fore will be natural irreal possibilities that have now attained the eidetic motivation and goal. Structurally, these artificial non-positional possibilities share everything in common with the natural nonpositional possibilities they modify. In both of these cases the now neutralized objects, i.e., phenomena, may be granted in a perspectival (spatio-temporal) manner (cf., Abschattung). The phenomenological analysis of perceiving a blossoming apple tree will necessarily unfold in a manner bound by the 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§4, 43, 70. See also Hua VIII, §44 317 incomplete and indeterminate nature of this experience. The same holds in analyses of imaging consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) or of imaging consciousness (Phantasie qua direct intuitive presentation not level of consciousness) when the latter entails the givenness of the object in a spatio-temporal manner (i.e., having a spatial environment). As I already argued in Chapter 1, Phantasie qua direct intuitive presentation does not entail – given its structure and thus necessarily – mental images as Fikta or image objects. Despite the structural lack of mental images (just like external perception), Phantasie may give its objects in a perspectival, spatial manner – as in the presentation of a weeping centaur in a dark primeval forest. Thus, the phenomena qua possibilities that the phenomenological investigation works with determine the very unfolding of this investigation. We would make a crass mistake, however, if we were to consider these as the sole non-positional intuitive options. The artificial non-positional attitude can easily engage non-perspectivally given objects or possibilities. For instance, in a phenomenological study of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) I can engage memories, which are non-perspectivally given (though unnecessary for the purposes of this current discussion, I can further qualify this by adding that the objects of these memories could be themselves non-spatially experienced). This artificial ability is rooted in the very structure of natural non-positional consciousness (Nat.N-P) and its core direct intuitive presentation. I can image that I judge or remember; these are acts marked solely by temporality and given in a non-perspectival manner. Through the phenomenological reduction I simply relocate this imagining non-positional experience in the eidetic teleological and motivational context. While it is important to recognize the import of the imagination as a second potential starting point for the phenomenological reduction, we should not view it as the primary way in which the imagination contributes to phenomenological reflection. Though Husserl was 318 fond of stressing this secondary import, it is my contention that he had in mind something else entirely when he made the puzzling claim in Ideas I about the power of the imagination to ground and guide eidetic inquiry. While he may not have realized it in 1913, I take his statement to signify nothing less than his glimpsing the rich methodological reservoir that Phantasie (Nat.N-P) is. The role played by Nat.N-P neutrality, freedom, and possibility in the reductions, and the role played by free variation in ideation are the true reasons why the imagination fuels and grounds eidetic phenomenological thought. Husserl's explicit claims about the relationship between the imagination and phenomenological reflection refer mostly to its potential role in eidetic variation. He was otherwise mostly silent about the import of the imagination for the reductions. We find some suggestive traces in his 1918 and early 1920s lectures on Phantasie.1 As noted in the case of the epochê, the reductions are neither momentary transitions from the natural to the artificial attitude nor multi-single step processes. They are horizonalnexic level shifts that trigger as well as sustain entire ideational endeavors. As such, the phenomenological reduction can facilitate the engaging of various types of non-positional possibilities – a) neutralized Nat.P1 objects, b) irreal Nat.N-P possibilities, and c) alternatives to either a or b. These alternatives are brought to the fore through the process of free variation, essentially pertaining to Nat.N-P but able to function in the eidetic artificial context under the guidance of the eidetic goal. We shall have ample opportunity to discuss this functioning of free variation in ideational processes in the following section. What I would like to emphasize here is the ability of the reductions to sustain, just like 1 Cf., Hua XXIII, Nos. 18-20; see also Hua IX, p.119. Here Husserl alludes to the 'quasi-epochê' of Phantasie; the problem with this claim lies in importing the methodological structure into his analysis of the imagination rather than employing what he has learned about the latter in his elucidating discussion of the former. 319 Phantasiemodifikation in the natural attitude, the non-positional character of noetic-noematic complexes. Our discussion of the structure and conditions of possibility (sources) of the phenomenological reduction would not be complete without accounting for its ability to unravel the transcendental character of consciousness – i.e., its non-appurtenance to the world as natural and real. Viewing consciousness as other than the world (and not a part of it) requires a distancing facilitated especially by negative freedom on the background of neutrality. The former's role in the transcendental aspect of the reductions is obvious; only a consciousness free from the reality and actuality of the world can be uncovered as 'transcendental'. Recognizing the intentional character of consciousness – i.e., its being 'consciousness of something as something' – is grounded on this negative freedom; through negative freedom one comes to see that consciousness is necessarily other than this 'something' (be it object or meaning).1 Neutrality plays an even bigger role: putting out of the play ontic and doxic commitments as well as any interest in attaining factual knowledge with certainty lays the ground for the possibility of universal knowledge. Not only is the inquiring consciousness able to perform and complete such a search with respect to objective essences (e.g., mathematical or logical principles); it is also able to inquire into its own essential structure apart from any commitment to objective reality. We saw in Chapter 4 that Husserl's goal in the Logical Investigations was to secure the possibility of analyzing subjectivity in its ideal structures along with objective essences. Any successful eidetic inquiry – be it objective or subjective – requires non-positional neutrality and freedom as conditions for its possibility. 1 We will soon have the opportunity to discuss the dynamic between object and meaning in the context of eidetic variation. 320 Thus, rather than obtaining certainty through a method of doubt that could not guarantee the necessary distancing from the world (along with its reality and epistemic demands), Husserl followed an inherently non-Cartesian way – the path of the imagination rather than that of realizing modalization (which is what doubt structurally is). §1!3. The Eidet i c Reduct ion Rethought Our previous discussion of the eidetic reduction questioned its genuinely 'reductive' character because the new objects, new phenomena, that emerge through it do not appear to exhibit any new structural features. What sets them apart is their eidetic motivational and teleological penchant. Their givenness entails the empty intention of ideal structures or essences. The question becomes: Does the new motivational layer affect their structure as non-positional possibilities and what kind of artificial possibilities are they? We gestured in Chapter 5 at the significance of the distinction between particular and actual instantiations of essences (Vereinzelungen) and free imaginative exemplars as nonsingular instantiations of essences (Veranschaulichungen). The latter are marked by a type of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from the epistemic indeterminacy exhibited by all noetic-noematic complexes in the realizing positional consciousness (i.e., this epistemic indeterminacy occurs given the perspectival givenness inherently pertaining to this level of consciousness). Natural non-positional indeterminacy is structural rather than epistemic. The exemplars are not concrete individualizations of essence – they are removed from concreteness given the neutrality and negative freedom guaranteed through Phantasiemodifikation. On the lowest level of generality they are, as mentioned in Chapter 5 when we listed the various possible types of objects given in imagining consciousness, neutralized Nat.P1 objects. On a higher level these exemplars can either be alternatives to neutralized Nat.P1 actual objects or alternatives to irreal possibilities (Nat.N-P possibilities). 321 If we continue to engage alternatives to exemplars in a serial manner we may either remain at the same level of exemplar generality or we may surpass it and intuit imaginative essences, which are exemplars of a higher order of generality (i.e., are representative of larger classes of possibilities). This process of free variation can occur in the natural attitude at the non-positional imagining level (Nat.N-P).1 It can also be relocated in the phenomenological artificial context through a process that attributes to it the eidetic motivation specific of phenomenological inquiry. This 'process' is nothing other than the eidetic reduction. To return to the question whether this reduction affects the structure of natural nonpositional possibilities (i.e., exemplars), we must offer a qualified answer. First, we must note that the initial exemplars brought to the fore through the eidetic reduction neither exhibit new structural moments nor an altered structure. While the eidetic reduction paves the way for subsequent ideational processes, the initial new objects it makes available for these processes are natural non-positional possibilities relocated in the artificial motivational context. Second, we must take into account the Nat.N-P ability to freely vary exemplars. This ability, too, translates, through the eidetic reduction and becomes available in the artificial methodological attitude. Free variation, bound by all of the limits already discussed as pertaining to Nat.N-P, is now further bound by its eidetic goal. We shall see what else binds it in our discussion of eidetic variation. The artificial non-positional possibilities that free variation brings to the fore in the methodological context and post eidetic reduction may, like the free variation of natural imagining consciousness, exhibit the same level of generality or a higher one. Imaginative exemplars and imaginative essences are thus available in the artificial methodological context. Their exact role in ideational post-reduction processes and 1 For a detailed discussion of Nat.N-P free variation, see Chapter 3§3 322 the promise of their success has yet to be clarified. For now let us stress their availability for eidetic projects. Differently than in the case of the initial possibilities brought to the fore through the eidetic reduction, the eidetic motivational layer affects these higher order nonpositional possibilities. Free variation in the artificial attitude, unlike the natural free variation that lacks the goal of eidetic intuition, is necessarily bound to render intuitable exemplars (or imaginative essences) of higher order generality. Thus, artificial free variation may still entail playful spontaneity, but is no longer aimless (and thus random) the way natural free variation can afford to be. For the purpose of our present argument, namely, that natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P) is both necessary and sufficient for the successful unfolding of all of the reductions, we note that ontic, doxic, and epistemic neutrality as well as negative freedom are both required for the successful performance of the eidetic reduction. The artificial conceivability (the relationship between possibility and positive freedom) pertaining to this reduction is structurally the same as the conceivability of the natural imagining nonpositional consciousness (Nat.N-P). Thus, all of the features exhibited by the eidetic reduction are directly reliant upon imagining consciousness. Are there other dimensions or moments of this reduction that remain unaccounted for? What about its ability to impose and project a new telos and motivation? What guarantees its success in dictating the goal of phenomenological projects? In order to uncover the condition for the possibility of intending the ideal goal, all we have to do is recall the import of neutrality and negative freedom, which inherently make room for the possibility of conceiving that which is radically and fundamentally other than the actualities and real objects (qua particular, concrete, and passive (unwilled and unaware) instantiations of essences) pertaining to the natural realizing positional consciousness 323 (Nat.P1). The conceivability of the eidetic reduction means nothing other than the possibility of intending ideals understood as the otherwise: "Now when we stated that every fact could be 'essentially' other than it is, we were already expressing thereby that it belongs to the meaning of everything contingent that it should have essential being and therewith an Eidos to be apprehended in all its purity; and this Eidos comes under essential truths of varying degrees of universality."1 This reduction makes possible the very engaging of ideals as necessary, which entails surpassing the factual and particular as contingent. We say possibility of intending ideals, rather than intuiting them, because the eidetic reduction alone cannot grant access to eidetic intuition. Eidetic variation is required for the fulfillment of this intention. Despite what may present itself prima facie as its utter limitation, opening the possibility of intending ideals is a significant accomplishment – one unthinkable without the three core dimensions of the natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). This is precisely what we learned by examining Husserl's break from Brentano in Chapter 4. Phantasie – through its radical modification – is the sole facilitator of intending of ideal objects. This must be qualified in terms of will and ability. We can now say that the imagination secures the decision to pursue the ideal not only because it grants the inquirer the ability to do so, but also because, as the sole source of non-realizing conceivability, it triggers the very thought of that which could be otherwise – including the ideal. The realizing positional consciousness (Nat.P1) is, as Husserl tells us, the 'entrance gate' (Eingangspforte) of phenomenology; however, this requires a further, most important qualification: this can be only through its non-positional translation, which 1 Ideas I, p.47. "Sagten wir: jede Tatsache könnte, 'ihrem eigen Wesen nach' anders sein, so drückten wir damit schon aus, dass es zum Sinn jedes Zufälligen gehört, eben ein Wesen, und somit ein ren zu fassendes Eidos zu haben, und dieses steht nun unter Wesens-Wahreheiten verschiedener Allgemeinheitsstufe" (Hua III/1, 12). 324 Phantasiemodifikation alone can facilitate. This radical natural modification is most potent. As already stressed, it affects both noetic and noematic structures as well as the entire Nat.P1 level of consciousness along with its corresponding real and actual world. Without this modification there would be no abstraction in the context of objective eidetic sciences, no hypothetical thought in the context of the positive sciences,1 and no reductions in the context of phenomenology as subjective eidetic science. Any type of theoretical thought, inherently entailing a distancing from the natural attitude, is reliant to some extent, upon neutrality, freedom, and possibility as core dimensions of Nat.N-P. Thus, natural Phantasiemodifikation as radical modification is different from abstraction, hypothetical thought, and the reductions, yet it holds the key to their very possibility. Each of these modes of thought2 and each of Husserl's reductions is rooted in a different facet of the natural imagining consciousness guaranteed by Phantasiemodifikation. This reminds us of the uniqueness of imagination – it alone can trigger the shift from the real to the irreal, and irreality, it appears, lies at very core of universalizing thought. §1! . Phenomenological Modification (Phen.Mk1): Manifested Natural-Artificial Bond Our rethinking of each of Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reductions revealed all of their core dimensions and conditions for possibility. We saw, on the one hand, that they all relied – collectively as well as separately – on the ontic-doxic and 1 Positing a hypothesis and then testing it along with designing the suitable experiment and method of testing require considering situations different from what had been taken for granted as real and actual; they also rely on engaging a variety of possibilities some of which are to be chosen above others. Because of this, motivation in the context of hypothetical thought is not the same as that governing the mere attainment of factical knowledge. Scientific knowledge aims at grasping knowledge of essences that directly govern facts. The focus and grasp of these essences are conditioned by the ability to break free from facts and bring forth ideal rather than real possibilities. Neutrality modification in the context of abstraction as universalizing thought secures the bracketing of the object's ontic modality and thus frees meaning from empirical reality (for an interesting discussion of this 'freeing' of meaning, see Eliott, p.18 (2002)). 2 I intend to explore the dynamic between Phantasiemodifikation and hypothetical and experimental thought in a future project. 325 epistemic neutrality as well as negative freedom pertaining to natural non-positional imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P). We uncovered on the other, that conceivability (i.e., the relation between non-positional possibility and positive freedom) conditions these reductions' successful unfolding and we investigated its specific import in each case. In doing so, we did not depart from Husserl's explicit claims about the reductions in his main programmatic texts. We superposed what he overtly stated about the reductions with the model of consciousness developed through our attentive study (and further development) of his phenomenology of the imagination. In bringing these two models together much has come to light. Besides clarifying the conditions for the possibility of the reductions, we also analyzed their structure and functioning in the overall context of the phenomenological project. Granted, we have yet to understand the dynamic between the reductions and eidetic variation; this is what we turn to in our discussion of the status and role of the noetic-noematic residuum in ideational processes. Understanding the reductions as radical modifications fueled by various facets of natural imagining consciousness (Nat.N-P) has done more than clarify their source and structure. It has brought to light the significance of the relation between the natural pretheoretical attitude and the phenomenological artificial one – a relation easily overlooked if Husserl's transcendental idealism is taken to be grounded in the reductions viewed as eliminations of the natural and viewed as methodological solipsism.1 I suspect that accepting the strong argument I have sought to make – namely, that imagining consciousness is not only necessary but also sufficient for the possibility of the reductions – is no easy feat. My suspicion stems less from doubting the completeness and 1 For precisely this mistaken view of Husserl's idealism, see Dreyfus (1991). For informative discussions of Husserl's idealism grounded in thorough research of Husserl's works, see De Palma (2005), Zahavi (2008). For an interesting comparison of Kantian and Husserlian idealism see Luft (2007); for a discussion of Husserl's relation to Descartes' thought, see Berger (1972) and Naberhaus (2007). 326 coherence of my argument. I am reminded instead of the allure of long lasting presuppositions regarding the imagination, the most potent being: its pictorial character, its derivative and secondary representational faculty nature – one absolutely dependent on perception and the information it wields, its playful randomness, and its secondary bridging epistemic role in factual knowledge. If one holds these habits of thought dearly, my argument will not convince them. Those fond of an abstract notion of 'scientific purity' will also fail to see the significance of our discovery. What Husserl means by 'purity', whether applied to consciousness or to his method of inquiry, is not the elimination of the natural attitude. He means nothing other than an attitude marked by neutrality, freedom, possibility – all of which are dimensions of the imagination and all sources of our ability to recognize the transcendental and intentional character of consciousness along with its ability to pursue eidetic projects. If, however, one accepts the challenge to rethink and discover anew the essential nature of the imagination, one will also gain new perspectives on what it means to inquire eidetically. Husserl encourages us to discover the non-pictorial character of the imagination. His analyses aided us in seeing that there are no mental images as copies of external things; that the imagination is not representational the way the early Moderns would have us think. It is neither structurally random and without order and unity nor is it a 'psychological' faculty only secondarily self-standing (as if conditioned by factual epistemic behavior). The imagination is a nexic-horizonal primary level of consciousness – one that, like the realizing positional one, has an axial genuine intuitive presentation as its simplest and most direct 'information gatherer'. Once we recognize the imagination as both presentational act as well as level of consciousness many ambiguities are dispelled. We are thus not doing away with imagination as act; we are simply qualifying this act on the 327 background of a fundamental level of consciousness. We come to see that ratiocination is not something the imagination has to reach out for without fully accessing the latter's predicative and universalizing abilities; we understand that the imagination is essentially a holistic and coherent whole structured in accordance with necessary organizing principles. As we shall soon discuss in our analysis of eidetic variation, predicative theoretical judgments of higher universalizing order unfold in the imagining consciousness (Art.N-P). All of the intentional acts unfolding at the realizing level (Nat.P1) – all but perception, which is replaced by Phantasie qua direct non-positional presentation – can likewise unfold in the imagining one. This alone, however, would not show that imagining is the key to the success of universalizing thought. We must add that imagining consciousness opens new experiential possibilities: new noetic-noematic complexes unavailable to us in the natural realizing attitude. What we have uncovered about the eidetic reduction points this out clearly; what we are about to discover with respect to the unfolding of eidetic variation will fully make this case. Acts at the imagining level in the natural as well as artificial attitudes can bring to the fore objects heretofore hidden from the resources of realizing positionality: e.g., lower level universals free from protodoxic particular demands pointing beyond themselves toward essences. For Husserl essences are necessary ideal possibilities. They are necessary, because unlike facts, they could not be otherwise; they are ideal possibilities because they guide their manifestations at the realizing and non-positional levels in both artificial and natural contexts. The key to finding a path toward essences lies in seeing them as necessary and ideal possibilities. It is my contention that this path is none other than that of the imagination as sole source of non-positional possibilities; as free and neutral, these possibilities alone are able to guide eidetic projects. The key lies in non-positional conceivability – something Husserl 328 himself recognized when he claimed, in manuscripts discussing his transcendental idealism, that possibility is, methodologically speaking, a 'Hauptbegriff'.1 We are now in the position to understand and further explore the truth behind his claim. Part II of this project has sought thus far to emphasize and explore the importance of the relationship between the structures of consciousness on the one hand methodological possibilities on the other. Thus, overlooking structures of consciousness (such as radical modifications or its nexic-horizonal levels) could not only deprive us of significant methodological tools; it could also cripple the success of those tools already set in place. Brentano's method of abstraction ultimately failed, like all empiricist universalizing thought models, because of his failure to identify on the one hand, the non-additive character of founding (Fundierung) and harness, on the other, the modal power of radical modification. Husserl was well aware of this dynamic; this is the reason why he viewed his carving of the phenomenological method as a multi-stage process. It is my contention that the ambiguities he left behind – those regarding the conditions for the possibility and functioning of the reduction and eidetic variation – could be dispelled once we recognize the versatility of the imagination and the methodological possibilities this versatility entails. As already discussed,2 imagining non-positional consciousness can function in the context of both the natural and artificial attitudes (a reminder: we are not looking here at two distinct levels but rather at one level in two different contexts – the pre-theoretical and the theoretical-methodological ones). It is the only consciousness level able to span the naturalartificial divide; this is so due to its dimensions of freedom, neutrality, and possibility. If we are to understand what this 'spanning' entails for the relationship between these attitudes as well the role it plays in phenomenological eidetic inquiry as transcendental idealism, we need to 1 Hua XXXVI, p.12 2 Cf., Ch.5§3! 329 further examine this structural ambiguity of non-positional imagining consciousness. We need to ask questions such as: Are Nat.N-P and Art.N-P structurally the same? Does eidetic motivation affect the structure of Art.N-P? Do both of these levels grant us access to the same kinds of objects (i.e., possibilities)? To answer these questions we must first put the final touches on our analysis of the relationship between Phantasiemodifikation and Phen.Mk1. I use the latter as an umbrella term for all of the reductions since they are all shifts from the natural to the artificial attitudes and they are all reliant upon neutrality and negative freedom in roughly the same ways; the differences among them express themselves primarily through the non-positional possibilities they employ and bring to the fore. We should not equate the reductions as a whole (and any reduction separately considered) with Phantasiemodifikation. There are several reasons for this: 1) each of the reductions relies on some – not all – of the facets or dimensions of natural non-positional consciousness (Nat.N-P) and of its modification; thus, Phantasiemodifikation is structurally broader in scope than any of Husserl's reductions; 2) the reductions taken collectively (Phen.Mk1) do not overlap with Phantasiemodifikation because they are shifts from the natural to the artificial attitudes whereas the latter is a shift from natural realizing positionality to natural non-positionality; granted, the initial stage of the artificial attitude – the one immediately following the performance of the reductions, is as we shall soon see, structurally identical with natural non-positional consciousness (with the exception of eidetic motivation); 3) the reductions, as already noted, are not ephemeral transitions but sustained processes. Advanced stages in the ideational inquiring process remain under the aegis of the reductions; the possibilities intuited at these advanced stages will exhibit a different structure than those presented at the natural non-positional level. 330 Despite these differences, the natural and artificial non-positional attitudes are in principle the same immediately after the performance of the reductions. The qualification 'in principle' is in place for two reasons: First, we are discussing the shift from the natural to the artificial in the context of performing specific micro-phenomenological studies. Second, we take a 'ground zero' starting point approach for each of these studies, not the historically informed one of the phenomenological inquiring project as a whole. This project entails innumerable reductions performed by different phenomenologists at different points in time and the constant shaping, reshaping, and accumulation of eidetic knowledge. We shall discuss the historicity and intersubjectivity of this long-lasting project when closing our investigation of phenomenological reflection as well as its implications for the reductions and eidetic variation.1 For now, let us clarify the structure of isolated microphenomenological projects, which will lay the foundations for our eventual historical discussions. What the natural and artificial imagining levels of consciousness (Nat.N-P and Art.N-P) share in common are their radical character (the ability to translate information from one level/attitude to another), 'purity' (ontic, doxic, and epistemic neutrality and freedom), noetic-noematic unfolding, and the six types of non-positional possibility listed in Chapter 5. These were: neutralized actual objects, conceived objects never before perceived, conceived fantastic objects, conceived impossible objects, conceived alternatives to real objects, and conceived alternatives to non-positional possibilities. We note here once more that the last two types will prove to be the most pervasive ones at work in ideational processes; the others, too, may play a role in certain inquiries primarily analyzing experiences 1 For an insightful discussion of intersubjectivity in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, see Zahavi (1996, 2001) and Taguchi (2006). 331 intending spatio-temporal objects (Husserl's discussion of geometric variation in Ideas I falls in this category1). Thus, the noetic-noematic meaning and information initially available to us in natural and artificial imagining consciousness are in principle the same. We shall soon investigate the effect eidetic motivation and teleology have on artificial non-positional possibilities in our discussion of the phenomenological 'given and taken'. What I wish to emphasize here, however, is the deep reliance of the artificial attitude on the natural one. This reliance is twofold: structural and informational. It is structural in so far as it requires the noeses, organizing principles, and dimensions pertaining to the natural non-positional consciousness (Nat.N-P). It is informational given that the reductions are not eliminations of natural information; a happier approach views the reductions as translations or 'trans-locations' of meaning from the realizing to the non-positional context. The richness of Nat.P1 experiences is preserved without the cumbersome ontic and epistemic commitments of the protodoxa and its modalizations. The reservoir of natural non-positional possibilities (from Nat.N-P) is likewise available for translation from the natural experiential to the artificial inquiring mode. What Phen.Mk1 as radical modification translates from the natural attitude informs the artificial non-positional level of consciousness. This bond, as our discussion of neutralized (translated) types and their role in eidetic variation will soon show, guides ideational inquiring processes. Eidetic variation will reveal itself as (fruitfully) bound by its starting point, intuited meanings, as well as its eidetic goal. Let us now turn to an in-depth discussion of the conditions of possibility, structure, and functioning of eidetic variation as the core information-harnessing process pertaining to all phenomenological inquiries. 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §7 332 §2. Eidetic Variation Rethought1 As we begin our discussion of eidetic variation (or simply, ideation understood as process not just the end result of eidetic intuition) we must stress that this process alone does not constitute 'phenomenological reflection' as a whole. I take this latter term to include: 1) the phenomenological-transcendental reductions, 2) eidetic variation, and 3) postideational thought (i.e., thought engaging the results of one or more specific eidetic variation processes). Neither one of these three types of phenomenological reflection can sustain the phenomenological project as a whole. We must think these types as collaborating codependent aspects of a holistic project (esp. the genetic one where the results of ideational processes affect subsequent reductive endeavors). On this note, let me stress here that everything that we have established about the reductions – their source and structure, their transcendental character, their motivation – holds with respect to eidetic variation, which in its turn commences with the reductions and unfolds in a manner conditioned by these. Thus, what we must ask ourselves here is not whether artificial non-positional imagining consciousness (Art.N-P), along with its three core dimensions, is necessary for eidetic variation, but whether Art.N-P is sufficient for the move from the variant to the invariant. We must seek to clarify the role played by imagining consciousness in ideation 1 There are very few scholars who have embarked on projects seeking to clarify Husserl's method of eidetic variation. Their studies explore this inquiring projects either through the import of genetic phenomenology and its emphasis on passive, pre-predicative synthesis or through the methodological similarities exhibited by mathematics and phenomenology (in Lohmar's case; cf., Lohmar (1998, 2009, 2010a, 2010b)) or through technical discussions of the role of concepts, judgments, and statements (in Sowa's case; cf., Sowa, (2007, 2008, 2010a, b, 2011). Their discussions are illuminating and for the most part, my project does not go against their results (though I disagree that in order to emphasize methodological similarities across fields we necessarily have to sacrifice Husserl's demands for the 'purity' and 'uniqueness' of his method of inquiry; I also disagree with the view that judgments are primitive acts in the process of eidetic variation). I consider the model of leveled, nexic-horizonal consciousness better equipped to deal with the ambiguities crippling Husserl's account of ideation. Exploring the shift from the variant to the invariant through the lens of the imagination grants us access to a reservoir of insights heretofore unrecognized and neglected. For a discussion of 'examples' in ideation, see Ferencz-Flatz (2011). For a discussion of free variation and its role in geometric inquiries, see Tieszen (2005). 333 once the reductions are performed. We must elucidate the import of artificial non-positional possibilities (be they noetic or noematic) for ideation. Eidetic variation is the core venue for phenomenological inquiry in its attempt to secure knowledge of the ideals (necessary ideal possibilities). What we are about to uncover about this mature methodological tool is based on insights stemming from our discussion of imagining consciousness along with a close study of Husserl's explicit and implicit claims about it in programmatic texts as well as lecture courses and research manuscripts dated after the publication of his Ideas I. While this is our first comprehensive attempt to deal with what could be considered one of the most convoluted aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, we have already considered and reflected on the essential features of the ideational method. Our discussion of idealizing abstraction (ideirende Abstraktion) in Chapter 4 emphasized important aspects of the eidetic method Husserl was seeking to establish as early as 1900/01. We stressed there the parameters he deemed necessary for the success of this method; we also witnessed the covert but axial import of non-additive founding, radical modification, and the horizonal-nexic leveled understanding of the structure of consciousness as conditions for the possibility of this method. Husserl's eidetic method of investigation morphed over the decade following the Logical Investigations – it became marked by transcendentality; the analysis of acts and reell contents was no longer sufficient, the reductions secured the 'purity' of the method as well as its subject matter, the relationship between phenomenological and a critical theory of knowledge took center stage from 1906/07 onward. And yet despite all these changes, the core features and the goal of phenomenological idealizing inquiring thought remained largely the same. It still aimed at grasping ideal subjective and objective structures with certainty and in a manner that would not threaten their universal validity. 334 The relationship between consciousness and its object remained, over the course of Husserl's career, at the very heart of his thought. Thirty years after the publication of the Investigations, in his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl's fight against nominalism, psychologism, and a foundationalism based on the spurious dichotomy between the real and the ideal was still very much at the forefront of his programmatic endeavors. The eidetic method – be it act-descriptive, static transcendental, or genetic – retained its claim of independence from anything particular and concrete (of freedom from the ontic, doxic, and epistemic presuppositions of the natural realizing attitude). Only a method indebted to radical modification and the recognition of the methodological import of different attitudes and nexic-horizonal levels of consciousness could maintain these features throughout its gradual morphing. Only a method dedicated to uncovering ideals not as products of thought but as essential and universally valid structures of experience (i.e., of consciousness and its correlates) could avoid the pitfalls of a failing abstractive thought reliant upon simplification, association, or comparison. We are here interested in uncovering the source, structure, and functioning of Husserl's mature theory of ideation. Recognizing what changes and what stays the same with respect to this method over the course of Husserl's career will prove most helpful. §2! . Husserl's Eidetic Variation On this note, we would do well to commence our discussion of eidetic variation understood as descriptive analysis of experience (i.e., of consciousness plus correlate). We would do well not to confuse the descriptive character of phenomenological reflection with Husserl's early act-descriptive method of inquiry despite the partial overlap between them. The latter is a method focusing solely on reell moments and structures of experience; it is descriptive rather than explanatory in so far as it does not rely on a causal account in its 335 attempt to elucidate the structures it studies. The former is descriptive for the same reason, but unbound by the narrow focus on reell moments only. With the advent of the transcendental method Husserl leaves behind this narrow focus; he does not, however, forfeit the descriptive (non-explanatory) character of his method of inquiry. Let us take a closer look at what this 'descriptive' character entails beyond the negative definition just offered. §2!1. Phenomenologi ca l Ref l e c t ion as Descr ipt ive Analys is o f Experience Exploring the nature of phenomenological reflection through the lens of its descriptive character reveals much about what Husserl means by the methodological search for invariants. Description (Deskription) is first and foremost an artificial investigative type of reflection. It is facilitated by the reductions, and, like all phenomenological inquiring processes, it is marked by freedom and neutrality. Description unfolds in a manner free from ontic, doxic, and epistemic prejudice;1 it is unaffected by the protodoxa and the demands of natural realizing consciousness. It occurs, in the artificial attitude, in a disinterested manner;2 that is, description takes no interest in the ontic and epistemic status of the object (and its background world) under investigation. This freedom from all and any realizing prejudices is absolute.3 While it may not commence at a universal level, description structurally seeks to attain the highest level of universality.4 As we shall see, all phenomenological reflection is necessarily or essentially bound to seek this high-order universality; we will soon show that all phenomenological ideational as well as post-ideational projects could be mapped on a 1 Hua I, p.74 2 Hua I, p.73 3 Hua I, p.74 4 Ibid. 336 noetic-noematic eide scale, or the universality level pertaining to their intuitions.1 Not only does description seek to give evidence (intuition) of higher order universals; it also functions as the foundation for a 'universal criticism'.2 This 'criticism', as we already noted in our discussion of Husserl's genetic reductive method of inquiry, entails freedom from all kinds of prejudices, including the scientifically, culturally, historically constituted ones that permeate the pre-theoretical lived world. Description also entails what could be called 'hermeneutical freedom' – a freedom from non-essential, concrete, contextual, realizing, habitual interpretations.3 This is not to say that phenomenological descriptive reflection is not hermeneutical in nature. Interpretation (Auslegung) lies at the very heart of this inquiring process. Husserl's careful distinction points at the importance of distinguishing between various types of interpretation. Interpretation – the process through which meaning is brought to the fore through the intentional apprehension (Auffassung) of content (hyle) guided by a determinate object (Materie) – is at work at each level of consciousness and in each attitude. Husserl here simply warns us against importing natural modes of interpretation, which are bound by factual epistemic motivations and goals, into the phenomenological attempt to clarify the essential structures of experience. On this mature transcendental model, Husserl reminds us that description is no longer the analysis of reell (or noetic) moments only, as we witnessed in his Investigations. In fact, it appears that there is a 'doubling' of description at work in critical transcendental projects: one noetic and one noematic. These lines of thought are correlative, just like their 1 Husserl explicitly introduces and discusses the notion of the gradation of eide or universals in the 1920s in lectures courses dealing with passive and active synthesis (most published in Hua XI and Langrebe's Erfahrung & Urteil). The notion is present in earlier guises in research manuscripts predating even his Ideas I (these manuscripts have been recently published in Hua XLI; most are A manuscripts where Husserl engages the problem of induction in an Aristotelian and Humean manner). 2 Hua I, p.74 3 Ibid. 337 objects of investigation.1 It remains to be seen what this correlation entails at the inquiring level; are these two distinct analytical processes somehow running in a parallel fashion or are they affecting each other intuitively as they unfold? Is this a true parallelism or something along the lines of a dynamic exchange of evidence or meaning? What Husserl has to say about constitution2 (or better yet, co-constitution) as one of the binding limits of transcendental phenomenological inquiry is illuminating. We have here referred to description as 'analysis'. The best way to understand what about this process is 'analytical' is to remind ourselves of Husserl's mereology, which played – covertly post his Investigations – a central role in the carving of his phenomenological method. We saw in Chapter 4 in our discussion of part-part and part-whole relations that Husserl followed this set theoretical model, under Cantor's influence, in his development of idealizing abstraction (ideirende Abstraktion) as early phenomenological method of inquiry. The important lesson that Husserl learned from Cantorian theory of manifolds is that the manifested concrete relation among parts within these wholes is one necessarily dictated by the essential structure of the parts. As such, these parts relate to each other in a law-like manner. To capture the structure of the whole one must thus take a close look at its parts' structures; this, in its turn, can uncover the universal principles at work in the manifold. Husserl was explicit about the import of mereology for phenomenological inquiry in 1900/01. This changes during the following decade. His reliance upon these mathematical insights retreats under the surface, but does not disappear altogether. It was in Husserl's interest to place less of an emphasis on this mathematical model. The reason for this was a shift in his methodological goals. In 1900/01 the goal was establishing phenomenology as eidetic science. Its similarity to mathematics was of considerable aid in this argument. In the 1 Hua I, pp.74-75 2 Cf., Hua I, §22 and Third Meditation 338 years to follow Husserl became more and more aware of the need to distinguish between mathematics as objective eidetic science and phenomenology as subjective eidetic science. This is the reason why gradually, in the decade following the Investigations, Husserl comes to employ the term 'idealizing abstraction' less and less. If phenomenology is to become a selfstanding science with a unique inquiring method, then it should not rely on any imported objective eidetic tools. The danger of ambiguity stemming from methodological overlap steered Husserl away from the language of mereology. Nevertheless, his mathematical insights remained his faithful guides in his transcendental project. Husserl must have known, without explicitly admitting it, that methodological dialogue across disciplines need not threaten the uniqueness and independence of the fields involved. If we dare look beneath the surface of Husserl's explicit claims, we discover, as in the case of description, the mereological model of the Investigations. His notion of explication (Explikation or Betrachtung) provides the venue for this discovery.1 Phenomenological description is analytical because it is explicative – it looks at and seeks to clarify the structure of the parts (along with their dynamic) of the object under investigation understood as whole. Explication is the structural unfolding of that which is investigated.2 The language of 'content' clarification in the case of both noeses and their corresponding noemata points at this as well.3 The notion of clarification (Aufklärung or Klärung) in the context of Husserl's ideational method of inquiry is an interesting one that merits our attention.4 Husserl employs this term pervasively in a fairly ambiguous manner. He uses it to stress the importance of 1 Hua I, pp.70, 72-73; Cf., also Ms. AI-9 (1907/08) (in the context of description) 2 Hua I, p.88 3 Hua I, p.71 4 Cf., Hua I, §22 339 definitions and of ridding philosophical language of baggage that is unaccounted for,1 or ridding philosophical inquiry of presuppositions and habits;2 we see him use it when discussing the relationship between phenomenology and other sciences (along with their respective ontologies);3 we see also him refer to the task of phenomenological reflection as a clarifying one.4 In this last guise, clarification appears to play a core methodological role. Our analysis of the structure and unfolding of eidetic variation will thoroughly explore clarification understood as methodological tool. For now, let us note that along with explication, appropriate interpretation, and analysis it characterizes the nature and project of description. In order to successfully explicate and analyze the objective wholes under investigation, the phenomenologist must clarify their substructures as well as the relations among them. What this 'clarification' process entails exactly has yet to be established. Husserl is not specific enough about this in his programmatic texts. The situation is somewhat more fortunate in his research manuscripts, which we shall soon engage. What description, like all types of experience, seeks to attain is evidence – given in the direct intuition of the intended. As phenomenological-transcendental reflection, description aims at the attainment of apodictic evidence, i.e., the direct non-mediated givenness of structures understood as ideal meanings. Every experience entails evidence. Different kinds of experience entail different kinds of evidence. Husserl was the first to show this and other phenomenologists did not fail to recognize the methodological import of his discovery.5 We can easily map Husserl's insight on the various levels of consciousness and attitudes we have identified. 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §66 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §64 3 Cf., Hua V, p.93ff. 4 Cf., Hua III/1, §10; see also Hua XLI, Nos. 3-4 (1911) 5 Cf., Sartre, TE, p.51 340 Our discussion of realizing consciousness has shown us that its evidence is never complete – that given its perspectival character, it is fundamentally marked by an infinitely determinable indeterminacy. Thus, we should avoid collapsing Husserlian and Cartesian evidence. For Descartes, evidence necessarily entailed certainty stemming from clarity and distinctness. The main problem with this model, apart from its one-sided understanding of evidence, was its deep reliance on the realizing natural attitude. Cartesian evidence has the notion of existence inherently built into it. For Husserl, evidence (Evidenz) is nothing other than the direct self-givenness, the 'seeing' of the intuited in any experiential context, not just the philosophical-scientific one.1 To say that every experience entails the attainment of evidence is to say that every non-empty experience (i.e., having an intention without intuition) brings forth new meaning. What then is the nature of evidence sought in phenomenological reflection understood as transcendental description, and, what kind of meaning does it bring to the fore? To answer these questions we go back to Husserl's seminal distinction between empirical and apodictic evidence.2 The former is given in the natural attitude, the latter, in the artificial theoretical one. Given Husserl's goal of establishing and securing the status of phenomenology as subjective eidetic science,3 phenomenological evidence must be genuinely scientific4 – i.e., able to establish the solid foundation upon which an entire coherent edifice or system of knowledge could be built.5 Phenomenology as eidetic science must be 1 Hua I, pp.52, 92-93 2 Hua I, §§6-7 3 We see Husserl stressing the eidetic scientific character of phenomenology as early as his 1907 Idea of Phenomenology (Hua II), and most emphatically in his 1910/11 Logos essay Philosophy as Rigorous Science. The 'purity' of this science understood as transcendentality and non-positionality comes forcefully to the fore in his Ideas I and onward through his thorough discussion of the phenomenological reductions. The only reduction Husserl mentions more or less extensively prior to Ideas I is the phenomenological reduction (in the 1905 Seefelder Manuskripte and onward). 4 Hua I, pp.53-54 5 Hua I, p.55 341 ultimately founded upon evidence that it is at once absolutely indubitable and given with absolute certainty.1 Thus, this absolute evidence structurally lends itself to founding (Fundierung); it functions as the founding level for higher-order critical phenomenological reflections.2 It appears that unlike empirical evidence given in realizing positional experiences – one that is inherently indeterminate, incomplete, dubitable, and solely entailing factual certainty,3 phenomenological apodictic evidence exhibits a certain kind of perfection; this perfection is, however, according to Husserl, in need of qualification.4 Its absolute indubitability and certainty do not necessarily entail completeness and lack of obscurity. Experiences exhibiting apodictic evidence could very well also involve obscurity and incompleteness in the manner of their givenness or intuition. Husserl reserves the term 'adequate' to describe complete and clear evidence.5 While apodictic evidence could be adequate, it need not be so in order to be indubitable and absolutely certain. This is important if we are to understand and disentangle the functioning of ideational thought (i.e., thought seeking fulfillment in the intuition of ideal meanings or possibilities). A key aspect of apodictic evidence is the inconceivability6 it necessarily entails; what it gives it gives in a manner that absolutely excludes the otherwise. Thus, apodictic evidence is necessary, not contingent. We already stressed the significance of non-positional conceivability in the reductions. We shall have ample opportunity to explore the role of this conceivability (i.e., 1 Ibid. 2 Hua I, pp.55-56 3 Cf., Hua I, §7. Husserl notes here that the being of the real world is not an obvious matter of fact (cf., Hua I, p.58); it is not given with necessity and for epistemological purposes one ought to surpass the need to establish its existence with certainty. The best way to avoid this most potent penchant is to recognize that genuine theoretical inquiry does not unfold in the natural attitude (cf., Hua I, §15). 4 Hua I, p.55 5 Ibid. 6 Hua I, p.56 342 the givenness of artificial non-positional possibilities) in the process of eidetic variation. We note here that the goal of eidetic intuition – the terminating point for the ideational process – necessarily entails inconceivability. Much will hinge upon unraveling the dynamic between non-positional conceivability and ideal conceivability at the core of eidetic variation. Husserl notes, in passing in the Cartesian Meditations, that the best way to attain the eidetic goal of phenomenological reflection is to completely leave behind the natural realizing attitude and engage pure possibilities rather than actualities.1 Comments such as these leave us to wonder about the exact role played by the imagination in eidetic inquiry. We know that Husserl located pure possibility at the level of imagining consciousness in his lecture courses on this subject matter; we also know that comments about possibility abound in his discussions of the phenomenological method; and yet, instead of adopting what presents itself as a most fruitful venue for elucidating the complex nature of his method, Husserl steers clear of any in-depth methodological analysis of Phantasie. I have already stressed what I believe to be the main reason for this reluctance to trust his insights into the nature of imagining consciousness. To return to our discussion of apodictic evidence – Husserl is careful enough to 'leave open' the issue of the infinity or potential finitude of the process leading to the attainment of adequate apodictic evidence.2 He had good reason for this qualification. As we shall soon see in our analysis of eidetic variation, this process of seeking the intuition of the ideal – a process in principle able to culminate in fulfillment (Erfüllung) or the synthesis of identity (Deckung) between that which is intended and that which is intuited3 – is in some cases finite 1 Hua I, p.66 2 Hua I, p.55 3 Because of this synthetic – filling dynamic unfolding in the artificial transcendental rather than natural factual attitude, Husserl's notion of truth and his model of eidetic knowledge acquisition do not follow the adaequatio model the Moderns were so fond of. This is why Heidegger's claim that Husserl fails to escape adaequatio rei et intellectus in his lecture "The History of the Concept of Time" is misguided. Eidetic knowledge for Husserl is 343 and in some infinite depending on the object under investigation. Core structures and moments of consciousness, such as memory as realizing positional presentification (Vergegenwärtigung), could be studied and analyzed through eidetic variation in a complete manner. Thus, adequate apodictic evidence is attainable.1 When it comes to the phenomenological study of cultural objects however, or of any objects that are structurally and necessarily affected by the historicity of intersubjective constitutive processes, the ideational process could never reach fulfillment – no full overlap of intended and intuited is attainable here. The questions we must ask, given this distinction between finite and infinite ideation, are: What grants apodictic evidence to begin with? What happens with the apodictic evidence available at various stages of the ideational process? If the evidence is apodictic but inadequate what 'clarifying' processes could the phenomenologist employ in order to dispel the intuited obscurity? If apodictic evidence is foundational, what role does founding (Fundierung) play in the later stages of eidetic variation? At what point is completeness attained and what facilitates the full synthesis of identity between intended and intuited? Ideation as transcendental ideal analysis is a search for the intuition of essences or ideal meanings.2 Recognizing that 'meaning' is a central point of reference in Husserl's transcendental idealism is of utmost importance if we are to understand how ideation unfolds. As already noted, meaning is given or intuited in any non-empty experience. Clarifying what kind of meaning is being intended and intuited at different stages in the not a matter of inner (the subjective/indubitable)-outer (the real/the actual) 'matching;' it entails instead reaching identity through the overlap of intended and intuited meaning both given at the artificial nonpositional level; the natural attitude is here completely left behind. Even the attainment of factual knowledge unfolds in a manner distinct from this matching. The synthetic model holds, unfolding this time in the natural attitude and necessarily exhibiting an infinitely determinable indeterminacy. There is no complete fulfillment in the case of factual knowledge and evidence. 1 Cf., Ms. AI-11 (1907-1928) 2 Hua I, §§34, 41 344 process of eidetic variation will bring light on how the shift from the variant to the invariant occurs and whether Husserl's claim that such a shift is possible holds. The ideal meaning (essence or ideal possibility) is what ideation intends. The question is: What does it intend? What kind of information, evidence, and meaning does it have access to on its way to the ideal? What is given and what is taken in and through the ideational process and what kinds of 'contents' and 'interpretations' secure its success? Resolving the issue of the possibility of attaining universal and objective knowledge through subjective processes guided Husserl's attempt to establish a phenomenological method in 1900/01. This project did not shift in the decade that followed the Investigations. Around 1906/07 the same issue attains a critical theory of knowledge spin and the question becomes: What are the conditions for the possibility of universal knowledge given the first person perspective or singular subjective stance of the inquiring process?1 2 The answer Husserl found in 1900/01 hinged upon the successful universal analysis of subjective acts. Husserl's mature answer involves looking at subjectivity in a radically new way: as transcendental subjectivity. We have already seen that the reductions are meant to secure our access to this horizon of noetic possibilities – a horizon that is intentionally and constitutively related to that which is other, namely, to noematic possibilities. The reductions uncover subjectivity as being other than the real world. Where Descartes failed to establish the grounds for the possibility 1 Cf., Hua I, p.115 2 Cf., Hua XXIV (II. Abschnitt: Noetik, Erkenntnistheorie und Phänomenologie); cf., also, Ortiz-Hill (2008), Translator's Introduction. Husserl's five lectures delivered in 1907 under the title Die Idee der Phänomenologie (Hua II) likewise clearly show his interest in a criticial approach to the theory of knowledge. His interest in Descartes and Kant in these lectures is quite prominent. This refocusing of his project in light of theory of knowledge eventually aided Husserl in formulating his mature transcendental idealism. The reason for this lies in having to find a solution to the old Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. Husserl's way out of this apparently inescapable conundrum was his employment of attidinal difference. Only by leaving the natural attitude behind can be recognize the transcendental character of consciousness, and only by establishing a non-positional stance can be guard ourselves from following the appeal of ontic claims (the necessary reality and existence of the world). 345 of universal knowledge without appealing to the divine, Husserl succeeds – or so he tells us – through his employment of the reductions1 understood as radical shifts in attitude.2 As tempting as it might be to simply take Husserl at his word, we must bring further clarity to his claim; we must understand why the artificial attitude and the meaning and evidence it renders available succeed where the Cartesian natural stance fails. Why is the attainment of genuine universal knowledge possible in the artificial attitude? To answer this question Husserl suggests that we look closer at the horizon of possibilities that transcendental subjectivity itself is.3 He urges us to 'explicate' this horizon, to let it unfold in its structural detail and follow the clues that announce themselves in the process.4 According to him, we will find universal structures shared by all subjectivities,5 we will uncover its essentially constitutive nature6 along with its motivational character7 (i.e., the search for eidetic knowledge and absolute truth given with verified certainty), we will stumble upon intersubjective traces at its very core,8 and all of these findings will point us in the direction of the conditions for the possibility of universal knowledge. We accept this challenge with one proviso: because of reasons already given in our discussion of the reductions, we shall explore 'transcendental subjectivity' as multi-level nexic horizonal consciousness. Before delving into this in-depth study of ideational processes through the lens of transcendental consciousness, let us also stress once more the methodological import of the distinction between the natural and artificial attitudes. According to Husserl, this 1 Hua I, pp.115-116 2 Hua I, p.119 3 Cf., Hua I, p.118 4 Ibid. 5 Hua I, p.117 6 Hua I, p.118 7 Hua I, p.92 8 Hua I, pp.129-130 346 distinction is what renders successful a critique of the theory of knowledge;1 without it, critical inquiring thought would remain bound by deeply-engrained factual epistemic habits. Husserl locates the natural and artificial attitudes in a methodological context for the first time in his 1910/11 lecture entitled Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.2 As I already pointed out, Husserl's discovery of attitudes dates back to his 1904/05 lecture on Phantasie.3 The novelty of the 1910/11 lecture lies in its explicit discussion of attitudes in the context of the phenomenological method. We learn here that the phenomenological attitude is radically different from the natural one;4 that the natural attitude is one of empirical experience granting provisional factual evidence5 and marked by an inherent interest in the existence of its objects as actual things.6 Once we perform the reductions, however, we leave this natural attitude behind, engaging objects as phenomena – i.e., non-positionally given – rather than actual existing things.7 Phenomenology as eidetic science exhibits a different motivation8 than the natural sciences9 understood as sciences of fact. Because the attainment of knowledge of ideals motivates phenomenology, the latter must necessarily leave the realizing positional level behind and seek a path to eidetic positionality.10 This lecture, along with his 1907 Idea of Phenomenology,11 offers one of the earliest discussions of the distinction between existence and essence,12 their respective types of positionality and corresponding theses (what I labeled Nat.P1 and Art.P2), and the natural and the philosophical artificial attitudes.13 1 Cf., Hua I, §40 2 Cf., Hua XIII, No.6 3 Cf., Hua XXIII, No.1 4 Hua XIII, pp.112 5 Hua XIII, No.6, §§8-10 6 Hua XIII, No.6, §7 7 Hua XIII, p.123 8 Hua XIII, pp.125-126 9 Hua XIII, p.124 10 Hua XIII, p.126 11 Cf., Hua II, pp.3-4, 8-9, 17-19, 67-76 12 Cf., Hua XIII, §9 13 Cf., Hua XIII, p.135 347 Husserl claims here that in order to attain knowledge of essence we must perform an 'intuitive ideation' (intuitive Ideation)1 – an inquiry pertaining to and grounding of a 'true philosophy' (echte Philosophie)2 whose 'purity'3 lies in its eidetic goal and freedom from the positing of existence granted through the suspension of the empirical (Ausschaltung des Empirischen).4 It appears that the success of phenomenological eidetic inquiry requires a fruitful dynamic among attitudes and levels of consciousness. Another interesting claim Husserl makes here is that there are two kinds of 'perception' – one granting access to facts, the other to ideals or essences.5 The claim of the primary direct givenness of evidence is not new here; what is worthy of our attention, however, is the parallelism Husserl suggests here between how evidence is given in these two radically different attitudes. Evidence is necessarily given in a direct grasp. Let us revisit our discussion of the direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung) functioning as axis of all nexic-horizonal consciousness levels. We identified perception as the core presentation of the realizing positional level and Phantasie qua act as the presentation of the non-positional level (be it natural or artificial). Both of these direct presentations give access to meaning and evidence. What about the apodictic evidence of phenomenological inquiry? Is it, too, directly granted through a type of direct intuitive presentation? Husserl's answer here and later on is obvious. There is a type of 'perception' that grants access to essences. We would, however, do better to avoid referring to this act as 'perception'. Presentation (as direct and genuine) is the happier term. Perception is the direct intuitive presentation of the realizing positional attitude, and as we have already seen, it structurally entails ontic commitment. 'Eidetic presentation' would do the trick and avoid importing 1 Hua XIII, p.127f. 2 Hua XIII, p.128 3 Cf., Hua XIII, pp.127-128, 135 4 Hua XIII, §12 5 Hua XIII, §§13-15 348 realizing dimensions at the eidetic positional level. We thus have three types of direct intuitive presentation: perception, imagination, and eidetic presentation. Their intuitive moments are evidence and meaning granting; as basic, these acts are also founding – i.e., their 'content' can be taken up and reinterpreted in higher order apprehensions such as presentifications (e.g., memory and expectation), judgment, empathy, etc. Those apprehensive to adopt 'presentation' given Husserl's critique of Brentanian presentation in the Investigations should remember the motivation behind Husserl's critique. It was not to show that external perception is the most primitive dator act, but rather to emphasize the ambiguity exhibited by Brentano's account of acts. What Husserl took issue with was the latter's failure to clearly distinguish act, content, and object on the one hand and the reell structures of the acts themselves on the other.1 Our claim here that there are three distinct direct types of intuitive presentation does not threaten Husserl's realism. External perception remains the most primitive of direct intuitive acts; nevertheless, this should not prevent us from recognizing the genuine and direct character of Phantasie and of eidetic presentation. Husserl's initial failure to recognize these features of the imagination stemmed from his assuming that only one act could be primitive and direct. As we move forward to our discussion of the structure and functioning of eidetic variation, it will be interesting to see: 1) how the founding relation between direct intuitive presentations and higher order acts manifests itself as organizing principle of eidetic variation, which as process and act-complex necessarily entails direct intuitive presentations, 2) what specific direct intuitive presentations are at work in the ideational process, and 3) what the relationship is, in the context of eidetic variation, among the various kinds of meaning and evidence these three types of direct presentation bring to the fore. This last 1 See my discussion of Husserl's critique in Chapter 4. 349 point reminds us once more that if we are to expose the complexity of Husserl's method of inquiry we are to pay close attention to the relation between the natural and artificial attitudes. §2!2. Husser l ' s Eidet i c Variat ion Before exploring the role played by the imagination (both as direct intuitive presentation and as artificial non-positional consciousness) in the process of eidetic variation understood as the shift from the variant to the invariant, let us first consider Husserl's explicit claims with respect to the nature of this process. What Husserl discloses about eidetic variation, the model of consciousness I proposed earlier in this project, and our rethinking of the reductions will function as the foundation upon which we will engage the import of Phantasie for ideational phenomenological inquiry. In order to best expose Husserl's views with respect to eidetic variation I will examine three of his mature genetic accounts, which are also the most extensive discussions of the shift from the variant to the invariant (except those offered in his research manuscripts on ideation1). These three mature accounts – in Experience and Judgment, Phenomenological Psychology, and Formal and Transcendental Logic – exhibit what could be considered Husserl's final position with respect to this method of investigation. Some of the claims made in these accounts were already foreshadowed by his attempts to elucidate eidetic variation in Ideas I. These latter discussions are unfortunately very brief, highly ambiguous, and tangentially scattered across various other arguments Husserl makes in his 1913 programmatic project. We learn there that ideation (the inquiry seeking the intuition of 1 These manuscripts (mostly A manuscripts) are now published in Hua XLI. 350 essence) culminates in essential insight,1 which is granted through a type of direct intuitive presentation.2 These intuited essences can be subsequently taken up in judgments and other non-direct intuitive acts.3 About the eidetic process itself, we learn that exemplars play an important role4 and that the status of these exemplars is that of 'free irreal possibilities'.5 Thus, Husserl suggests here that Phantasie plays an important part in eidetic variation.6 His discussion of Phantasie, as we have already seen in the case of the reductions and his argument for the independence of neutrality modification, is marred by references to mental images and its pictorial character. Instead of following the trail of irreal possibilities (which he claims to be at work in ideation) as the better venue through which to uncover the role of the imagination, he relies instead on the imagination understood as the act through which non-ontically qualified representations or copies are brought to the fore. His example of geometric idealization speaks volumes about his 1913 views and their reliance upon a jejune model of imagination, especially when he juxtaposes this mathematical method to phenomenological eidetic variation in order to stress their resemblances.7 In his later genetic discussions of eidetic variation, as we shall soon see, he likewise makes reference to the 'images' of Phantasie as variants and 'copies' of the initial exemplar or model guiding the varying process. By 1928/29, however, in his Formal and Transcendental Logic, he places emphasis on possibility and conceivability as the marks of the imagination rather than its so-called 'pictorial' representational abilities. The exact unfolding of the ideational process remains, however, largely obscure in Husserl's 1913 account. We are 1 Hua III/1, §3 2 CF., Hua III/1, §§3-4 3 Hua III/1, §5 4 Cf., Hua III/1, §34 5 Hua III/1, §77 6 Cf, Hua III/1, §§34-35, 38, 67, 70 7 Cf., Hua III/1, §§7, 70 351 briefly told that the ideational process is structurally open and infinite,1 and that it entails a gradual process of attaining fulfillment2 (i.e., of reaching the synthesis of identity between the intended and the intuited) through the analysis of the exemplars3 (exemplarische Analyse). If anything, Husserl's claims about eidetic variation in Ideas I raise more questions than offer answers. Because of the ambiguous nature of these discussions, we will focus primarily on Husserl's later more substantial accounts of ideation (i.e., the method of 'seeing essences' – Wesensschau or Wesenserschauung) and occasionally refer back to some of his Ideas I claims. The three substantial genetic accounts of ideation are all dated during Husserl's prolific 1920s and they are genetic and synthetic in character. They differ in the facets of eidetic variation they emphasize: coincidence in conflict (Deckung im Widerstreit), higher-order variation, eide scale, or conceivablity. Together, they grant us a rich picture of Husserl's position. Despite the fair amount of detail they provide, these accounts still raise numerous questions. I will consider these questions and seek to dispel the ambiguities Husserl left behind with respect to some of the most important structural aspects of the shift from the variant to the invariant. Let us turn to a few key passages in order to point out the main moments of ideation as Husserl conceived it in his mature genetic transcendental phenomenology. I. Eidetic Variation in Experience & Judgment (early 1920s Mss.) Preceding this seeing [the true seeing of the universal as eidos], there is the transition from the initial example, which gives direction and which we have called a model, to ever new images, whether these are due to the aimless favor of association and the whims of passive imagination (in which case we only seize upon them arbitrarily as examples) or whether we have obtained them by our own pure activity of imaginative invention from our original model. In this transition from image to image, from similar to the similar, all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence (Deckung) in the order of their appearance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then as arbitrary sequences of particulars in which the same universal is 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §83 2 Hua III/1, §69 3 Hua III/1, p.203 352 isolated as an eidos. Only in this continuous coincidence does something which is the same come to congruence, something which henceforth can be seen purely for itself. This means that it is passively preconstituted as such and that the seeing of the eidos rests in the active intuitive apprehension of what is thus preconstituted – exactly as in every constitution of objectivities of the understanding, and especially of general objectivities. Naturally, the presupposition of this is that the multiplicity as such is present to consciousness as a plurality and never slips completely from our grasp. Otherwise, we do not attain the eidos as the ideally identical, which only is as hen epi pollôn.1 An individual pure and simple is an existing individual (or one capable of existing). However, what is seen as unity in the conflict is not an individual but a concrete hybrid unity of individuals mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive: a unique consciousness with a unique content, whose correlate signifies concrete unity founded in conflict, in incompatibility. This remarkable hybrid unity is at the bottom of essential seeing.2 The first of these passages discusses the unfolding of eidetic variation and its structure. Let us stress what appear to be central moments and elements in this process. We learn that eidetic variation begins with an original example that functions as model (Vorbild) for all subsequent variants, which appear to be 'copies' or 'images' (Nachbildern) of the initial model.3 These variants are either brought to the fore through passive imagining and association or through active imagining. Either way, what seems to matter most is that the total experience of the variants (i.e., multiplicity taken as a whole), through their shared 1 EJ, pp.342-343 (Husserl's emphases). "Voran liegt der Übergang vom Ausgangsexempel, das die Leitung gibt und das wir Vorbild nannten, zu immer neuen Nachbildern, mögen wir sie der ziellosen Gunst der Assoziation und Einfällen passiver Phantasie verdanken und sie uns nur willkürlich als Exempel zueignen, oder mögen wir sie durch pure eigene Aktivität phantasiemässigen Umfingierens aus unserem ursprünglichen Vorbild gewonnen haben. Bei diesem Übergang von Nachbild zu Nachbild, von Ähnlichem zu Ähnlichem kommen alle die beliebigen Einzelheiten in der Folge ihres Auftretens zu überschiebender Deckung und treten rein passiv in eine synthetische Einheit, in der sie alle als Abwandlungen voneinander erscheinen, und dann weiter als beliebige Folgen von Einzelheiten, in denen sich dasselbe Allgemeine als Eidos vereinzelt. Erst in dieser fortlaufenden Deckung kongruiert ein Selbiges, das nun rein für sich herausgeschaut werden kann. Das heisst, es ist als solches passiv vorkonstituiert, und die Erschauung des Eidos beruht in der aktiven schauenden Erfassung des so Vorkonstituierten – genau wie bei jeder Konstitution von Verstandesgegenständlichkeiten und spezieller von Allgemeingegenständlichkeiten. Voraussetzung dafür is natürlich, dass die Mannigfaltigkeit als solche, als Vielheit bewusst ist und nie ganz aus dem Griff gelassen wird. Sonst gewinnen wir nicht das Eidos als ideal Identisches, das nur ist als hen epi pollôn" (EU, pp.413-414; Husserl's emphases). For a discussion of the one over many, see Hua XLI Nr.11 (1918) and Blg.17. 2 EJ, p.345 (Husserl's emphasis). "Ein Individuum schlechthin ist ein existierendes (oder möglicherweise existierendes). Was aber als Einheit im Widerstreit erschaut wird, ist kein Individuum, sondern eine konkrete Zwittereinheit sich wechselseitig aufhebender, sich koexistential ausschliessender Individuen: ein eigenes Bewusstsein mit einem eigenen konkreten Inhalt, dessen Korrelat konkrete Einheit im Widerstreit, in der Unverträglichkeit heisst. Diese merkwürdige Zwittereinheit liegt der Wesenserschauung zugrunde" (EU, p.417; Husserl's emphasis). 3 We shall soon have more to say about the specific status of the variants; for now, let us note that as late as the 1920 Husserl still struggles to leave the language of images behind when referring to the imagination and its potential methodological import. 353 similarity, entails a synthesis of coincidence (Deckung); through this synthesis, that which is the same across all of these instances comes to the fore. Husserl also stresses here the significance of the arbitrary or optional (willkürlich, beliebig) character of these variants. The second passage stresses the significance of conflict in the process of attaining synthesis of identity (or the intuition of essence as that which is the same) across variants (Deckung im Widerstreit). It is here, in Erfahrung & Urteil, that we find Husserl's most explicit discussion of conflict (Widerstreit) in the context of eidetic variation. II. Eidetic Variation in Phenomenological Psychology (1925) The fundamental performance upon which everything else depends is the shaping of any experienced or fancied objectivity into a variant, shaping it into the form of the optional example and at the same time of the guiding 'model,' of precisely the first member of an openly endless multiplicity of variants, in short, a variation. Of course this open infinity does not signify an actual continuation in infinity, the nonsensical demands actually to produce all possible variants – as if we could only then be sure that the eidos which subsequently becomes grasped actually accords with all possibilities. Rather, what is meant is that the variation itself as the process of forming variants has a character of optionalness, that it is to be carried out in the consciousness of optionally forming further variants. Therefore, even when we discontinue, we have not meant the factual multiplicity of intuitive single variants converted into one another as this factual series of objectivities which are presented in some way or other and are arbitrarily referred to, or which are produced purely fictitiously from the start; rather, just as every single moment has the character of being exemplarily optional, so also an optional character pertains continually to the multiplicity of variation, since it makes no difference what might join in, makes no difference what I might lay hold of in consciousness, 'I could continue thus.' Therefore, the remarkable and extremely important consciousness of 'and so on optionally' belongs essentially to every multiplicity of variation. What we call an 'openly infinite' multiplicity is given only in that manner; and it is evidently the same whether we go on for a longer time producing or optionally referring to what is suitable, and thus extend the series of actual intuitions, or whether we discontinue sooner.1 1 PP, p.57 (Husserl's emphasis). "Die Grundleistung, von der alles weitere abhängt, ist die Gestaltung irgendeiner erfahrenen oder phantasierten Gegenständlichkeit zu einer Variante; ihre Gestaltung in die Form des beliebigen Exempels und zugleich des leitenden 'Vorbildes': eben des Ausgangsgliedes für eine offen endlose Mannigfaltigkeit von Varianten, kurzweg eine Variation. Diese offene Endlosigkeit besagt natürlich nicht ein wirkliches Fortgehen in die Unendlichkeit, nicht die unsinnige Forderung, alle möglichen Varianten wirklich zu erzeugen – als ob wir nur dann gewiss sein könnten, dass das nachher zur Erfassung kommende Eidos wirklich allen Möglichkeiten gemäss sei. Was vielmehr gemeint ist, ist, dass die Variation als Prozess der Variantenbildung selbst eine Beliebigkeitsgestalt habe, dass er im Bewusstsein beliebiger Fortbildung von Varianten vollzogen sei. Auch wenn wir also abbrechen, so haben wir doch nicht die faktische Mannigfaltigkeit von anschaulichen einzelnen und ineinander übergeführten Varianten gemeint, als diese faktische Reihe von irgendwie sich darbietenden und willkürlich herausgezogenen oder von vornherein rein fiktiv erzeugten Gegenständen, sonder wie alles Einzelne den Charakter des exemplarisch Beliebigen hat, so gehört auch zur Variationmannigfaltigkeit immerzu ein Belieben, indem es gleichgültig ist, was immer noch sich ihr beigesellen möge, gleichgültig, was ich im Bewusstsein des 'ich könnte so weitergehen' noch in den Griff bekäme. Also zu jeder Variationsmannigfaltigkeit gehört wesentlich das merkwürdige und so überaus wichtige Bewusstsein des 354 But as soon as the first step of the eidos has been climbed, the first step above pure and simple experience, insofar as it is a consciousness – admittedly higher and actively producing – in which a new kind of objectivity, the universal, becomes itself given.1 Thus I could from the start be oriented toward varying in completely unrestricted fashion, therefore without restriction to any universal already lighting up, and toward seeking the universal which is higher than all other universalities which can be singled out intuitively and then restricted – in our example, which is higher than the universalities 'red,' 'blue,' 'yellow,' etc., as the highest universality. Here then the only demand is that the variation – no matter how – moves on, as long as it is a variation at all, thus is at all combined in a synthesis of pervasively unitary coincidence with a pervasively universal moment. That is the way therefore toward the constitution of the highest essential universalities as highest genera which in particular, if they are concrete genera, are called regions.2 The first passage, like the first passage from Erfahrung und Urteil, seeks to clarify the structure and essential stages or moments of the process of eidetic variation in much of the same ways. We see Husserl once more mention the original example qua model, the variants modeled based on it, their arbitrariness understood as non-positionality (i.e., not bound by any realizing positional facticity). There is an additional point we ought to consider: the varying process exhibits infinite openness. It does so in principle (it need not be carried out all the way) by exhibiting an 'and so on...' (und so weiter) character. What this openness and infinity point at is the arbitrariness of the process itself – a feature it thus shares with its correlates. Arbitrariness appears to mark both noetic and noematic structures of the ideational experience. 'und so weiter nach Belieben'. Dadurch allein ist das, was wir eine 'offen undendliche' Mannigfaltigkeit nennen, gegeben, und evidenterweise ist dies dieseble, ob wir längerhin erzeugend oder beliebig Passendes heranziehend fortschreiten, also die Reihe wirklicher Anschauungen erweitern der schon früher abbrechen (Hua IX, pp.7677; Husserl's emphasis). 1 PP, p.62. "Aber nun werder wir, sobald die erste Stufe des Eidos erstiegen ist, die erste über der schilichten Erfahrung, darauf aufmerksam, dass auch ein Eidos variierbar ist, m.a.W.: Ideenschau ist selbst ein Analogon der schlichten Erfahrung, insofern sie ein freilich höheres und aktiv erzeugendes Bewusstein ist, in dem eine neuartige Gegenständlichkeit, das Allgemeine, zur Selbstgegebenheit kommt" (Hua IX, p.83). 2 PP, pp.61-62. "So könnte ich nun von vornherein darauf eingestellt sein, in völlig ungebundener Weise, also ohne Bindung an irgendein schon aufleuchtendes Allgemeines zu variieren und das Allgemeine zu suchen, das über allen herauszuschauen und dann beschränkenden Allgemeinheiten liegt, in unserem Beispiel, das über den Allgemeinheiten Rot, Blau, Gelb etc. liegt als die oberste Allgemeinheit. Hier ist also nur verlangt, dass die Variation – gleichgültig wie – vonstatten geht, solange sie überhaupt Variation ist, also überhaupt zu einer Synthesis durchgängig einheitlicher Deckung zusammengeschlossen ist mit einem durchgängig Allgemeinen. Das also ist der Weg zur Konstitution oberster Wesensallgemeinheiten als oberster Gattungen, die insbesondere, wenn sie konkrete Gattungen sind, Regionen heissen" (Hua IX, p.82). 355 The second passage points at a most important and interesting process – an eidetic variation beginning with an eidos and whose variants are eide rather than arbitrary or free instances of one essence. This second type of variation necessarily entails an increase in the level of generality as regards the eide scale. We shall soon have more to say about this process, especially in the context of adequate apodictic evidence and post-ideational thought. The third passage seeks to elucidate the structure of this new type of eidetic variation. It seems, according to Husserl, that its structure – one entailing variation, conflict, and coincidence – is not much different from that of variations commencing in experience through the initial aid of the reductions. III. Eidetic Variation in Formal and Transcendental Logic (1928/29) In this inquiry [into the systematic universe of possible experiences], the variation of the necessary initial example is the performance in which the 'eidos' should emerge and by means of which the evidence of the indissoluble eidetic correlation between constitution and constituted should also emerge. If it is to have these effects, it must be understood, not as an empirical variation, but as a variation carried on with the freedom of pure phantasy and with the consciousness of its purely optional character – the consciousness of the 'pure' Any Whatever. Thus understood, the variation extends into an open horizon of endlessly manifold free possibilities of more and more variants. Now, in such a fully free variation, released from all restrictions to facts accepted beforehand, all the variants belonging to the openly infinite sphere – which includes the <initial> example itself, as 'optional' and freed of all its factualness – stand in a relationship of synthetic interrelatedness and integral connectedness; more particularly, they stand in a continuous and all-inclusive synthesis of 'coincidence in conflict' (Deckung im Widerstreit). But, precisely with this coinciding, what necessarily persists throughout this free and always-repeatable variation comes to the fore: the invariant, the indissolubly identical in the different and ever-again different, the essence common to all, the universal essence by which all 'imaginable' variants of the example, and all variants of any such variant, are restricted. This invariant is the ontic essential form (a priori form), the eidos, corresponding to the example, in place of which any variant of the example could have served equally well.1 1 FTL, pp.247-248 (Husserl's emphases). "Die hierbei zu vollziehende Variation des (als Ausgang notwendigen) Exempels ist es, in der sich das 'Eidos' ergeben soll und mittels deren auch die Evidenz der unzerbrechlichen eidetischen Korrelation von Konstitution und Konstituirtem. Soll sie das leistein, so ist sie nicht zu verstehen als eine empirische Variation, sondern al seine Variation, die in der Freiheit der reinen Phantasie und im reinen Bewusstsein der Beliebigkeit – des 'reinen' Überhaupt – vollzogen wird, womit sie sich zugleich in einem Horizont offen endlos mannigfaltiger freier Möglichkeiten für immer neuen Varianten hineinerstreckt. In einer derartigen völlig freien, von allen Bindungen an im voraus geltende Fakta gelösten Variation stehen nun alle Varianten des offen unendlichen Umfangs – in die auch das von aller Faktizität befreite Exempel selbst, als 'beliebiges', einbezogen ist – in einem Verhältnis synthetischer Aufeinanderbezogenheit und allheitlichen Verbundenheit, und des näheren in einer kontinuerlich durchgehenden Synthesis der 'Deckung im Widerstreit'. Eben in dieser Deckung tritt aber das in dieser freien 356 Accordingly, any intentional and constitutional analysis performable on the basis of factual data is to be looked upon from the start as an analysis of examples, even though the analyst does not understand it in that manner. All its results, when freed from factualness and thereby transposed into the realm of free phantasy-variation, become eidetic, become results that (as is apodictically evident) govern a universe of conceivability (a 'pure' allness), in such a manner that the negation of any result is equivalent to an intuitable eidetic impossibility, an inconceivability.1 These two passages from Formal and Transcendental Logic complement Husserl's previous statements about the structure of ideation as process of shifting from the variant to the invariant. Freedom, neutrality, arbitrariness characterize the noetic-constituting as well as the noematic-constitutive dimensions of the process. Because of this, Husserl warns us, we should avoid collapsing eidetic variation and empirical variation – the latter unfolding at the realizing level of consciousness and bound by past experiences and protodoxic demands. The true variants are 'pure free possibilities' brought to the fore through Phantasie. The eidetic success of variation depends upon the synthetic unity across the terms of the multiplicity as well as the coincidence (their sameness) revealed in and through conflict (their differences). The invariant, unlike the free variants understood as possibilities (the conceivable), refuses that which is otherwise. Its negation entails inconceivability or eidetic impossibility. This 1928/29 account of eidetic variation is perhaps the most open of all to recognizing the import of the imagination for ideation. The language of freedom, possibility, und immer wieder neu zu gestaltenden Variation notwendig Verhharende, das Invariante hervor, das unzerbrechlich Selbige im Anders und Immer-wieder-anders, das allgemeinsame Wesen – an das alle 'erdenklichen' Abwandlungen des Exempels und alle Abwandlungen jeder solchen Abwandlung selbst gebunden bleiben. Dieses Invariante ist die ontische Wesensform (apriorische Form), das Eidos, das dem Exempel entspricht, wofür jede Variante desselben ebensogut hätte dienen können" (Hua XVII, pp.254-255; Husserl's emphases). 1 FTL, p.249. "Danach ist jede an faktischen Gegebenheiten zu vollziehende intentionale und konstitutive Analyse von vornherein, auch wenn dafür das Verständnis fehlt, als eine exemplarische anzusehen. Alle ihre Ergebnisse, von der Faktizität befreit und so in das Reich freier Phantasie-Variation versetzt, werden zu wesensmässigen, zu solchen, welche ein Universum der Erdenklichkeit (eine 'reine' Allheit) in apodiktischer Evidenz beherrschen, derart dass jede Negation so viel besagt, wie intuitiv-eidetische Unmöglichkeit, Unausdenkbarkeit" (Hua XVII, p.256). 357 and neutrality – so pervasive in Husserl's discussions of the reductions – appears here once more. These dimensions' specific role in eidetic variation is, however, by no means clear. The same holds with respect to many aspects of Husserl's account. What, for instance, is the difference between free variation and eidetic variation? Husserl appears to employ them interchangeably. The original model binds and guides the process of variation and the givenness of subsequent variants. What else binds this process? The eidos as goal guides and binds it as well, yet how does it do so? Are we to 'know' the eidos and rely on it for guidance? If we are to avoid falling into the trap of petitio principii, what kind of pre-givenness of the eidos as guide are we looking at here? Husserl is silent on these most important fronts. Why is the arbitrary character of the process and of the variants necessary for the attainment of eidetic intuition? Why is infinite openness (und so weiter...) of the essence here, so to speak? Why is it that any conceivable free alternatives would do? Furthermore, what is the relationship between the variant (whose 'otherwise' is conceivable without contradiction) and the invariant (whose 'otherwise' entails eidetic inconceivability and impossibility)? If the variants are all instantiations (Vereinzelungen) of the essence, how are they different from realizing instantiations? Is the language of copies and images necessary here? Why is the grasping of the multiplicity of variants as whole important for the 'seeing of essence'? What is the role of the imagination in this shift from the variant to the invariant? The process from the model, through variants, toward the invariant appears to entail several stages. According to Husserl in the passages listed above, once the varying process is triggered, the variants are exposed as 'each other's other' while also sharing something in common – this seems to be a level of synthesis and unity where through comparison the shared aspects are illuminated; once this realizing occurs, the next stage is of relation 358 between each variant and the invariant rather than a relation among variants – each instance becomes recognizable as exactly that: an instance of the ideal. This latter realization seems to be facilitated by conflict and difference as non-essential. The shared sameness announces itself through a coincidence in conflict. As detailed as this account may be, it still leaves several lacunae unaddressed. First, if eidetic variation is a shift from the variant to the invariant, does it span across more than one level of consciousness? How, if at all, does the natural attitude and its two core levels of consciousness inform eidetic variation as artificial? What secures the givenness of an original model? Is the first variant the neutralized objectivity engaged through the reductions or a freely presented alternative to this neutralized objectivity? What is the dynamic between the reductions and eidetic variation? Is ideation different from empirical abstraction, which engages particular existent particulars through processes of simplification, comparison, association, replaceability, and so forth, if it appears to exhibit the same kinds of processes (granted, at a non-positional level)? Is non-positionality the main feature distinguishing between ideation and empirical abstraction or are there structural differences also? What is the structure of coincidence (Deckung)? What is the structure of conflict (Widerstreit)? Are these passively or actively accomplished? If passivity plays a role in eidetic variation, what is the root of this passivity and how does it collaborate, so to speak, with the active aspects of the varying process? These are important questions that must be unequivocally answered in order to understand the analytic, descriptive, explicative, and clarifying nature of ideation. Lastly, if ideals or essences are organized, on a genus-species model, and if, following Husserl's claim, there are higher-order eidetic variations that do not take their starting point in neutralized particular objectivities, then how are we to understand their possibility? How 359 are we to understand the relationship between lower-order and higher-order eidetic variations in the context of the phenomenological project as a whole (i.e., one unfolding at a community level and across generations of investigators)? If we are to clarify Husserl's primary method of investigation, we will have to address these important questions, along with those we asked in our discussion of eidetic variation understood as description at the beginning of the current section. Our approach in attempting to disentangle Husserl's convoluted account of eidetic variation will be to look at and evaluate whatever hints and clues he offers us in the three texts mentioned above, along with his vague yet powerful claims about ideation in Ideas I, and previous pieces of information stemming from his research manuscripts on ideation (some published in Hua XLI, some still unpublished but available at Husserl Archives) on the background of our model of nexic-horizonal consciousness and our discussion of the reductions. §2! . Artificial Non-Positional Consciousness (Art.N-P) and Eidetic Variation In what follows I will attempt to show that the imagination is both necessary and sufficient for the successful performance of eidetic variation. Like in the case of the reductions, this claim may present itself as unpalatable unless we remind ourselves that the imagination is a non-pictorial direct intuitive presentation as well as a fundamental level of nexic-horizonal consciousness within which all acts other than perception can unfold. This level also has the ability to adopt motivations and projects that are otherwise structurally foreign to it. Our discussion of the fruitful ambiguity of non-positional consciousness revealed this inherent ability of non-positional consciousness – it can function in both natural and artificial contexts. The first step in our argument is to clarify the beginning stages of the process of eidetic variation – the stages unfolding immediately after the 360 performance of the reductions, which, as already shown, transfer and translate information from the natural into the artificial attitude. §2!1. The Given and the Taken Husserl's claims in the above-listed passages discussing the structure and unfolding of eidetic variation raise several noteworthy questions regarding the incipient stages of the ideational process. His mentioning of 'original examples' functioning as guides or 'models' for subsequent productions of variants understood as 'copies' or 'images' does little to clarify what is given and what is taken through the phenomenological-transcendental reduction as starting point for eidetic inquiry. We saw what the reductions bring to the fore; collaboratively, they present phenomena as new objects – as non-positional possibilities, free from the ontic and epistemic bonds of realizing consciousness and motivationally oriented toward fulfillment in eidetic intuition. Are these possibilities necessarily pictorially presented as 'copies' of the initial realizing objectivities that undergo radical modification (Phen.Mk1)? Given what we have established with respect to the non-pictoriality of the imagination, we dismiss a positive answer to this question. Our previous discussion of the various kinds of irreal or non-positional objectivities1 stressed the possibility of engaging both spatio-temporal as well as temporal objects at the level of non-positional consciousness. Eidetic variation is not bound to the former (i.e., it can also intend and intuit solely temporal objects such as acts). Even when the nonpositional objectivity is spatio-temporally given (e.g., a centaur), there are no mental images involved; the variants will be alternatives to an original exemplar given in a direct intuitive manner (i.e., without the aid of Fikta). At most we could say here, with Husserl, that the variants are in this case 'images' or 'copies' if by this we refer to the appearance (Erscheinung) 1 Cf., Chapter 5 361 or direct givenness of spatio-temporal irreal objectivities. It would be advisable, however, to leave the mental imagery language completely behind since it adds nothing to our analysis of ideation and most likely hinders our attempt to rethink the imagination beyond its traditional epistemic role as discrete faculty. Now that we have set the issue of 'images' and 'copies' aside, we must seek to uncover the dynamic at the very beginning of eidetic variation between the original examplar and the subsequent variants whose presentation is guided and limited by the original member of the series. What is this original exemplar and what renders it capable of fruitfully limiting the varying process? Husserl's silence on this front should not deter us from seeking a substantial answer. A most plausible candidate for the initial member of the varying sequence is the neutralized and eidetically motivated Nat.P1 or Nat.N-P objectivity. Thus, if our eidetic project is one of studying the structure of memory, we begin with a memorial instance that has undergone the bracketing of the reductions. What is left then is a nonpositional possibility. Having established this, we cannot help but wonder how a neutralized individuation of the essence is able to guide the eidetic varying process. This process, as all complex noeses (or act-complexes), is temporally structured in a manner that necessary projects expectations based on previous experience. As eidetic variation begins, it cannot draw sustenance for this necessary projective behavior solely from one neutralized instance. The question remains: What triggers the substantial unfolding of variation at the artificial non-positional (Art.N-P) level secured by the reductions? The intending of the ideal could not possibly offer substantial guidance since we have yet to grasp it in eidetic intuition. The initial stages of eidetic variation must seek guidance elsewhere – the telos thrusts the process beyond any one individual, but it cannot guide it step 362 by step. The key to this questions lies in uncovering the exact status and nature of the first stages of variation. We would do well here to remind ourselves of the historical and intersubjective background of the neutralized individual possibility that emerges through the reductions. As already noted, the reductions put out of play ontic, doxic, and epistemic realizing demands; they do not eliminate all of the information pertaining to the object apprehended in the natural attitude, so what does this residuum consist in? This residuum – whatever it may be – is going to be necessarily involved in the eidetic inquiry ensuing after any reduction. We know the objectivity is a non-positional possibility; we must learn more about its structure and content. The genetic model of consciousness Husserl proposed in the early 1920s in his lectures on active and passive synthesis1 reveals the historical and intersubjective nature of objective constitution. At the realizing positional level of consciousness, factual knowledge is accumulated on this synthetic model – one that we explored extensively in Part I of this project. What we learned there about retentional modification as synthesis of identification,2 about memorial modification as synthesis of recognition (along with the pertaining discussions of association, similarity, succession, and simultaneity),3 and about modality modification4 will prove most helpful in our attempt to understand the structure of this residuum. As soon as we consider whether the retentional, memorial, associational, and modalizing features of the reduced objectivity are put out of play or not, we realize that the reductions 'translate' rather than 'eliminate' them. Objects in the realizing positional attitude 1 Cf., Hua XI, XXXI, and the manuscripts published in Erfahrung& Urteil. 2 Cf., Part I, Chapter 2§1! 3 Cf., Chapter 2§1" 4 Chapter 2§2 363 are always given on the background of association and comparative relations. Retention secures the unity and integrity of the object; memory or recollection is able to refer to the object as distinct in subsequent associations and comparisons because it has been retentionally constituted. As such, the object becomes recognized as being of a certain 'type'. When we experience a new object, we automatically (i.e., passively) seek to locate it on this background of empirical, passively constituted knowledge.1 When the object is taken up by the reductions, all of the presuppositions we may have about its ontic status and all of the factual epistemic demands of realizing consciousness are bracketed. However, the outcome of the syntheses of identification and recognition – i.e., the background of factual knowledge – is translated from the positional to the non-positional level but remains otherwise intact. If this body of historically constituted knowledge, which is also essentially marked by intersubjectivity in so far as these objects are experienced on the background of a shared world, is still available to us as we commence the process of eidetic variation, it can, along with the initial neutral objectivity which evokes it, guide the sequence of variants.2 To further consolidate this suggestion, let us take a closer look at the nature of types and their constitution as Husserl himself thoroughly exposed them.3 If neutralized types and the background knowledge they entail prove themselves faithful guides of eidetic variation, we will have taken yet another step toward our goal of showing the intimate relationship between the natural and artificial attitudes. Moreover, we would have also stayed truthful to Husserl's genetic-synthetic model of consciousness – a model that clearly stipulates the continuity between lower-level passive intentional noeses, such as perception and type constitution, and higher-order predicative processes, such as judgments intending essences. 1 Cf., EU, §83a 2 For a discussion of passive sythesis and intersubjectivity, see Yamaguchi (1982). 3 For an interesting discussion of pre-thematic type constitution, type constitution in perception and spatiotemporal imaginining, as well as their role in thematic inquiries (phenomenological or otherwise), see Lohmar (2008b, 2010c). 364 The manuscripts published by Landgrebe, under Husserl's guidance, in Erfahrung & Urteil along with Husserl's research manuscripts on ideation (some recently published in Hua XLI, some unpublished) offer an interesting and detailed discussion of types (Typen). Type constitution occurs primarily at the realizing positional level of consciousness in a passive manner (intentional yet pre-predicative and pre-thematic);1 nevertheless, what we learn about types here can be easily relocated in the artificial methodological context through the reductions understood as radical modifications. There are, according to Husserl, two broad categories of generalities: empirical and eidetic. Types belong to the former, the objects of eidetic variation to the latter. Both of these classes of generalities are organized in a hierarchical manner on a 'universality scale'; thus, each generality (Allgemeinheit) on either scale is of a higher or lower order.2 We shall have the opportunity to discuss the hierarchy of essences (i.e., eide scale) in our forthcoming analysis of higher-order variations. What distinguishes these two classes of generalities is the process through which they are constituted. Empirical generalities are either passively or actively constituted in the natural attitude (primarily in Nat.P1) through realizing positional presentations, presentifications, and judgments (thus being inherently bound to the protodoxic behavior pertaining to this level); eidetic generalities are actively, thematically, and theoretically constituted through eidetic positional processes such as eidetic variation in phenomenology, or formalizing and idealizing abstraction in mathematics. The latter are completely free from all factual particular bonds and presuppositions. Despite the radical difference between them, these two classes of generalities or universals are linked.3 Husserl's reason for claiming this link stems from his analyses of synthesis, which uncovered the 1 EU, p.383 2 EU, p.383; cf., also, Hua XLI Nos.2, 4, 6, 7, 8-11, 16-19 and Blg.13, 15 3 Cf., Hua XLI, Nos.6, 18 365 founding relationship between passive and active, pre-thematic and thematic noeses and their corresponding noemata.1 The passive constitution of types exhibits some very interesting aspects that will help us clarify if and how they could function as guides at the incipient stages of eidetic variation. We constitute types, or lower level empirical generalities, through a passive associational synthesis of likeness (Gleichheitssynthesis) that entails sedimentation through memorial modification.2 The most basic act providing information for the synthetic sedimentation is passive external perception.3 This latent empirical knowledge facilitated through perceptual interactions with objects intended as present and real can be subsequently taken up in passive as well as active presentifications, such as memory and expectation, as well as judgments.4 The unity and identity of individual objects as well as the unity and identity of the type are secured through retention and memory.5 Type constitution unfolds as a multi-stage process entailing a multiplicity of given individual objects; these objects are one by one, as they are encountered, located through the synthesis of likeness in the overall context of the type as empirical class. The correlate of this constitutive process is thus a multiplicity (Mannigfaltigkeit) of individuals – all sharing a common ground (i.e., the essence manifested at the real positional level). The unity behind the multiplicity of real individual instantiations (Vereinzelungen) of an essence gradually comes to the fore through the 'colligation', the 'running through' the members of the series (kolligierende Durchlaufen der Einzelglieder) motivated by the interest in their similarity and 1 Cf., EU, pp.384-385; cf., also EU, §81b 2 EU, p.385 3 EU, pp.395-386 4 EU, pp.387-8 5 EU, p.386 366 seeking coincidence (Deckung) of the shared moments.1 This process occurs, for the most part, in passivity. It may, however, also unfold actively and attentionally if motivated by a thematic (Nat.P1) goal.2 Interestingly enough, the notion of coincidence (Deckung) across a multiplicity exhibiting difference – the notion Husserl appealed so heavily to in his discussion of the eidetic variation in studies dated during the same period – appears here as well. And Husserl has significant qualifications to add regarding the process of attaining 'coincidence' across multiple individuals in type constitution. When unfolding, type constitution relies initially on the synthesis of similarity and on the comparison of like to like. Husserl refers to this relation as 'Explikation'.3 This is a movement from individual instance to individual instance – from one member of the set to another. Type constitution does not reach completion, however, until the focus shifts away from explication toward the sameness exhibited by all of the particular instances.4 The one, shared essence does not come to the fore as empirical generality here in the context of realizing consciousness until the emphasis is placed on the similarity itself – until the particulars are viewed as instantiations (Vereinzelungen) of the universal or in other words, until their participation (Teilhabe) in the universal comes becomes the focal point of the intentional endeavor. The initial emphasis on colligation of distinct individuals helps with this shift in emphasis.5 We saw Husserl make a similar claim regarding the stages of eidetic variation: eidetic intuition is not reached until the focus is placed on what the variants share in common. We shall have to see to what extent the eidetic Deckung Husserl relies on in his description of 1 Ibid. Cf., also Hua XLI, Nos. 1c (1896-1900), 3 (1911), 4b (1912), 17 (1919), 19 (1924); see also Hua XLI, Blg.15 (1917) 2 Cf., EU, §81b 3 EU, p.391 4 Ibid. 5 EU, p.392 367 eidetic variation is structurally the same or different from the empirical Deckung pertaining to passive type constitution.1 One thing is clear here, namely, that Husserl views the setmember relational model as the path toward uncovering participation. Could it be that eidetic variation, like type formation, also follows this template? To return now to our discussion of the incipient stages of eidetic variation, let us consider the potential import of types in guiding the formation of free variants. Once the reductions 'purify' the object initially given in the natural attitude of its potential2 ontic and epistemic connotations and locate it in the eidetically motivated context, we are presented with a non-positional objectivity evocative of a passively constituted type. This holds whether our object was initially reel (e.g., an act of memory) or real (e.g., a dog) and irrespective of its initial realizing or non-positional givenness in the natural attitude. The type too, once brought to givenness, is stripped of its protodoxic features. The Art.N-P direct presentation of the type does not, however, constitute the givenness of the first genuine variant in the series; this is so because the type is not an instantiation (here in the N-P context, Veranschaulichung) of an essence – which is what the variants are supposed to be; it is an empirical generality stripped of its ontic and doxic commitments. While it cannot itself function as the first model variant, it can nevertheless help bring this guiding variant to the fore. Something Husserl uncovered about the nature of types makes this assertion highly likely. When, in the realizing positional consciousness, a new object is given in perceptual presentation it becomes 'known' through the type that it belongs to (I recognize this animal approaching me as a 'dog'). The synthesis of similarity, with the aid of memorial 1 Cf., Ms. AVI-28 (1934) 2 I say 'potential' here because the reductions may commences from either of the two natural levels of consciousness (Nat.P1 or Art.N-P). 368 modification and association, and the ensuing coincidence ensure this 'recognition'. Yet this is not all that I 'know' through typified experience. According to Husserl, a certain array of attributes – core attributes identified as pertaining to all previously encountered dogs – also comes (passively) to mind.1 My expectations with respect to my interaction with the dog are all organized in a system of possibilities stemming from my latent knowledge of the core attributes. I expect it to have teeth and to be able to bark, I expect it to wag its tail if it is friendly, etc. The type can thus project an entire sphere of possibilities – be they attributes, behaviors, or variations on the same theme, namely 'other possible instances of dog'. This last point is crucial – if types have this ability in the natural realizing consciousness, why wouldn't they maintain their projective modal potency through the reductions? We could easily conceive of engaging these attributes and these dog variations in a manner free from all ontic and doxic presuppositions. Thus, the initial givenness of the type at the artificial non-positional level (evoked by the neutralized individual objectivity) can expectationally bring to the fore a non-positional free possibility as the genuine variant – the guide for all subsequent alternatives that we have been looking for. Viewing this possibility as the true starting point of variation has its advantage: it is conceived at the non-positional, eidetically-motivated level, which will help the inquirer steer clear of falling back into realizing habitual patterns of thought.2 Two important questions come to mind. First, given the inherent indeterminacy of empirical knowledge, it is quite 1 EU, p.399ff. 2 In research manuscripts dealing with the structure of ideation dated around 1918, Husserl begins to stress more and more emphatically the importance of realizing that eidetic variation as process unfolds in nonpositionality (cf., Hua XLI, Nos.9 (1917), 10 (1917/1918), 11 (1918), 14 (1918); that its variants and the intuited information as the process moves from variant to variant are irreal (cf, for instance, No.14a, 183ff., Blg.21, and No.16 – these manuscripts stress most clearly that the shift from the variant to the invariant happens with the help of Phantasiemodifikation and the irreal possibilities it facilitates; cf. also, Mss. AIII-5 (1932), AIV-11(1934)). The success of the eidetic grasp depends on the coincidence in conflict (Deckung im Widerstreit) of moments pertaining to the variants understood as irreal possibilities (cf., Hua XLI, Blg. 20, No.17 (1919), No.19 (1924)). This breakthrough is contemporaneous with his emphasis on freedom, neutrality, and possibility as dimensions of the imagination in manuscripts focusing on the study of Phantasie (cf., Hua XXIII, Nos.18-20). 369 likely that the array of attributes identified as pertaining to the type in question is not complete. If this is the case, will not this incapacitate the formation of genuine variants in the ideational process? Second, given the deep reliance of type constitution on memorial modification, will not the eidetic varying process suffer from the limitations imposed by the past experience of the inquirer? These are both important and legitimate questions. To answer the first, even if the type is fundamentally marked by indeterminacy and incompleteness, it is still a far better source of information for the production of variants than any one singular particular instantiation of the universal (Vereinzelung).1 The second question would incapacitate the eidetic endeavor if it were not for the transvaluational potency of the reductions understood as radical modifications. All we have to do here to dispel the worry of chaining down ideation to the limits of realizing factual knowledge acquisition is consider the character of the non-positionality brought to the fore through the reductions. Non-positional conceivability may indeed draw inspiration from actual experiences and even realizing conceivability, which is precisely what expectation based on typical knowledge is, but it need not rely entirely on natural intuitions. Positive freedom and the ability to conceive that which is radically other lie at the very core of imagining consciousness. Indeed, we see Husserl engage this very path of Phantasie when he considers ways to surpass the boundaries of empirical constitution of generalities. He notes that stretching open paths toward the ideal – the eidetic universal – requires not only that we surpass the parameters of realizing expectations, thus engaging irreal possibilities that are radically other; he also stresses the importance of an 'in principle' open and infinite series of imaginative 1 Cf., Hua XLI, Nos.9 (1917), 10 (1917/1918) 370 instantiations of the ideal (Veranschaulichungen).1 They key lies in the nature of the instantiations (imaginative rather than actual) as well as in the infinite openness of the projective series of examples. This latter feature is nothing other than the arbitrariness he mentioned in his discussion of eidetic variation.2 The free variation pertaining to imagining consciousness has the ability to surpass the boundaries of any realizing positional comparative and associative process.3 To constitute and reach the ideal, the factual must be left behind. And yet, reaching eidetic universality need not entail an utter divorce from the lessons of the natural everyday interactions with the world as real. To further emphasize this last statement, let me point out something that both actualities and real possibilities on the one hand and irreal imaginative possibilities on the other share in common – they are both instantiations of the essence as ideal possibility. The latter governs these two distinct systems of possibilities. The real and the irreal are linked through their participation in the ideal. However, only the latter can lay open the path toward the ideal because ideation necessarily entails the exclusion of factual commitments. Husserl himself seems to suggest this venue as most fruitful for unpacking ideation in the opening chapter of his Ideas I where he draws the distinctions as well as relation between fact and essence. While the two exhibit to radically distinct types of positionality (of existence and of essence, respectively),4 and are motivated by two very different direct intuitions – perceptual and eidetic, according to Husserl, they are inseparable because of the former's 1 EU, p.395ff.; cf., also Hua III/1, §70 2 Cf., Hua XLI, No.14c (1918). Here Husserl claims explicitly that eidetic variation owes its arbitrariness (Beliebigkeit) to Phantasie. 3 Cf., EU, pp.395-396 4 Hua III/1, §§3-4 371 participation in the latter1 and because any attempt to grasp the latter commences with the intuition of fact2 and unfolds through the freedom of Phantasie.3 The scope of possibilities governed by an eidetic universal is thus both quantitatively and qualitatively different than that governed by empirical universals, such as types. However, despite this radical difference, structural overlap is necessarily implied between these universals' modal scopes. Thus, as long as the inquirer takes the precaution of bracketing the ontic and doxic context of the latter, the ideational process is not only not threatened by the reliance upon typical information, but bolstered by it instead. It is my contention here that without the (neutralized) involvement of a type at the initial stages of any ideational endeavor, the varying process could not commence. Three qualifications are in order here. First, this claim, while emphasizing the relationship between the natural and artificial attitudes, does not, on any reading, suggest that type constitutive processes along with associative and comparative realizing relations will ever suffice for the attainment of knowledge of ideals. Second, as already noted, types are hierarchically organized on a scale of empirical generality (i.e., 'dog' and 'quadruped'). We must be clear here about the factor that decides the universality level at which the eidetic variation will unfold. It is not the type that sets the scale standard for the search (we must remember that eide, too, are hierarchically organized on genera-species model); it is the original neutralized object. As we shall see, higher order processes of eidetic variation begin with an ideal – they unfold entirely at the Art.P2 level. Because of this, they have no direct ties to the natural attitude and hence cannot rely on empirical types to jumpstart their variation. And third, my claim that imagining consciousness is both necessary and sufficient 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §2 2 Cf., Hua III/1, §3 3 Cf., Hua III/1, §§4-6 372 for the possibility of eidetic variation is made while keeping in mind that it alone stretches open the very horizon within which such an inquiring search could unfold. It remains for us to see whether Phantasie carries this process to its completion. Now that we have elucidated the nature of the beginning stages of eidetic variation – what is given and what is taken through the phenomenological reductions – let us attempt to unravel its structure as a whole (i.e., as shift from the variant to the invariant) and put to the test what we have learned from Husserl's theory of type constitution as well as argue for the import of imagining consciousness. We will proceed to answer the important questions asked earlier in this section in the structural order of the ideational process, culminating with a discussion of the conditions for the possibility of eidetic intuition. §2!2. Phantasie and the Shi f t f rom the Variant to the Invariant In order to illuminate the parameters and structure of eidetic variation as the shift from the variant to the invariant we must pay close attention to its limits that bind it as a process. The formation of the first true or genuine variant (i.e., as non-positional instantiation of the essence) guides the ensuing stages of variation. The movement from variant to variant follows in light of the information provided by the neutralized type. Thus, typical knowledge along with the first variant as model open the horizon of irreal possibilities that could be engaged, but are they the sole limits to determine the scope of this horizon and the features of the possibilities pertaining to it? To answer this question we need to consider the freedom and arbitrariness (Beliebigkeit) of eidetic variation. In Erfahrung & Urteil Husserl tells us that "[...] by an act of volition we produce free variants, each of which, just like the total process of variation itself, occurs in the subjective mode of the 'arbitrary.' It becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of 373 a thing, an invariant is necessarily retained as the necessary general form, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of this kind, would not be thinkable at all."1 Thus, each of the variants is free and arbitrary; it is not bound either by the realizing experiential field or by its ontic and epistemic features. The eidetic process itself exhibits the same kind of freedom – both a freedom from realizing limits and a freedom to conceive that which is radically other than any apprehended fact. One feature of the arbitrariness exhibited by the process lies precisely in the inquirer's not being bound by the scope of what they had experienced and come to know in the natural attitude. Another feature of this arbitrariness is its optionalness. Any variant could function as a step in the process as long as it shared the same core features presented by all of the other alternatives. The varying process may be free of realizing memorial, expectational, and epistemic demands, but it is not random. The constitution of variants is dictated by the eidetic goal – the invariant they are eventually meant to uncover. As Husserl suggests in the passage above, without this shared form the variants as exemplars would not be thinkable at all. The eidos conditions and determines the non-positional conceivability of alternatives. According to Husserl, the free varying process is limited and guided by its end or goal as well as by its starting point. Claiming the latter, once the nature of this starting point is clarified, does not pose any philosophical problems. Claiming the former, however, requires some additional philosophical muscle flexing. We have already pointed at the potential Socratic conundrum behind the success of eidetic variation: we are supposed to know the very thing we are trying to attain knowledge about. How can the eidos as goal condition and guide the process that 1 EJ, p.341 (Husserl's emphases). "Wir erzeugen so frei willkürlich Varianten, deren jede ebenso wie der ganze Prozess der Variation selbst im subjektiven Erlebnismodus des 'beliebig' auftritt. Es zeigt sich dann, dass durch diese Mannigfaltigkeit von Nachgestaltungen eine Einheit hindurchgeht, dass bei solche freien Variationen eines Urbildes, z.B. eines Dinges, in Notwendigkeit eine Invariante erhalten bleibt als die notwendige allgemeine Form, ohne die ein derartiges wie dieses Ding, als Exempel seiner Art, überhaupt undenkbar wäre" (EU, p.411). 374 seeks to uncover it? How can we hold on to what appears a necessary structural guidance and limit without being guilty of petitio principii? One potential solution lies in further unpacking the structure of eidetic motivation, i.e., that which drives the eidetic project to seek the intuition of the ideal. Husserl himself makes reference to a 'volition' responsible for positing the eidos intuition as the goal of the process. In our analysis of the eidetic reduction we exposed the volitional aspect of phenomenological inquiries. We stressed there that what makes eidetic intuition a conceivable goal is the imagination itself and its essential ability to intuit free possibilities. Husserl claims that without the ideal the variants are inconceivable. Structurally speaking this is the case – we know that real and irreal possibilities are all instantiations of one ideal possibility. When it comes to unpacking the structure of the eidetic varying process however, this claim appears to threaten the very lack of presupposition that Husserl held in such high esteem. We would do better to claim instead that without imagining consciousness the eidetic goal could not be thinkable (i.e., conceivable). Let us consider what this claim ultimately suggests. Eidetic reduction, the assigning and focusing on an eidetic goal, depends on the free conceivability of the imagination. What this entails is that through the non-positional ability to conceive that which is other than fact (i.e., that which is not contingent), eidetically motivated searches become feasible endeavors. The motivation driving any such search has two core moments: the intention of the ideal and the intuition of the ideal. When Husserl claims that the ideal guides the varying process, he could not possibly mean the latter if he is to safeguard the critical inquiring attitude. He must mean the former: intending the ideal guides the formation of non-positional variants, which would not lead the phenomenologist into the petitio trap. 375 The 'guidance' provided by the ideal requires additional qualification: it is not a substantial, content-heavy, guidance – like the one provided by the neutralized type. It is a structural formal guidance – one that simply posits an 'end' to the search. What this means is that while free and in principle infinitely open, the varying non-positional process must seek to reach a level of sufficiency of information able to justify the cessation of the process in fulfillment (i.e., the synthesis of identity between the intended and the intuited or, in Husserl's genetic words, the coincidence in conflict – Deckung im Widerstreit). In order to fully dispel the petitio concern, let us take a closer look at this synthetic process – one seeking the complete overlap of the intended and the intuited through the shared structural elements of the variants. Let us ask once more: what guides and limits this process of variation other than the type and the empty posited intention of the ideal? Our previous discussions of free imaginative variation identified several different limits at work in its unfolding. These limits were primarily the organizing structural principles pertaining to imagining consciousness: time-consciousness, founding, non-radical modification, and Phantasiemodifikation as radical modification. We saw that free variation was likewise bound by formal ideal principles such as the principle of non-contradiction. The order and unity of natural non-positional consciousness rendered possible its functioning at the artificial level. Structurally speaking and apart from any adopted motivation, imaginative free variation – i.e., the bringing forth of irreal possibilities – is infinite and open, yet organized by the shared core of the possibilities it engages. Once we relocate free variation in the artificial context of ideation, we note that it attains two additional limits: the initial binding type and the eidetic goal. Given that free variation and eidetic variation are not, structurally speaking equivalent, we will employ 'eidetic variation' in our analysis of the shift from the variant to the invariant. 376 As multi-stage process, eidetic variation is an act-complex,1 or what Husserl refers to in Part III, Chapter 4 of his Ideas I as 'polythetic act'. It is not one simple act (noesis) intending one object; rather, it is a series of simple noeses all bound by their shared intending of the ideal. The unity of this act-complex lies in the shared intention of the acts involved. The question becomes: what do these acts intuit? We know the eidetic variation begins to unfold in the artificial non-positional consciousness. Variants as irreal or imaginative possibilities are what each and every noesis brings to givenness. Thus, we could say that eidetic variation as act-complex intends the ideal and intuits the irreal. This is why the phenomenologist escapes the petitio threat. They do not presuppose the knowledge they are supposed to attain. Variation intuits irreal exemplars (Veranschaulichungen) as instantiations of the essences whose intuition it seeks. The 'currency' of ideation is imaginative possibility; its dealing spans across the horizon of non-positional conceivable exemplars participating in the ideal. The constitution of eidetic generalities unfolds through imaginative possibilities. The primary noesis at work in eidetic variation is thus non-positional direct presentation (i.e., Phantasie as act independent of any pictorial mediation). Like type constitution, eidetic variation involves retentional and memorial modification. As such, it can always access and bring to the fore not only specific exemplars, but the whole multiplicity (Mannigfaltigkeit) of variants it had previously engaged.2 This, as we shall see, is particularly important for the possibility of coincidence in conflict (Deckung im Widerstreit), which in its turn conditions the fulfillment of the process as a whole. Non-positional judgment may become part of the noetic picture at any point during the process of variation, but it need not. The success of eidetic variation does not depend on predicative thought. As we shall see, the latter has its own phenomenological role in post-ideational thought and eidetic knowledge 1 For a discussion of the intentionality exhibited by act-complexes, see Ms.AI-35 (1922/27). 2 Cf., Ms. AI-35 (1922/27) 377 accumulation. What is essential to eidetic variation is the direct and genuine givenness of possibilities, along with the ability to recollect the entire series and expectationally project forward in a manner unhindered by the body of factual knowledge attained prior to the eidetic inquiring project. Let us take a closer look at the dynamic between intuited imaginative variants. The first moment we need to analyze here is the 'multiplicity' of irreal variants and structure. Our discussion of type constitution has shown Husserl's preference for thinking about multiplicities (Mannigfaltigkeiten) on a set model. This mathematical penchant goes back to his interaction with Cantor during the 1890s, as we already noted. Chapter 4 presented an in-depth discussion of Husserl's mereology.1 How Husserl understands part-part and partwhole relationships has deep implications for his model of eidetic variation. To quote once more from one of our initial Erfahrung & Urteil passages: "In this transition from image to image, from similar to the similar, all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence (Deckung) in the order of their appearance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then as arbitrary sequences of particulars in which the same universal is isolated as an eidos."2 Husserl seems to suggest here two core movements in the varying process: first, there is a movement from variant to variant, a process that exhibits each irreal possibility as a modification (Abwadlung) of each other; second, there is a shift in focus from the punctuated series of variants to that which they share in common (i.e., the essence as manifested shared core). In set theoretical terms, this is a shift from focusing on the series of members and their relation to each other, to focusing on that which they share in common as members of the same set. 1 He remained a proponent of the model he presented in the Logical Investigations. 2 EJ, p.343 378 As in the case of type-constitution discussed above, the set model is meant to expose the participation of instances in the universal. Unlike type constitution, however, eidetic variation as eidetic universal constitution employs irreal instantiations of the universal rather than real ones. Both of these constitutions rely for their success on both synthesis of coincidence (the 'shared' across multiples) and conflict across individuals (the differences they exhibit).1 To fully understand how coincidence and conflict are articulated, we must acknowledge (as we did in the case of idealizing abstraction in Chapter 4) that Husserl's mature model of phenomenological idealizing thought is organized on the part-part, partwhole model he borrowed from set theory. Why did Husserl remain faithful to this model throughout his career? It is not because of his mathematical inclinations, important as they may have been for his development as a thinker. It was because the set theoretical model provides two very important insights about how idealizing thought unfolds away from the individual toward the purely universal: the structure of the parts dictate how they relate to each other, and the whole is organized in and through the very structure of its parts (or in other words, the principles articulating the whole are informed by the structure of the parts). If we apply these insights to eidetic variation, we can begin to disentangle the two movements identified by Husserl: from variant to variant, and from variant(s) to the invariant. What must first come to light is the structure of the parts and their relationship to each other in order for the principle binding the multiplicity to come to the fore. In order to illuminate the structure of the parts (i.e., variants) themselves, we need to identify what repeats itself across multiple instances and what differs from instance to instance. The latter are the non-essential features that trigger conflict across individuals; the former, the essential features that once fully identified secure the overlap of intended and intuited. The immense 1 Cf., Ms.AI-22 (1918) 379 reservoir of irreal possibilities that artificial non-positional consciousness commands through its conceivability, and organizes through the guidance of neutralized typical knowledge, offers a plethora (in principle infinite) of opportunities to illuminate sameness and difference across the members of the varying multiplicity. Unlike mathematical formalization, though, phenomenological eidetic variation analyzes reell as well as transcendent objects. Furthermore, as Husserl notes in Ideas I, the varying process is twofold – it unfolds in a parallel manner at both noetic and noematic levels (i.e., it analyzes both the act and the apprehended object, not just the latter). On the static model, Husserl suggests that we can separate the two variations and focus on only one at a time. On the genetic model we see that such separation is not feasible because the two processes (noetic variation and noematic variation) are co-dependent. What we learn about the acts intending and giving the object we apply to our study of the object and vice-versa. Therein lies the uniqueness of phenomenological eidetic variation – it is in truth, a covariation of noetic and noematic structures. At its broadest level, it is the co-variation of consciousness and world1 – a co-dependent infinite (in practice as well as in principle) hermeneutical process of studying transcendental subjectivity in and through its relationship to the world.2 We have yet to understand two important aspects of the arbitrariness suggested by Husserl in his three mature genetic accounts of ideation – its open 'in principle' infinity, and its optional 'und so weiter' aspect. We also need to clarify how the synthesis of identity between intended (ideal) and intuited (irreal) becomes possible through coincidence and conflict: 1 Cf., Part V, Hua XLI; cf., for instance, also Hua IX, p.87 2 Husserl has much to say about this self-world co-variation in his genetic research manuscripts in the nature of ideation (Hua XLI, Nos.28, 32; cf., also Mss. AIV-9 (1927), AIV-10 (1930-33), AV-25 (1932), AVII-12 (1932), BI-9II (1926), BI-32I (1931), BII-16 (1931, BII-17 (1926/27, BII-18 (1910-1924), D3 (1920)); see also his similar discussions in the Lebenswelt (Hua XXXIX, No.11, an Hua VI, Blg.3) 380 That the eidos depends on a freely and arbitrarily producible multiplicity of variants attaining coincidence, on an open infinity, does not imply that an actual continuation to infinity is required, an actual production of all the variants – as if only then could we be sure that the eidos apprehended at the end actually conformed to all the possibilies. On the contrary, what matters is that the variation as a process of the formation of variants should itself have a structure of arbitrariness, that the process should be accomplished in the consciousness of an arbitrary development of variants [...] it is a matter of indifference what might still be joined to it, a matter of indifference what, in addition, I might be given to apprehend in the consciousness that 'I could continue this way.' This remarkable and truly important consciousness of 'and so on, at my pleasure' belongs essentially to every multiplicity of variations. Only in this way is given what we call an 'infinitely open' multiplicity...1 Husserl is adamant here about the infinite openness of eidetic variation as process involving a free multiplicity. He qualifies this by stressing that in practice, this infinity is not necessary for the eventual fulfillment of the process. It appears that sufficient justification can be found in an 'in practice' finite openness as long as it retains the structural possibility of infinite unfolding. Why is this structural infinity important for the intuition of the eidos? The answer to this question lies in Husserl's notion of 'und so weiter', which is also borrowed from mathematics. This structural continuity ad infinitum brings to the fore the optionalness of each variant – any one could do the work and any one could follow given that the first true variant that was engaged in the varying process was itself arbitrary (free of all Nat.P1 and Nat.N-P bonds) despite it being guided by the inquirer's neutralized typical knowledge. Arbitrariness and optionalness are both secured here because the process unfolds at the nonpositional level. These features are core features of imagining consciouness and its objects – irreal possibilities. Thus, we could confidently say that the imagination renders possible the beginning as well as the unfolding of eidetic viariation (i.e., the shift from the variation to the 1 EJ, p.242 (Husserl's emphasis). "Dass das Eidos auf eine frei beliebig weiter erzeugbare Mannigfaltigkeit zur Deckung gelangender Varianten bezogen ist, auf eine offene Endlosigkeit, das besagt nicht, das ein wirkliches Fortgehen in die Unendlichkeit erforderlich wäre, eine wirkliche Erzeugung aller Varianten – als ob wir nur dann gewiss sein könnten, dass das nachher zur Erfassung kommende Eidos wirklich allen Möglichkeiten gemäss sei. Es kommt vielmehr darauf an, dass die Variation als Prozess der Variantenbildung selbst eine Beliebigkeitsgestalt habe, dass der Prozess im Bewusstsein beliebiger Fortbildung von Variationen vollzogen sei [...] es ist gleichgültig, was immer noch sich ihr beigesellen möge, gleichgültig, was ich im Bewusstsein des 'ich könnte so weitergehen' noch in den Griff bekäme. Zu jeder Variationsmannigfaltigkeit gehört wesentlich dieses merkwürdige und so überaus wichtige Bewusstsein des 'und so weiter nach Belieben'" (EU, pp.412-413). 381 invariant). It remains to be seen whether the final stages of the process likewise depend upon and unfold at the level of artificial non-positionality (Art.N-P). Once it becomes clear that the relationship between variants exhibits each new variant as an alternative to those preceding it – once we clarify the part-part relations within the multiplicity as a whole (this is what Husserl identifies as Explikation in his discussion of type constitution), we need not bother continue with the formation process indefinitely.1 We need only reach the stage of this 'clarity' in order to proceed with the next movement, which Husserl describes as the recognizing of all variants as sharing the universal in common. We do so through a certain amount of repetition as well as relying on the power of the imagination to unhinderedly tap into the spectrum of irreal possibilities governed by the intended universal in question. Apprehending the synthesis of coincidence requires more than mere repetition however; it requires that we hold the entire multiplicity in view2 (i.e., the 'running through' instances; durchlaufen)3 as we move beyond instances and their like-to-like relations.4 In order to expose that which the variants share in common, the differences between them must also come to light through conflict. The latter entails more than the formal principle of non-contradiction, though this principle is most definitely part of the equation.5 Conflict here is of a material nature – it stems from the substantial differences between the variants. Once these differences are exposed as non-essential, they can be gradually pointed out and in a sense 'eliminated' as the varying process unfolds as long as the whole series of 1 This is the same rule at work in mathematical induction (this process draws its deductive force from the arbitariness of n). See also Hua XVII, §70 for Husserl's discussion of the 'und so weiter' notion in the context of mathematics. 2 Husserl refers to this as 'Wiederholung' in one of his 1918 manuscripts (Ms. D8, SS.19b, 20b, 21b). He discusses this holding into view of the whole series by focusing the part-part as well as part-whole relations at work. 3 EU, §87c 4 Cf., EU, §87c; cf., also, Hua IX, p.78 5 Cf., EU, §87d 382 variants (and differences) is held into view at once. Coincidence in conflict (Deckung im Widerstreit) is this clarification of that which is shared beyond any non-essential differences.1 Is this coincidence the same as the synthesis of identity between intended and intuited? Does it represent the arrival at eidetic intuition – the direct givenness of the eidos in fulfilled eidetic presentation? Before we can answer this question we must dispel one more concern, namely, that eidetic variation relies on similar tools as empirical abstraction and because of this it, too, would be doomed to fail. Husserl's account of eidetic variation appears to rely heavily on processes also employed in empirical abstraction and empirical universal constitution – comparison with its focus on similarity and differences, memorial association, a simplification of sorts in the analysis of variant-variant relations... Husserl himself was aware of these resonances, which is why he addresses the distinction between eidetic variation and abstraction. In a nutshell – one is not wrong to rely on these processes in the search for universals; what one must guard oneself against is thinking that the successful constitution of eidetic universals is possible in the natural attitude (which is exactly what the Modern empiricists thought they could do). Empirical abstraction begins in the natural attitude and never surpasses it. Thus, what these processes come to work with at the natural level are merely actualities or real possibilities – weighed down by ontic and epistemic presuppositions, particular and contingent, and with no hope of genuine freedom of conceivability. Whereas eidetic variation is true exposition of free alternatives as instances of the universal, any variation at the natural realizing level 1 In his research manuscripts exploring the nature of ideation (most now published in Hua XLI), clarification plays a prominent role. Husserl employs the term to refer to the nature of ideation as description and explication – i.e., a study of the variants on a part-part and part-whole model (cf., Hua XLI, Nr.4, 60ff. (1912); cf., also Ms. AI-2 (1908-1911)). He also uses 'Klärung' to refer to the dynamic process between the intended (ideal) and the intuited in the process of variation (the irreal) (cf., Hua XLI, Nr.3, 45ff., (1911)); thus, the search for the synthesis of identity (i.e., fulfillment) takes the form of gradual clarification of the ideal through nonpositional givenness. Lastly, Husserl employs Klärung to refer to eidetic variation as gradual approximation of the essence as limit idea (cf., Hua XLI, Nr.4, 78ff. (1912); cf., Ms. AIII-5 (1932)). 383 would be at best a mere semblance of genuine variation given that all modalization, doubt, and vacillation in Nat.P1 is bound to terminate in some kind of factual epistemic and ontic commitment about particular contingent objects.1 Empirical variation exhibits neither infinite openness, nor arbitrariness, nor optionalness. The real possibilities it engages are fundamentally, memorially and expectationally determined by actual empirical experience. To return to our most recent question: Does coincidence in conflict represent the eidetic intuition or the synthesis of identity between the intended and the intuited? We noted earlier that what is intuited in the process of variation is not the essence, but the variants as irreal possibilities.2 How would the synthesis of identity between the ideal (intended) and the irreal (the intuited) look like? If conflict does away with non-essential differences and if we intuit the arbitrary variants as all exhibiting the same shared core, are we then also intuiting the ideal as this shared core? Husserl most definitely holds this position. One qualification supports this view: while the irreal and the ideal are non-coordinate (they are intuited at two different levels of consciousness) they are also not mutually 'toxic' to put it metaphorically. The reason for this is their common non-positionality with respect to existence. Nevertheless, the question regarding the exact nature of the shift from the variant to the invariant is an important one that Husserl is silent about. Our model of nexic-horizonal leveled consciousness mapped on the two main experiencing attitudes – the natural and the artificial – may provide the clue to the mystery of the 'shift' that Husserl left behind. Given what we have learned about the potency of radical modifications – their ability to relocate entire noetic-noematic complexes from one consciousness level to another, the question whether we would need such a modification to 1 Cf., my discussion of realizing consciousness in Part I of this dissertation; see also EU, §87d and Hua IX, §9d – both sections where Husserl distinguishes between eidetic variation and empirical abstraction. 2 Cf., Ms. BII-12 (1935) 384 secure eidetic intuition is a legitimate one. One the chart in Chapter 5 I listed Phen.Mk2 as the radical modification from Art.N-P to Art.P2. Such a shift would entail completely leaving the non-positional level behind and solely engaging (intending as well as intuiting) ideal objects. This is not something that happens in eidetic variation as Husserl describes it and as we have analyzed it through the prism of artificial imagining consciousness. Phantasie has proven to be both necessary and sufficient for the performance of the reductions as well as for the performance of eidetic variation culminating in the coincidence of conflict. But have we attained apodictic adequate evidence of the ideal through this coincidence? In passages from Pheomenological Psychology and Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl hints at types of eidetic variation unfolding entirely at the Art.P2 level – and thus potentially involving what I referred to as Phen.Mk2. Learning more about these processes, their goals, and their varying unfolding could provide an answer to our question regarding the evidence brought to the fore in eidetic intuition at the end of non-positional variation. In what follows I will try to show that the evidence provided by the process of low-level eidetic variation commencing with neutralized objects evocative of types that subsequently guide the varying process (what we just finished analyzing and what I will refer to this as EV1 from now on) is apodictic but not adequate. I would like to stress from the beginning that, as already previously noted, Husserl views universals – be they empirical or eidetic – as being organized on a scale. Thus, what we need to consider is what happens to the intuition provided by EV1 (let us call this eidetic intuition 1, EI1) in the context of subsequent higher order variations (EV2 broadly construed regardless of their level). We need to understand what could possibly facilitate the attainment of apodictic adequate knowledge of ideals and whether the imagination has any role to play at this level. 385 §2! . Higher-order Eidetic Variations and Post-Ideational Thought As we have come to see, the core relations driving EV1 at the non-positional level are part-part and part-whole relations meant to uncover the relationship of participation between irreal exemplars or possibilities and the ideal essence under investigation.1 EV1 is not a process of 'increase' in universality properly speaking since there is no increase on the eide scale that the intended essence pertains to. For instance, if our goal was to investigate the structure of memory and grasp its essence, we did not, in our EV1 process, engage higher order universals under which the essence of memory was subsumed on a genus-species relation. If EV1 culminates with the grasp of the low level essence 'memory', it does not analyze it in its relation to other essences, namely higher order universals such as 'indirect presentification', 'presentification', 'intuitive intentional presentation', 'intentional act'. If adequate evidence is the goal of the phenomenologist, then these genus-species relations must likewise be studied, only this time, in processes that unfold entirely at the eidetic positional (Art.P2) level of consciousness. This is precisely what Husserl suggests in his 1925 lecture on phenomenological psychology.2 The entire doctrine of genera and of the sequence of levels of genera and species can be grounded here, on the basis of original sources of clarified ideation [...] We can very well arrive at different eide from the same example as model, while we let ourselves be determined purely by free variation [...] Thus I could from the start be oriented toward varying in completely unrestricted fashion, therefore without restriction to any universal already lighting up, and toward seeking the universal which is higher than all the universalities which can be singled out intuitively and then restricted [...] Here then the only demand is that the variation – no matter how – moves on, as long as it is a variation at all, thus is at all combined in a synthesis of pervasively unitary coincidence with a pervasively universal moment. That is the way therefore toward the constitution of highest essential universalities as highest genera which in particular, if they are concrete genera, are called regions [...] Manifestly we can also say: ideas, pure eide, can also themselves function again as variants, and then a universal can again be singled out from them at a higher level, an idea out of ideas or of ideas, an idea whose extension consists of ideas and only mediately of their ideal singulars.3 1 For a discussion of part-part and part-whole relations in the context of ideation, see Hua XLI, Nos.1c, 4 2 Cf., Hua IX, §9e 3 PP, pp.60-62 (Husserl's emphasis); "Von hier aus ist überhaupt die gesamte Lehre von Gattungen und von der Stufenfolge von Gattungen und Arten aus ursprünglichen Quellen der geklärten Ideation zu begründen 386 What Husserl is claiming here is that we can take almost everything that we uncovered with respect to the structure of EV1 and apply it to the structure of higher order variations (EV2), which begin with lower level ideas as their first variants and thus unfold entirely at the Art.P2 level of consciousness. He also stresses here that EV2 functions as continuation of EV1 – in fact, in the context of an overall phenomenological analysis of memory, the inquirer would not stop with EI1 or the intuition of coincidence across a multiplicity of differences. This latter intuition is taken up at the eidetic positional level as the starting point of EV2. We could say that the neutralized type, with the help of the reductions (Phen.Mk1), jumpstarts the lower level eidetic variation (EV1); so too, the intuited shared core of EV1 – the 'ideal' under the guise of that which is shared across irreal instances, with the help of a necessary radical modification (Phen.Mk2), triggers higher order variation (EV2). If EV1 could not intuit the ideal with adequate apodictic evidence, the subsequent one or more EV2 processes are in a much better position to do so. If by adequacy we understand a sense of perfection as completeness, then clarifying the internal structure of the ideal through EV1 together with the subsequent clarification of its overall position on the eide scale that it pertains to (its location on the genera-species relational model) would together, collaboratively secure the apodicticity and adequacy of eidetic phenomenological knowledge. There are some essences that refuse adequate givenness. The phenomenological [...] Von demselben Exempel als Leitbild können wir sehr wohl zu verschiendenen Eide kommen, indem wir uns doch rein von freier Variation bestimmten lassen [...] So könnte ich nun von vornherein darauf eingestellt sein, in völlig ungebundener Weise, also ohne Bindung an irgendein schon aufleuchtendes Allgemeines zu variieren und das Allgemeine zu suchen, das über allen herauszuschauenden und dann beschränkenden Allgemeinheiten liegt [...] Hier ist also nur verlangt, dass die Variation – gleichgültig wie – vonstatten geht, solange sie überhaupt Variation ist, also überhaupt zu einer Synthesis durchgängig einheitlicher Deckung zusammengeschlossen ist mit einem durchgängig Allgemeinen. Das also ist der Weg zur Konstitution oberster Wesensallgemeinheiten als oberster Gattungen, die insbesondere, wenn sie konkrete Gattungen sind, Regionen heissen [...] Wir können offenbar auch sagen: Ideen, reine Eide, können auch selbst wieder als Varianten fungieren, und dann ist aus ihnen in höherer Stufe herauszuschauen wieder ein Allgemeines, eine Idee aus Ideen oder von Ideen, eine Idee, deren Umfang Ideen bilden und erst mittelbar deren ideale Einzelheiten." (Hua IX, pp.81-83). 387 eidetic study of cultural, historical, and intersubjectively constituted objects as well as the study of transcendental subjectivity or the world would, according to Husserl, fall into the category of infinite projects given their structurally dynamic character.1 If we adopt the EV1-EV2 collaborative model outlined above a few things come to the fore that could help us answer some of the questions previously asked. First, like Phen.Mk1 (the reductions as a whole), Phen.Mk2 translates to the eidetic positional level (P2, which can only be artificial) all noetic-noematic complexes, apart from perception and Phantasie as direct intuitive presentations and their correlates. Second, unlike Phen.Mk1, which was able to translate the entire body of typical knowledge as well as any objects initially given in realizing consciousness, Phen.Mk2 can only translate knowledge that entails an intuition of the ideal (i.e., EI1 and its correlate). Third, we could say that in a qualified sense, both Phen.Mk1 and Phen.Mk2 are facilitated by the imagination. The former, due to the structure and system of possibilities of the imagination understood as natural nonpositional nexic-horizonal consciousness; the latter, due to the variational work (EV1) that unfolds entirely at the level of artificial non-positional consciousness. Without natural imagining consciousness there would be no phenomenological-transcendental reductions and no lower-level eidetic variation (EV1). Without artificial imagining consciousness there would be no possibility of engaging in higher-order eidetic variations (EV2). EV2 completely leaves the imagination behind – both as direct intuitive presentation and as level of consciousness; and yet, without it, these higher order eidetic positional inquiring processes could not commence (and subsequently unfold). An important note before we turn to our concluding thoughts regarding the nature of Husserlian phenomenological reflection revealed anew through the lens of Phantasie. The 1 Cf., Hua XLI, Part V 388 Phen.Mk1-Phen.Mk2 and EV1-EV2 models proposed here on the background of a nexichorizonal leveled consciousness make room for a rich understanding of the dynamic between various pre-predicative and predicative, pre-thematic and thematic simple or complex acts. They uncover the deep and dynamic relationship between the natural and artificial attitudes as Husserl conceived them in the overall context of his transcendental idealism, which eludes, through its genetic richness, spurious dichotomies such as realism vs. idealism, subject vs. object, philosophy vs. the everyday, the real vs. the ideal. The key to surpassing all of these dichotomies lies in recognizing the structure and system of possibilities of the imagination, which through Husserl's fertile and meticulous studies need no longer be viewed as the mysterious faculty somehow able to make knowledge acquisition possible. 389 CONCLUSION: INQUIRING THOUGHT – (A) WORLD STRETCHED OPEN The success of phenomenological reflection as descriptive analysis of transcendental consciousness and its correlates depends upon its clarifying prowess. After carefully studying the various facets of this reflection – the reductions and eidetic variation – we can now revisit Husserl's claims about clarification (Klärung). We must then bring to the normal distance, to complete clearness, what at any time floats before us shifting and unclear and more or less far removed, intuitionally, so that our intuitions of the essence may be given a corresponding value in which the intended essences and essential relations are given to the fullest possible advantage. Apprehension of the essence has accordingly its own grades of clearness, just as in the case of the particular which floats before our gaze. But for every essence, just as for the corresponding phase of its individual counterpart, there exists, so to speak, an absolute nearness, in which its givenness is in respect of this graded series absolute, i.e., pure self-givenness.1 As Husserl suggests in this passage from his 1913 Ideas I, the clarifying project of phenomenology is a never-ending task seeking to bring ever closer, to absolute and adequate self-givenness, the structures and ideal meanings of consciousness and of its correlates. As descriptive, phenomenology does not 'produce' the eidetic universals it studies; it uncovers them by gradually bringing them into full view. One of the key tasks of phenomenology is to 'capture' the constitutive dynamic manner in which consciousness – through its intricate structure – engages objects. The reductions and eidetic variations – Husserl's main methodological tools – are the analytical, explicative, and interpretational processes through which the clarifying task is continuously pursued. This process of continual accumulation and constant reshaping of the body of phenomenological knowledge occurs at the investigative community level through the predicative employment of concepts (Begriffe). Concepts, for Husserl, are not the 'universals' 1 Ideas I, p.177 (Husserl's emphases). "Es gilt also, was jeweils in fliessender Unklarheit, in grösserer oder geringerer Anschauungsferne vorschwebt, zur normalen Nähe, zur vollkommenen Klarheit heranzubringen, um an ihm entsprehend wertvolle Wesensintuitionen zu üben, in denen die intendierten Wesen und Wesensverhältnisse zu vollkommener Gegebenheit gelangen. Die Wesenserfassung hat demnach selbst ihre Klarheitsstuffen, so wie das vorschwebende Einzelne. Es gibt aber für jedes Wesen, ebenso wie für das ihm entsprehende Moment am Individuellen, sozusagen eine absolute Nähe, in der seine Gegebenheit eine in Hinsicht aud diese Stufenreihe absolute ist, d.h. reine Selbstgegebenheit" (Hua III/1, p.141.) 390 that we produce; they are intuitively grasped essences or ideal meanings (Sinne) engaged in an expressed form (Bedeutungen) in various judgments:1 "[...] we gain universal essential concepts, the pure idea of a statement and the meaning of a statement, of a name, of a connected discourse and the sense of a discourse, etc. The eide which fall to our lot at every level we make our own, we name them, express them in statements, and a universal statement becomes possible which shares in the essential insights and the essential necessities of seeing ideas..."2 Through concepts and (predicative) statements understood as faithful expressions of apodictically intuited ideal meanings the community of thinkers 'fixes' and shares the results of their phenomenological studies. Through concepts understood as signs of essences grasped in ideation, the community of phenomenologists partakes in the continual carving and (re)adjusting of the eidetic body of knowledge. As his powerful statements in the Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis show, Husserl considered the communal, harmonious, and dynamic accumulation of transcendental knowledge a tangible possibility. As he disavows the fragmentary state of the philosophical community of his time, he makes no secret of his hope; he presents his own inquiring path as a most suitable venue for the attainment and securing of this horizon of honest intellectual exchange. This, according to Husserl, holds both within the sphere of philosophical inquiry as well as beyond it, in its interaction with fields of inquiry foreign to it – such as the exact and positive sciences as well as psychology. What stretches open and sustains this horizon of cross-disciplinary inquiry is the recognition that the objective and universally valid study of the world cannot occur 1 Cf., Hua III/1, §§65-66. See also Ideas I, Part IV, Ch.1; cf., also Ms. AIII-13 (1918) 2 PP, p.63. "[...] und wir gewinnen allgemeine Wesensbegriffe, die reine Idee einer Aussage und Aussagebeudeutung, eines Names, einer zusammenhängenden Rede und <eines> Redesinnes usw. Die in jeder Stufe uns zuteil werdenden Eide machen wir uns nun zu eigen, benennen sie, prägen sie aussagemässig aus, und es wird ein allgemeines Aussagen möglich, das an den Wesenseinsichten und Wesensnotwendigkeiten der Ideenschau Anteil hat..." (Hua IX, p.84). 391 without the investigation of the structures of consciousness – of the knowing subjectivity itself. This latter investigation must, in its turn, be self-reflective and critical in its relation to itself as well as to objective inquiring projects. It must seek to overcome all of the presuppositions it may have about itself and its objects. It must question all habits of thought and replace them with a flexible yet well-delineated inquiring method able to secure the validity of its insights. To do so, it must also hold within its view its genetic development. Husserl's notions of Rückgang, Rückbesinnung, and Rückfrage encapsulate the hermeneutical and historical character of phenomenological inquiry. This 'backward reflection' – the 'deepest kind of self-reflection' – seeks to unravel, with universal and valid insight, the human condition and experience in their historicity.1 The task of the true philosopher is to engage past and contemporary thinkers and in 'confronting' them, locate their own thought on the background of an ever-growing body of knowledge.2 Philosophical 'coming to one's own self' unfolds as an independent search for eidetic knowledge as well as dialogue with those whose projects sought and are seeking still the adequate and apodictic elucidation of human experience. Unlike Descartes, Husserl sees philosophy as a communal endeavor that invites rather than stifles unique projects, which may at times be conducted while 'withdrawing in solitude.'3 Following such a path is no easy feat: "What makes the appropriation of the essential nature of phenomenology, the understanding of the peculiar meaning of its form of inquiry, and its relation to all other sciences (to psychology in particular) so extraordinarily difficult, is that in addition to all other adjustments a new way of looking at things is necessary, one 1 Crisis, p.72, Hua VI, §15 2 Ibid. 3 Descartes, Meditations, p.13 392 that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought. To move freely along this new way without reverting to the old viewpoints, to learn to see what stands before our eyes, to distinguish, to describe, calls, moreover, for exacting and laborious studies."1 It was my goal in this project to show that Husserl's phenomenological method owes its flexibility as well as its well-delineated character to the imagination. I sought not only to establish the imagination as the grounding and sustaining force behind Husserl's powerful method of inquiry (i.e., its horizon of necessary and sufficient conditions) but also to reveal, through its dimensions of freedom, neutrality, and possibility, its ability to open new potential horizons for inquiries defiant of ossified field-specific and disciplinary boundaries. These three dimensions of the imagination secure the necessary distancing from habitualities, presuppositions, that which is taken for granted, and the familiar without which no genuine critical, self-reflective endeavors could occur. At the beginning of this project we asked whether and how the imagination – prima facie a lawless fluid play – could ground and sustain the phenomenological method in its structural rigor and complexity. The answer we gave stemmed from a detailed and careful analysis of Husserl's investigations of the imagination over two decades of intensive thought. While much of the evidence that Husserl unearthed with respect to the structure and dimensions of the imagination proved clear, I stepped at times beyond the parameters of his studies and proposed new ways of integrating his insights. The model I arrived at the end of Part I of this project was the outcome of these efforts. Several important aspects of the 1 Ideas I, p.39. "In der Tat, das macht die Zueignung des Wesens der Phänomenologie, das Verständnis des eigentümlichen Sinnes ihrer Problematik und ihres Verhältnisses zu allen anderen Wissenschaften (und insbesondere zur Psychologie) so ausserörderlich schwierig, dass zu alledem eine neue, gegenüber der natürlichen Erfahrungsund Denkeinstellungen völlig geänderte Weise der Einstellung nötig ist. In ihr, ohne jeden Rückfall in die alten Einstellungen, sich frei bewegen, das vor Augen Stehende sehen, underscheiden, beschreiben zu lernen, erfordert zudem eigene und mühselige Studien" (Hua III/1, p.5). 393 imagination came to light – aspects that would prove most helpful in Part II in my attempt to understand and clarify Husserl's complex yet ambiguous method of investigation. I uncovered, through a thorough comparative discussion of imagination and external perception, the non-pictorial character of the former as direct intuitive presentation (eigentliche anschauliche Vorstellung); an argument which dispelled hopefully for good the need to rely on the language of mental images when referring to the imagination. This insight subsequently helped us question the assumed limited span of objects the imagination could intend and intuit (namely 'quasi' spatio-temporal objects as copies of external real objects). We likewise learned that the imagination was driven by a radical modification (Phantasiemodifikation) functioning as structuring and organizing principle able to stretch open an entirely new horizon of noetic-noematic possibilities. This in turn has led us to recognize, by drawing a parallel with the realizing positional attitude organized around the axis of external perception, the intricate and dynamic ways in which founding as well as founded noeses and their correlates unfold at the level of imagining consciousness through Phantasiemodifikation. Thus I revealed Phantasie as both nexic-horizonal level of consciousness as well as intuitive act functioning as the direct and most primitive venue for the givenness of the irreal. This discovery, in its turn, encouraged me to consider and investigate all of the levels of consciousness. Three came to the fore – the realizing positional, the imagining, and the eidetic positional – as radically distinct yet fundamentally interrelated levels. What we emphasized about radical modification uncovered this dynamic linkage in its translational or transvaluational character. The methodological significance of this modification first announced itself in Chapter 4, in our discussion of Husserl's break from Brentano and the former's attempt to found his own phenomenological path. There we stressed the tight relationship between the structure and system of possibilities of consciousness on the one 394 hand and the structure and system of possibilities of the phenomenological method on the other (though the same could be argued with respect to any method, not just the philosophical-phenomenological one). Once clarified, this intimate structural and modal dynamic invited a substantial consideration of the distinction between the natural and artificial attitudes – between our everyday immersion in the world and our theoretical attempts to uncover, through specific methodological processes, the universal and essential features of consciousness in its relationship to the world. I found the mapping of the previously proposed model of leveled nexic-horizonal consciousness onto this natural vs. artificial distinction a seamless affair – one that would organize my technical and careful attempt to analyze and disentangle Husserl's core methodological tools (i.e., the reductions and eidetic variation). Employing this model as a guide at every stage in the analytic process proved illuminating. Not only did we reveal new aspects of his method (heretofore hidden either beneath his ambiguity or beneath his silence) such as the role played by neutralized empirical types in the constitution of the first true variant upon which the entire series of variants was modeled. We also unearthed the very sources and conditions for the possibility of these indispensible methodological tools – something Husserl was for the most silent about, apart from occasional misguided attempts to clarify them by pointing at an apparently independent neutrality modification or all too brief and random references to the imagination. My claim that the imagination is both the necessary and sufficient (overall) condition for the possibility of phenomenological reflection in its reductive and eidetic variational guises was unpacked in a series of arguments all drawing their sustenance from the structural fruitful ambiguity of imagining non-positional consciousness. More specifically, the success of my arguments hinged upon recognizing not only that the imagination is a nexic-horizonal 395 level of consciousness, but also that it essentially bridges the other two levels of consciousness – the realizing positional and the eidetic positional one. Its radical modification along with its ability to adopt projects (and motivations) pertaining to either of these two levels uncovered it as the sole and ultimate link between the natural and artificial attitudes. As such, it alone could expose, ground, and fuel the intimate and substantial relationship between our everyday lived experiences and the empirical (passively or actively constituted) knowledge of the world on the one hand, and our theoretical methodological investigations seeking knowledge of eidetic universals (both subjective and objective) on the other. Clarifying this tight dynamic bond between the natural and the artificial placed Husserl's transcendental idealism in what I consider its true light. As transcendental – it is a philosophical project seeking to elucidate the essential structures of experiences through the constitutive relationship that consciousness, in its non-appurtenance to the world as real and actual, has to its objects. As idealism, it is a philosophical attempt to attain universal knowledge of essences, understood as ideal necessary possibilities and meanings, while relying on the vast array of everyday experiences without affecting or 'contaminating' the universal validity of the knowledge it secures. Imagination alone – through its radical modification, non-positionality, and free conceivability – can secure a 'pure' employment of empirical experience and knowledge in the context of eidetic inquiring thought. Imagination helps us understand why Husserl's idealism does not entail solipsism, nominalism, or the reducibility of the transcendent to the immanent. It also helps us see the ways in which the phenomenological project is an essentially intersubjective, communal, and historical endeavor. 396 If we take seriously Husserl's remarks regarding the flexible adaptability and accumulation of eidetic knowledge, we concede that such adaptability requires engaging ever new perspectives in free manners unhindered by any habits of thought (as dear as they may be to us) – an inherently imaginative stance. If we agree with him, that all genuine critical and self-reflective philosophical investigations imply the inquirer's dialogue with multiple generations of thinkers in a manner both open and receptive as well as independent and distanced (safeguarded from all too easily adopting the encountered theoretical claims), we recognize the import of the imagination for the possibility of an 'open yet distanced' attitude – a stance one holds if one is equipped with a method strong enough to put out of play blinding presuppositions while also engaging precious previously attained knowledge. If we take Husserl at his word that interdisciplinary dialogue is a feasible and most fruitful venue for the advancement of different fields related by their interest in similar subject matters (such as phenomenology and neuroscience nowadays), then we agree to view disciplinary boundaries and radical methodological differences not as insurmountable obstacles but as novel and productive venues for engaging possibilities that are radically other – a path sustained by the imagination and most illuminating, as we have seen in our discussion of eidetic variation, in all projects aiming at knowledge of universals. In this project I have sought to reveal the imagination anew as a fundamental level of experience by rethinking its nature; I have sought to relocate it at the heart of Husserlian phenomenological reflection by uncovering it as the necessary and sufficient source for the possibility of the reductions and of eidetic variation – the main methodological tools Husserl equipped us with. As such, the dissertation makes important contributions to the phenomenology of the imagination and to studies of phenomenological methodology. The framework and model of consciousness provided by this study could be fruitfully employed 397 in a plethora of phenomenological studies – studies of aesthetic consciousness, literature, empathy (as presentification), intersubjectivity, memory and any other act able to unfold non-positionally, and so on. While squarely grounded in phenomenology, the project has hopefully also brought to the fore aspects, dimensions, and abilities of the imagination – while also dispelling incapacitating myths about its pictoriality and reduced epistemic scope – that could be taken up in self-reflective inquiries about method in other fields. For instance, what we have established about the imagination in the present study would help investigate the grounds, structure, and unfolding of hypothetical and experimental thought in the positive sciences – both processes that entail: 1) a certain freedom from the factual and the familiar, 2) a bracketing of established theoretical views as well as the ability to take up previously established knowledge in a manner free from commitment, and 3) the conceivability of that which is novel and radically other. Alternatively, should one seek ways to breach the continental-analytic divide, the imagination – recognized as intimately linked to modality by both traditions – could stretch open the horizon within which such a dialogue, between say phenomenology and analytic epistemology of modality, could unfold. Lastly, at the broadest level, we could reflect anew upon the very nature of inquiring thought. We could seek to understand, through the lens of the imagination as nexichorizonal consciousness, what it means to ask a question and seek an answer to it; what it means to engage in any search (skepsis) for that which is not immediately available. In Chapter 1§4 I pointed out these very topics and suggested the imagination as a most exciting venue for their elucidation. The inherent conflict or tension between the realizing everyday attitude and the imagining one – a conflict best captured by the engagement of the radically other along with the freedom, neutrality, and possibility brought to the fore through Phantasiemodifikation – holds the key to uncovering how questions arise and how searches 398 commence. What all inquiries share in common is their search for that which is non-present and otherwise – be it real, irreal, or ideal. To return to my closing thought in Chapter 1: In order to ask any question, regardless of its goal, one must imagine. 399 BIBLIOGRAPHY: Primary Sources: Brentano, F. (1924). Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt, Oskar Kraus (Ed.). Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. ---. (1928). Vom Sinnlichen und Noetischen Bewusstsein, Oskar Kraus (Ed.). Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. ---. (1930). Wahrheit und Evidenz, Oskar Kraus (Ed.). Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag. Descartes, R. (1993). Meditations on First Philosophy. D Cress (Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. Husserl, E. (1950-). Husserliana – Gesammelte Werke. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. (41 vols); abbreviated as Hua Hua I (1950). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Stephan Strasser (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Cartesian Meditations. Dorion Cairns (Trans.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Hua II (1950). Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Walter Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. The Idea of Phenomenology. William P. Alston & George Nakhnikian (Trans.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Hua III/1 (1976). Ideen zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch. Karl Schuhmann (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. W.R. Boyce Gibson (Trans.). New York: Collier Books, 1972. Hua IV (1952) Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Marly Biemel (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hua V (1971). Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Marly Biemel (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Phenomenology and the Fondations of the Sciences. Third Book. Ted Klein & William Pohl (Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Hua VI (1954). Die Krisis de Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie. Walter Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. David Carr (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Hua VIII (1959). Erste Philosophie. Rudolf Boehm (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Hua IX (1962). Phänomenologische Psychologie. Walter Biemel (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Phenomenological Psychology. John Scanlon (Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. 400 Hua X (1966). Zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). Rudolf Boehm (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (18931917). John Barnett Brough (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. Hua XI (1966). Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungsund Forschungsmanuskripten 19181926. Margot Fleischer (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Anthony J. Steinbock (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Hua XIII (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil. 1905-1920. Iso Kern (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910-1911. Ingo Farin and James Hart (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer. Hua XVI (1973). Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907. Ulrich Claesges (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907. Richard Rojcewicz (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997. Hua XVII (1974). Formale und Transzendentale Logik. Paul Janssen (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Dorion Cairns (Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. Hua XVIII (1975). Logische Untersuchungen. Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik. Elmar Holenstein (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Logical Investigations (2 vols). J.N. Findlay (Trans.). New York: Routledge, 2001. Hua XIX/1 (1984). Logische Untersuchungen. Ursula Panzer (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Logical Investigations (2 vols). J.N. Findlay (Trans.). New York: Routledge, 2001. Hua XXIII (1980). Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung 1898-1925. Eduard Marbach (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898-1925). John B. Brough (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. Hua XXIV (1985). Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07. Ullrich Melle (Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Introduciton to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07. Claire-Ortiz Hill (Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer. Hua XXXI (2000). Aktive Synthesen: Aus der Vorlesung "Transzendentale Logik" 1920/21 Erganzungsband zu "Anlysen zur Passiven Synthesis". Roland Breeur (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Anthony J. Steinbock (Trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Hua XXXIV (2002). Zur Phänomenologische Reduktion: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1926-1935). Sebastian Luft (Ed.). Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Hua XXXVI (2003). Transzenndentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908-1921). Robin Rollinger & Rochus Sowa (Eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer. 401 Hua XXXIX (2008). Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916-1937). Rochus Sowa (Ed.). New York: Springer. Hua XLI (2012). Zur Lehre vom Wesen und zur Methode der eidetischen Variation. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1891-1935). Dirk Fonfara (Ed.). New York: Springer. Husserl, E. (1910-1911). Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft. In Logos, 1(3). Philosophy as Rigorous Science. In Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Q. Lauer (Trans.). New York: Harper Row, 1965. Husserl. E, (1948). Erfahrung und Urteil. Ludwig Landgrebe (Ed.). Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts. Experience and Judgment. J. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Sartre, J-P. (2004). The Imaginary. Weber, J. (Trans.). London: Routledge. Secondary Sources: Baptist, G. (2008). Tra Ideazione e Fatticità: Le Possibilità della Fantasia in Edmund Husserl. In Kurotschka and De Luzenberger (Eds.), Immaginazione Etica Interculturalità, Milano: Mimesis. Bender, J. & Marrinan, M. (2010). The Culture of Diagram. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Benoist, J. (2000). Husserl entre Brentano et Bolzano: jugement et proposition. Manuscrito, 11-39. Berger, G. (1972). The Cogito in Husserl's Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Boehm, R. (1965). Basic Reflections on Husserl's Phenomenological Reduction. International Philosophical Quarterly, 5, 183-202. ---. (1968). Vom Gesichtpunkt der Phänomenologie I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. ---. (1981). Studien zur Phänomenologie der Epochê II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Brainard, M. (2002). Belief and its Neutralization. Husserl's System of Phenomenology in Ideas I. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brough, J. (1992). Some Husserlian Comments on Depiction and Art. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, LXVI (2), 241-259. ---. (2008). Consciousness is not a Bag: Immanence, Transcendence, and Constitution in The Idea of Phenomenology. Husserl Studies, 24, 177-191. 402 Brudzinska, J Assoziation, Imaginäres, Trieb. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Genesis der Subjektivität bei Husserl und Freud. Dissertation, Köln 2005. (http://kups.ub.unikoeln.de/volltexte/2010/2999/pdf/Diss_Koeln.pdf) Byers, R. (2002). Intentionality and Transcendence. Closure and Openness in Husserl's Phenomenology. Shoreline (WA): Noesis Press. Caeymaex, F. (1996). Questions sur la Phénoménologie de l'Image de Husserl. Recherches Husserliennes, 6, 5-23. Carr, D. (1974). Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. ---. (1987). Interpreting Husserl : Critical and Comparative Studies. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 106. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff. ---. (1999). The Paradox of Subjectivity. New York: Oxford University Press. ---. (2010). The Crisis as a Philosophy of History. In Hyder.D and Rheinberger, H-J (Eds.), Science and the Life-World. Essays in Husserl's 'Crisis of European Sciences'. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chiriac, H-C. (2008). Imagination and Descriptive Imaginary in Contemporary Science (in Romanian). Revista de Filosofie, 55(5-6), 629-641. Cooper-Wiele, J.K. (1989). The Totalizing Act: Key to Husserl's Early Phenomenology. In Phaenomenologica, Vol.112. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Cunningham, S. (1976). Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 70. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. De Palma, V. (2005). Ist Husserls Phanomenologie ein transzendentaler Idealismus? Husserl Studies, 21, 183-206. De Warren, N. (2009). Husserl and the Promise of Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dreyfus, H.L. (1991). Being-in-the-World. Cambridge: MIT Press. Drummond, J. (1990). Husserlian Intentionality and the Non-Foundational Realism Noema and Object. In Contributions to Phenomenology, Vol. 4. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ---. (1991). Phenomenology and the Foundationalism Debate. Reason Papers, 16 (Fall), 45-71 Drummond, J. & Embree, L. (Eds.) (1992). The Phenomenology of the Noema. In Contributions to Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Elliott, B. (2002). Imagination and the Shadow of Husserlian Phenomenology. Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, 14-22. ---. (2005). Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger. New York: Routledge. 403 Embree, L. (1992). Phenomenology of Natural Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Feist, R. (2004). Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Fernández-Beites, P. (2000). Perceptión, Imaginatión y Signo en las 'Investigationes Lógicas': Crítica a la Teoría de las Formas de Aprehensión. Dialogo Filosofico, 16/1, 53-68. ---. (2001). Perceptión External y 'Teoría de las Imágenes'. Pensamiento: Revista de Investigación e Información Filosofíca, 57/219, 393-412. Ferencz-Flatz, C. (2011). Das Beispiel bei Husserl. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 73(2), 261-286. Flynn, T. (2006). Sartre as Philosopher of the Imagination. Philosophy Today, 50(Supp), 106112. Galison, P. (1987). How Experiments End. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Garrison, J. (1986). Husserl, Galileo, and the Processes of Idealization. In An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 66, 329-338. Ghigi, N. (2005). La Sensibiltà a Fondamento delle Sintesi Passive ed Attive: Una Riflessione sulla Fenomenologia Genetica di Husserl. Idee: Rivista di Filosofia, 59-50, 47-63. Giaquinto, M. (2007). Visual Thinking in Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press. Gurwitsch, A. (1970). Towards a Theory of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 30, No. 3, 354-367. Haardt, A. (1995). Bildbewusstsein und aesthetische Erfahrung bei Husserl. In IntentionalitätWerte-Kust, 223-233. Harvey, Charles W. (1994). Husserl's Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science. In History of European Ideas, 18(3), 422-425. Hintikka, J. (1975). The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities. Boston: D. Reidell Pub. Co. Holenstein, E. (1972). Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Hopkins, B. (1993). Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology. In Contributions to Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ---. (1997). Husserl's Phenomenology and Contemporary Science. Contributions to Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ---. (2011). The Philosophy of Husserl. Durham: Acumen. Hopp, W. (2007). Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism. Inquiry. 51 (2), 194-216. 404 Ierna, C. (2005). The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy, Part 1: From Über den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 1-56. ---. (2006). The Beginnings of Husserl's Philosophy, Part 2: From Über den Begriff der Zahl to Philosophie der Arithmetik. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 3381. Jansen, J. (2005). On the Development of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology of Imagination and its use for Interdisciplinary Research. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 121-132. Kaiser, D. (2005). Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kern, I. (1962). Die drei Wege zur transzendental-phänomenologischen Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 24, 303-349. ---. (1975). Idee und Methode der Philosophie. Leitgedanken für eine Theorie der Vernunft. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Kuspit, Donald B. (1968). Fiction and Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29/1, 16-33. Kockelmans, J. & Kisiel, T. (1970). Phenomenology and the Natural Sciences. Evanston: Northwestern UP. Lohmar, D. (1998). Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken. Hume, Kant und Husserl über vorprädikative Erfahrung und prädikative Erkenntnis. Phaenomenologica 147. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ---. (2002). Die Idee der Reduktion, Husserls Reduktionen und ihr gemeinsamer, methodischer Sinn. In H. Huni, P. Trawny (Eds.), Die erscheinende Welt. Berlin: Klaus Held, 751-771. ---. (2005). Die phänomenologische Methode der Wesensschau und ihre Präzisierung als eidetische Variation. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 65-91. ---. (2008a). Kategoriale Anschauung. VI. Logische Untersuchung, §§40-66. In Meyer V. (Ed.), Edmund Husserl Logische Untersuchungen, Klassiker Auslege, Bd. 35 (pp.209-237). Berlin: Academie Verlag. ---. (2008b). Phanomenologie der Schwachen Phantasie Untersuchungen der Psychologie, Cognitive Science, Neurologie und Phanomenologie zur Funktion der Phantasie in der Wahrnehmung. Dordrecht Heidelberg: Springer / Kluwer. ---. (2009). Die Entwicklung des Husserlischen Konstitutionsmodells von Auffassung und Inhalt. In Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philosophia, LIV, 2. ---. (2010a). Intuition in Mathematics: On the Function of Eidetic Variation in Mathematical Proofs. In M. Hartimo (Ed.), Phenomenology and Mathematics. In Pheanomenologica, Vol. 195. Dordrecht: Springer, 73-90. ---. (2010b). Phänomenologische Methoden und empirische Erkenntnisse. In C. Ierna (Ed.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 200, 191-219. 405 ---. (2010c). The Function of Weak Phantasy in Perception and Thinking. In S. Ghallager and D Schmicking (Eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Springer, 159-177. Lotz, C. (2007). Depiction and Plastic Perception. A Critique of Husserl's Theory of Picture Consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review, 40, 171-185. Luft, S. (1998). Husserl's Phenomenological Discovery of the Natural Attitude. Continental Philosophy Review, 31, 153-170. ---. (2004). Husserl's Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life-World and Cartesianism. Research in Phenomenology, 198-234. ---. (2007). From Being to Givenness and Back: Some Remarks on the Meaning of Transcendental Idealism in Kant and Husserl. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 15(3), 367-394. Marbach, E. (1974). Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. ---. (1989). Phänomenologie der Anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. In Bernet, Kern, Marbach (Eds.), Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 131-153. ---. (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness. Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. McMullin, E. (1996). Enlarging Imagination. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 58(2), 227-260. Mohanty, J. (1984). Husserl on 'Possibility.' Husserl Studies, 1, 13-29. ---. (1988). The Relevance of Husserl Today. Husserl Studies, 15, 219-233. ---. (1999). Logic, Truth, and the Modalities. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ---. (2008). The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl. New Haven: Yale University Press. ---. (2011). Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years 1916-1938. New Haven: Yale University Press. Moran, D. (1996). The Inaugural Address: Brentano's Thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, vol. 70, 1-27. ---. (2000). Husserl's Critique of Brentano in the Logical Investigations. Manuscrito, 163-206. ---. (2005). Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology. New York: Polity Press. Morrison, J. (1970).Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 1, 27-46. Naberhaus, T.M. (2007). Husserl's Transcendental Idealism. Husserl Studies, 23, 247-260. Ortiz Hill, C. (2004). Abstraction and Idealization in Husserl and Cantor before 1895. In Coniglione, Poli, Rollinger (Eds.), Idealization XI. Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 217-244. ---. (2009). Husserl and Phenomenology, Experience and Essence. Analecta Husserliana, CIII, 9-22. Poli, R. (1998). The Brentano Puzzle. Aldershot: Ashgate. 406 Prechtl, P. (1989). Die Struktur der Intentionalität bei Brentano und Husserl. Brentano Studien, 2, 117–30. Rang, B. (1973). Kausalität und Motivation. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Perspektivität und Objektivität in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff ---. (1975). Repräsentation und Selbstgegebenheit. Die Aporie der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung in der Frühschriften Husserls. Phänomenologie Heute: Grundlagen und Methodenprobleme, 105-137. Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (2000). Edmund Husserl. Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität. Freiburg/München: Karl Aber. Rizzoli, L. (2008). Erkenntnis und Reduktion. Die operative Entfaltung der phänomenologischen Reduktion im Denken Edmund Husserls. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 188. Dordrecht: Springer. Rollinger, R. D. (1993). Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals From Hume Studies I to Logical Investigations II. In Haller, R. (Ed.), Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie, Bd.20. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi. ---. (1999). Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer. ---. (2008). Austrian Phenomenology Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object. In Chrudzimski and Huemer (Eds.), Phenomenology & Mind, Bd.12. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Saraiva, M. M. (1970). L'Imagination selon Husserl. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff. Sepp, Hans R. (1996). Bildbewusstsein und Seinsglauben. Recherches Husserliennes, 6, 117-137. Shim, M. (2005). The Duality of Non-conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 4, 209-229. Sokolowski, R. (1970). The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. ---. (1974). Husserlian Meditations. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Sowa, R. (2007). Essences and Eidetic Laws in Edmund Husserl's Descriptive Eidetics. New yearbook for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy, 7, 77-108. ---. (2008). Wesen und Wesensgesetze in der deskriptiven Eidetik Edmund Husserls. Phänomenologische Forschungen (2007), 5-37. ---. (2010a). Husserls Idee einer nicht-empirischen Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt. Husserl Studies, 26(1), 49-66. ---. (2010b). The Universal was 'What is in Common': Comments on the Proton-Pseudon in Husserl's Doctrine of the Intuition of Essence. In Ierna, Jacobs, and Mattens (Eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Science. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 200. Dordrecht: Springer. 407 ---. (2011). Deictic Abstractions: On the Occasional References to Ideal Objectivities Producible with the Words "This" and "Thus". Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 42(1), 525. Ströker, E. (1993). Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ---. (1997). The Husserlian Foundations of Science. In Contributions to Phenomenology, Vol. 30. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Taguchi, S. (2006). Das Problem des 'Ur-Ich' bei Edmund Husserl. Die Frage nach der selbstverständlichen 'Nähe' des Selbst. In Phaenomenologica, Vol. 178. Dordrecht: Springer. Tãnãsescu, I. (2008). Problema senza!iei "i a reprezent#rii fanteziei la Franz Brentano. Revista de Filosofie, Vol.LV, No.1-2, 139-158. Thomasson, A. (2000). After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.8, No.2, 190-209. Tieszen, R. (2005). Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70(1), 153-173. Vaihinger, H. (1911). Die Philosophie des Als-Ob. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard. Volonté, P. (1997). Husserls Phänomenologie der Imagination. Munchen: Karl Aber Verlag. ---. (1999). Imagination: Rescuing What is Going to Be Cancelled. Analecta Husserliana, LIX, 473-492. Welton, D. (1983). The Origins of Meaning. A Critical Study of The Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Wiesing, L. (1996). Phänomenologie des Bildes nach Husserl und Sartre. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 30, 255-281. ---. (1998). Sind Bilder Zeichen? Bild – Bildwahrnehmung, Bildverarbeitung, Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur Bildwissenschaft, 95-101. ---. (2000). Phänomene im Bild. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag ---. (2005). Artifizielle Präsenz: Studien zur Philosophie des Bildes. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Willard, D. (1984). Logic and Objectivity of Knowledge. A Study in Husserl's Early Philosophy. Athens: Ohio University Press. Yamaguchi, I. (1982). Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivität bei Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Yates, F.A. (1966). The Art of Memory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 408 Zahavi, D. (1996). Husserl's Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 27/3, 228-245. ---. (2001). Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity. Athens: Ohio University Press. ---. (2003). Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ---. (2008). Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism. Synthese, 160, 355-374. ---. (2010). Inner (Time)-Consciousness. In Lohmar and Yamaguchi (Eds.), On Time New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time. Phaenomenologica 197. Springer: Dordrecht, 319-339.